domenica 29 marzo 2020

USURY ON THE GREAT WAR

USURY ON THE GREAT WAR 
(Extracted from:
THE FINANCIERS AND THE NATION
by The Rt. Hon. THOMAS JOHNSTON, P.C. 
EX LORD PRIVY SEAL
With a Preface by SIDNEY WEBB 
1934

   ‘ The investing public have been pandered to in a manner altogether out of keeping with the times. . . . Victory can be purchased at too high a price.' - Glasgow Herald (4/10/1916).

   ‘ The Imperial Democracy that held all the world beneath its sway, from the senators who bore historic names down to the humblest tiller of the soil, from Julius Caesar down to the smallest shopkeeper in a back street of Rome, was at the mercy of a small group of usurers.' - Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of the Roman Empire, vi. 223.


WHEN the whistle blew for the start of the Great War in August 1914 the Bank of England possessed only nine millions sterling of a gold reserve, and, as the Bank of England was the Bankers' Bank, this sum constituted the effective reserve of all the other Banking Institutions in Great Britain.

   The bank managers at the outbreak of War were seriously afraid that the depositing public, in a panic, would demand the return of their money. And, inasmuch as the deposits and savings left in the hands of the bankers by the depositing public had very largely been sunk by the bankers in enterprises which, at the best, could not repay the borrowed capital quickly, and which in several and large-scale instances were likely to be submerged altogether in the stress of war and in the collapse of great areas of international trade, it followed that if there were a widespread panicky run upon the banks, the banks would be unable to pay and the whole credit system would collapse, to the ruin of millions of people.

   Private enterprise banking thus being on the verge of collapse, the Government (Mr. Lloyd George at the time was Chancellor of the Exchequer) hurriedly declared a moratorium, i.e. it authorized the banks not to pay out (which in any event the banks could not do), and it extended the August Bank Holiday for another three days. During these three or four days when the banks and stock exchanges were closed, the bankers held anxious negotiation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. And one of them has placed upon record the fact that ' he (Mr. George) did everything that we asked him to do.’  When the banks re-opened, the public discovered that, instead of getting their money back in gold, they were paid in a new legal tender of Treasury notes (the £1 notes in black and the 10s. notes in red colours). This new currency had been issued by the State, was backed by the credit of the State, and was issued to the banks to prevent the banks from utter collapse. The public cheerfully accepted the new notes ; and nobody talked about inflation.

   Not since 1697 had the State itself issued paper money. In that year, 1697, notes in the denomination of £5 were issued direct to the public without the intervention of the finance houses ; and these notes were not backed by gold but were legal tender for the payment of taxes. In 1914, however, the State issue of money was upon a colossal scale ; the legal tender was not limited to the payment of taxes, but was complete for all purposes, and the issue was made with the good- will of the bankers and indeed at their plea and intercession. Had that new money not been issued, the private banking houses of Britain would have been compelled to default to their creditors in a week's time. Dr. Walter Leaf, late Chairman of the Westminster Bank and an ex-President of the Institute of Bankers, has enlightened us as to the real effect of the issue of Treasury notes under the Currency and Bank Notes Act of August 6, 1914.

   ‘ The amount and manner of the issue’ he declares, ' was left to the absolute discretion of the Treasury. This was essentially a War Loan, free of interest, for an unlimited period, and, as such, was a highly profitable expedient from the point of view of the Government.'
[Banking, by Dr. Walter Leaf, Home University Library, p. 46]

   He proceeds to argue that, to some extent, this State issue of Treasury notes was covered by the gold coinage which patriotic people exchanged for the notes ; but there was no provision whatever in the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1914 for any gold backing, and, in any event, the amount of gold coin reserved for pretended security against Treasury notes totalling some three hundred million pounds was, at its maximum, only twenty-seven million pounds. The three hundred million of new money issued by the Treasury in 1914 was therefore, in effect, a War Loan, free of interest. But, alas, when the War was over, the Treasury, by a Minute issued on December 15, 1919, announced that its policy was to be a gradual reduction in these Treasury notes ; and it proceeded year by year to take the notes off the Market, on the plea that the notes so cancelled were not covered either by gold or by Bank of England notes. Between the years 1920 and 1926, there was a progressive reduction in Treasury notes from £320,600,000 to £246,902,500.

   To return, however, to the early war period, no sooner had Mr. Lloyd George got the bankers out of their difficulties in the autumn of 1914 by the issue of the Treasury money, than they were round again at the Treasury door explaining forcibly that the State must, upon no account, issue any more money on this interest free basis ; if the war was to be run, it must be run with borrowed money, money upon which interest must be paid, and they were the gentlemen who would see to the proper financing of a good, juicy War Loan at 3! per cent, interest, and to that last proposition the Treasury yielded. The War was not to be fought with interest-free money, and/or/with conscription of wealth ; though it was to be fought with conscription of life. Many small businesses were to be closed and their proprietors sent overseas as redundant, and without any compensation for their losses, while Finance, as we shall see, was to be heavily and progressively remunerated.
   As each war loan became exhausted the lenders upon the first lower interest War Loans were permitted to transfer into the later higher interest Loans, and usurers' interest upon credit was added to the national burden, so that to-day that burden is insupportable and the nation staggers along, cutting the bread and cheese of its poor, and starving the social services in a vain attempt to meet the charges incurred in the Great War Loan ramps.
   The report of the Cunliffe Committee (1927) relates the story of the progressive piling up of our War Debt burdens. [Appendices to the Report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation (1927), p. 18 et seq.]
   But it is in nowise a complete chronique scandaleuse of usury in war-time ; nor did its authors so intend it to be. We find in its pages no reference to or hint of the magical process by which, while the nation struggled almost at death's door for its very existence, and while masses of the fittest of our manhood were daily being blown into bundles of bloody rags, our banking fraternities continued to create for themselves a great volume of new credit and to lend that credit to us at interest, and indeed at progressively increased interest ; no reference to the fact that by this manufacture of bankers' credit some portion, variously estimated in amount, of what now stands as the public debt, was simply fabricated for private ends and was not a bona-fide loan of real wealth to the nation. Professor Soddy has estimated that the bankers actually created £2,000,000,000, no less, of this bank credit, and lent it out to us at 5 per cent [Soddy, Wealth, Virtual Wealth, and Debt (Allen & Unwin Ltd.), p. 195]. That means £100,000,000 a year upon nothing.

   The first War Loan at interest was floated in November 1914, at 3 ½ per cent., and the investors were only required to subscribe £95 for each £100 of scrip. The total amount of the loan was £350 millions, but as there were not three hundred and fifty millions of money in the country, what the State received was credit the pledged credit of individuals and corporations and banking houses (the same banking houses which, as we have seen, three months earlier had been begging the Treasury notes on loan from the Government to save their precious banking system from bankruptcy) .

