lunedì 29 febbraio 2016

THE EMPIRE WILL STRIKE BACK

THE EMPIRE WILL STRIKE BACK

Posted on 28th February 2016 by Yojimbo in Economy
Guest post by Robert Gore, of www.straightlinelogic.com.
http://www.theburningplatform.com/2016/02/28/the-empire-will-strike-back/

The populist revolt fueling non-mainstream political movements in both Europe and the US flows from a single source: you can not fool all the people all the time. The central lie of our time is that governments can and should forcibly assume control of individuals’ lives, in the name of vague and always shifting greater goods. The Command and Control Futility Principle holds that governments and central banks can control one, but not all variables in a multi-variable system. The number of variables global governments and central banks have arrogated to their purported control has grown beyond measure. Breakdowns are visible everywhere, and as those failures exact their ever-increasing toll on the masses, the masses are pushing back.
The last financial crisis was a watershed. Capitalism’s rough justice was obviously, and gallingly, not allowed to play out. Favored financial institutions didn’t face the consequences—insolvency and bankruptcy—of their promotion of various bubbles and their leveraged business models. They were bailed out with taxpayer funds. Especially galling was that they knew they were going to be bailed out. More salt on the wound: improvident homeowners and housing speculators who took on too much mortgage debt were, other than a few spotty government programs, not bailed out or even offered appreciable relief. Since the crisis passed, banks have operated on the assumption they will be bailed out again during the next crisis. Despite all the hype about improved capital ratios and cleaned up loan books, fractional reserve banking is still fractional reserve banking; a leveraged business model that is wiped out if enough loans and speculations go bad.

Still more salt: despite unprecedented government debt and spending, new programs, particularly Obamacare, central bank debt monetization, and ultra-low interest rates, the purported recovery is the weakest on record, with the labor force participation rate at a multi-decade low, the number of people on food stamps recently reaching a record high, and real incomes back where they were in the 1970s. Those ultra-low interest rates have destroyed the incentive to save and forced retirees back into the workforce (the one group whose labor force participation rate has increased), but provided cheap funding to the carry-trade set, stock options-laden corporate executives, and Silicon Valley moguls. Their trophy art, cars, mansions, and spouses grace the media. That’s beyond salt, it’s rubbing people’s noses in it.
The messes the globalist powers that be have made outside their jurisdictions are even larger than the ones inside. Led by the US, the Western powers have bestowed unending chaos on the Middle East and Northern Africa. They have achieved none of their goals, (see “How To Defeat Your Enemies”) but have created massive blowback with the spread of terrorism and the refugee inundation of Europe. Not only have the war-torn lands not been reordered along liberal democratic lines, but mountains of money and barrels of blood continue to be spent in perpetual war. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens in Western homelands, not the elites, are left to contend with terrorist attacks, refugees burdening already strained social welfare systems, and obnoxious and illegal behavior by some of the new entrants. The elites shun even acknowledging these problems.
It comes as a surprise only to the elites and their media mouthpieces that the peasants are revolting, tired of their prevarication, arrogance, and ineptitude. Don’t, however, expect them to pay attention to anything so insignificant as the popular will; they won’t go gentle into that good night. In the US, the establishment can live with Hillary, and if either Trump or Sanders—the revolution’s candidates—wins, the new president will soon learn who actually runs the government. Or he will have an unfortunate accident or heart attack. However, the Empire is leaving nothing to chance; it has already initiated a preemptive counterattack.

The counterattack has three overlapping fronts: war, the economy, and civil liberties. “The Quagmire to End All Quagmires” stated that “the US faces the danger of being dragged into World War III.” That phrasing may have been an error (SLL reserves the right, in perpetuity, to make mistakes, see “On Failure”). The US government most likely won’t get “dragged” into World War III; it will probably initiate it. If Turkey and Saudi Arabia invade Syria, assume they’ve been green-lighted by the US government, which will join them in the carnage.
As the economy goes down in flames, central bankers and the usual totalitarian creeps are embracing negative interest rates and bans on cash. Negative interest rates self-evidently destroy the incentive to save, the foundation of honest capitalism and progress. Many commentators have pointed out that negative rates lead to an increased demand for zero return cash, so the monetary Dr. Strangeloves have to ban it to drive money into the banking system. Although negative interest rates are patently absurd and counterproductive, always strong selling points for the Strangeloves, the real reason for locking money in the banking system is to prevent a systemic run. As in the last crisis, on a mark-to-market basis the leveraged banking system—with the largest US and European banks still massively exposed to derivatives—will be recognized as insolvent and subject to a run unless money is kept locked in the banks and expropriated.
This assault on financial freedom goes hand in hand with the war against civil liberties, a specious battleground in the concocted “War on Terrorism.” The mainstream media and even some of the non-mainstream blogosphere have been filled with articles about the “complexity” of the Apple-FBI standoff on encryption. The word “complexity” is often a tip-off that someone’s about to pull an intellectual fast one.
Encryption is simple. It’s one of those issues most people dread: an either-or. Either one’s computer communications are encrypted and safe from prying eyes, or they are not. There is no middle ground, and Apple is ostensibly cutting its throat asking Congress, of all people, to come up with one. Encryption that has been compromised, for any reason, is useless. At Apple and the rest of Big Tech’s behest an encryption “compromise” will emerge that fatally compromises encryption, cementing Big Tech’s partnership with government. Lovers of liberty and privacy will be left searching for quite possibly illegal encryption developed by smaller, guerrilla software outfits.
Many will say that deliberate war, economic destruction, and technological repression are inconceivable; such a strategy is contradictory, counterproductive, depraved, deranged, diabolic, deadly, pathologic, sociopathic, psychotic, and out-and-out evil. All of the above, but if that’s your reaction, read, or reread, “Life, Or Death?” SLL recently posted Matt Bracken’s “Burning Down the House in 2016.” Bracken shares SLL’s forebodings of impending disaster, and it’s an excellent article, but he makes a mistake: granting the destroyers their stated intentions.
The proto-Marxist Jacobins of the French Revolution put it this way: “Out of order, chaos.” But first the Jacobins had to create the chaos, with an artificially engineered grain shortage leading to food riots, which they exploited for their revolutionary ends. Vladimir Lenin put it this way, when told that bread riots were breaking out in Russia: “The worse, the better.” The better for creating the optimal revolutionary conditions. The Black Panthers, revolutionary Marxists of the 1960s, said, “Burn, baby, burn.”
The currently existing social compact has to be burnt to the ground before the new world economic order can be built up from the ashes. This will be as true in 2017 as it was in 1917.
Regardless of the rhetoric—Liberté, égalité, fraternité; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; The Thousand Year Reich; The New World Order—the truth is that the means—destruction and death—are the ends. Psychopaths kill millions of people because…they enjoy killing millions of people. As SLL posited in “Life, Or Death?”, citing Ayn Rand, a malevolent desire to kill others is, at root, a desire to kill one’s self. The slogans, the supposed omelets that justify cracking all those skulls eggs, are dross.
That imparts analytic clarity to the future. When one understands that one’s life is on the line, one must fight with everything one has. Or else.

