venerdì 27 novembre 2015

Big banks accused of interest rate-swap fixing

Business News | Thu Nov 26, 2015 1:01am EST

Big banks accused of interest rate-swap fixing in U.S. class action suit

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/26/us-interestrateswaps-lawsuit-idUSKBN0TE2YQ20151126#cBdMYqibRG0tGzQm.97

NEW YORK (IFR/Reuters) - A class action lawsuit, filed Wednesday, accuses 10 of Wall Street’s biggest banks and two trading platforms of conspiring to limit competition in the $320 trillion market for interest rate swaps.The class action lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, accuses Goldman Sachs Group (GS.N), Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAC.N), JPMorgan Chase(JPM.N), Citigroup(C.N), Credit Suisse Group (CSGN.VX), Barclays Plc (BARC.L), BNP Paribas SA (BNPP.PA), UBS (UBSG.VX), Deutsche Bank AG (DBKGn.DE), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS.L) of colluding to prevent the trading of interest rate swaps on electronic exchanges, like the ones on which stocks are traded.
As a result, the lawsuit alleges, banks have successfully prevented new competition from non-banks in the lucrative market for dealing interest rate swaps, the world’s most commonly traded derivative.
The banks “have been able to extract billions of dollars in monopoly rents, year after year, from the class members in this case,” the lawsuit alleged.
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse and Royal Bank of Scotland declined to comment.
JP Morgan, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and UBS were not immediately available to comment.
The suit was brought by The Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago, which purchased interest rate swaps from multiple banks to help the fund hedge against interest rate risk on debt. The plaintiffs are represented by the law firm of Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart, & Sullivan LLP, which has taken the lead in a string of antitrust suits against banks.
As a result of the banks’ collusion, the suit alleges, the Chicago teachers’ pension and retirement fund overpaid for those swaps.
The suit alleged that since at least 2007 the banks “have jointly threatened, boycotted, coerced, and otherwise eliminated any entity or practice that had the potential to bring exchange trading to buyside investors.”
“Defendants did this for one simple reason: to preserve an extraordinary profit center,” the lawsuit said.
The banks masked their collusion by using code-names for joint projects such as “Lily”, “Fusion,” and “Valkyrie,” according to the suit.
    The suit also accused broking platforms ICAP and Tradeweb, which control key cogs in the infrastructure of the swaps market, of facilitating the antitrust violations by acting as a forum for collusion and making business decisions on the banks' behalf.
    Nine of the ten defendant banks own equity stakes in Tradeweb and hold positions on the company's board and governance committees. Tradeweb is majority owned by Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters is not named as a defendant in the suit.
Tradeweb, ICAP and Thomson Reuters declined to comment.
    Bankers used those positions to control the direction of the Tradeweb and collectively blocked the development of more investor friendly swaps exchanges by firms such as the CME Group, TrueEX, Javelin Capital Markets, and TeraExchange, according to the suit.
    "During the time period relevant here, Tradeweb board and governance committees… were organized specifically for the purpose of protecting the 'dealer community' from the growth of exchange trading," reads the suit.
     Similar allegations of bank collusion in the market for another type of derivative known as credit default swaps, have been the subject of investigations by the United States Department of Justice and the European Commission, as well as a separate class action lawsuit brought by investors.
In September, twelve banks and two industry groups settled that lawsuit by agreeing to pay $1.87 billion, making it one of the largest antitrust class action lawsuits in U.S. history.

(Additional reporting by Dan Freed; Editing by Charles Levinson and Cynthia Osterman)

A lost century in economics: the conclusive evidence

Werner, R.A., A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence, International Review of Financial Analysis
(2015)


 Abstract

How do banks operate and where does the money supply come from? The financial crisis has heightened awareness that these questions have been unduly neglected by many researchers. 


During the past century, three different theories of banking were dominant at different times: 

(1) The currently prevalent financial intermediation theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank financial intermediaries. 

(2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a financial intermediary without the power to create money, but the banking system collectively is able to create money through the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’). 

(3) The credit creation theory of banking, predominant a century ago, does not consider banks as financial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but instead argues that each individual bank creates credit and money newly when granting a bank loan. 

The theories differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. 

Since according to the dominant financial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank financial intermediaries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover, the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economics modelling and policy-making would be without empirical foundation. 

Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternative methodology, which allows control for all other factors. 

The financial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of banking are rejected by the evidence. 

This finding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Barclays Bank during the crisis illustrates. 

The finding indicates that advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. 

The question is considered why the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation theory well over a century ago. 

The role of conflicts of interest and interested parties in shaping the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are indicated.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521915001477

 Appendix 1: Original audited balance sheet of Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg e.G., 2013.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/MiamiMultiMediaURL/1-s2.0-S1057521915001477/1-s2.0-S1057521915001477-mmc1.pdf/272090/html/S1057521915001477/04c868adc7a27fbb4cb9ffc84f7a0db5/mmc1.pdf

Appendix 2: 2013 Balance sheet of Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg e.G. after test adjustment.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/MiamiMultiMediaURL/1-s2.0-S1057521915001477/1-s2.0-S1057521915001477-mmc2.pdf/272090/html/S1057521915001477/324d81eaee5b3ee7dd33723beb52febc/mmc2.pdf

Knowing me, not knowing you – Barclays edition

Knowing me, not knowing you – Barclays edition

Barclays was slammed with a £72m FCA fine over financial crime risks on Thursday, this time for “ignoring its own process” over how to handle risky very rich clients and basically, allowing the (theoretical) risk of money laundering to creep in via an elephant deal of the century with a “Politically Exposed Person”.
Corporate governance fears aside, the FCA case file makes for fascinating reading (as usual).