  The second War Loan was issued at par in June 1915 at 4 ½ per cent, interest ; and such investors, and corporations and banking houses as had held the previous War Loan Stock at 3 ½ per cent, were permitted to transfer into the new loan at the increased rate of interest.

   Actually of the 4 ½ per cent. Loan the sum of £176,000,000 was not new loan money at all, but was a considerable portion of the old 3 ½ per cent. Loan silently 'jumping the counter ' on to the higher rate.
   And, in addition to that, the holders of no less than £138,000,000 of the new 4 ½ per cent. Loan were old holders of 2 ½ per cent. Consols and 2 ½ per cent, and 2 ¾ per cent. Annuities, who also had been permitted to transfer into the higher rate of interest yield. These conversions at the higher rate of interest meant a clear gift of at least £4,000,000 a year in extra interest to the money-lenders.

  But the story of this great finance ramp of June 1915 is incomplete without a reference being made to the pledge extracted from the State by the finance houses and banks that, should there be any subsequent issue of War Loan at a still higher rate of interest than 4 ½ per cent., the holders of the new 4 ½ per cent. Loan (£901,000,000 in amount) would be entitled to convert at a higher scale, and this, as we shall see in a moment, the great bulk of them succeeded in doing.

   Mr. Lloyd George has publicly declared that the increased rate of interest offered in the War Loan of June 1915 was quite unnecessary. He says :

   ‘Looking back, I cannot help regretting that Mr. McKenna should have thought it necessary to raise the interest rate of a Government loan to 4 ½ per cent. Maybe this corresponded to the price that was being offered for other gilt-edged securities. But in view of the increase in our nominal capital reserves due to war inflation and to the restriction of an overseas market for investment money, which was also one of the effects of the War, there can be little doubt that the Government could have continued to obtain as much money as it required by voluntary investment, without raising its interest rate beyond the level of 3 2/3 per cent, at which my first loan had been negotiated. Investors would have had to take this, for lack of an alternative. And if they had been unwilling to do so, there would have been a clear and popular ground for the conscription of capital for war purposes - a step which would have been an appropriate corollary to the conscription of man-power which we were soon to introduce.' [War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. i. p. 122]
   We must note another, even more amazing and more impudent, of the methods of debt and interest concoction in these delirious war-times. The banks actually issued circulars to thousands of their customers inviting them to apply for a portion of the new War Loan and to borrow credit from the banks for that purpose at 3 per cent. The customer was to put up no money for his War Loan, no margin, no securities. The bank was to supply the credit, or rather was to back the customer's credit and was to charge the customer 3 per cent, interest for so doing ; but the State was pledging itself to pay 4 ½ per cent, interest on the War Loan which the customer was purchasing with his 3 per cent, money. The customer, after allowing for his Income Tax, &c., was clearly 1 per cent, per annum in pocket on the deal.

   It is indeed difficult to write in cold blood of these financial dodges, arranged between the City and the Treasury and committed upon a nation in extremis.

   In March 1916 the Bank of England, without any apparent sense of shame, issued press advertisements which ran :

‘ IF YOU CANNOT FIGHT '

' If you cannot fight, you can help your country by investing
all you can in 5 per cent. Exchequer Bonds. . . . Unlike the
soldier, the investor runs no risk.'

   Yet all these efforts surely paled before the shameless greed of the third great War Loan in January 1917. No foreign conqueror could have devised a more complete robbery and enslavement of the British Nation. The rate of interest in War Loan was jumped to 5 per cent, (or at the option of the investor, 4 per cent, free of Income Tax until October 1942) and the holders of previous War Loans and Treasury Bills and War Expenditure Certificates were invited to come in and convert their old stock into the higher rates of booty, and for each £100 of Stock in the new loan, only £95 had to be subscribed, so that the rate of interest really had been raised to 5 1/3 per cent. Into this 5 per cent. War Loan tumbled the holders on £820,000,000 of the 4 ½ per cent. Loan, thus securing an extra ½ per cent, or 4,000,000 in addition to the increases which many of them had secured when the rate of interest was previously jumped from 3 ½ per cent to 4 ½ per cent. And not only were the 4 ½ per centers permitted to convert into the 5 per cent. War Loan, but the holders of £130,000,000 of Treasury Bills and £280,500,000 of Exchequer Bonds also converted. The new 5 per cent. Loan of £2,075,750,000 secured only, in fact, £844,750,000 of new loans, the balance being paper conversions from old lower interest Stocks, whereby the converters were enabled to dig deeper into the national pocket than they had hitherto done.

   But that was not the sum-total of the iniquitous ramp which the lackeys of the money interest imposed upon us with the 5 per cent. Loan of 1917. The investors were made exempt from all British Income Tax upon their interest payment if they chose to go and live abroad. Mr. Lloyd George has himself testified that this 5 per cent. Loan was raised at ' a penal figure/ and he continues :

   ' The same rate governed subsequent borrowings, which by the end of the War had added a further £4,000,000,000 to our National Debt. It cost the country a dozen years of remorseless deflation and concomitant depression to bring interest rates down again to a level that would enable this vast sum to be reconverted to 3 ½ per cent. Throughout the interval, not only was the country taxing itself to pay a sum ranging at one time as high as £100,000,000 a year more than it would otherwise have done, but the high yield of a gilt-edged Government security kept up rates all round, and made money dearer for all enterprises, industrial, commercial, and national. It would be hard to estimate the sum-total of the price paid by the nation in every department of affairs for the decision of Mr. McKenna in 1915 to increase the rate of interest paid by the Government on its war-time borrowings. His action had, no doubt, the fullest authorization from the leading circles of banking and finance. But the country has since then had ample evidence that these circles are by no means to be reckoned as infallible advisers.’ [War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. i. p. 123]

   The 4 per cent. Tax-Free Loan of 1917 provided a similarly convenient cloak for an increased tribute to the money-lending interests. If that loan be examined it will be found that out of a total loan of £52,000,000, over £30,000,000 was conversion from previously issued and less attractive interest-rated stocks.

   But even in these hectic days there were stray warnings in the capitalist-owned press that the money maniacs were overdoing it. While the Financial News gleefully and recklessly cried : ' Money is at last coming in to its own ! ‘ the more sober Glasgow Herald (May 1916) was declaring that:
   ' rates of interest have been raised and concessions made until people have come to regard the giving of money for the prosecution of the War, not as a patriotic duty, but as a profit-making medium ; this spirit is becoming so pronounced that we have reached the stage when capital is deliberately withheld in the hope that the Treasury will ultimately offer better terms. As we have said, the Government has fostered this spirit by its system of legalized bribery.'