domenica 28 febbraio 2016

How land barons, industrialists and bankers corrupted economics

How land barons, industrialists and bankers corrupted economics

The so-called discipline of economics has been systematically corrupted in two major ways: first to get rid of the word ‘land’ from the very language of economics and second to downplay, omit or misrepresent any discussion of the words ‘credit’, ‘banking’ and ‘money’. They shamelessly describe banks as intermediaries when they know this is a minor function and that bank’s major function is money creation.  Fortunately the story behind the flagrant omission of land as a factor of production has now emerged, while the money story remains for some enterprising researcher in the future, (though various DVDs and stories hint in that direction).
The Corruption of Economics by Mason Gaffney and Fred Harrison, while free online, is hardly known; as of December 2015 only three New Zealand university libraries and the Auckland Public Library held copies. Yet in it is a very important story.
Fred Harrison describes the phenomenon of Henry George, the San Francisco journalist who took the world by storm with his book Progress and Poverty in 1879, in which he argues that the benefits of land ownership must be shared by all and that a single tax is needed to fund government –  a land tax. The factors of production are land, capital and labour. Untax labour and tax land was the cry. Poverty could be beaten. Social justice was possible!
Of Henry George influential economic historian John Kenneth Galbraith writes,
In his time and even into the 1920s and 1930s Henry George was the most widely read of American economic writers both at home and in Europe. He was, indeed, one of the most widely read of Americans. Progress and Poverty… in various editions and reprintings… had a circulation in the millions.
Unlike many writers, Henry George didn’t stop there. He took his message of hope everywhere he could travel – across America and to England, New Zealand, Australia, Scotland and Ireland.  He turned political. Seven years after his book came out in remote California, in 1886 he narrowly missed out on being elected Mayor of New York, outpolling Teddy Roosevelt.  During the 1890s George, Henry George was the third most famous American, after Mark Twain and Thomas Edison. Ten years after Progress and Poverty he was influencing a radical wing of the British Liberal Party. He was read by semi-literate workers from Birmingham, Alabama to Liverpool, England. His Single Tax was understood by peasants in the remotest crofts of Scotland and Ireland.
Gaffney’s section of the book outlines how certain rich land barons, industrialists and bankers funded influential universities in America and proceeded to change the direction of their economics departments. He names names at every turn, wading through presidents and funders of many prestigious universities. In particular, Gaffney, an economist himself, names the economists bought  to discredit his theories, their debates with George and their papers written over many decades.
‘George’s ideas were carried worldwide by such towering figures as Lloyd George in England, Leo Tolstoy and Alexander Kerensky in Russia, Sun Yat-sen in China, hundreds of local and state and a few power national politicians in both Canada and the USA, Billy Hughes in Australia, Rolland O’Regan in New Zealand, Chaim Weizmann in Palestine, Francisco Madero in Mexico, and many others in Denmark, South Africa and around the world. In England Lloyd George’s budget speech of 1909 reads in part as though written by Henry George himself. Some of Winston Churchill’s speeches were written by Georgist ghosts.’
When he died there were 100,000 at his funeral.
The wealthy and influential just couldn’t let the dangerous ideas spread. Their privileged position was gravely threatened. Henry George must be stopped. But the strategy had to be subtle. What better route than by using their money to influence the supposed fount of all knowledge, the universities? That would then indoctrinate journalists and the general public. Nice one!
The story explains how, for their wealthy paymasters, academics corrupted the language to subsume it under capital. They redefined rent, and created a jargon to confuse public debate. Harrison says, ‘For a century they have taken people down blind alleys with abstract models and algebraic equations. Economics became detached from the real world in the course of the twentieth century.’
Yes, the wealthy paid money to buy scholars to pervert the science.
Gaffney’s rich, whimsical language is a joy to read. He writes to Harrison,
‘Systematic, universal brainwashing is the crime, tendentious mental conditioning calculated to mislead students, to impoverish their mental ability, to bend their minds to the service of a system that funnels power and wealth to a parasitic minority.’
He painstakingly describes the funding of various American universities by such figures as JP Morgan and John D Rockefeller who choose the President who obligingly appoints suitable economists to key academic positions. He trawls through the writings of key figures in neoclassical economics over many decades, quoting numerous pieces attacking Henry George and his Single Tax proposal. Several neoclassical economists actually debated George in person. These early neoclassical economists were J B Clark, Philip Wicksteed, Alfred Marshall, ERA Seligman and Francis A Walker, who each contributed something to ‘addle, baffle, boggle and dazzle the laity’.  J B Clark for instance has a bibliography that quotes at least 24 works directed against George over a span of 28 years.
Banker JP Morgan funnelled his wealth through Seth Low to Columbia University in New York, and John D Rockefeller did the same in Chicago. Ezra Cornell, who Gaffney says once held one million acres of land, creator of the Western Union Monopoly, founded Cornell University in Ithaca, New York State. Leland Stanford of Southern Pacific Railroad (really a land company), funded Stanford University. Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland was endowed by Johns Hopkins, millionaire merchant and investor.
Each of these benefactors appointed their own president. Hopkins appointed Daniel Gilman as President. Out of that university came eleven Presidents of the American Economics Association. Gilman had a natural hatred of Henry George as he had been hounded out of Berkeley by the crusading young journalist when he uncovered ‘Gilman’s improper diversion of the Morrill Act funds.’
In his chapter entitled The Chicago School Poison, Gaffney writes:
John D Rockefeller funded Chicago spectacularly in 1892, and started raiding other campuses by raising salaries. Rockefeller picked the first President, William Rainey Harper. Harper picked the first economist, J Laurence Laughlin, from Andrew Dickson White’s Cornell (he liked Laughlin’s rigid conservative and anti-populist views. Harper drove out Veblen in 1906, then died, leaving Laughlin in charge of economics until he retired in 1916. He passed the torch to J. M. Clark, the son and collaborator of J.B.Clark. Frank Knight came to Chicago in 1917 from Laughlin’s Cornell. The apostolic succession is very clear from Rockefeller to Harper to Laughlin to Clark to Knight. …Chicago to this day is still the lengthened shadow of John D Rockefeller.
In terms of numbers, and intensity of feeling generated, Knight probably produced more neoclassical economists than anyone in history. He made no secret of his firm opposition to Henry George and ideas that might comfort Georgists. His enduring interest and his view point are clear from the title “Fallacies in the Single Tax” (1953)
Who would have thought nowadays that Henry George still have to be neutralised six centuries later? After all, he wrote his books and did his public speaking and touring from 1870 to 1897.
It was in these five Universities that neoclassical economics developed to the stage where it has almost completely taken over from classical economics, and it was out of these universities that the American Association of Economists was founded in 1885 by Ely, Walker, Edwin Seligman and others. He notes they did not welcome ‘reformers’.
In addition Richard Ely retired after a long career a John Hopkins University, to found what he called The Institute for Research in Land and Public Utilities whose purpose was ‘to investigate all problems connected with land taxation’. Contributors included utilities, railways, building and loan associations, land companies, lumbermen, farmers, bankers, lawyers and insurance men.
At least two of these academics were wealthy – E R A Seligman of Columbia came from a wealthy banking family. Richard Ely, who was known as the ‘Dean of American economists,’ was a well connected land speculator, making a small fortune in Wisconsin real estate. He spent his life rationalising land speculation.
Of Chicago, generously funded by John D Rockefeller in 1892, Gaffney says, ‘The apostolic succession is very clear from Rockefeller to Harper to Laughlin to Clark to Knight. …Chicago to this day is still the lengthened shadow of John D Rockefeller.’
To give you another taste of Gaffney (take a big breath): ‘To most modern readers, probably George seems too minor a figure to have warranted such an extreme reaction. This impression is a measure of the neo-classicals’ success; it is what they sought to make of him. It took a generation, but by 1930 they had succeeded in reducing him in the public mind. In the process of succeeding, however, they emasculated the discipline, impoverished economic thought, muddled the minds of countless students, rationalised free-riding by landowners, took dignity from labour, rationalised chronic unemployment, hobbled us with today’s counterproductive tax tangle, marginalised the obvious alternative system of public finance, shattered our sense of community, subverted a rising economic democracy for the benefit of rent-takers and led us into becoming an increasingly nasty and dangerously divided plutocracy.’