For one thing, we learn the important lesson that NO, doing an internet search on someone’s background isn’t quite the same thing as doing actual due diligence:
Barclays also relied on printouts from publicly available internet pages to verify the Clients’ sources of wealth. However, while internet research can be a useful source of information for firms carrying out EDD, the articles used by Barclays did not provide sufficiently detailed, meaningful or reliable information as to the size and source of the Clients’ wealth.
That’ll teach those fintech companies planning to credit check you based on your not-at-all manipulatable Facebook and Linkedin profiles.
With respect to the specific nature of the failing:
2.2. The Transaction was the largest of its kind that Barclays had executed for natural persons. Deals over £20 million were commonly referred to within Barclays as “elephant deals” because of their size and the Transaction, which was for an amount of £1.88 billion, was also referred to as an “elephant deal”.
Other notable snippets:
2.7. Barclays went to significant lengths to accommodate the Clients. It did this to win the Clients’ business and for the significant revenue that it would generate from the Transaction. In the early stages of arranging the deal, when it was suggested that the Transaction might be for a larger sum, one senior manager recognised that it could be “the deal of the century”. It was also recognised by some within Barclays that the Transaction could open the door to similar significant business opportunities for Barclays.
In fact, the FCA adds the size of the deal was exceptional in that it comprised of a £1.88bn transaction for a number of ultra high net worth PEPs.
And …
c) Barclays expected to generate a significant amount of revenue from the Business Relationship by providing similar services to other clients; and
So, what do we know about the politically exposed person involved?
Watch closely because, remember, the clues are there, as we go through… the Barclays keyhole.
First there’s the period during which the deal was structured:
4.10. During 2011 Barclays was asked to arrange and execute the Transaction. Barclays was keen to do so for various reasons, in addition to winning the Clients’ business and the significant revenue that it would generate from the Transaction.
What was going on in the political environment at that time?
Second, there’s the internal confidentiality arrangements that came with it:
4.11. Prior to Barclays arranging the Transaction, Barclays agreed to enter into the Confidentiality Agreement which sought to keep knowledge of the Clients’ identity restricted to a very limited number of people within Barclays and its advisers. In the event that Barclays breached these confidentiality obligations, it would be required to indemnify the Clients up to £37.7 million. The terms of the Confidentiality Agreement were onerous and were considered by Barclays to be an unprecedented concession for clients who wished to preserve their confidentiality.
Then there’s THE ENTIRELY MANUAL PROCESS Barclays decided to dedicate to the maintenance of the deal:
In view of these confidentiality requirements, Barclays determined that details of the Clients and the Transaction should not be kept on its computer systems. A select team, including representatives from senior management, was brought together from across Barclays’ divisions and offices around the world to carry out the checks required to establish the Business Relationship and to arrange and execute the Transaction.
(They even bought a special safe!)
Some documents relating to the Business Relationship were held by Barclays in hard copy in a safe purchased specifically for storing information relating to the Business Relationship. This was Barclays’ alternative to storing the records electronically.
(Which hardly anyone knew existed!)
While there is nothing inherently wrong with keeping documents in hard copy, they must be easily identifiable and retrievable. However, few people within Barclays knew of the existence and location of the safe.
Then there’s the nature of the legal entity obfuscation:
4.13. The Transaction involved the use of a number of companies and a trust across multiple jurisdictions, which Barclays understood was to preserve the Clients’ confidentiality. It was a structured finance transaction comprised of investments in notes backed by underlying warrants and third party bonds. The target investment objective for the Transaction was a specified rate of income with full capital guarantee over a number of decades. The proceeds of the investment were held in the Trust of which the Clients were beneficiaries.
The FCA adds that some of the accounts into which funds were received as part of this structure were set up solely to transfer funds and then closed.
And, finally, a surprising amount of liquidity services offered to the clients to boot:
c) the Credit Side Letter, which stated that, if required, Barclays would provide one of the companies involved in the Transaction with an open line of credit, in the amount of up to 60% of the value of the assets invested in the Transaction, for the life of the investment and secured against all or any part of those assets. If Barclays was unable to provide the credit referred to in the letter, Barclays agreed to pay several millions of US dollars to the relevant company.
So what do we know? We know the deal occurred between 2011 and 2012. We know the clients had a certain penchant for liquidity and secrecy. We also know they weren’t the sort of people who liked to be asked about the nature of their multi-million dollar transfers to third parties.
The above should tell us something, maybe quite a bit, about the persons that benefited from the transaction…
So who would live in a business arrangement like this?
Normally, readers, it’d be over to you. But extremely rich Politically Exposed Persons tend to be quite sensitive about libel, so perhaps don’t say anything in the comment box you might regret later …