And again :

   ‘ The investing public have been pandered to in a manner altogether out of keeping with the times. If the process is continued much further it may well be that victory can be purchased at too high a price. ... It has been said, and not without truth, that it is easier to find men willing to risk their lives than to find capitalists willing to risk their money, unless at a high price.' [Glasgow Herald, 27/5/1916 and 4/10/1916]

   The Daily Telegraph made no bones whatever about it. War Loan Investment was, it advised its readers, no sacrifice, but a ' golden opportunity ' and a ' certain gain.' The distressed Glasgow Herald protested of the 1917 War Loan that ' It is not helping us at all to prosecute the War.' And in June 1917 The Nation declared that
   ' a huge proportion of the money loaned to the Government is inflation representing no real savings on the part of the bankers and financiers who have manufactured it themselves. This means that when the War is over . . . the propertied men in this country will be several thousand million pounds the wealthier.'

   And now we have the indisputable testimony of Mr. Lloyd George, the war-time Prime Minister, that from 1915 onwards the country has paid annually huge unnecessary sums in War Loan interest, rising to as high as £100,000,000 per year.

  By January 1917 the position was that

£176,000,000 of the loan issued in November 1914 at 3 ½ per cent, had been, in the year 1915, gradually raised to 4 ½ per cent.

£138,000,000 of 2 ½ per cent, and 2 ¾ per cent. pre-War loans had been gratuitously raised to 4 ½ per cent, in the year 1915.

£820,000,000 of 4½ per cent, money (including presumably the two conversions above noted totalling £404,000,000 already raised to the rate of 4½ per cent.) were gradually further raised in 1917 to 5 per cent.

£130,000,000 of Treasury Bill money and £280,500,000 of Exchequer Bond money had also converted from lower rates into the higher 5 per cent, interest rate.

If we accept 3 ½ per cent, the outbreak-of-war rate for money and that is Mr. Lloyd George's figure as the normal and non-profiteer rate, then these successive bribes down to 1917 meant, upon the most conservative computation, a net increase of £30,000,000 per annum in the nation's toll to its money-lenders. Nor does the fact that in the year 1932 part of this money was reconverted to a 3 ½ per cent, rate, disguise, in the slightest degree, the shameless money ramps that were permitted for seventeen years onwards from 1915.
   Whoever else made economic sacrifices during the War, the rentier class, as a class, did not.
   The man who invested £10,000 in British Government Stock before the War would have received interest of £325 per annum. By October 1915 he would have received £450 per annum. After allowing for the increased Income Tax from 1s. 3d. to 3s. 6d. per £1, he was in 1915 better off by £67 per annum. And while the Income Tax rate rose in subsequent years, so too and more, did the war loan interest rise to meet it. For example, the man with 100,000 sunk in Consols in 1913-14, earning 2 ½ per cent, got £2500 of an investment income. Upon this sum he had to pay Income Tax and Super Tax amounting to £137, 1s. 8d., leaving him with £2362, 18s. 4d. In 1918-19 the same man with his £100,000, by that time yielding 5 per cent., or 5000, would pay from his 5000 an Income Tax and a Super Tax amounting altogether to £1787, 10s., leaving him with £3212, 10s., or an increase in his net income of £849, 11s. 8d. after paying his taxation. It is true, of course, that this man's death duties had increased as also had his local rating and his cost of living, but these charges had equally increased for other classes whose income was not secured upon the national taxes.

   In post-War years there appears another form of money-lending to the State to which attention must be drawn the form known as Savings Certificates. These Certificates have had various interest yields, usually, however, running about 4 per cent, per annum, and each investor is authorized to hold as many as 500 certificates and is exempted from all Income Tax upon them. By this method a man, his wife, and say five of a family may each hold 500 certificates, or a sum-total of £3500 upon which all Income Tax is evaded on the interest yield.

   By June 1919 we came to what was gleefully described as the Joy Loan. The rate of interest was nominally 4 per cent., but the investor had only to pay £80 for each £100 of stock, so that the yield was 5 per cent., and holders of the previous 4 ½ per cent. War Loan, various Exchequer Bonds, and the first three series of National War Bonds were accepted at par. The total issue of the loan was £409,000,000, but £120,000,000 of this sum was simple conversion from a lower rate of interest and really meant an annual increase of over half a million sterling for the taxpayer to meet in interest. More important, perhaps, was the proviso that fixed these rates until the year 1960, so that although, as the Manchester Guardian sapiently observed, the interest rate for money might fall after the War, the nation would be tied up to the rate of 5 per cent., and this, indignantly declared the Guardian :
   ‘will mean a gift of thousands of millions of pounds unearned increment to the investor out of the taxpayer's pocket . . . from the point of view of the English people this is the most burdensome and vicious loan in English History.' [Manchester Guardian, 13/6/1919]

   And the comment of the Nation (Radical) [Nation, 21/6/1919] was no less indignant :

   ' To find large numbers of these men and their ill-gotten money planted permanently on their country and sucking each year an interest higher than that paid to current thrift will act, we feel sure, as a dangerous social irritant in the body politic.'

   The Joy Loan, moreover, was made more joyous still by a clause decreeing that stock costing £80 was to be accepted in payment of Death Duties as if that Stock were the equivalent of £100 - a clear gift of over 17 per cent, to the heirs of the patriotic lenders.

   The Victory Bonds (£100 Bonds for every £85 and an interest rate of 4 per cent.) issued at the same time raised £359,500,000, of which £71,500,000 was simple conversion from lower interest-yielding War Loans.

  The few isolated protests against these proceedings went unheeded, and year after year the Financial Interests openly looted additional millions from the National Treasury. When in the summer of 1921 a load of National War Bonds was being converted into an additional burden to the State, The Times was constrained to utter a solemn protest and warning, Under the heading of ' Financial Folly ' its leading article declared that :
  ' There is being enacted before our eyes at this moment a most extraordinary performance in finance : and yet the spectacle seems visible only to a few... the Government... offering holders of £632,000,000 of 5 per cent. National War Bonds an opportunity, quite unsought, of exchanging each £100 into amounts of 3 ½ per cent. Stock, varying from £160 to £163. [This refers to the first Conversion Loan, 1921] In other words, they are being asked to receive from the taxpayer £4,000,000 more in interest and between three and four hundred millions of additional capital when the loan is redeemed.' [The Times, 13/5/1921]

   By this time saner elements in the City had come to the conclusion that the limits of interest raising and capital conversion into increased plunder of the national debt had, at last, been reached. The public would stand no more of it. Yet new vistas of profit opened up to the rentier class when Wall Street and London City agreed to begin a policy of price deflation. The idea was that the bankers were to call in loans and overdrafts : they were to compel manufacturers to throw their goods hurriedly upon the markets so as to raise cash for the repayment of their bank loans. At the same time the Government were to throw their surplus War Stores in clothing, &c., upon the markets, thereby intensifying the glut in the markets and making a fall in prices inevitable. As the prices of consumable goods fell, wages were to be broken.