Let’s turn a blind eye to money too
The omission of the words credit, banking and money or the downright distortion of facts in university teaching was also no accident. The publishing in 1906 of Silvio Gesell’s book The Natural Economic Order sparked a decades-long movement. Gesell has been described by Irving Fisher as a ‘strangely neglected prophet’. John Maynard Keynes wrote, ‘I believe that the future will learn more from Gesell’s than from Marx’s spirit.’
For centuries American politicians and British politicians had been making money creation as issue.Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln are two who knew that banks create money. But after the arrival of neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century, things started to change. To please the banks who profit from land ownership, mention of the words ‘money’, ‘credit’ and ‘banking’ was also omitted, especially after the widespread influence of both Major CH Douglas from the 1920s and Silvio Gesell’s advocacy of a decaying currency. It was a bit worrying for banks that the Social Credit Party in New Zealand won 12% of the vote in 1953. So a Royal Commission on Banking and Credit was set up. In 1956 it found that banks were ‘banks of issue as well as banks of deposit’. However, thanks to their spin doctors, politicians their  managed to misrepresent the findings well enough for the public to believe the Commission had ruled the opposite. Who knows what mischief went on behind the scenes? Universities fell into line. Academic teaching on money creation was reduced to a brazenly inaccurate paragraph or two, misleading generations of students. But money is really created by private banks as interest-bearing debt. This writes in a growth imperative, ensuring we depend on exponentially growing debt and continue to monetise and privatise the commons.
If universities are a vehicle for spreading misinformation about how money is created we can more easily understand Mayer Amschel Rothschild when he said “Let me issue and control a nation’s money and I care not who writes the laws.”

Predicting the Global Financial Crisis
The corruption of economics in universities is no trivial matter. Economic crises are serious matter involving loss of homes, savings and jobs and economists need the right tools to predict them so they can deal with them. Tragically only a handful of economists predicted the Global Financial Crisis  of 2007-8 and the Queen of England was known to ask, ‘Why didn’t anyone see this coming?’ Professor Steve Keen in his book Debunking Economics spends a chapter summarising the work of a Dutch economist, Dr Dirk Bezemer. After laying down certain criteria for selection, he concludes there were only 12 (two published together). He named Dean Baker, Wynne Godley, Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson, Eric Janszen, Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer, Nouriel Roubini, Peter Schiff and Robert Shiller. Subsequently Bezemer had the list at three dozen, but out of a total profession of at least 20,000 it is a very dismal record. If any other profession (e.g medicine) was so wrong in something that affected millions they would be sued. The universities who train economists should hang their heads in shame.
Hyman Minsky claimed that in prosperous times, when corporate cash flow rises beyond what is needed to pay off debt, a speculative euphoria develops, and soon thereafter debts exceed what borrowers can pay off from their incoming revenues, which in turn produces a financial crisis. He said we moved from a hedging stage where risk is low to a speculative stage and finally to a Ponzi stage. A key indicator was the growth of private debt as a fraction of GDP. The “Bezemer 12” quoted above had in common that they were concerned with the distinction between the financial economy (making money from money) and the real economy. Keen wrote in 2009, “Unfortunately after the crisis everything being done by policy makers around the world is instead trying to restart private borrowing.” Sadly Wikipedia notes that while Minsky’s theories have enjoyed some popularity, they have had little influence in mainstream economics or in central bank policy.
These same people are among those now warning of a very much larger international financial collapse, as debt deflation takes hold and ongoing globalisation locks the global economy ever more tightly together. Economics is too important to be left to mistaught economists. The absence of good, reality-based economic theory in education leaves millions of environmental and social activists – along with the compassionate right – to flounder about helplessly trying to solve growing inequality and the climate crisis.

Challenging the universities
Tackling the veracity of university teaching in economics is no job for a quitter. In 2013 a retired engineer started on a mission when he read the Bank of England paper on money creation. Peter Morgan wrote to the Vice-Chancellor of Auckland University, Professor Ananish Chaudhuri:
‘The textbook used by the University of Auckland for its macroeconomics courses is Principles of Macroeconomics in New Zealand, by N. Gregory Mankiw, Debasis Bandyopadhyay and Paul Wooding. It contains several statements that are unequivocally fallacious. By way of example – by no means the only one in the textbook – the following is an example:
“Financial intermediaries are financial institutions through which savers can indirectly provide funds to borrowers.”’
He went on to quote from both the Royal Commission on Banking and Credit in New Zealand in 1956, but mostly from the Bank of England papers e.g. Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds – and why this matters by Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof
Back came his answer:-
“Dear Mr Morgan:
Thank you for your recent letter to the Vice Chancellor which has now been sent on to me via the Dean of the Business School.
First of all, thank you for taking the time to write.
I begin by noting that the questions you have raised go to the heart of the debate raging around the world. There is no question that in the aftermath of the GFC, the state of macroeconomics globally is in a flux with possibly more questions than answers. As you must be well aware leading scholars as well as policy makers are currently engaged in a robust debate world-wide particularly as Greece and Germany enter into a stare-down which may result in the break-up of the European currency union.
Having said that let me make a few points:
First, the textbook at issue is the most popular textbook world-wide including most leading institutions of higher learning. Greg Mankiw is a leading scholar, a professor at Harvard (which I believe also teaches from this text) and was Chairman of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors. I expect that he is well aware of the state of the art in terms of both the theory and policy-making. There are local editions of this book written by leading scholars in those countries. The Australian edition was done by Joshua Gans of Melbourne and Stephen King (till recently Dean at Monash Business School). Their role is to provide a local perspective and local data but the major intellectual force is provided by Mankiw. It is important to understand that the scholarship in this area is still very much evolving and therefore a plausible counter-argument is that no matter which text-book we choose to use, it will suffer from some flaws and deficiencies.
Second, while authors do their best to keep up with evolving knowledge nevertheless it takes time to update textbook content, at least partly because it takes time to understand and absorb the lessons of history. As I noted above the state of macroeconomics is in a flux and new research needs to be integrated into future editions.
Third, I would disagree that the book contains fundamental errors. I think this may have more to do with differences in assumptions and philosophies rather than violations of some universally held truths. We and indeed all scholars welcome robust debate on such differences. They are part and parcel of the academic discourse. As the VC has already pointed out, at the end of the day, this is also an issue of academic freedom. I have absolutely no reservations about the use of this textbook in our degree program.”
So having acknowledged that economists have spent a fruitless seven years scratching their heads about what caused the GFC, or the crisis in Greece, the Head of Department, Professor Chaudhuri puts this major issue aside and declares the book valuable. He justifies using a textbook with fundamental inaccuracies by saying other universities are doing it too! In a subsequent letter he confesses that he is not an expert in monetary policy. This is rather like the head of a medical school saying he is not an expert in medicine or the head of an architecture school saying he is not an expert in building design. The sheer nerve of senior economists to think that they don’t need to come to grips with monetary policy when the world is awash with debt would be incomprehensible if one didn’t know their very jobs depend on their pulling the party line.
Perhaps we can get some clarity from Steve Keen here. In a 2014 blog, he explains the three options open to universities after the 2014 Bank of England paper that refuted the loanable funds model. ‘Now if I believed in the tooth fairy, I would hope this emphatic denunciation of the textbook model would cause macroeconomics lecturers to drastically revise their lectures for next week. But I’m too long in the tooth to have such a delusion. They’ll ignore it instead. Their dominant “tactic” – if I can call it that – will be ignorance itself: most economics lecturers won’t even know that the bank’s paper exists, and they will continue to teach from whatever textbook bible they’ve chosen to inflict upon their students. A secondary one will be to know of it, but ignore it, as they’ve ignored countless critiques of mainstream economics before. The third arrow in the quill, if they are challenged by students about it (hint hint!), will be to argue that the textbook story is a “useful parable” for beginning students, and a more realistic version is introduced in more advanced courses.’
He seriously doubts if the paper will cause senior economists to change their current position and explains that until you know that banks can create and cancel money, you will never be able to understand how demand rises and falls. ‘All the parables of conventional economics fly out the window once you know this. The level of economic activity now depends on the lending decisions of banks (and the repayment decisions of borrowers). If banks lend more rapidly, or if borrowers repay more slowly, there will be a boom; if the reverse, there will be a slump. If new loans simply make up for old ones being repaid, then there is no effect, but if new loans exceed repayment then aggregate demand will increase.’

