domenica 9 giugno 2019

ECB: Draghi Is No Longer Taken Seriously

Draghi Is No Longer Taken Seriously by Markets

Dovish comments by the ECB president sent the euro soaring, exactly the opposite of what should happen. Also, book club notes.
The President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi is on his way out. 
The President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi is on his way out.  Photographer: Stringer/AFP/Getty Images
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Max Headroom to do whatever it takes.

When European Central Bank President  Mario Draghi speaks, markets usually take notice. Back in 2012, he effectively ended the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis by promising to do “whatever it takes” to protect the euro. His words were so effective that the market never tested his resolve. The crisis abated, even as the economy went into a long and slow malaise.

On the face of it, his comments after the ECB monetary policy meeting Thursday, held this month in Lithuania, were almost as aggressive as those he spoke in 2012. He was obviously determined to convince all that he was prepared to be far more dovish if necessary. He even suggested that he had “headroom” to resort to more quantitative easing, or bond purchases, if necessary. And yet the market did not take him all that seriously. The euro somehow strengthened against the dollar, exactly the opposite of what should happen when a central banker hints at interest rate cuts.

This is partly because Draghi is half way out the door, as Bloomberg Opinion columnist Ferdinando Giugliano put it. It is also because the ECB is running out of ammunition. Rates are already low, and its balance sheet is loaded. It does not have anything like as much freedom of movement as the Federal Reserve. The need to do something is clear enough. The euro zone’s economy has not lagged behind the U.S. as badly as many believe since the single currency came into being in 1999, but the latest dip, while the U.S. is gaining strength, is concerning.
Eurozone: Slipping Behind Again
Another problem is that inflationary expectations appear to have become untethered.  The German bund market is signaling inflation of less than 0.8% per year over the next 10 years. This is lower than at any point when the sovereign debt crisis was at its height, from 2010 to 2012, and approaching its lowest since the euro’s inception. The ECB has another deflation scare on its hands:
German inflation expectations are falling again
The Achilles heel responsible for Europe’s relative weakness is its banking system. The price-to-book multiple that shareholders pay for bank shares is as good an indicator of this as any. Ever since the first Greece bailout crisis broke out in early 2010, European banks have traded at a discount to their book value, and a big discount to banks in the U.S. This explains why the ECB needs to keep propping up the banking system with targeted help. But as it wants to avoid moral hazard, that help cannot be too generous, which is why I found the plans for the latest “TLTRO” loan program to shore up banks rather unconvincing.
Europe's banks have traded at deep discounts ever since the first Greek crisis
There is a decent argument that pessimism towards the euro zone has become excessive. But with the real possibility that we will have to wait months to learn the identity of Draghi’s successor – he is due to leave at the end of October, just when the U.K. is due to leave the EU – there is a nasty tail risk from the euro zone to look forward to over the summer.

sabato 8 giugno 2019

Banco Popular resolution casts long shadow over Europe's banks

Rushed Popular resolution casts long shadow over Europe's banks

Related images

  • Evolution of deposit outflows
  • Banco Popular’s final weeks
Banco Popular

At 8:33am on Monday June 5 2017, an email landed in a mailbox at Banco de Espana. A bank run was underway at Banco Popular, one of Spain’s biggest banks. Barely three minutes into the working week, the situation was already critical – Popular was running out of cash, and fast.

The email contained a formal request: Popular was appealing to the Spanish central bank for €1.9bn in emergency liquidity assistance.
For officials at Banco de Espana, the request was not unexpected. They had been working for more than two months with a team from Popular to prepare for this moment, ever since an internal audit at the lender had uncovered financial irregularities totalling hundreds of millions of euros at the end of March, irregularities that included a web of Luxembourg companies designed to hide the extent of Popular’s bad loan problem.

By 11:41am the same morning, the money was with Popular. The injection came just in time – according to people involved, the bank wouldn’t have survived another half an hour. But any relief was short-lived. As deposits continued to pour out, it soon became clear the bank would need more help. At 3:32pm, Banco de Espana received another email from the bank, this time requesting an increase in ELA to €9.5bn.