giovedì 26 novembre 2015

The Economist bankist propaganda: Italy’s bad debts


Italy’s bad debts

Burden-sharing

The government tries to relieve banks of non-performing loans


BANKS in Italy fared better during the financial crisis than many of their peers, sparing Italian taxpayers the bail-outs their counterparts in other countries had to shoulder. But although they stuck to their cautious business models and avoided fuelling a big housing boom and bust, Italy’s protracted recession has enfeebled them. It has caused bad loans to soar, which in turn has prevented them from supporting a still weak recovery with new lending.
The burden of non-performing loans (NPLs) in Italy is now immense: they amount to €350 billion ($370 billion), the equivalent of 21% of GDP. With these unproductive assets tying up their capital, Italian banks are unable to extend new credit to businesses. In fact, they are lending out less in an effort to shore up their balance-sheets (see chart).

The government would like to fix all this by setting up a “bad bank”—an asset-management company that would strip bad loans off the banks’ books and thus enable them to resume normal service to businesses. Schemes of this sort recently helped Ireland and Spain overcome big banking crises. BCG, a consultancy that has worked with the Bank of Italy on the issue, reckons that paring the most intractable NPLs to the level of 2009 would boost GDP by 1.5-2 percentage points over three years. Given the weakness of Italy’s recovery, that would be a huge leg-up.

However, such a gain would not come cheap. That was highlighted this week by the central bank’s decision to wind up four lenders whose total assets were only €47 billion. Even though these were small outfits, the cost of the rescue came to €3.6 billion. That will be used to cover losses and to recapitalise the new “bridge banks” into which the deposits and good loans will be transferred. Around a third of the sum will come from “bailing in” shareholders and junior creditors; a newly created “resolution fund”, financed by contributions from other Italian banks, will provide the rest. Intesa and UniCredit, Italy’s two biggest banks, will lend to the fund immediately to kick-start the operation. The Italian government is not putting up any of the money directly, although the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), a publicly controlled development bank that often comes to the aid of the government, is involved. The proceeds of the eventual sale of the bridge banks, plus any money recovered from the bad debts, will go to the fund.

Sorting out these four banks alone will mop up four years’ worth of contributions to the resolution fund, according to RBS, a British bank. Putting all the bad loans in the Italian banking system into a bad bank would be a far more ambitious project. Any such asset-management company could not be financed exclusively by the banks themselves; it would require some form of state backing. That is particularly problematic for the Italian government, whose debts as a share of GDP are second only to Greece’s in Europe. Moreover, any initiative has to be approved by the European Commission, which worries that banks would be relieved of their NPLs on overgenerous terms, giving them an unfair advantage. Although it approved several such measures during the heat of the crisis, it is now taking a sterner line. A hybrid solution may be the answer. This could involve a private vehicle whose borrowing would be guaranteed by CDP.

Other steps would still be needed to pep up Italy’s lenders. The government is already seeking to rationalise the banking industry by requiring big mutual banks (popolari) to turn themselves into joint-stock companies. It has also introduced a reform of bankruptcy proceedings to speed up credit recovery, which can take up to seven years. Italy cannot wait that long to sort out its bad loans.

mercoledì 25 novembre 2015

What mobile money giveth, it also taketh away

Mpesa, the digital money system rolled out in Kenya by Vodafone-owned Safaricom, is frequently cited by mobile money advocators as an excellent example of what can be achieved when you give emerging markets access to mobile money services.
But, as we’ve previously written, some unique and hard-to-replicate drivers were responsible for Mpesa’s success in Kenya — not all of them good.
Notably, in its early days, Mpesa drew major benefits from its extremely monopolistic market positioning, at one point even threatening the seigniorage power of the central bank and that of the regulated banking system.

Countries attempting to introduce digital money in a more measured manner have since learned the hard way that competitive digital money systems are inordinately harder to roll out — not least because they lack the harmonising efficiencies of monopolistic systems making them only marginally less costly than existing frameworks. This has impeded the roll-out of digital mobile money systems further afield.
With that in mind, it’s worth looking objectively at the physical reality of mobile money solutions in emerging markets rather than idealised narratives being propagated by digital vested interests.
A good indicator of the reality comes by way of Kenya’s 2015 FinAccess Geospatial Mapping Survey, which was released at the end of October.
A starting point is the physical reality of “digital mobile solutions”, which is often ignored, forgotten about or skirted over by digital fintech evangelists.
That physical reality looks like this:

What these shopfronts represent are the physical entry and exit points for national cash into and out of the mobile e-float network. Contrary to the fintech evangelist narrative, these points are essential if mobile money is to maintain its valuation peg with the national currency. Without such points, there would be no national value transfer, just a network of variably priced efloat. Without such shop fronts, there would also be no way for the unbanked population (which doesn’t have digital deposit accounts with the conventional banking system) to acquire mobile units to send anywhere.
So why then is the conventional banking system so reluctant to run these branches directly?
The simple answer, of course, is risk versus return. As a general rule there’s too much of the former and too little of the latter — not to mention, a helluva lot of operating expense in between.
Mobile money systems cut down on many of these costs by relying on networks of agents rather than having to recruit or invest in personnel and infrastructure directly. Hence the tendency for monopolisation and Uber-esque platform effects.
In a competitive system — especially one which lacks the presence of a supervisory authority or regulator — competing vendors will have their own way of doing things, from how they vet agents and users, to how they manage deposits and withdrawals, or even how they secure and hold funds.
Given the lack of common standards, the greater the competition, the greater the uncertainty regarding whether or not operators meet basic standards. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the risk. And the greater the risk, the greater the need for vendors to do their own checks when accepting mobile money originating from other vendors. By which point, it’s hardly worth the trouble or the expense.
A monopoly provider, however, avoids many of these uncertainties, thus reduces many of these costs as well (providing it can trust its own agent network).
To wit, here’s the key reason why mobile money has succeeded so triumphantly in Kenya, not so much anywhere else:

And yet, even in a highly monopolised market, there’s still the question of trusting your agents. Can trust really be assumed when nearly 14 per cent of the agent network says it has never been formally trained by the operator, while those who had mostly received training from “mobile money specialists”, whatever they may be?

One thing above all else is very notable. For all the hoopla and ballyhoo regarding Mpesa’s impact on monetary velocity in Kenya, there has been little industry acknowledgement of the increased fraud that’s come with it. From the survey:


And now compare and contrast the counterfeit money stats with that of the traditional banking system (which we know, already has principal agency problems of its own in many emerging states) – click to enlarge:

As Patrick Njoroge, governor of the central bank of Kenya commented at the launch of the survey on October 29:
The fieldwork interviews gave some interesting feedback, with some of the key issues that emerged indicating instances of fraud. Mobile money service providers reported the highest instances of fraud at 37 percent as compared to 10 percent of bank agents. Counterfeit money was the greatest reported type of fraud amongst service providers in forex bureaus and mobile money providers, while fake identification was the highest reported type of fraud amongst insurance providers and capital markets service providers.
We must remember that fintech and mobile money promoters have an interest in depicting a world where digitised solutions have the potential to eliminate all system ails, including the costs of servicing risky sectors. We must also remember they have an interest in depicting a world wherein incumbents purposefully constrain services for no good reason at all.
For the most part, however, there’s a reason why experienced providers (many of whom are already digital businesses) withhold services from risky sectors, or if they do provide them, why they do so at prices which cover the related risks. That reason is… they’re not in the business of non-profit or charitable operations.
Given that reality, it’s not implausible that many of the mobile operators currently claiming revolutionary efficiency and profitability are sleepwalking their way into risk markets they don’t fully comprehend.
At the end of the day, poorly vetting customers for their ability to pay up for services already rendered impacts only a corporation’s potential bottom line if and when they fail to pay. Poorly vetting customers for their ability to pay others, however, potentially undermines the entire system’s solvency and hurts those who contribute productively to the system the most.
Related links:
Mpesa: the costs of evolving an independent central bank – FT Alphaville
When financial inclusion stands for financial intrusion – FT Alphaville

venerdì 20 novembre 2015

Negative Interest, the War on Cash, and the $10 Trillion Bail-in

Hang Onto Your Wallets: Negative Interest, the War on Cash, and the $10 Trillion Bail-in