  But while prices were to crash the rates of War Loan interest were fixed, and the bankers foresaw that every fall in the price of potatoes and wheat and cheese and boots and coal would mean that War Loan interest would be able to purchase increasing quantities of these commodities. If prices, let us say, fell by half, the value of interest would be doubled. In other words, a fall in prices by half would double the value of the War Loans. As the nation would pay off the loans or meet the interest upon the loans it would require to yield up double the quantity of consumable wealth to the money-lending class.

   Mr. Bonar Law early saw the alarming possibilities of this new financial policy, and bravely warned the House of Commons of what it would mean to the taxpayer and the National Debt. ’We had borrowed,’ he said, ' £8000 millions ; we should probably require to pay £16,000 millions.’ [Hansard, 2/5/1922] Sir Henry Strakosch has estimated that the fall in prices during the four years 1925-8 added silently no less than £1,300,000,000 to the capital value of the National Debt, [Supplement to the Economist, 5/7/1930] and Mr. J. M. Keynes has declared that a fall in prices to pre-War level (and some prices are already below pre-War level) would make the British National Debt 40 per cent, greater than it was in 1924, and double what it was in 1920. [The Nation, 20/12/1930. The policy of deflation has of course a similar effect upon municipal debt, feu duties, and all forms of fixed money contracts.]
   Nevertheless, this policy of deflation and price and wage deduction, with its appalling social consequences in poverty and unemployment, was relentlessly pursued. And not until 1932 did any British Government even pretend to set a limit to the toll of the money-lenders. In that year the Treasury, reversing the policy it had consistently buttressed since 1915, appeared with a loan conversion scheme which reduced the rate of interest upon £2,000,000,000 of Government Stock.

   The scheme, however, was voluntary ; five per-centers were invited to exchange into a new 3 ½ per cent, loan to correspond with the rate for money prevailing in 1932 ; but the appeal had to be sweetened with a bribe of cash down to be paid immediately to those who would accept the new terms ; and even so, the 5 per cent, rate of interest had to be paid until December 1932.

   The bribe, in fact, cost £20,000,000. or nearly a year of the saving to be derived from the Conversion Scheme. And the bankers insisted upon receiving a fee of 5s. per £100 for rubber stamping any application for Conversion Loan which went to the State through their hands.
   Doubtless there were many millions of money lent patriotically to the State, money whose owners were disturbed and ashamed at the profiteering in finance which made riot during and after the War. The Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin, for example, who was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and saw at first hand the roguery and ravenous greed of Finance while the Nation was in extremis, anonymously handed over £150,000, representing 20 per cent, of his fortune, [Encyclopaedia Britannica, ii. 986] to the State to clear his conscience, and to set an example.

  But the controllers of the Money Power, the men who cold-bloodedly raised their demands upon their fellow-countrymen with every German advance in the field and with every German U-boat campaign at sea ; the men who organized the creation of hundreds of millions of unnecessary debt, the men who inflated rates of interest ; the men who, as the price of providing credits to free us from the threat of German slavery, enmeshed us in an interest burden of a million pounds per diem it is they whose war-time plunderings I have sought to record in the foregoing pages. The machinations of the organized Money Power during the stress of war surely provide the most convincing of evidence that the nation must be the sole creator of money, and the guardian and banker of the savings and thrift of its citizens, if well-being and security are ever to be the common lot of men.

“Corporate Strategy in Post-Communist Russia” details Khodorkovsky

“Corporate Strategy in Post-Communist Russia” details Khodorkovsky’s Yukos transfer-pricing & tax cheating

By Lucy Komisar
March 23, 2020
Source:  https://www.thekomisarscoop.com/2020/03/corporate-strategy-in-post-communist-russia-details-khodorkovskys-yukos-transfer-pricing-tax-cheating/

Knockout details about how Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky used transfer-pricing in sales of Yukos oil to cheat the Russian government and minority shareholders of massive amounts of money are found in this seemingly staid business-academic book by Mikhail Glazunov.
Mikhail Glazunov
Glazunov, now an independent consultant, has been a Lecturer in the Department of Business Studies at the University of Hertfordshire, UK, and Chief Executive Officer of a Russian company.
Transfer pricing, he explains in business-academic speak, operates as an instrument for the distribution of costs and profits between different corporate units and does not represent real market prices.
It works this way. One part of a company sells to another part at a fake price “reducing the firm’s effective tax rate and lowering the cost of capital.” “Cost of capital” is a way of saying investors are cheated of dividends.
He explains, “the profit is shifted to a region where tax avoidance is easier due to tax administration being fragile, with less strict enforcement of fiscal laws; or to a region with high corruption, where tax can be reduced to zero.”
Corporate Strategy in Post-Communist Russia, Routledge 2016.
The case of Yukos Oil Company 

He writes: Yukos Oil Company was created on 15 April 1993 and included the oil extraction enterprise Yuganskneftegaz, three oil refineries in the Samara region, oil distribution networks in a few Russian regions and a number of construction and service companies. In 1995, the oil extraction company Samaraneftegaz and several research and industrial organisations were added to the assets of Yukos.
By the end of 1995, the Russian government decided to sell state-owned shares. The sale was carried out in several stages: 45 per cent of the shares, in the public domain, were put up for auction escrow; 33 per cent of the shares at an investment tender and 7.96 per cent at cash auctions. Another 7.04 per cent of the shares were distributed among the workforce of Yukos and 7 per cent of the balance transferred to the company for resale in the secondary market.

He describes Khodorkovsky’s corruption.
“The winner of the auction and the investment competition was the firm Laguna, which was owned by the bank Menatep. Shares traded on cash auctions were mostly acquired by structures close to Menatep. In December 1996, Menatep bought the government stake in Yukos, which was in pledge, and became the owner of 85 per cent shares of the company.” By the way, the auction was run by Menatep!
He says Yukos over several years became one of Russia’s largest oil companies. Then he inexplicably says it became “a leader in corporate governance reform.”
Reform? He has described a corrupt auction? He will shortly tell of massive transfer-pricing tax evasion. Once MBK had stolen Yukos and other companies, he did some serious PR, and western media and academics drank his Kool-Aid about now he was going straight.
In 2000, Vladimir Putin became president of Russia after the death of Yeltsin. People like Khodorkovsky found they could not get away with what they had gotten away with before.
Glazunov notes that Khodorkovsky’s October 2002 arrest was for “acting illegally in the privatization process of the former state-owned fertilizer company Apatit. In addition, he was charged with large-scale tax evasion.”
Mikhail Khodorkovsky 2001, when he was a billionaire and important player in the oil industry, from Wikipedia.
Khodorkovsky has protested that he was being taxed more than company profits. But Glazunov points out that “the high value of claims was due to an unprecedented level of fines” due to the deliberate nonpayment of taxes.