WITHIN THE LIMITS

Although high, the amount was within the limits previously discussed. Popular had €40bn of unencumbered assets available, and Banco de Espana had earlier indicated that €26bn of those would meet its secretive ELA criteria. Once haircuts – of between 35% for the best assets and 90% for the worst – were applied, officials calculated the central bank could lend Popular just over €10bn, albeit at a penal interest rate of more than 12%.

But, first, approval was needed from the European Central Bank, which had to sign off on any ELA request greater than €2bn. Despite it being a public holiday in Germany, the ECB governing council discussed the matter by phone. Popular was confirmed as solvent, and the request was approved. But what happened next came as a shock: Banco de Espana turned down the request, citing incomplete paperwork.

Popular staff worked through the night to meet the central bank’s last-minute demands, which were threatening its access to vital ELA. The bank still had €21bn of acceptable collateral left - €5bn had been used to secure the first tranche of ELA - and these issues with the paperwork hadn’t been flagged before. Banco de Espana eventually gave the green light to a further €1.9bn the next day, but it was too little, too late.

“It was embarrassing,” said one person involved. “In March we started discussions – in March! We were doing trial runs, going back and forth with the collateral. They had checked it. But the truth is they were absolutely determined not to take it. By the time they realised they had to, they just weren’t ready. We started hitting all these little hiccups, and then suddenly they told us they couldn’t do anything more.”
Popular available collateral and ELA
Popular had €26bn of collateral, entitling it to €10bn of ELA
Source: Banco de Espana

The sudden denial of ELA has puzzled many since.
“Crucially, the bank was still solvent,” said Jerome Legras, head of research at Axiom, an asset manager that focuses on banks and owned a small amount of Popular bonds. “They mostly had a cash problem. If it was possible to lend €80bn of ELA to Greek banks to keep them afloat when they were completely insolvent, then why couldn’t they do the same with Popular? There is a real problem of consistency.”

By the end of the day on Tuesday, Popular bosses concluded the bank simply could not open the next day. They notified the ECB, which declared Popular – a bank it had deemed solvent a day earlier – as “failing or likely to fail”. That morning Popular become the first, and to date only, bank to be put into resolution using new European rules brought in after the 2008 financial crisis to make bank failures more orderly.

STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES

The mess around ELA is just one in a series of mishaps in the Popular case that have raised questions about whether the system to deal with failing banks is fit for purpose. Through dozens of interviews and a trove of confidential documents totalling thousands of pages, IFR has pieced together what happened during Popular’s final days. It is clear that, despite the bank’s problems being flagged many months in advance, when the crisis finally hit authorities found themselves ill-equipped and ill-prepared to adequately deal with the situation.

Indeed, far from being an orderly resolution, the Popular case has since become a legal quagmire. European institutions including the ECB and Single Resolution Authority, which was set up in 2015 specifically to plan for and oversee the resolution of failing banks, are now defendants in more than 100 legal cases. One common theme is that, despite plenty of warning and years of preparation, the approach of authorities was piecemeal and ad hoc.

The issue goes much wider than just Banco Popular; it has implications for the health of the entire European banking system. Since the resolution of Popular, there has been a dramatic increase in the cost of borrowing for even the healthiest of banks. While a multitude of factors is doubtless in play, many believe that the way the Spanish bank was dealt with is the biggest contributor. Investors no longer trust that failing banks will be dealt with in an orderly and legalistic way.

“It is absolutely critical that the law is complied with,” said Richard East, a lawyer at Quinn Emanuel, which is representing a group of disgruntled bondholders. “The SRB cannot make up the rules as it goes along. The EU legislator took years to design and lay down these rules in the wake of the financial crisis. Investors cannot invest with confidence if they see that the regulator is acting outside of its own rules.”

Former shareholders and bondholders of the failed Spanish bank are leading the charge for answers – and change. The two groups were hit hard: all shares were annulled, while €2bn of bonds were bailed in then written down to zero. The bank was then sold to Santander for a token €1. Investors argue that the resolution process, overseen by the SRB, was flawed. They are seeking billions of euros in compensation.