In uncertain times, “cash is king,” but central bankers are systematically moving to eliminate that option. Is it really about stimulating the economy? Or is there some deeper, darker threat afoot?
Remember those old ads showing a senior couple lounging on a warm beach, captioned “Let your money work for you”? Or the scene in Mary Poppins where young Michael is being advised to put his tuppence in the bank, so that it can compound into “all manner of private enterprise,” including “bonds, chattels, dividends, shares, shipyards, amalgamations . . . .”?
That may still work if you’re a Wall Street banker, but if you’re an ordinary saver with your money in the bank, you may soon be paying the bank to hold your funds rather than the reverse.
Four European central banks – the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, Sweden’s Riksbank, and Denmark’s Nationalbank – have now imposed negative interest rates on the reserves they hold for commercial banks; and discussion has turned to whether it’s time to pass those costs on to consumers. The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve are still at ZIRP (Zero Interest Rate Policy), but several Fed officials have also begun calling for NIRP (negative rates).
The stated justification for this move is to stimulate “demand” by forcing consumers to withdraw their money and go shopping with it. When an economy is struggling, it is standard practice for a central bank to cut interest rates, making saving less attractive. This is supposed to boost spending and kick-start an economic recovery.
That is the theory, but central banks have already pushed the prime rate to zero, and still their economies are languishing. To the uninitiated observer, that means the theory is wrong and needs to be scrapped. But not to our intrepid central bankers, who are now experimenting with pushing rates below zero.
Locking the Door to Bank Runs: The Cashless Society
The problem with imposing negative interest on savers, as explained in the UK Telegraph, is that “there’s a limit, what economists called the ‘zero lower bound’. Cut rates too deeply, and savers would end up facing negative returns. In that case, this could encourage people to take their savings out of the bank and hoard them in cash. This could slow, rather than boost, the economy.”
Again, to the ordinary observer, this would seem to signal that negative interest rates won’t work and the approach needs to be abandoned. But not to our undaunted central bankers, who have chosen instead to plug this hole in their leaky theory by moving to eliminate cash as an option. If your only choice is to keep your money in a digital account in a bank and spend it with a bank card or credit card or checks, negative interest can be imposed with impunity. This is already happening in Sweden, and other countries are close behind. As reported on Wolfstreet.com:
The War on Cash is advancing on all fronts. One region that has hogged the headlines with its war against physical currency is Scandinavia. Sweden became the first country to enlist its own citizens as largely willing guinea pigs in a dystopian economic experiment: negative interest rates in a cashless society. As Credit Suisse reports, no matter where you go or what you want to purchase, you will find a small ubiquitous sign saying “Vi hanterar ej kontanter” (“We don’t accept cash”) . . . .
The Lesson of Gesell’s Decaying Currency
Whether negative interests will actually stimulate an economic recovery, however, remains in doubt. Proponents of the theory cite Silvio Gesell and the Wörgl experiment of the 1930s. As explained by Charles Eisenstein in Sacred Economics:
The pioneering theoretician of negative-interest money was the German-Argentinean businessman Silvio Gesell, who called it “free-money” (Freigeld) . . . . The system he proposed in his 1906 masterwork, The Natural Economic Order, was to use paper currency to which a stamp costing a small fraction of the note’s value had to be affixed periodically. This effectively attached a maintenance cost to monetary wealth.
. . . [In 1932], the depressed town of Wörgl, Austria, issued its own stamp scrip inspired by Gesell . . . . The Wörgl currency was by all accounts a huge success. Roads were paved, bridges built, and back taxes were paid. The unemployment rate plummeted and the economy thrived, attracting the attention of nearby towns. Mayors and officials from all over the world began to visit Wörgl until, as in Germany, the central government abolished the Wörgl currency and the town slipped back into depression.
. . . [T]he Wörgl currency bore a demurrage rate [a maintenance charge for carrying money] of 1 percent per month. Contemporary accounts attributed to this the very rapid velocity of the currencies’ circulation. Instead of generating interest and growing, accumulation of wealth became a burden, much like possessions are a burden to the nomadic hunter-gatherer. As theorized by Gesell, money afflicted with loss-inducing properties ceased to be preferred over any other commodity as a store of value.
There is a critical difference, however, between the Wörgl currency and the modern-day central bankers’ negative interest scheme. The Wörgl government first issued its new “free money,” getting it into the local economy and increasing purchasing power, before taxing a portion of it back. And the proceeds of the stamp tax went to the city, to be used for the benefit of the taxpayers. As Eisenstein observes:
It is impossible to prove . . . that the rejuvenating effects of these currencies came from demurrage and not from the increase in the money supply . . . .
Today’s central bankers are proposing to tax existing money, diminishing spending power without first building it up. And the interest will go to private bankers, not to the local government.
Consumers today already have very little discretionary money. Imposing negative interest without first adding new money into the economy means they will have even less money to spend. This would be more likely to prompt them to save their scarce funds than to go on a shopping spree.
People are not keeping their money in the bank today for the interest (which is already nearly non-existent). It is for the convenience of writing checks, issuing bank cards, and storing their money in a “safe” place. They would no doubt be willing to pay a modest negative interest for that convenience; but if the fee got too high, they might pull their money out and save it elsewhere. The fee itself, however, would not drive them to buy things they did not otherwise need.
Is There a Bigger Threat than a Sluggish Economy?
The scheme to impose negative interest and eliminate cash seems so unlikely to stimulate the economy that one wonders if that is the real motive. Stopping tax evaders and terrorists (real or presumed) are other proposed justifications for going cashless. Economist Martin Armstrong goes further and suggests that the goal is to gain totalitarian control over our money. In a cashless society, our savings can be taxed away by the banks; the threat of bank runs by worried savers can be eliminated; and the too-big-to-fail banks can be assured that ample deposits will be there when they need to confiscate them through bail-ins to stay afloat.
And that may be the real threat on the horizon: a major derivatives default that hits the largest banks, those that do the vast majority of derivatives trading. On November 10, 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported the results of a study requested by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Elijah Cummings, involving the cost to taxpayers of the rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act in the “cromnibus” spending bill last December. As Jessica Desvarieux put it on the Real News Network, “the rule reversal allows banks to keep $10 trillion in swaps trades on their books, which taxpayers could be on the hook for if the banks need another bailout.”
The promise of Dodd-Frank, however, was that there would be “no more taxpayer bailouts.” Instead, insolvent systemically-risky banks were supposed to “bail in” (confiscate) the money of their creditors, including their depositors (the largest class of creditor of any bank). That could explain the push to go cashless. By quietly eliminating the possibility of cash withdrawals, the central bank can make sure the deposits are there to be grabbed when disaster strikes.
If central bankers are seriously trying to stimulate the economy with negative interest rates, they need to repeat the Wörgl experiment in full. They need to first get some new money into the economy, money that goes directly to the consumers and local businessmen who will spend it. This could be achieved in a number of ways: with a national dividend; or by using quantitative easing for infrastructure or low-interest loans to states; or by funding free tuition for higher education. Consumers will hit the malls when they have some new discretionary income to spend.
_____________
Ellen Brown is an attorney, founder of the Public Banking Institute, and author of twelve books including the best-selling Web of Debt. Her latest book, The Public Bank Solution, explores successful public banking models historically and globally. Her 300+ blog articles are at EllenBrown.com. Listen to “It’s Our Money with Ellen Brown” on PRN.FM.