How the tax cheating worked

Taxes had been “calculated as a percentage of the commercial oil sales revenue of oil companies.” According to the scheme developed, an oil extraction enterprise sold wellbore fluid subsidiary companies, which were registered in territories with preferential tax rates dramatically lower than in other parts of Russia. All the companies were created in December 1997 and controlled by the management of Yukos.
Wellbore fluid is a mixture of oil, water, salts and impurities such as sand. It is not a commercial product and its production is not liable for tax because the object of taxation under the tax code is dehydrated, desalted and stabilized oil. The wellbore fluid was delivered by the Sverdlovsk’s company to the plant located near the well, where commercial oil was extracted.
Oil was sold to the companies registered in the Sverdlovsk region and in Mordovia at a low price, based on the fact that this oil and raw materials were not used for production. Then the wellbore fluid was delivered to the plant located near the well, where it was extracted for the preparation of commercial oil. The company paid taxes at the regional special rate and paid income in the form of dividends to its offshore shareholder.

Using the offshore system

Dividends were included, if needed, in the consolidated balance sheet of Yukos.  For optimizing this tax, the factory capacity of refineries was rented to companies which bought oil and oil products at the lowest prices and sold at market prices on the domestic market or abroad. Export products were bought out by foreign offshore operations associated with Yukos, and then sold at world prices.
A chart of Yukos transfer-pricing system set up by Stephen Curtis, managing director in London of Group Menatep, the holding company that owned Yukos. From Lucy Komisar’s reporting.
Glazunov writes, “Allegedly, these schemes enabled Yukos and its affiliates to reduce its revenue for the year 2000 by 210 billion roubles, and the government sued the company for $28 billion for back taxes and penalties. These schemes were legally justified, they were assured by the large international auditors and were admired by minority shareholders, for which Yukos was positioned as the most profitable and efficient oil company in Russia.”
Thievery pays!
 Glazunov added, “It must be noted that similar schemes were used by all Russian oil companies, but only Yukos used the version with wellbore fluid.”

Khodorkovsky found guilty

On May 16, 2005, the judgment of the Meshchansky District Court (Moscow) found Khodorkovsky guilty of the crimes stipulated under different Articles of the Criminal Code and imposed a final sentence in the form of imprisonment for a term of nine years in a correctional colony. As a result, the main oil-producing assets of Yukos became the property of the state oil company Rosneft, and the company Yukos became bankrupt.
He quotes another source as noting that vertical integration and transfer pricing were used by most mining companies.
He says that other companies received a higher tax bill due to the inferior talents of their lawyers and accountants in comparison with those of Yukos, who used tax optimization techniques and efforts to protect the legality of these activities on an extremely large scale. For a long time, the Yukos government relations department successfully blocked any resistance of regional authorities to tax optimization, including the arbitration courts, but this led Yukos management to a loss of vigilance and they were not forced to think about urgent changes in company strategy.
“Tax Optimization” is the international corporate way of saying how to evade taxes.
While the West bought Khodorkovsky’s story that the government went after him on taxes, because he brought attention to government corruption, Glazunov says, “Yukos is not an exceptional case; the Russian government has initiated other similar investigations against large oil companies that employed transfer pricing and demanded back-taxes and penalties. The oil giant Lukoil got a $200 million back-tax claim for 2000 and 2001 for use of transfer pricing. The TNK oil company was hit with a tax claim for nearly $1 billion for 2000.
Forbes reporter Paul Klebnikov
His citations about Lukoil and TNK are from this article I wrote for CorpWatch in 2005.

Citizens think backroom asset deals are frauds

He quotes Paul Klebnikov, the Forbes journalist murdered in Moscow in 2004, that when a business buys state assets in the course of a backroom deal and at such a low price, it takes the large risk that its rights to the new property will never be safe. Citizens will consider this business as a fraud, and the state will take it as a custodian rather than the asset’s real owner.
Glazunov says that “transfer pricing was the dominant strategy in almost all large Russian oil companies in the 2000s.
He writes, “In all cases, large oil companies’ production subsidiaries sold crude oil at dramatically below-market prices to shell companies which were established in SEZs (special economic zones) and were affiliated with the central companies. Shell companies sold oil and/or petroleum products to domestic and foreign buyers at market prices, they also managed to resell oil or oil products a few times between different affiliated companies which could be in different jurisdictions and had different tax benefits.” Note the offshore chart above.
“Companies strictly controlled the full processes of the shell companies through placement of directors, force support and contracts with the shell company. Under contracts, oil giants organised the purchase, transport, processing and sale of oil and petroleum products. The shell companies received the main part of the profit resulting from the sale of oil. The transfer pricing policies allowed oil giants to avoid taxes as the shell companies had large tax privileges in different sorts of taxation.”
Western commentators and governments look back at the Yeltsin period with nostalgia. Since Western banks run the offshore system, they probably got a nice piece of the action.
Corporate Strategy in Post-Communist Russia, by Mikhail Glazunov, Routledge, 2016.    

Anti-money laundering controls failing to detect the banking cartel

March 14, 2018 / 2:15 PM / 2 years ago

Anti-money laundering controls failing to detect terrorists, cartels, and sanctioned states

NEW YORK (Thomson Reuters Regulatory Intelligence) - Regulators are holding financial institutions responsible for the real-life consequences of anti-money laundering (AML) failures. Firms must reconfigure their transaction monitoring programs to identify the emergent, multi-dimensional money laundering and terrorism finance methods that are defeating today’s rules-based detection scenarios. Adopting an actor-centric hybrid threat finance (HTF) model can cut compliance costs, reduce risk, improve regulatory relations, and increase the usefulness of suspicious activity reports (SARs).
A pedestrian looks over at masked, and heavily armed, Mexican Federal agents as they stand guard, June 21, 2001, outside a Mexican money changing house during raids on properties in the capital linked to yesterday's DEA "Operation Marquis" in which tons of narcotics and over two hundred suspects were arrested in an attempt to close down a large cocaine smuggling operation allegedly linked to the Juarez cartel.
Financial institutions are required by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to detect and report customers engaged in money laundering, fraud, terrorist financing, and sanctions violations. With millions of customers, banks have fielded automated transaction monitoring systems, which use money laundering detection scenarios known as rules, to alert firms to certain customers for potential violations. Current industry detection logic has proven flawed and inefficient at identifying financial crime, resulting in record-breaking regulatory fines for financial institutions that fail to detect terrorists, drug cartels, and sanctioned state actors exploiting the U.S. financial system.