FLAWED VALUATION

Like Banco de Espana, the SRB missed vital opportunities in the run-up to Popular’s collapse that left it critically unprepared. It is clear that, as early as April, the resolution body was so concerned about the situation that, during a routine visit to visit Spanish banks in Madrid, it thought it prudent to move its long-standing meeting with Popular from the bank’s own offices to Banco de Espana, so as not to arouse any suspicions.

During the meeting, Popular’s worsening liquidity situation - more than €5bn of deposits would leave the bank that month - was discussed. That should have been cause for concern, given that almost all the SRB’s routine planning for a resolution of Popular had revolved around potential solvency issues - not liquidity problems. Despite that, the SRB critically saw no need to start a “special dialogue” with the bank at that stage.

Perhaps one reason was because the SRB knew it was seriously under-tooled to deal with a liquidity crisis. Due to a slow phase-in of funding for the resolution agency, and despite having been set up more than two years previously, the SRB had only €10bn of funds to fight a crisis, less than a quarter of its planned firepower. Internal rules also severely limited how those funds could be used.
“This was the first case in our history and all the elements were not in place,” said one person involved with the resolution process. “We built our strategy on the bail-in tool. But due to the characteristics of the crisis, it would have been difficult to implement. And we were not sure that all the tools would have been available from a liquidity perspective. At that moment, the available amount was limited.”

The person said that the SRB quickly realised that only one of the potential options in its resolution toolbox was really available: a sale of Popular to a healthier bank that could inject liquidity. Even then, it waited until May 23 to begin any serious work, when it commissioned Deloitte to put together a detailed valuation of Popular, which would inform any future sale of the bank.

HIGHLY UNCERTAIN

On May 28 the SRB ordered Deloitte to “strictly prioritise … focusing only on key assets and liabilities where there is considerable valuation uncertainty”. Three days later it called to say it that the accountancy firm had only two more days to complete its work.

As a result of the compressed timeline, when Deloitte completed the report, it warned that its findings were “highly uncertain”. It further prefaced its work with the warning that it had “not had access to certain critical information”. Reflecting this uncertainty, Deloitte’s report estimated Popular could be worth as much as €1.8bn in a best case, a negative €8bn in a worst case and a negative €2bn in a “best estimate” scenario.
Deloitte letter to Single Resolution Board
Deloitte letter to Single Resolution Board
Source: Single Resolution Board

Despite the caveats, the negative €2bn number formed the basis for the sale of the bank and tallies exactly with the losses later imposed on bondholders.
On June 3, while Popular and Banco de Espana were doing final checks on the doomed ELA process, resolution authorities made contact with Santander and BBVA, piggybacking on a failed sales process (that involved five interested parties) Popular had run earlier in May. After signing non-disclosure agreements the next day, the two spent Monday and Tuesday going over Popular’s books. When Popular was declared “failing or likely to fail” on Tuesday evening, both were invited to submit binding offers.

Only one bid arrived: from Santander, for €1, but only on the condition that shareholders, AT1 holders and Tier 2 holders were bailed in.

UPPER HAND

With insufficient liquidity of its own to support Popular, and having already concluded that a winding up of the bank under normal insolvency proceeding would pose risks to financial stability, the SRB was left with little option but to accept the offer. Reports in the Spanish press allege that Santander’s own lawyers took the purchase agreement drawn up by resolution authorities and rewrote it.

“The auction was organised so quickly that it was difficult for anyone to make a serious offer, and the valuations they used to justify the sales price were also difficult to understand,” said Axiom’s Legras. “The range was enormous and the methodology looked more like doing a firesale on the entire balance sheet. With that sort of approach, any bank, even the most solid one, will look very weak.”
Critically, investors allege that the situation clearly compromised the SRB and its obligation to ensure that shareholders and bondholders were dealt with fairly. Santander had been given access to Popular’s financials as part of the private sales process for weeks, and internal presentations show it had considered paying up to €1.6bn for Popular just a few weeks before, but it held off on making an offer.
A man withdraws money from an ATM at a Spanish Banco Popular branch in Madrid
One person involved in that failed sales process said that because Popular was suddenly no longer working with its own advisers to arrange a deal, Santander held all the cards.

“Suddenly you change your counterparty from professional M&A bankers, with a whole structure of corporate governance and a board and shareholders to convince, to civil servants of something called the resolution authority who have never ever done anything like this,” said the person.