The urgency of getting this right
If universities are failing us by misleading our young people, journalists and politicians, think how critical it is to reverse this. Naomi Klein says that the climate crisis came along at the just the wrong time – when neoclassical economics was at its zenith. No wonder there was a reluctance to do anything meaningful as it simply clashed with the dominant economic paradigm. She says, ‘Economics is at war with the planet’. According to many experts there is only a small window to reverse climate change, until 2017.
There is a long way to go to reverse public thinking. Neoclassical (or neoliberal) economics has a death like grip on us. In over a century the doctrine has succeeded in further privatising the commons, dismantling the state,  deregulating everything that moves and fooling the public over land and money. The economic theory that ignores the role of money and debt can’t possibly make sense of the economy in which we live. It should be jettisoned.
While the collapse of the global economy will be terribly painful and chaotic, it will certainly reduce carbon emissions dramatically. But as long as it holds up we need to get on our bikes and work. Whatever happens, no future economy should have the flaws we have now. It is time to get cracking, or as the sheep farmers of the South Island of New Zealand say – rattle our dags.  We can do it.

Do universities lead advances in economics?
During depressions great thinking is done, sometimes in universities, but more often not. Henry George, a journalist, wrote Progress and Poverty in response to abject poverty in San Francisco (1879 book), Silvio Gesell, a businessman, wrote after an Argentinian depression of the 1880 and 1890s and John Maynard Keynes wrote after the Great Depression of the 1930s. As we descend into worldwide debt deflation today’s searchers now must urgently find and implement a new economic model. And that will involve a huge shift in thinking.
Keynes suggestions were widely adopted after the Great Depression. In 1933-4 Gesell’s currency was put into practice in a small town in Austria with spectacular results. People came from all over Europe to witness the ‘miracle of Wørgl’.  But it lasted a mere fifteen months, cut short by the influence of big banks over the Austrian government at the time, who made the ‘work certificates’ illegal. So despite considerable influence for three decades for his important thinking on currency design (a currency must only act as a medium of exchange and must rot like potatoes and rust like iron), Gesell is now all but forgotten. As central bankers grope helplessly for tools to stimulate the economy at the same time as controlling inflation, Gesell presents answers.
Gaffney’s description of how land barons, industrialists and bankers perverted university’s teaching, which in turn leads to  wrong government policy, is reminiscent of the story of the history of banking. Banks have been a powerful influence on governments ever since governments allowed banks to create credit that could be used to pay taxes. This may have happened in Europe centuries ago after the goldsmiths.
To add to our troubles universities, under the influence of neoclassical economists, have all but stopped teaching economic history so no one can study Gesell or George.
The tie-up between universities and neoclassical economists also influences the relationship of politicians to bankers. Nomi Prins in her landmark book All the Presidents Bankers sheds light on the symbiotic relationship of a century of American presidents with the top bankers of the country, and how elite bankers can even dictate foreign policy. The dust cover of her book says she ‘ushers us into the intimate world of exclusive clubs, vacation spots, and Ivy League universities that binds presidents and financiers. She unravels the multi-generational blood, intermarriage, and protege relationships that have confined national influence to a privileged cluster of people. These families and individuals recycle their power through elected office and private channels in Washington, DC.’

Bankers admit they create money
Of course the bankers themselves know better than the universities who prefer to be complicit in keeping the secret. Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada and Lord Josiah Stamp of the Bank of England have been quoted regularly in the monetary reform literature. Even in New Zealand in 1955 we had H W White, Chairman of the Associated Banks telling the Royal Commission on Banking and Credit:

“The banks do create money. They have been doing it for a long time, but they didn’t realise it, and they did not admit it.”
Be Sociable, Share!

giovedì 25 febbraio 2016

IMF, F&D: The TRUTH about BANKS

The TRUTH about  BANKS
Michael Kumhof and Zoltán Jakab
Finance & Development - A quarterly publication of the International Monetary Fund, March 2016, Volume 53 - Number 1, pp. 50-53
Original link with images:
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/03/pdf/fd0316.pdf

Banks create new money when they lend, which can trigger and amplify financial cycles

PROBLEMS in the banking sector played a critical role in triggering and prolonging the two greatest economic crises of the past 100 years: the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. In each case, insufficient regulation of the banking system was held to have contributed to the crisis. Economists therefore faced the challenge of providing policy prescriptions that could prevent a repeat of these traumatic experiences.

The response of macroeconomists—those who study the workings of national economies—in the 1930s was strikingly different from attitudes today. Then, there were two leading contenders for radical banking reform in the United States: the proposals that would eventually become the Glass-Steagall Act—which separated commercial and investment banks, created the deposit insurance program, and allowed greater branching by national banks—and proposals for 100 percent reserve banking, under which each dollar deposited by a bank customer must be backed by a dollar of cash in bank vaults or of bank reserves in the central bank.

Most leading U.S. macroeconomists at the time supported 100 percent reserve banking. This includes Irving Fisher of Yale and the founders of the so-called Chicago School of Economics. One of the main reasons they supported 100 percent reserve banking was that macroeconomists had, just before the Great Depression, come around to accepting some fundamental truths about the nature of banking that had previously eluded the profession, specifically the fact that banks fund new loans by creating new deposit money (Schumpeter, 1954). In other words, whenever a new loan is made to a customer, the loan is disbursed by creating a new deposit of the same amount as the loan, and in the name of the same customer. This was a critical vulnerability of financial systems, it was thought, for two reasons.

First, if banks are free to create new money when they make loans, this can—if banks misjudge the ability of their borrowers to repay—magnify the ability of banks to create financial boom-bust cycles. And second, it permanently ties the creation of money to debt creation, which can become problematic because excessive debt levels can trigger financial crises, a fact that has since been corroborated using modern statistical techniques (Schularick and Taylor, 2012).

The proposals for 100 percent reserve banking were therefore aimed at taking away the ability of banks to fund loans through money creation, while allowing separate depository and credit institutions to continue to fulfill all other traditional roles of banks. Depository institutions would compete to give customers access to an electronic payment system restricted to transactions in central-bank-issued currency (some of which could bear interest); credit institutions would compete to attract such currency and lend it out once they had accumulated enough.

In Benes and Kumhof (2012) we found support for the claimed advantages of the 100 percent reserve proposal, using modern quantitative tools. To be clear, this article does not advocate 100 percent reserve banking; we mention its history here only as critical to the debate over the nature of banks.
In the 1930s the less radical Glass-Steagall reforms won the day, and eventually the U.S. financial system stabilized. But a by-product of this victory was that critical pre-war lessons about the nature of banking had, by the 1960s, been largely forgotten. In fact, around that time banks began to completely disappear from most macroeconomic models of how the economy works.

Unprepared for the Great Recession

This helps explain why, when faced with the Great Recession in 2008, macroeconomics was initially unprepared to contribute much to the analysis of the interaction of banks with the macro economy. Today there is a sizable body of research on this topic, but the literature still has many difficulties.