BANKS FOCUSED ON SIMPLE TRANSACTIONAL BEHAVIORS

Banks have spent billions on transaction monitoring systems that scrub their accounts for possible money laundering schemes. Detection rules are action-based and target suspicious transaction behaviors, such as excessive cash deposits, structured transactions intended to avoid government record-keeping thresholds, and rapid money movement through one bank to another.
Customers who violate the detection rules trigger a system-generated alert, which is reviewed by an internal investigator. Despite decades and billions of dollars in industry investment, over 95 percent of system-generated alerts are closed as “false positives” in the first phase of review, with approximately 98 percent of alerts never culminating in a suspicious activity report (SAR).
False positives cost the financial industry billions of dollars in wasted investigation time each year but more importantly, expose banks to steep fines and reputational damage for failing to identify bad actors involved in organized crime, sanctions evasion, or terrorism. Banks can reduce risk by reassessing their detection strategies, which presently lack the focus or sophistication to identify illicit source behavior.

REGULATORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FOCUSED ON THREAT ACTORS

Unlike fraud, money laundering stems from a precursor criminal act, like extortion, misappropriation of funds, or trafficking. As such, most global money laundering is perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), rather than individuals. Bank accounts used to launder illicit proceeds may be set up for personal or business use, but are most often used to cleanse funds on behalf of a threat organization. As one might imagine, different threat groups launder money in different ways.
For this reason, law enforcement agencies (unlike banks) target money laundering purpose; meaning they consider both source criminal behavior (e.g. drug trafficking) and illicit organizational membership. When a U.S. law enforcement investigation into a crime syndicate or terrorist group identifies suspect bank accounts, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issues request for information notices (known as 314(a) forms) to those banks. The resulting case investigations often reveal that banks failed to detect or investigate these suspicious accounts, leading to increased regulatory scrutiny that opens the floodgates to fines and remediation.

THE TOTAL COST OF FAILURE

When bank AML programs neglect detection considerations for money laundering purpose and preceding illicit activities, they fail to identify bad actors exploiting the firm. Such failures have caused major institutions to incur hundreds of millions, or billions, in regulatory penalties and associated costs. Global and retail banks, money service businesses (MSB), digital currency exchanges, and casinos are all at risk of crushing enforcement actions. Financial institutions globally have been fined over $321 billion by regulators since 2008 (PDF)(here), with $42 billion in fines in 2016 alone.
The monetary penalty value, according to a McKinsey & Company analysis dating back to 2005, turns out to be the lesser issue when compared with the following:
—A regulatory fine is a top-five loss event for any bank (alongside embezzlement, loan fraud, revelations of deceptive sales practices, and anti-trust settlements);
— Corporate share values decline approximately 6 percent the day fines are announced;
— Cease and desist orders result in loss of new programs, vendors, and business plans;
— Remediation costs over the first 18 months are typically 12 times greater than the fine itself.
Firms incur not only financial loss, but also reputational harm. Regulatory enforcement actions often feature specific language indicating that banks aided and abetted terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking by failing to detect and report illicit activity. Financial institutions have learned the hard way that regulators hold them responsible for the broader outcome of AML failures, not just their program’s procedures. Additionally, media outlets are quick to capitalize on negative news about large corporations, which can trigger a public relations disaster, especially when amplified by viral social media.

FAILED APPROACHES TO REMEDIATION

When a regulatory fine is enforced upon a bank, it is often accompanied by a consent order requiring a forensic (lookback) examination of customer data to identify previously undetected risks and suspicious activity. This often results in tens of thousands (or more) of historical transaction-monitoring alerts that need to be reviewed in tandem with current alert output. As a result, many banks hire external consulting firms to address the alert backlog, which can end up costing many times more than the regulatory fine itself.
Many of these same consulting firms market AML detection products and services that claim to reduce false positives and improve SAR filing percentages. For retail banks, these firms focus on tuning the very action-based rules that failed in the first place, without providing new scoring tables or custom data attributes to improve performance. In global correspondent banks, the detection rules are even less focused, due to limited information on external parties (i.e., non-customers) conducting global wire transfers.
More expensive providers market high-tech applications, like unsupervised machine learning (UML) and artificial intelligence (AI) software, billed as a turnkey solution that updates scenarios based on quantitative abnormalities that lack common-sense detection logic. These applications are largely developed by technical specialists such as computer scientists who are unlikely to possess the requisite law enforcement, intelligence, and financial crime backgrounds to effectively target emergent risks.
AML detection is a dynamic process that requires awareness and consideration of transnational security issues, public policy, and the regulatory climate – areas simply not being calculated into these AI scenarios. While UML/AI software improves efficiency in many business areas by instantly siphoning through vast quantities of structured and unstructured data, the complexities of money laundering tradecraft means there can be no magic bullet for solving detection challenges.
Keep in mind: AML detection is already automated, just not predictive. Transnational criminal organizations employ professional money laundering cells that do not operate within the confines of expected, predefined, overly-broad transactional actions. Firms that continue to focus their detection strategies on UML/AI software and broad action-based targeting will fail to identify emergent threats and risk the ire of regulatory agencies.