“These civil servants, who barely have the capabilities to understand how a bank is valued, are called in during the very last days with a mission – a mission impossible – to dispose of assets according to rules that were thought up years before and completely detached from the reality of the way things work and the speed at which things happen. Santander must have thought, ‘we have a great negotiating hand here’.”

INVESTOR PROTECTIONS

European lawmakers at least foresaw the possibility of a rushed resolution, and within the rules governing the SRB is a requirement to conduct an “independent” valuation of a bank after the event to determine whether or not shareholders and bondholders were short-changed, and whether they might have seen a better outcome in an insolvency. If so, compensation is due.
While the SRB says such an assessment was made, investors believe it was not “independent”. Deloitte, the same firm that did the first assessment, was asked to do it, which investors say is a clear conflict of interest. The second Deloitte report concluded that shareholder and bondholder losses would have been much greater under a normal insolvency process.

“This is the safety valve of the entire regime,” said East, the lawyer at Quinn Emanuel. “The SRB is simply making things up as it goes along; it doesn’t really seem to know what it is doing.”

“Unless there is serious and thorough review of the Banco Popular case by the EU General Court, no lessons will be learned,” he said. “This is our only hope because the SRB has vigorously denied shareholders and bondholders access to documents and data for the last two years … and will not admit that anything it did was wrong.”

The risk of botched resolutions will remain as long as the current regime remains in place, others believe.

“The process gives so much leeway and flexibility to authorities that they pretty much can do anything they want,” said Legras. “And the result is that you can end up with something that is fairly reasonable and well managed – or the exact opposite. There are very few safeguards for investors and stakeholders. It’s an open bar for the authorities.”

giovedì 23 maggio 2019

Economist Julie Nelson Says Much of Economics is a Sham

Economist Julie Nelson Says Much of Economics is a Sham Science

We undermine our survival if we continue to imagine economics as a ethics-free and care-free sphere

By Julie Nelson
Source: http://evonomics.com/pretending-hard-science-ethics-free-julie-nelson/

Most economists, rather than seeing ourselves as studying communities of human beings, pretend to a more physics-like discipline. We model market, national, and international phenomenon using ideas of presumably universal “principles,” “laws,” and “forces.” We consider extreme mathematicization, as well as distance from normative concerns, to be signs of objectivity and rigor. Social research, we think, is for the sociologists. Normative arguments are for philosophers. And this is precisely why serious discussions of ethics in economic research are far, far overdue.
A small crack in this “ethics are not our problem” edifice appeared after the financial crisis in 2008. Media coverage, including the movie Inside Job, revealed cases of, for example, the crass slanting of economic “research” results to fit a funder’s requirements. A very modest amount of self-reflection resulted, resulting in more attention to disclosure of sources of funds. Much bigger ethical issues, however, are yet to be addressed.
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The first, and most important, is the way in which certain core economic doctrines have infiltrated, and caused widespread damage to, academic and public discussion. Ideas that originated with economists have “poisoned the well” from which we now draw our ideas of appropriate personal, organizational, and national behavior. This is having severely detrimental effects on human life on the planet. My second, more inward-looking critique, has to do with the sham nature of much of our “science.”