We find that many of these difficulties reflect the failure to remember the lessons of the 1930s (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015).
Specifically, virtually all recent mainstream neoclassical economic research is based on the highly misleading “intermediation of loanable funds” description of banking, which dates to the 1950s and 1960s and back to the 19th century. We argue instead for the “financing through money creation” description, which is consistent with the 1930s view of economists associated with the Chicago School. These two views have radically different implications for a country’s macroeconomic response to financial and other shocks. This in turn has obvious relevance for key policy choices today.

New funds are produced only with new bank loans.

In modern neoclassical intermediation of loanable funds theories, banks are seen as intermediating real savings.
Lending, in this narrative, starts with banks collecting deposits of previously saved real resources (perishable consumer goods, consumer durables, machines and equipment, etc.) from savers and ends with the lending of those same real resources to borrowers. But such institutions simply do not exist in the real world. There are no loanable funds of real resources that bankers can collect and then lend out. Banks do of course collect checks or similar financial instruments, but because such instruments—to have any value—must be drawn on funds from elsewhere in the financial system, they cannot be deposits of new funds from outside the financial system. New funds are produced only with new bank loans (or when banks purchase additional financial or real assets), through book entries made by keystrokes on the banker’s keyboard at the time of disbursement. This means that the funds do not exist before the loan and that they are in the form of electronic entries—or, historically, paper ledger entries—rather than real resources.

This process, financing, is of course the key activity of banks. The detailed steps are as follows. Assume that a banker has approved a loan to a borrower. Disbursement consists of a bank entry of a new loan, in the name of the borrower, as an asset on its books and a simultaneous new and equal deposit, also in the name of the borrower, as a liability. This is a pure bookkeeping transaction that acquires its economic significance through the fact that bank deposits are the generally accepted medium of exchange of any modern economy, its money. Clearly such transactions—which one of us has personally witnessed many times as a corporate banker—involve no intermediation whatsoever. Werner (2014), an economist with a banking background, provides a much more detailed description of the steps involved in a real-world loan disbursement.

We use the term “bank deposit” very broadly here to include all nonequity bank liabilities—that is, everything from checking accounts to long-term debt securities—because these liabilities can all be considered forms of money, albeit with highly varying degrees of liquidity. While the initial deposit is always created as a checking account, the ultimate holders of the new bank liability will as a rule demand a positive interest rate, with the level depending on how much they value liquidity over financial returns.

Two misconceptions could arise in this context. First, the newly created deposit does not “go away” as soon as the borrower uses it to purchase a good or an asset. It may leave the borrower’s bank if the seller of the good or asset banks elsewhere, but it never leaves the banking system as a whole unless the underlying loan is repaid. This highlights the great importance of thinking about banks as part of an interconnected financial system, rather than thinking about one bank in isolation. Second, there is no reason to assume that such a loan will be repaid immediately. To the contrary, a loan is extended precisely because the funds are to be used to support additional economic activity, which in turn generates additional demand for liquidity and thus for bank deposits.
If the funds are used to support relatively unproductive economic activity, it will give rise to relatively more goods or asset price inflation and less additional output. But this type of distinction is precisely what our new conceptual framework allows us to quantify.

Financing through money creation

This “financing through money creation” function of banks has been repeatedly described in publications of the world’s leading central banks—see McLeay, Radia, and Thomas (2014a, 2014b) for excellent summaries. What has been much more challenging, however, is the incorporation of these insights into macroeconomic models. Our research therefore builds examples of economic models with “financing through money creation” banks and then contrasts the models’ quantitative predictions with those of otherwise identical “intermediation of loanable funds” models.

We should add here that the financing through money creation view is well known in the post-Keynesian economic literature, which however differs from our approach in two ways. First, it does not feature the optimizing households and firms of modern neoclassical theory, which have become de rigueur in mainstream economics, including at most policy institutions. Second, it tends to model credit and money as fully demand determined, with banks playing a very passive role. The added value of our work is the assumption of a more realistic world in which credit risks limit banks’ credit supply, and liquidity preferences limit nonbanks’ demand for money.

In simulations that compare how these models behave, we assume that, in a single quarter, the likelihood of borrowers missing payments increases very significantly. Under the realistic assumption that banks had to set their lending interest rates before this shock, and are committed to these rates for some time under existing loan contracts, banks suffer significant loan losses. They respond by writing new loan contracts that take into account the increased risk and the erosion of their capital buffers. This forces them to make fewer new loans and charge higher interest on the ones they do make. However, hypothetical “intermediation of loanable funds” banks would choose very different combinations from real-world “financing through money creation” banks.

Intermediation of loanable funds banks would not, in aggregate, be able to reduce their balance sheets quickly during a crisis. Aggregate deposits of loanable funds could at best fall gradually over time, if depositors, in response to a recession, were to accumulate smaller savings than before.

The only other theoretically feasible way for bank balance sheets to shrink would be for depositors to acquire private debt or equity securities from banks during the crisis. But empirical evidence shows that, during crises, holdings of nonbank debt or equity by the nonfinancial sector do not grow significantly. Moreover, this explanation says nothing about how banks’ loan books (as opposed to their securities books) could shrink during a crisis.

Therefore, banks in the intermediation model, with the size of their balance sheets changing slowly, would keep lending to riskier borrowers. To compensate for this risk, they would dramatically increase their loan rates to ensure continued profitability.

On the other hand, financing through money creation banks can instantly and massively reduce the quantity of their lending if they think it will improve profitability. To reiterate, this flexibility is possible because deposits represent monetary purchasing power that can—through bookkeeping entries—be destroyed as fast as it was created, rather than representing real savings, which can decline only through reduced production or increased consumption of resources. Banks in the money creation model can immediately demand repayment (or refuse rollover) of a large share of existing loans out of existing deposits, causing an immediate, simultaneous, and large contraction of bank loans and bank deposits, while intermediation banks would experience almost no initial change.

Because this cutback in lending, relative to the intermediation model, reduces existing corporate bank borrowers’ ratios of loans to collateral assets, and therefore the riskiness of their outstanding loans, banks initially increase interest rate spreads on these remaining loans far less than in the intermediation model. Much of their response is therefore in the form of quantity rationing rather than changes in interest rate spreads.

This is also evident in the behavior of bank leverage, a key balance sheet ratio defined as the ratio of bank assets to net worth. In the intermediation model, bank leverage increases on impact, because losses and thus the decrease in net worth far exceed the gradual decrease in loans. In the money creation model, leverage either remains constant or drops, because the rapid decrease in loans is at least as large as the change in net worth. Finally, the contraction in GDP in the money creation model is typically far larger than in the intermediation model, mainly as a result of severe credit rationing and the ensuing shortages of liquidity throughout the economy.

It is straightforward to demonstrate that these characteristics of money creation models are much more in line with the actual data. Most important, bank lending—both for individual banks and for national banking systems—exhibits frequent, large, and fast jumps. Contrary to typical intermediation models, and again in line with the data, money creation models predict bank leverage ratios that increase during booms and fall during contractions, as well as severe credit rationing during downturns.

Saving does not finance investment, financing and money creation do.

The fundamental reason for these differences is that, according to the intermediation narrative, aggregate system-wide deposits must be accumulated through saving physical resources, which by its very nature is gradual and slow. On the other hand, the money creation narrative says that banks can create and destroy deposits instantaneously, because the process involves bookkeeping transactions rather than physical resources. Although deposits are essential to purchases and sales of real resources outside the banking system, they are not themselves physical resources and can be created at almost no cost.