HEZBOLLAH AS HYBRID THREAT FINANCE EXAMPLE

Criminal cartels, hostile states, and terrorist groups today form hybrid threat alliances that extend through their finances. In some cases, one single group may be classified as a hybrid threat organization. The Lebanese Shiite Islamic group Hezbollah is one such example.
Designated by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization, Hezbollah is aligned with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Palestinian Hamas, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and nearly one-hundred Shiite militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elswehere. These connected Shiite militant groups (Hamas is Sunni) collectively report to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran is subject to a number of U.S. and international economic sanctions.
Hezbollah has recently become a hot-ticket political issue for U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who in January 2018 announced the Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team (HTNT)(here), an interagency team of prosecutors and investigators tasked with targeting Hezbollah's criminal and money laundering networks. This announcement followed revelations outlined in a media report alleging the Obama administration derailed a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) program targeting Hezbollah's trafficking operations(here), in order to secure the 2015 Iran nuclear deal(here).
Sessions has indicated(here) that targeting Hezbollah's money laundering operations will be a primary focus of the current administration; an emphasis set to extend to bank regulators.
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According to a December 2016 terrorism finance report (PDF)(here) by the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, Hezbollah is a hybrid threat organization with a global footprint. With a structure that includes a Lebanese political party, conventional military, Iranian terrorist proxy force, and crime syndicate, Hezbollah is one of the world's most unique and versatile threat groups.
Hezbollah’s crime syndicate is extremely multi-faceted, with long-held narcotics, human trafficking, and counterfeit goods underworld networks throughout the tri-border Area of Latin America, the Middle East, North/West Africa, and Asia.
Hezbollah maintains one of the most sophisticated and efficient trade-based money laundering (TBML) operations in the world, as evidenced by the 2012 Lebanese Canadian Bank laundering case (PDF)(bit.ly/2FCTV6h). Their TBML tradecraft is so proficient that they hide drugs and cleanse narcotics proceeds by owning all parts of an elaborate global distribution network that falsifies the number of shipments and amount of products shipped, while concurrently hiding counterfeit goods among legitimate products(here).
This double-dipping smuggling and false invoicing operation provides the profit margin Hezbollah needs to purchase weapons, tactical kit, and to provide logistical support to their global insurgency operations in places like Iraq(here), Syria(here), and Yemen(here).
Hezbollah’s business and money laundering tactics are extremely specific and unique (compared to other groups) and require seasoned intelligence practitioners to identify. They use virtually all banking products, including international wires, retail services, prepaid products, and money service businesses (MSBs) at different operational echelons, ranging from international/strategic to regional, domestic support companies (DSC), and at the tactical level.
Accordingly, this one organization presents separate enforcement and reputational risks at different levels of operation.
Like Hezbollah, other militant groups, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), human trafficking outfits, and hostile nation-state actors are also competent money launderers. They too possess a hierarchical, multi-echelon global structure that utilizes numerous controls designed to subvert modern AML detection mechanisms. These groups hire professional money launderers with a detailed knowledge of compliance that could rival the AML experts working at banks.
Professional money launderers working for global threat organizations launder funds in ways that superficially appear entirely legitimate, failing to raise red flags through conventional detection strategies. Put simply, these professional criminals are unlikely to make amateur mistakes, such as structuring or rapid withdrawal of cash.

FLAWED APPROACH

Detection logic focused on simple transactional behavior will never successfully identify money laundering operations by sophisticated hybrid threats like Hezbollah. Banks might think unsupervised machine learning (UML) and artificial intelligence (AI) software sounds new and exciting, but these programs detect anomalies and mistakes that professional money launderers are unlikely to make.

HYBRID THREAT FINANCE DOCTRINE

The best way to address these challenges is with a detection platform based on the hybrid threat finance (HTF) concept derived from the U.S. Department of Defense “hybrid threat” doctrine. The military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities recognize the hybrid nature of international conflict relations, in that threat organizations across different classifications are deeply interconnected. HTF methodology targets the extension of those connections into financial markets, focusing detection strategies on the fund flows and intersections between one or more threat groups or operational echelons in international and retail banking, gaming, MSBs, and digital currency exchanges.
Institutions should adopt an “actor-centric” HTF model that targets bad actors with precision, increasing SAR efficacy rates and decreasing false-positive alerts. This concept relies heavily on a typology matrix, which analyzes a bank’s geographic nexus of services, products, and customer base, while cross-referencing identified risks in the global threat landscape. Matches between geography, product line, and high-risk customer profile are tied to specific threats, which leads to the implementation of targeted detection scenarios.
Additionally, it is incumbent upon banks to also train their investigations, sanctions, and risk personnel in these new detection scenarios. Sound detection strategies are of little value if the people investigating the behavior lack the requisite knowledge to identify and escalate threat activity.

CONCLUSION

The New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) in 2017 implemented new bank transaction monitoring requirements (Part 504) (PDF)(here), which redefined SARs to include the following language: "identifies suspicious or potentially suspicious or illegal activities". This is in stark contrast to past regulatory language that called for the identification of suspicious "transactions".
Regulators are holding financial institutions responsible for the outcomes of compliance failures, not just their processes. AML units who update their detection logic to a hybrid threat finance model stand to cut costs, reduce risk, improve regulatory relations, and provide improved financial intelligence products to law enforcement, intelligence, and military officials keeping our nation safe.

Joshua Fruth is the Director of anti-money laundering advisory services at New Jersey based consultancy Matrix-IFS www.matrix-ifs.com/. The views expressed are his own.

domenica 22 marzo 2020

Cartesian Economics, The Bearing of Physical Science upon State Stewardship

Cartesian Economics.

The Bearing of Physical Science upon State Stewardship.

Two Lectures to the Student Unions of Birkbeck College and The London School of Economics, November 10th and 17th, 1921.

By Frederick Soddy, M.A., F.R.S.

[These lectures owe much to a long controversial correspondence carried on with Dr. H. Lyster Jameson, whose sad death is just reported in the papers. Dr. Jameson upheld the neo-Marxian or proletarian view in economics and the determinist or, as I style it, the “ ultra-materialistic.” philosophy, and from the controversy my own views gained in definiteness and clearness. March 3rd, 1922. F. S.] 


First Lecture. — Chairman, Sir Richard Gregory.

   IT is my intention to try to bring the existing knowledge of the physical sciences to bear upon the question “ How do men live ? ” This question ought to be the first the economist should try to answer. I am by no means the first to essay this task, but the modern economist seems to have forgotten that there is such a question, whilst the earlier ones lived at a stage of the development of scientific knowledge when no exact answer was forthcoming.

   My own point of departure could not be better illustrated than by a quotation from Descartes, and the aspects I propose to examine might well be called “Cartesian Economics.”

   "Starting from the forms of knowledge most useful to life, instead of from that speculative philosophy taught in our schools, and knowing the force and processes of fire, the air, the stars and all the other bodies which surround us as distinctly as we know the different occupations of our own workmen, we shall be able to employ them in the same fashion and so render ourselves as the masters and possessors of nature and contribute to the perfection of the human life."

   The enormous progress made in the mastery of man over nature and the meagre contribution to the perfection of the human life is a contrast that can only be accounted for by some such enquiry as that which I propose to essay. But in language more homely than that of Descartes I may illustrate my starting point by means of a story. An expert organist, drawing enthusiastic applause from his audience, was surprised and annoyed by the blower coming to the front of the screen and remarking to him, “ Yes ! we played that piece very well.” The blower not being encouraged in well-doing, in the next piece the divine music rose majestically to its climax and there petered out in a dismal wail, whilst a head appeared round the screen and remarked, “ Now ! is it we ? ” Nor is it without significance to note that, since the occurrence, the human labour upon which the organist relied has been replaced so completely by electric power. Power, rather than any qualifying adjective, human, mechanical or electrical, is the starting point of Cartesian economics.