Poisoning the Well

Economics 101 teaches that people act out of rational, individual self-interest, that the essence of business firms is to maximize profit, and that the measure of success in national policy is a growing GDP per capita. These teachings have become increasingly performative. That is, while they originally purported to merely describe the world, they are increasing shaping people’s behavior and the structure of organizations.
Some research has suggested, for example, that the study of Econ 101 tends to encourage self-interested behavior. The model of the economic agent as a self-interested, rational, autonomous individual utility-maximizer can make “looking out for number one” seem like a reasonable—and even the only reasonable—norm for behavior in economic life. In my economics classes, I increasingly find students willing to behave opportunistically, on the reasoning that if they don’t take advantage of a situation, someone else will. They are quite unapologetic about it, believing that this is simply the way the world works, and that to do otherwise would be foolish.
The “businesses maximize profit” story has even more thoroughly permeated the conceptual well from which, it seems, we all drink. There is, of course Milton Friedman’s famous dictum, “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible”. The idea that businesses have a single, narrow financial goal is now repeated ad nauseam in the business and popular press, as well as forming the foundation for teaching in economics and management. The widening chasm between the compensation of Chief Executive Officers and ordinary workers in the United States has been was spurred by the economic theory that CEOs must be “incentivized” CEOs to act in the interest of shareholders.
Yet the damage goes much further. Many critics of corporate abuses and rising inequality now also subscribe to the economist-created dogma about the essence of business. Arguing the case for an ethics of justice and sustainability from a Buddhist point of view, for example, David Loy argues that “Corporations are legally charted so that their first responsibility is not to their employees or customers, nor to other members of the societies thy are part of, nor to the ecosystems of the earth, but to those who own them, who with very few exceptions are concerned primarily about return on investment”. As a result, most aspirations for “alternative economies” tend to veer towards utopian or state-directed visions of communitarianism that are of limited practical value.
The message seems to be, from both right and left, that business is–by its very nature–an ethics-free, and care-free, sphere. And the pool of poison continues to spread, even beyond the business sphere. One recent article, for example, proclaimed “Whether we like it or not, colleges and universities are a business. They sell education to customers….While the typical for-profit firm tries to maximize its profit, non-profit universities generally try to maximize their endowments or operating revenue…” The poison has even spread to thinking about nations: Applying to nations the economists’ dictum that only actions that serve self-interest will be chosen, Posner and Weisbach argue that global climate “justice” will likely involve poorer nations, who are feeling this environmental crisis first, making payments to richer ones, to compensate them for the loss of GDP they will suffer by taking action.
These narrow, doctrinaire, and ethically scandalous claims could—and should—seem ridiculous to anyone with a modicum of social sophistication and humanistic sensibility. But even if you put ethics aside, standard economics doctrines don’t stand up to a pragmatically and empirically grounded view of the world. Any serious, grounded analysis shows that economic systems actually require a good deal of concern with ethics, interpersonal trust, and other-regarding behavior to function well. Purely opportunistic personal behavior, far from driving a market system, actually destroys it.
Moving to the organizational level, the widespread belief that profit maximization is required by corporate charters, or by other legal or economic mandates, is actually false (Stout, 2012). Even when leaders of corporations may seem to be trying to “maximize” something, in practice profits for shareholders is generally not the goal. Personal wealth and/or expansion for expansion’s sake are far more frequent, among the possible self-interested goals. The profit-maximization story also obfuscates socially positive business goals, supported by many leaders who have a broader and more long-term perspective. These include providing useful, healthy products; creating good places to work; promoting environmental sustainability; and supporting innovation. Among non-profits, some leaders act like self-interested business executives, but some still try to educate, promote health, or serve another social purpose. While short-sighted national self-interest may include a concern for GDP per capita, aspirations related to territorial power and pride seem to be at least as prominent. Taking a longer-term view, national interests clearly must include attaining the sort of global cooperation needed to seriously addressing climate change. Businesses, non-profits, and nations are social communities of humans, with all the complexity that this implies. A more accurate and balanced understanding of human personal and organizational behavior as including both reasonable self-interest and reasonable care–for others and for the natural environment–offers, I believe, our best chance for a survivable future.
So why do the economic ideologies have so much power? One explanation is that since such teachings serve the short-term interest of various wealthy and powerful parties, they can receive well-funded dissemination via education and the media. Yet there is another important reason: The effective disguising of economic doctrines as “scientific.”

Pretending to be a “Hard Science”