Varoufakis at Keiser Report: Radical Ideas to fix Inequality

mercoledì 18 novembre 2015

Where’s my liability, dude?

Something doesn’t add up in the world.
And when things don’t add up, you can only really blame the accountants.
Here’s the problem.
As per Gabriel Zucman’s book, The Hidden Wealth of Nations, the world’s financial liabilities are worth about $7.6 trillion more than the world’s financial assets. Roughly $6.1 trillion of these extra liabilities take the form of equity and long-term debt, with the other $1.5 trillion held in low-yielding deposits and money-market funds.
As FT Alphaville’s Matt Klein has pointed out already there are only three possible explanations for such a massive discrepancy:
  • aliens have been accumulating trillions of dollars of claims against Earthlings
  • innocent mistakes by statistical agencies add up to an enormous gap, or, most believably
  • the world’s ultra-rich have squirrelled away trillions of dollars from the authorities to avoid paying tax.
So, how long has this mismatch been a thing?
Zucman tells us nobody really knows for sure because before 2001 many countries didn’t report complete portfolio asset positions which messes with the statistics.
Nevertheless, our first hint of something being mismatched comes about in the 1970s when the IMF first began noticing the world was running a current account deficit, says Zucman.
As the IMF noted in a report in 2000:
In principle, since the exports of one country are the imports of another, the current account balances of all countries in the world should sum to zero. In practice, however, this is not the case. Since the mid-1970s, the sum of all countries’ current account balances has—except in 1997—been negative, giving the world in aggregate a measured current account deficit.

In 1998, the last year for which complete data are available, this global current account discrepancy was about 1 percent of world imports, but preliminary data suggest that it increased sharply to 3 percent of world imports in 1999. Such a large and variable current account discrepancy is of particular concern at a time when substantial external current account imbalances in the three main currency areas are a major policy issue.
As to the largest contributing factor to that global deficit? According to the IMF, that was the investment income account, with smaller, but still significant deficits on the transfers account, caused by four main factors: transportation delays (call that the stuff in “limbo” effect), asymmetric valuation (mis-valuation at import/export point due to fluctuating FX rates), data quality (book-keeping errors) and… underreporting of investment income.
But the 1970s start-point is interesting for other reasons.
Mariana Mazucatto, innovation economist at Sussex University, reminded us last week that GDP statistics only began to include financial rent as an added-value contribution to global productivity in the 1960s.
We started wondering whether this could have had some bearing on the discrepancy between global liabilities and assets.
As the IMF noted in 2000:
Investment income is difficult to capture and therefore may go underreported in the balance of payments. The growth of offshore financial centers is making it more difficult for statistical agencies to track financial transactions.
A paradox, surely?
On one hand we have the underreporting of investment income potentially contributing to a global asset/liability discrepancy, implying some portion of global wealth is being hidden for tax purposes or because it’s derived from illegal sources (a meth lab is a risky asset, but still an asset, as is a gun in the hand of an extortionist).
On the other hand, we formalised the manner in which investment and financial rent might be inputted into the system as a value-add. The latter would imply a boost to the asset side of the equation not a contraction, one would think?
In 1997, the IMF observed that it was the 1987 current account study’s focus on investment income transactions, which include interest and dividend earnings and payments, which had drawn attention to the discrepancy:
The discrepancy between investment income credits and debits (excluding reinvested earnings from direct investment) has steadily increased since then to become the largest contributor to the overall discrepancy in the world current accounts.
The IMF had basically noticed that a large body of cross-border assets were being recognised by debtor countries but not, for some reason, by the creditor countries, a condition which only got worse as interest rates rose after 1979. Countries receiving the capital, the IMF proposed, were perhaps in a better position to measure capital inflows than countries where the creditors resided.
Money as the product of a financial firm
As noted earlier, financial rent began to be featured as a value-add component in GDP in the 1960s, according to Mazzucato. Even so, the methodology behind this inclusion — which focuses on the net interest margin — has always been strongly challenged. Some have argued, for example, that because the interest margin includes a risk premium, a large amount of what’s being counted as value add might very well be being over-estimated. The counter argument, of course, is that the core value-add service banks provide is screening for investor risk and hunting out information advantages.
As the BoE’s quarterly bulletin in 2011 noted:
But it is hard to quantify the benefits arising when banks use this additional information. Banks with better risk management practices should be regarded as providing higher-quality services, and therefore as generating higher output when they provide finance. But this activity is almost impossible to measure ex ante. Conversely, the impact of poor decision-making may only become apparent years later, and cannot easily be reflected in estimates of output when a loan is first made.
This thinking adds to the thesis that finance is ultimately a production technology which uses data as an input, processes said data, and transforms it into a decision as to where to allocate capital profitably and without risk.
Diana Hancock, of the Federal Reserve, observed in her seminal piece on banks as financial firms, in 1985, that banks were in fact producers of monetary goods. Like conventional producers they too had an interest in withholding supply if and when returns fell below productions costs. The only difference is that banks as a rule have much lower production costs than traditional firms, amounting mostly to the cost of screening and verifying investments; their own as well as other players who they see fit to bring into their “eco-systems” for the sake of transaction fungibility.
In the topsy turvy world of monetary goods, consequently, the cost of production is directly linked to the cost of screening risk in the system and pricing it in accordance to the overall quantity of capital available in the economy.
If that’s true, marketshare, can only be gained if bankers are prepared to be less thorough with screening or take a contrarian view on how much capital there really is to go around. For the most part that makes “disruptor” money producers riskier entities as a whole, solidifying the cartel structure of the initial stakeholding network.
As Hancock notes:
The financial firm maximises a function based on the utility of variable profits, and the response of monetary production depends on the attitude toward risk and the specification of the utility function.
Should negative and positive values be fungible?
Money is a risk-sharing technology. When it works it transfers risk to those most willing and able to bear it and helps households and investors insure against the unexpected. When it doesn’t (very much like modern information technology platforms) it transfers risk — in some cases educated risk — to those least willing and able to bear it by forcing households and investors to cover losses when the value which was perceived as having been added is suddenly removed by constantly adjusting market dynamics.
Like Uber, banking works by getting others to absorb the risk of variable returns whilst taking a steady fee for itself for as long as it able to.
For as long as positive and negative value are conflated via the bank intermediation process, however, there’s an argument to be made that today’s financial accounting isn’t fit for purpose. We simply have no idea whether the assets being created by the banking sector are not being simultaneously offset by additional risks in the system elsewhere.
Going back to Zucman, should we really be surprised that there are outstanding liabilities versus creditor assets, if financial intermediaries are predisposed to overcharging for risk services before they have actually been proven to add value?
Once everything is squared up, after all, that’s tantamount to a significant number of non-asset-backed liabilities in the system, funded as it were by yet-to-be created future value rather than existing capital — a factor exaggerated by rising interest rates and the capacity of offshore centres to obscure unfunded liability creation.
Related links:
The bond liquidity ‘cognitive bandwidth deficit’ problem – FT Alphaville