Even though banks do not face technical limits to a quick rise in the quantity of their loans, they still face other restraints. But the most important limit, especially during the boom periods of financial cycles when all banks simultaneously decide to lend more, is their own assessment of their future profitability and solvency. The availability of savings of real resources does not constitute a limit to lending and deposit creation, nor does the availability of central bank reserves. Modern central banks pursue interest rate targets and must supply as many reserves as the banking system demands at those targets. This fact flies in the face of the still very popular deposit multiplier narrative of banking, which argues that banks make loans by repeatedly lending out an initial deposit of central bank reserves.

To summarize, our work builds on the fundamental fact that banks are not intermediaries of real loanable funds, as is generally assumed in the mainstream neoclassical macroeconomics literature. Rather, they are providers of financing, through the creation of new monetary purchasing power for their borrowers. Understanding this distinction has important implications for a host of practical questions. We will conclude with one example, but there are many others.

Practical implication

Many policy prescriptions aim to encourage physical investment by promoting saving, which is believed to finance investment. The problem with this idea is that saving does not finance investment, financing and money creation do. Bank financing of investment projects does not require prior saving, but the creation of new purchasing power so that investors can buy new plants and equipment. Once purchases have been made and sellers (or those farther down the chain of transactions) deposit the money, they become savers in the national accounts statistics, but this saving is an accounting consequence—not an economic cause—of lending and investment. To argue otherwise is to confuse the respective macroeconomic roles of real resources (saving) and debt-based money (financing). Again, this point is not new; it goes back at least to Keynes (Keynes, 2012). But it seems to have been forgotten by many economists, and as a result is overlooked in many policy debates.

The implication of these insights is that policy should place priority on an efficient financial system that identifies and finances worthwhile projects, rather than on measures that attempt to encourage saving, in the hope that it will finance desired investment. The “financing through money creation” approach makes it very clear that with financing of physical investment projects, saving will be the natural result.

Michael Kumhof is Senior Research Advisor at the Bank of
England’s Research Hub, and Zoltán Jakab is an Economist in
the IMF’s Research Department.

References:

Benes, Jaromir, and Michael Kumhof, 2012, “The Chicago Plan Revisited,” IMF Working Paper 12/202 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

Jakab, Zoltán, and Michael Kumhof, 2015, “Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds–And Why This Matters,” Bank of England Working Paper 529 (London).

Keynes, John Maynard, 2012, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Volume 27, reprint of 1980 edition (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press).

McLeay, Michael, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, 2014a, “Money Creation in the Modern Economy,”  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q1, pp. 14–27.

———, 2014b, “Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q1, pp. 4–13.

Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor, 2012, “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008,” American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 1029–61.

Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1954, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press).

Werner, Richard A., 2014, “Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing? The Theories and the Empirical Evidence,” International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 36, pp. 1–19.

Macroeconomics of Loanable Funds & Endogenous Money compared using Minsky

domenica 21 febbraio 2016

Money revolution: making banks public and locally accountable

Money revolution: making banks public and locally accountable

Ellen Brown
18th February 2016

The private banking system that dominates North America and Europe works very well indeed, writes Ellen Brown - for the bankers. As for us, it's a disaster, as the banks use their monopoly over the creation of money itself, at interest, as a tool to extract ever more value from us and the entire economy. But there is another way!

We need a banking system that truly serves the needs of the people, and that objective can best be achieved with banks that are owned and operated by and for the people.
The world is undergoing a populist revival.

From the revolt against austerity led by the Syriza Party in Greece and the Podemos Party in Spain, to Jeremy Corbyn's surprise victory as Labour leader in the UK, to Donald Trump's ascendancy in the Republican polls, to Bernie Sanders' surprisingly strong challenge to Hillary Clinton - contenders with their fingers on the popular pulse are surging ahead of their establishment rivals.
Today's populist revolt mimics an earlier one that reached its peak in the US in the 1890s. Then it was all about challenging Wall Street, reclaiming the government's power to create money, curing rampant deflation with US Notes (Greenbacks) or silver coins (then considered the money of the people), nationalizing the banks, and establishing a central bank that actually responded to the will of the people.

Over a century later, Occupy Wall Street revived the populist challenge, armed this time with the Internet and mass media to spread the word. The Occupy movement shined a spotlight on the corrupt culture of greed unleashed by deregulating Wall Street, widening the yawning gap between the 1% and the 99% and destroying jobs, households and the economy.
Donald Trump's populist campaign has not focused much on Wall Street; but Bernie Sanders' has, in spades. Sanders has picked up the baton where Occupy left off, and the disenfranchised Millennials who composed that movement have flocked behind him.

The failure of regulation 

Sanders' focus on Wall Street has forced his opponent Hillary Clinton to respond to the challenge. Clinton maintains that Sanders' proposals sound good but "will never make it in real life." Her solution is largely to preserve the status quo while imposing more bank regulation.

That approach, however, was already tried with the Dodd-Frank Act, which has not solved the problem although it is currently the longest and most complicated bill ever passed by the US legislature.

Dodd-Frank purported to eliminate bailouts, but it did this by replacing them with 'bail-ins' - confiscating the funds of bank creditors, including depositors, to keep 'too big to fail' banks afloat. The costs were merely shifted from the 'people as taxpayers' to the 'people as creditors'.

Worse, the massive tangle of new regulations has hamstrung the smaller community banks that make the majority of loans to small and medium sized businesses, which in turn create most of the jobs. More regulation would simply force more community banks to sell out to their larger competitors, making the too-bigs even bigger.

In any case, regulatory tweaking has proved to be an inadequate response. Banks backed by an army of lobbyists simply get the laws changed, so that what was formerly criminal behavior becomes legal. See, for example, CitiGroup's redrafting of the 'push out' rule in December 2015 that completely vitiated the legislative intent.

What Sanders is proposing, by contrast, is a real financial revolution, a fundamental change in the system itself.
His proposals include eliminating Too Big to Fail by breaking up the biggest banks; protecting consumer deposits by reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act (separating investment from depository banking); reviving postal banks as safe depository alternatives; and reforming the Federal Reserve, enlisting it in the service of the people.

Time to revive the original populist agenda? 

Sanders' proposals are a good start. But critics counter that breaking up the biggest banks would be costly, disruptive and destabilizing; and it would not eliminate Wall Street corruption and mismanagement.

Banks today have usurped the power to create the national money supply. As the Bank of England recently acknowledged, banks create money whenever they make loans. Banks determine who gets the money and on what terms. Reducing the biggest banks to less than $50 billion in assets (the Dodd-Frank limit for 'too big to fail') would not make them more trustworthy stewards of that power and privilege.

How can banking be made to serve the needs of the people and the economy, while preserving the more functional aspects of today's highly sophisticated global banking system? Perhaps it is time to reconsider the proposals of the early populists.

The direct approach to 'occupying' the banks is to simply step into their shoes and make them public utilities. Insolvent megabanks can be nationalized - as they were before 2008. (More on that shortly.)

Making banks public utilities can happen on a local level as well. States and cities can establish publicly-owned depository banks on the highly profitable and efficient model of the Bank of North Dakota. Public banks can partner with community banks to direct credit where it is needed locally; and they can reduce the costs of government by recycling bank profits for public use, eliminating outsized Wall Street fees and obviating the need for derivatives to mitigate risk.

At the federal level, not only can postal banks serve as safe depositories and affordable credit alternatives, but the central bank can provide a source of interest-free credit for the nation - as was done, for example, with Canada's central bank from 1939 to 1974. The US Treasury could also reclaim the power to issue, not just pocket change, but a major portion of the money supply - as was done by the American colonists in the 18th century and by President Abraham Lincoln in the 19th century.

Nationalization: not as radical as it sounds

Radical as it sounds today, nationalizing failed megabanks was actually standard operating procedure before 2008. Nationalization was one of three options open to the FDIC when a bank failed. The other two were (1) closure and liquidation; and (2) merger with a healthy bank.