Good science can be described as a process of systematic and open-minded investigation. Results should be carefully and intelligently compared to evidence brought forth from a wide and diverse community of investigators before being accepted as reliable. Models should be presented as what they really are: devices that some particular group of humans have found to be useful for examining some particular set of issues.
Examined in light of these standards, much of economics is a sham science. Instead of being open-minded about our core models, assumptions, and methods, we have made narrow selections and then allowed these to harden into dogma. There is a clear “macho” bias in preferring explanations based on self-interest to consideration of community interest, preferring mathematical analysis to qualitative analysis, preferring consideration of rational motivations to inclusion of emotional ones, and so on. In our textbooks, we teach our narrow models as revealed truth, rather than as limited tools. Instead of seriously evaluating the reliability of our knowledge, we follow established habits of claiming “rigor,” based on the mathematics of our models and on econometric “tests.” The recent popularity of Randomized Control Trials has tended to revitalize a belief that objectivity can be achieved by simply following formulaic rules, with little attention to context or to the possibility of implicit biases.
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I could point out how these biases comprise economic practice with many examples, but for brevity let me focus on just one. Recently, there has been a growing awareness in many fields–particularly in the biomedical sciences and in psychology–about the dangers of using “statistical significance” to decide which results are worthy of dissemination. The notion of rejecting null hypotheses based on p-values had been, for a long time, taken as the definition of “rigor” in empirical practice. Yet, as is now being shown, the following of such simplistic, mindless rules can actually cause severe distortions to arise in a literature. With many variations in data samples and model specifications open to most researchers, “p-hacking” to create publishable results has become rife. In a recent meta-analysis I undertook of the economics literature on preferences for risk-taking, I found not only publication bias (a preference towards statistically significant results), but also confirmation bias (a preference for results which confirm an author’s own stereotypes about gendered behavior). Yet I have seen little action within the economics profession, much less within economics education, to—honestly and ethically–face up to the fact that our customary beliefs about “rigor” are seriously flawed.

Conclusion

We seriously undermine the ability of the economy to do its job—that is, to provide for the sustaining and flourishing of life—if we continue to imagine it as an ethics-free and care-free sphere. Economic dogmas, misleadingly presented as scientific and widely disseminated through education and the media, are largely to blame for this damage. The field of economics is far overdue for an thorough-going ethical wake-up call.
Originally published at ISRF Bulletin.
2016 December 6
References
Brennan, Jason and Phillip Magness (2016). “Estimating the Cost of Justice for Adjuncts: A Case Study in University Business Ethics.” Journal of Business Ethics.
Friedman, Milton (1982). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Loy, David R. (2015). A New Buddhist Path: Enlightenment, Evolution, and Ethics in the Modern World. Boston, Wisdom publications.
Nelson, Julie A. (2014). “The Power of Stereotyping and Confirmation Bias to Overwhelm Accurate Assessment: The Case of Economics, Gender, and Risk Aversion.” Journal of Economic Methodology 21(3): 211-231.
Nelson, Julie A. (2016a). “Husbandry: a (feminist) reclamation of masculine responsibility for care.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 40(1): 1-15.
Nelson, Julie A. (2016b). Poisoning the Well, or How Economic Theory Damages Moral Imagination. The Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics. G. DeMartino and D. McCloskey. Oxford, Oxford Univesity Press: 184-199.
Posner, Eric A. and David Weisbach (2010). Climate Change Justice. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Stout, Lynn (2012). The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public. San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler.

giovedì 28 marzo 2019

The ECB was caught stealing gold from Italy !

The Bank of Italy Gold 
(by Nino Galloni)
Source: https://scenarieconomici.it/loro-di-banca-ditalia-di-nino-galloni/

Mario Draghi responded directly to the yellow-and-green European MEPs questions on the subject. He spoke of the ECB's right to hold and manage currency resources (based on Article 30 of the ECB Statute). It is therefore two aspects: if it manages and holds it means that it is not the owner, in other words that it cannot sell; but if gold is a currency reserve it may have to be sold (at least in theory) based on obvious needs.


 

However, in these situations, to sell (extraordinary act) the authorization of a higher-level authority is required in the interest of the owner (Italian people, inalienable assets; Italian state, alienable assets); but this superordinate authority does not exist. Therefore, of the two, one: or gold is a reserve, then the guarantee authority is missing (as in the case of the property of a minor or a subject not considered independent); or gold cannot be sold and then it is not "reserve". In fact, the second and even more delicate aspect: the ECB Statute speaks of foreign exchange reserves, but gold could be considered as such when there was the pledge of the currency to gold (and to other currencies with fixed exchange rates between them and gold convertibility established by international agreements). Today this is no longer the case: the sale of gold in the various currencies (or vice versa) is not decided by agreements or by an authority, but by the free market.