martedì 17 novembre 2015

How France loots its former colonies

How France loots its former colonies

Francois Hollande with the Senegalese President Macky Sall
Francois Hollande with the Senegalese President Macky Sall

By  for This is Africa

We try to keep a positive vibe going here at This Is Africa, but every so often you come across something that just paints your mood black. Some of you may already be aware of this, but if like us you’re hearing about this for the first time your jaw will drop. And it’ll probably raise the same BIG questions in your mind that it did in ours.
Incidentally, once you read this you’ll no longer wonder why French presidents and ministers are sometimes greeted by protests when they visit former French colonies in Africa, even if the protests are about other issues. Though what other issues could be more important than this one we have no idea.
14 African countries only ever have access to 15% of their own money!
Monetary bankruptcy
Just before France conceded to African demands for independence in the 1960s, it carefully organised its former colonies (CFA countries) in a system of “compulsory solidarity” which consisted of obliging the 14African states to put 65% of their foreign currency reserves into the French Treasury, plus another 20% for financial liabilities. This means these 14 African countries only ever have access to 15% of their own money! If they need more they have to borrow their own money from the French at commercial rates! And this has been the case since the 1960s.
Professor Nicolas Agbohou, Associate Professor at the Institute of Cheikh Anta Diop, University of Gabon
Believe it or not it gets worse.
France has the first right to buy or reject any natural resources found in the land of the Francophone countries. So even if the African countries can get better prices elsewhere, they can’t sell to anybody until France says it doesn’t need the resources.
In the award of government contracts, French companies must be considered first; only after that can these countries look elsewhere. It doesn’t matter if the CFA countries can obtain better value for money elsewhere.
Presidents of CFA countries that have tried to leave the CFA zone have had political and financial pressure put on them by successive French presidents.
CFA Zone
No escaping the CFA Zone
Thus, these African states are French taxpayers – taxed at a staggering rate – yet the citizens of these countries aren’t French and don’t have access to the public goods and services their money helps pay for.
CFA zones are solicited to provide private funding to French politicians during elections in France.
The above is a summary of an article we came across in the February issue of the New African(and from an interview given by Professor Mamadou Koulibaly, Speaker of the Ivorian National Assembly, Professor of Economics, and author of the book The Servitude of the Colonial Pact), and we hope they won’t mind us sharing it with you influx, so here goes:
w430.68de7-9The colonial pact
It is the Colonial Pact that set up the common currency for the Francophone countries, the CFA Franc, which demands that each of the 14 C.F.A member countries must deposit 65% (plus another 20% for financial liabilities, making the dizzying total of 85%) of their foreign exchange reserves in an “Operations Account” at the French Treasury in Paris.
The African nations therefore have only access to 15% of their own money for national development in any given year. If they are in need of extra money, as they always are, they have to borrow from their own 65% in the French Treasury at commercial rates. And that is not all: there is a cap on the credit extended to each member country equivalent to 20% of their public revenue in the preceding year. So if the countries need to borrow more than 20%, too bad; they cannot do it. Amazingly, the final say on the C.F.A arrangements belongs to the French Treasury, which invests the African countries’ money in its own name on the Paris Bourse (the stock exchange).
Ownership of natural resources
It is also the Colonial Pact that demands that France has the first right to buy or reject any natural resources found in the land of the Francophone countries. So even if the African countries could get better prices elsewhere, they cannot sell to anybody until France says it does not want to buy those natural resources.
The contract must go to a French company, which incidentally has quoted an astronomical price
It is, again, the Colonial Pact that demands that in the award of government contracts in the African countries, French companies should be considered first; only after that can Africans look elsewhere. Itdoesn’t matter if Africans can obtain better value for money elsewhere, French companies come first, and most often get the contracts. Currently, there is the awkward case in Abidjan where, before the elections, former president Gbagbo’s government wanted to build a third major bridge to link the central business district (called Plateau) to the rest of the city, from which it is separated by a lagoon. By Colonial Pact tradition, the contract must go to a French company, which incidentally has quoted an astronomical price – to be paid in euros or US dollars.
From Parliament to resources
Not happy, Gbagbo’s government sought a second quote from the Chinese, who offered to build the bridge at half the price quoted by the French company, and – wait for this – payment would be in cocoa beans, of which Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer. But, unsurprisingly, the French said “non, you can’t do that”.
Overall the Colonial Pact gives the French a dominant and privileged 
position over Francophone Africa, but in Côte d’Ivoire, the jewel of the former French possessions in Africa, the French are overly dominant. Outside parliament, almost all the major utilities – water, electricity, telephone, transport, ports and major banks – are run by French companies or French interests. The same story is found in commerce, construction, and agriculture.
central-african-republic-francois-hollande-china-oil
In short, the Colonial Pact has created a legal mechanism under which
 France obtains a special place in the political and economic life of its former colonies.
The big questions
In what meaningful way can any of the 14 CFA countries be said to be independent?
If this isn’t illegal and an international crime, then what is?
What is it going to take for this state of indentured servitude to end?
How much have the CFA countries lost as a result of this 50-year (and counting) “agreement”? (Remember, they’ve had to borrow their own money from the French at commercial rates)
Do French people know they’re living off the wealth of African countries and have been doing so for over half a century? And if they know, do they give a damn?
When will France start paying back money they’ve sucked from these countries, not only directly from the interest on cash reserves and loans these countries have had to take out, but also on lost earnings from the natural resources the countries sold to France below market rates as well as the lost earnings resulting from awarding contracts to French companies when other contractors could have done things for less?
Does any such “agreement” exist between Britain and its former colonies, or did they really let go when they let go?