Most failures were resolved using the merger option, but for very large banks, nationalization was sometimes considered the best choice for taxpayers.  The leading US example was Continental Illinois, the seventh-largest bank in the country when it failed in 1984. The FDIC wiped out existing shareholders, infused capital, took over bad assets, replaced senior management, and owned the bank for about a decade, running it as a commercial enterprise.
What was a truly radical departure from accepted practice was the unprecedented wave of government bailouts after the 2008 banking crisis. The taxpayers bore the losses, while culpable bank management not only escaped civil and criminal penalties but made off with record bonuses.

In a July 2012 article in The New York Times titled "Wall Street Is Too Big to Regulate," Gar Alperovitz noted that the five biggest banks - JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs - then had combined assets amounting to more than half the nation's economy. He wrote:


"With high-paid lobbyists contesting every proposed regulation, it is increasingly clear that big banks can never be effectively controlled as private businesses.  If an enterprise (or five of them) is so large and so concentrated that competition and regulation are impossible, the most market-friendly step is to nationalize its functions ...
"Nationalization isn't as difficult as it sounds.  We tend to forget that we did, in fact, nationalize General Motors in 2009; the government still owns a controlling share of its stock.  We also essentially nationalized the American International Group, one of the largest insurance companies in the world, and the government still owns roughly 60 percent of its stock."

A more market-friendly term than nationalization is 'receivership' - taking over insolvent banks and cleaning them up. But as Dr. Michael Hudson observed in a 2009 article, real nationalization does not mean simply imposing losses on the government and then selling the asset back to the private sector. He wrote:
"Real nationalization occurs when governments act in the public interest to take over private property ... Nationalizing the banks along these lines would mean that the government would supply the nation's credit needs. The Treasury would become the source of new money, replacing commercial bank credit. Presumably this credit would be lent out for economically and socially productive purposes, not merely to inflate asset prices while loading down households and business with debt as has occurred under today's commercial bank lending policies."

A network of locally-controlled public banks

'Nationalizing' the banks implies top-down federal control, but this need not be the result. We could have a system of publicly-owned banks that were locally controlled, operating independently to serve the needs of their own communities.

As noted earlier, banks create the money they lend simply by writing it into accounts. Money comes into existence as a debit in the borrower's account, and it is extinguished when the debt is repaid. This happens at a grassroots level through local banks, creating and destroying money organically according to the demands of the community.

Making these banks public institutions would differ from the current system only in that the banks would have a mandate to serve the public interest, and the profits would be returned to the local government for public use.
Although most of the money supply would continue to be created and destroyed locally as loans, there would still be a need for the government-issued currency envisioned by the early populists, to fill gaps in demand as needed to keep supply and demand in balance.

This could be achieved with a national dividend issued by the federal Treasury to all citizens, or by 'quantitative easing for the people' as envisioned by Jeremy Corbyn, or by quantitative easing targeted at infrastructure.
For decades, private sector banking has been left to its own devices. The private-only banking model has been thoroughly tested, and it has proven to be a disastrous failure.

We need a banking system that truly serves the needs of the people, and that objective can best be achieved with banks that are owned and operated by and for the people.



Ellen Brown is the founder of the Public Banking Institute and the author of a dozen books and hundreds of articles. She developed her research skills as an attorney practicing civil litigation in Los Angeles.
Books
  • In her best-selling Web of Debt, Ellen analyses the Federal Reserve and 'the money trust'. She shows how this private cartel has usurped the power to create money from the people themselves, and how we the people can get it back.
  • In The Public Bank Solution, the 2013 sequel, she traces the evolution of two banking models that have competed historically, public and private; and explores contemporary public banking systems globally.

This article
was originally published on Ellen Brown's Web of Deceit blog.

mercoledì 17 febbraio 2016

Fed President and Assistant Treasury Secretary Says: We Need to Break Up the Big Banks

Fed President and Assistant Treasury Secretary Says What Everyone Knows: We Need to Break Up the Big Banks

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-02-16/fed-president-and-assistant-treasury-secretary-says-what-everyone-knows-we-need-brea

George Washington's picture



The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis – who oversaw the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability (Neel Kashkari) – says that the nation’s biggest banks remain too big to fail and pose significant risk to the economy
Kashkari joins the following top economists and financial experts who believe that the failure to rein in the “too big to fail” banks is unacceptable:
  • Current Vice Chair and director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – and former 20-year President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City – Thomas Hoenig (and see this)
  • Former Federal Reserve Bank of New York economist and Salomon Brothers vice chairman, Henry Kaufman
  • Dean and professor of finance and economics at Columbia Business School, and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, R. Glenn Hubbard
  • Former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund, Simon Johnson (and see this)
  • President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, James Bullard
  • The leading monetary economist and co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading treatise on the Great Depression, Anna Schwartz
  • Economics professor and senior regulator during the S & L crisis, William K. Black
  • Professor of entrepreneurship and finance at the Chicago Booth School of Business, Luigi Zingales
  • The Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Harvey Rosenblum
  • Director, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, and Professor of Economics, University of Bonn, Martin Hellwig
And the head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank – and former Goldman Sachs chief economist – William Dudley says that we should not tolerate a financial system in which certain financial institutions are deemed to be too big to fail.
Federal Reserve Board governor Daniel Tarullo also backs a cap on the size of banks, and Former Treasury secretary under Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Nicolas Brady, says that we need to put a cap on leverage.

Top Bankers Call for Big Banks to Be Broken Up

While you might assume that bankers themselves don’t want the giant banks to be broken up, many are in fact calling for a break up, including:
  • Former managing director of Goldman Sachs – and head of the international analytics group at Bear Stearns in London- Nomi Prins
  • Numerous other bankers within the mega-banks (see this, for example)
  • Founder and chairman of Signature Bank, Scott Shay
  • Former Natwest and Schroders investment banker, Philip Augar
  • The President of the Independent Community Bankers of America, Camden Fine
Why do so many top bankers, economists, financial experts and politicians say that the big banks should be broken up?
Because they’re no longer acting like banks, and are destroying the economy.

The Mystery of the One Bank: its Owners?

The Mystery of the One Bank: its Owners? - Jeff Nielson
The Mystery of the One Bank: its Owners? - Jeff Nielson
By Jeff Nielson 5 days ago 11858 Views 9 comments
Jeff Nielson is co-founder and managing partner of Bullion Bulls Canada; a website which provides precious metals commentary, economic analysis, and mining information to readers/investors. Jeff originally came to the precious metals sector as an investor around the middle of last decade, but soon decided this was where he wanted to make the focus of his career. His website is www.bullionbullscanada.com.


February 12, 2016

Roughly 2 ½ years ago ; readers were introduced to a paradigm of crime, corruption, and control which they now know as “the One Bank”. First they were presented with a definition and description of this crime syndicate.
That definition came via a massive computer model constructed by a trio of Swiss academics, and cited with favor by Forbes magazine . The computer model was based upon data involving more than 10 million “economic actors”, both individuals and corporations, and the conclusions which that model produced were nothing less than shocking. 

The One Bank is “a super-entity” comprised of 144 corporate fronts, with approximately ¾ of these corporate fronts being financial intermediaries (i.e. “banks”). According to the Swiss computer model; via these 144 corporate tentacles, the One Bank controls approximately 40% of the global economy . The only thing more appalling than the massive size of this crime syndicate is its massive illegality. 

Some of the strongest laws in the Western world were created precisely to prevent such corporate concentration from ever coming into existence, and thus the crime, corruption, and conspiracy which automatically accompanies it. These are our “anti-trust laws”, laws which our puppet governments have long since ceased to enforce. The evidence of this crime/corruption/conspiracy is all around us. 