The question would be very simple in a historical perspective: after 1971 it is a resource, not a reserve (in a technical-monetary sense). The only competence of the ECB, therefore, concerns the authorization regime towards the Bank of Italy in terms of supervision over it as required by the Treaties and by the same Statute.

martedì 19 marzo 2019

Felwine Sar: "Africa does not have to catch up with anyone"

"Africa does not have to catch up with anyone"
Senegalese economist Felwine Sarr calls for abandonment of European values and development goals for Africa.
By Winfried Veit | 03/18/2019

Source:  https://www.ipg-journal.de/aus-meinem-buecherschrank/artikel/afrika-muss-niemanden-einholen-3329/



When a delegation of German parliamentarians headed by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas recently visited West African Mali, one of the deputies, according to a correspondent's report, offered a sobering picture: the weak state could not guarantee security, broken trains would stand for lack of infrastructure, the capital would suffocate in the garbage, economic growth is too weak. It is a picture that does not surprise Africa connoisseurs and that is not only true of Mali, but even more drastic in other African countries.

But does not this look through the Western glasses obscure the understanding of a completely different reality? Exactly this question poses the Senegalese economist, author and musician Felwine Sarr in his now published book in German "Afrotopia", which was already published in 2016 in French. And he answers them with a clear and clear yes, which he bases on 176 pages of his in many places almost lyrical and philosophical essay. Sarr, in the very postcolonial tradition, questions the universality of Western values ​​and models of development. According to Sarr, Sarr believes that it is not only the uncritical adoption of Western concepts such as development, growth, nation or representative democracy by the African elites, but above all that the West has succeeded in bringing "its ideas of human progress into the collective Imaginary of others ".
 
 It is not just about the appropriation of one culture by another, but more fatal and the appropriation and acceptance of the "image" that others make of this culture. With his criticism, Sarr follows up on the theses of Edward Said, who has mainly focused on "Orientalism", a trend emanating from Europe at the end of the 19th century, which has given its own stereotypes to the Middle East, some of them up to reverberate today. Similarly with Africa, Sarr demands nothing less than a "spiritual revolution" that puts an end to the "servile imitation of political models based on very different foundations and because they have no relation to the local (African) reality have, for extraversion, that is to lead to alienation. "

A departure from the "colonial library" and turning to a "pre-colonial library" was necessary. It is meant to throw overboard the narrative imposed by the colonial rulers of Africa and to reflect on the pre-colonial history of the "cradle of humanity". All the more so since since the Second World War in postmodern Europe its "great cultural orientations" are in disintegration: family, nation, sense of duty, social responsibility. Instead, there is now an extreme individualism, the cult of hedonism, fragmented identities and any social practices. In addition to the demographic, economic, political, cultural and social devastation caused by four centuries of slave trade and a century of colonization, there is now the "profound crisis of Western civilization", with which Europe and the West have finally served as models. As such, Japan in the Meiji era in the 19th century or the post-Hiroshima Japan, which both acquired Western technology while preserving its own tradition, are most likely to be considered. China, on the other hand, sees Sarr in the very colonial tradition of providing some infrastructure against the exploitation of natural resources and the colonization of lands.
 
 No, "Africa does not have to catch up with anyone. It no longer needs to walk on predetermined paths, but to take the path that it has chosen to swiftly follow. "But this path remains somewhat vague except for the constant references to the rediscovery of one's own tradition. Admittedly, Afrotopia is admittedly a utopia, but in Sarr's words it is an "active utopia that seeks to unearth the vast spaces of possibility within African reality and make them fruitful." If he opposes the Western He prefers to accept growth fetishism and instead focuses on the needs of the peoples. The same applies to his demand for a more ecological orientation of an African development model and the questioning of the Western concept of the nation. But all of this remains largely at odds, as it also somewhat nonchalantly overlooks the consequences of dramatic population growth in Africa, whose population will double by 2050 to two billion people. It is noteworthy, however, that Africa's share of world population at the beginning of the slave trade in the 16th century was 20 percent, at the end of which in the 19th century only 9 percent. If one could regard the re-growth to over 20 per cent by 2050 as compensatory justice, then it is certainly not sufficient to not only feed this growing number, but also to convey "education and the conditions for a life in dignity, in peace "in safety and freedom" must grant.