lunedì 16 novembre 2015

USBIG NewsFlash Volume 16, no. 89, November 2015

USBIG NewsFlash Volume 16, no. 89, November 2015
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USBIG NewsFlash Volume 16, no. 89, November 2015

 
NEWS
 
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UNITED STATES: Leading economists and business people discuss Basic Income at the World Summit on Technological Unemployment

 
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ALASKA: The state’s mini-basic income comes under increasing attack

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UNITED STATES: Detroit activist Grace Lee Boggs dies at 100, she endorsed city-level universal basic income

 
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ALASKA: Study Links Permanent Fund Dividend with Increased Birth Weight

NEWS FROM AROUND THE WORLD
 
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SWITZERLAND: Parliament rejects basic income initiative, but poll shows popular support

 
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SOUTH KOREA: Seongnam City announced to implement ‘Youth Dividend’

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PORTUGAL: New book from authors André Barata and Renato Miguel do Carmo released

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ITALY: Friuli-Venezia Giulia region introduces a minimum income experiment

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Portugal: First pro-Basic Income congressman gets elected to parliament

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FINLAND: Government Forms Research Team to Design Basic Income Pilots

 
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Portugal: Presidency candidate Manuela Gonzaga supports basic income

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NAMIBIA: Basic Income Grant Back on National Agenda

 
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PORTUGAL: Paulo Borges runs for President, while defending basic income

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United Kingdom: Opposition’s Economic Adviser Argues for UBI

EVENTS
 
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SAN FRANCISCO, USA: Political and Technological Strategies towards a post-Scarcity Society










 
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SAN FRANCISCO: Universal Basic Income Createathon, November 13-15

 
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Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: Call for Participation in the 15th North American Basic Income Guarantee Congress, 12-15 May 2016

FROM THE WEB
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Basic Income NYC, “what would you do?”

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Federico Pistono, “As tech threatens jobs, we must test a universal basic income”

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Christine Emba, “Universal basic income: A primer”

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UNITED STATES: U.S. Department of Arts and Culture Sponsors Basic Income Grant

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Roy Bahat, “To support innovation, subsidize creators”

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Tom Streithorst, “A New Golden Age Part III: The Basic Income Guarantee”

OPINIONS & REVIEWS
 
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Disputing Citizenship, a review

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Basic Income as the Core of the Economy

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Charity is for setbacks, not systematic shortfalls

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My libertarian-socialist working feeling

ACADEMIC LITERATURE
 
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Robin Jessen, Davud Rostam-Afschar, and Viktor Steiner, “Welche Effekte hätte ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen für Deutschland?” [What effects would a Basic Income have for Germany?]

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Herbert Jauch, “The Rise and Fall of the Basic Income Grant Campaign: Lessons from Namibia”

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David Casassas and Jurgen De Wispelaere “Republicanism and the political economy of democracy.”

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