On a near weekly basis; the Big Banks of the West are caught-and-convicted (but never punished ), perpetrating criminal conspiracies literally thousands of times larger than any other financial crimes in human history. The U.S. government has now publicly proclaimed that its Big Banks have a license to steal .
All of these Big Banks are tentacles of the One Bank, and the list of names here (as identified by the Swiss researchers) is almost as infamous as the mega-crimes which they commit: Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Credit Suisse, and UBS – for starters. But for many readers, this is now old news.
We observe the crimes of these corporate fronts, every day of our lives. We feel the impact of their crimes (on our standard of living) every day of our lives. However, these “banks” are ultimately merely the inanimate tools of crime. What many readers are now intent upon knowing goes beyond these tools, or even the mega-crimes which they are used to commit.

What people want to know is more basic. Who are the Criminals – the real Criminals? In this respect; we are not talking about the mere bankers, themselves. From the lowliest market-manipulating thugs to the upper stratosphere of CEO’s and central bankers, these are all merely foot soldiers, the psychopathic employees of the real Criminals. 

The information wanted by readers is not the names of these employees. They are all nothing more than easily replaceable parts. The information of real value can be encapsulated in one, simple question: who owns the One Bank?
At first glance; the question appears elementary. The One Bank is a financial crime syndicate which controls 40% of the global economy – a global economy with annual GDP of roughly $70 trillion. Clearly the owners of the One Bank would have to be “the world’s richest people” (richest men?). 

Here the Corporate media is only too happy to be of service to us. Once a year; we are presented with a “world’s richest list”, which is then parroted by all of the other outlets of the Big Media oligopoly, ad nauseum. Thus, we simply peruse this list for the names at the top, and we have our “owners” of the One Bank. Et voila! 

Not so fast. As most regular readers are already well aware; the mainstream media oligopoly is nothing but more of the One Bank’s tentacles. Perhaps we should look a little more closely, before we simply pluck the names from the top of the list, and hail them as the One Bank’s owner-criminals?
In fact, such skepticism is well-justified. These supposed “world’s richest” lists, produced by the propaganda arm of the One Bank, are not worth the virtual paper on which they are written. Exposing the absurdity of such lists requires nothing more than accumulating some aggregate financial data, and then pulling out a calculator. 

Fortunately, all of that work has already been done in a previous piece . Skipping to the bottom line; if we take the “world’s richest list” data, along with aggregate data on global wealth (all supplied by the Corporate media), we are presented with a world where total global wealth is supposedly a number in the low $10’s of trillions. 

Meanwhile, if we look no further than the oceans of paper “wealth” fabricated by the financial sector (and the One Bank crime syndicate), already we approach a quantum somewhere around ½ quadrillion dollars, i.e. $500 trillion, and this completely excludes all real wealth in the world, in the form of hard assets.
The conclusion is obvious: more than 90% of the actual wealth in the world today (real and paper) is hidden from us , in terms of any data made readily available to the general public. This unimaginable hoard of wealth is certainly not being hidden by the vast majority of people at the bottom of the wealth totem-pole, therefore it can only be hidden at the top. 

Equally clear; 90+% of all humanity’s wealth won’t be found by simply closer scrutiny of the supposed “world’s richest” people. If all of their fortunes were more than ten times larger than what is currently being reported, even the mathematically-challenged dolts of the mainstream media would quickly figure out that there was something amiss. 

Instead, the only rational answer is that there is another, entire tier of the “world’s richest”, an echelon above all the B-List Billionaires on the official lists. The real “world’s richest” are, in fact, not billionaires at all, but rather trillionaires: the Oligarch Trillionaires who own (among other things) the One Bank. 

How wealthy are these Oligarchs? Not only are these Oligarchs wealthy enough to be able to hide their names (and fortunes) from all public scrutiny, these trillionaires wield enough power to even prevent the word “trillionaire” from being recognized as an official word in our dictionaries. This absurdity was also noted in that prior commentary. 

Consider this. We live in a world of banker-created, fraudulent, paper currencies, where the amount of paper instruments merely sloshing around in the world’s markets is in the thousands of trillions, yet, officially we have no word for “trillionaire”. This is like imagining a world where large numbers of (fat) sheep, cows, and pigs roamed the plains, but there was no word for “carnivore”. If you have one, you must have the other.

The Oligarch Trillionaires may be able to hide in the shadows, even in a world 
where every inch of the planet is regularly scanned by spy satellites, because they control (most of) the governments who own/operate these satellites. They may be able to cover up most traces of their obscene hoards of wealth, and even prevent us from learning the precise quantum of those hoards. 

However, this doesn’t mean that the Oligarch Trillionaires have managed to erase all knowledge of their existence. For those looking for names which are at least probable candidates for the (real) “world’s richest” list, there is no better place to start than Charles Savoie’s historical chronology, The Silver Stealers.
In that compendium; Savoie has traced the deeds of many of these Oligarch families over the past 100+ years. He also identifies many of the (heavily overlapping) “organizations” which they have created, as vehicles for the administration/control of their Empire. For those who are skeptical that such a conspiracy-of-the-wealthy could trace back so far, we also have historical references. 

In 1907, U.S. Congressman (and career prosecutor) Charles Lindbergh Sr. presented “The Bankers Manifesto of 1892” to the U.S. Congress. This grandiose declaration of the oligarchs of the 19 th century, antecedents of the Oligarch Trillionaires of today, is as prophetic as it is despicable.
In part, it reads:

When through the process of law, the common people have lost their homes they will be more tractable and easily governed through the influence of the strong arm of government applied to a central power of imperial wealth under the control of the leading financiers. People without homes will not quarrel with their leaders. 
 
Look around us. The numbers of Homeless people in North America today already total in the millions, ignored by puppet governments which serve the Trillionaires, ignored by a mainstream media controlled by the Trillionaires. Meanwhile, a “central power of imperial wealth” rampages across the globe: the United States. Equally, there can be absolutely no doubt that it is “under the control of the leading financiers”, the Trillionaires. 

Beyond the cast of suspects presented by Charles Savoie as the owning families behind the One Bank, one name (and clan) stands out above all others: the Rothschilds. We reach this conclusion via two, entirely separate lines of reasoning. 

The One Bank is a crime syndicate which ultimately derives virtually all of its wealth/control via the power of the printing press, in the form of all of the West’s (and the world’s) private central banks, and primarily the Federal Reserve. When we search for some criminal clan most likely to base its empire of crime on the money-printing might (and corruption) of a central bank, we don’t have to look very far. 

Give me control of a nation’s money, and I care not who makes its laws.
- Mayer Amschel Rothschild (1744 – 1812)

Alternately, we reach this same conclusion via simple logic. We live in a world being (deliberately) drowned in debt . This is a process which, again, traces back roughly a century and more. In a world of debt, whoever starts with the largest fortune collects the most interest. In a world with total GDP of $70 trillion but total, outstanding debt in excess of $200 trillion, whoever collects the most interest will be the richest person on the planet. 

Therefore, whoever was the richest person yesterday will be the richest person today. Whoever was the richest person a hundred years ago would almost certainly be the richest person today. In the 19 th century; the Rothschild clan was universally regarded as the wealthiest “house” on the planet. Then any/all precise records of their wealth simply disappeared – not the wealth itself.
The One Bank is a crime syndicate which is literally a blight against all humanity. Its owners are guilty of the worst crimes-against-humanity. And, ultimately, as the One Bank strips humanity bare of all its wealth, these Owners make it harder and harder for themselves to continue to hide.

Post in evidenza

The Great Taking - The Movie

David Webb exposes the system Central Bankers have in place to take everything from everyone Webb takes us on a 50-year journey of how the C...