Despite some weaknesses, "Afrotopia" is a readable and worthy book by an African intellectual of the post-colonial generation, who recently became known to a wider public in Germany as co-author of a report to the French president about the return of looted colonial objects. The book should also give the West, and Europe in particular, more to think about in terms of, for example, devastating trade policies, but also the prevalent moral arrogance of making European values ​​the measure of all things, despite all the 're-rhetoric'


domenica 17 marzo 2019

The Matrix Revealed: Cartels That Run The World

The Matrix Revealed: Cartels That Run The World

by Jon Rappoport
March 16, 2019
Source: https://jonrappoport.wordpress.com/2019/03/16/matrix-revealed-cartels-run-world/

The following information comes from insider interviews with Ellis Medavoy and Richard Bell, two people I interview extensively in my collection, The Matrix Revealed. This is just a brief taste of what they have to say…

Major institutions on this planet that control Military, Money, Energy, Government, Medical, Corporate, Media, and Education are becoming, more and more, global cartels, horizontally integrated across national borders.
This is more than a top-down command process. It’s organically evolving. Three steps forward, two steps back. There is a great deal of competition among the components of a given cartel, but there is also cooperation. And in the long run, the see-saw is tipping in the direction of cooperation, as these entities realize they may well have more to gain that way.

I can’t stress too strongly this EVOLVING process. All attempts to merely assume twelve men in a room run the planet fall woefully short.
Instead, over time, people who lead a powerful institution (like Energy, for example) look out and recognize more major players, and in this recognition there is an impulse to compete and win and destroy, but there is also an impulse to build commonality and therefore monopolize the entire territory.
During one conversation with retired master propagandist Ellis Medavoy, I asked him about the extent of mutual cooperation in his given field, psychological warfare.

He responded:
“Twenty years ago, I would have said we were all operating separately and jealously. Each of us was mining his own contacts and building his false pictures of reality for the masses. But then things began to change. Globally. First of all, more of us were pushing the same holograms. And because communication and travel were speeding up so rapidly, we were working a lot of the same venues. We would run into each other more often. We began to share information. I mean, it was cautious. We weren’t gushing with unbridled love, I assure you. The competitive factor was still strong. And we had fights. But through all that, we began to see through the fog, so to speak. We began to understand the effectiveness of cooperating. We would test each other with privileged information, to see if we could trust each other to keep it private. A tidbit here, a tidbit there.

“And you see, behind us, other groups were finding commonality, too. For example, in the area of medical propaganda, where I operated a lot of the time. And these groups saw they could join together for specific operations, on an international scale. They could push enormous lies globally, and everyone of their class would profit and gain wider control. So I would find myself working with a psy warfare guy from, say, France, or Germany in a joint venture. We would rub elbows. We’d be feeding from the same basic money trough.
“We’d both be briefed by a team of intelligence experts, and those experts would be of several nationalities. Slowly, I saw a new kind of umbrella structure emerging.

“See, suppose during the secret lead-up to a planned economic crisis [money cartel], you can distract everybody with a phony epidemic [medical cartel]. Do you see? Leaders perceive a reason to cooperate. Planners become more intelligent and clever. They reach across lines they never would have reached across before…
“You begin to see the outlines of a much more inclusive future structure. This is multi-front warfare.”

Richard Bell, another former insider, said to me: “People like to assume that money is everything. If you can limit the amount of money the public has, eventually they weaken and cave in and they’re easier to control. And this is certainly true. But on the other hand, as mega-corporations gain more power and range and markets, you have a clash, because those corporations, which are now cooperating in ways they never have, as a cartel in some respects, want customers for their products. They don’t want abject poverty across the board. People have to be able to buy their products.

“So there is a heavy conflict. It’s a conflict between elite bankers [money cartel] and mega-corporations [corporation cartel]. It needs to be resolved through advance planning, over the long term. So now you have these powerful men sitting down and talking in a new way. Other big-time players get involved, too [government, media, energy cartels, for example].”

This is just the beginning of what these people have to say about the Matrix in their interviews and how it REALLY works.

The Matrix Revealed
(To read about Jon’s mega-collection, The Matrix Revealed, click here.)

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