   At the risk of being redundant, let me illustrate what I mean by the question, “ How do men live ? " by asking what makes a railway train go. In one sense or another the credit for the achievement may be claimed by the so-called " engine-driver," the guard, the signalman, the manager, the capitalist, or the share-holder, — or, again, by the scientific pioneers who discovered the nature of fire, by the inventors who harnessed it, by Labour which built the railway and the train. The fact remains that all of them by their united efforts could not drive the train. The real engine-driver is the coal. So, in the present state of science, the answer to the question how men live, or how anything lives, or how inanimate nature lives, in the sense in which we speak of the life of a waterfall or of any other manifestation of continued liveliness, is, with few and unimportant exceptions, “ By sunshine.” Switch off the sun and a world would result lifeless, not only in the sense of animate life, but also in respect of by far the greater part of the life of inanimate nature. The volcanoes, as now, might occasionally erupt, the tides would ebb and flow on an otherwise stagnant ocean, and the newly discovered phenomena of radioactivity would persist. But it is sunshine which provides the power not only of the winds and waters but also of every form of life yet known. The starting point of Cartesian economics is thus the well-known laws of the conservation and transformation of energy, usually referred to as the first and second laws of thermodynamics.

   But let us, before starting on this quest, go to the other extreme and try to obtain a consistent mental picture of the whole of knowledge and the inter-relationship of the sciences, if only to rebut two, in my opinion, errors, caricatured rather than described by the terms "Mechanistic " and "Vitalistic" in philosophy. In any classification of the sciences it is customary to distinguish three great groups, (i) the Mechanical, Physico-Chemical and Mathematical ; (2) the Biological ; and (3) the Mental, inter-related much as in the order enumerated, like the links of a chain, two end links and a middle link, and the latter, the great division of animal and vegetable life, alone in direct relation to the two ends.

   Without perhaps any more quantitative notion than that the subjects enumerated in the list are in order of cognateness, one may regard the first link of the chain as commencing with the present ultimate realities of physics — Electricity, Energy, Ether, and Matter in increasing complexity from the element to the complex colloid, actuated by the liveliest Brownian movement under the microscope, and yet not alive. The second link begins with the simplest unicellular form of life and stretches in ever-increasing complexity from amoeba to man. The third begins with rudimentary forms of instinctive behaviour closely allied to those produced by purely physical stimuli in simple creatures, through free-will and the deliberate choice of action to secure predetermined ends, up to the human reason and the highest intellectual, aesthetic, ethical, moral and spiritual perceptions of humanity.

   My own philosophy can be expressed by a line of Kipling — “East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet.”

   One thousand years hence it is certain, if civilisation lasts as long, that men will still be examining into the fundamental realities of the physical world, far beyond the world of atoms and energy which marks its present boundary. Equally, we may believe that they may in psychological enquiry and in spiritual perceptions be much advanced from our time. In each direction possibilities of further knowledge extend ad infinitum, but in each direction diametrically away from and not towards the problems of life. It is in this middle field that economics lies, unaffected whether by the ultimate philosophy of the electron or of the soul, and concerned rather with the interaction with the middle world of life of these two end worlds of physicist and mind in their commonest everyday aspects, matter and energy on the one hand, obeying the laws of mathematical probability or chance as exhibited in the inanimate universe, and, on the other, with the guidance, direction and willing of these blind forces and processes to predetermined ends. The physicist claims that his world of matter and energy exists as a reality independent of life, and points to the laws of conservation to show that it is eternal, without beginning and without end, and to the record of the rocks to show that it is life, rather than the universe of nature, which began. The theologian and religious philosopher claims under the name of Deity the independent and eternal existence of the qualities of guidance, will and direction outside of life, and points to this to account for the ascending scale of evolution and the appearance of perceptions above the level of animal. I have no claim or call to express an opinion on the reality of the existence of intelligence apart from and outside of life. But that life is the expression of the interaction of two totally distinct things represented by probability and free-will is to me self-evident, though the ultimate nature of those two different things will probably remain, a thousand years hence, as far off as ever.

   It is simple now to indicate what to my mind are the two errors that hinder progress. Both are monistic obsessions due to the mind in its innate desire to reduce everything to its simplest terms ending by trying to reduce everything to its simplest term. The first links up the two ends of the chain running in diametrically opposite directions into a grand circle, and so gets the sublimated conceptions of the mental world inextricably mixed up with the physical. The oriental philosophies and religions seem to have been freer from the cruder forms of this confusion than our own. In the early forms deities were given physical powers analogous to those of trinitrotoluene, as for example the hammer of Thor and the thunderbolt of Jove. The idea that the physical universe must, like life, have had a beginning and therefore a creator still survives. Heaven to the ordinary man is at once the abode of disembodied souls and of constellations which perform their evolutions with such mathematical accuracy that events therein can be accurately predicted in advance. Its most recent phase is the theosophistical enquiry by occult powers into the internal structure of the atom and the prevalent belief that the discovery of wireless telegraphy lends strong support to the reality of telepathy.

   The second error is perhaps more common in the sphere of economics. It may be called “ Ultra-Materialism ” and is the attempt to derive the whole of the phenomena of life by continuous evolution from the inanimate world. We begin with a nebula of primordial material condensing into ever more complex forms, first to the light and then the heavy elements, then to chemical compounds up to the complex colloid. By a continuation of the same processes such a complex results that it is continually decomposing and as continually regenerating itself. The inanimate molecules begin to live and life then runs through its course of evolution up to man. This may satisfy a biologist, but it fails to satisfy me as a chemist. I cannot conceive of inanimate mechanism, obeying the laws of probability, by any continued series of successive steps developing the powers of choice and reproduction any more than I can envisage any increase in the complexity of an engine resulting in the production of the “ engine-driver ” and the power of its reproducing itself. I shall be told that this is a pontifical expression of personal opinion. Unfortunately, however, for this argument, inanimate mechanism happens to be my special study rather than that of the biologist. It is the invariable characteristic of all shallow and pretentious philosophy to seek the explanation of insoluble problems in some other field than that of which the philosopher has first-hand acquaintance. The biologist has first-hand knowledge of animate mechanism and seeks the origin of it in colloid chemistry. The test of the hypothesis is not so much what the biologist as what the chemist has to say about it. The difference to my mind between dead and living matter is much that between Niagara Falls thirty years ago and now, and is not to be explained by the laws which Niagara formerly obeyed, by the laws of pure probability, but by their opposite, the operations of intelligence, as typified in their most rudimentary form by Clerk-Maxwell’s conception of the "sorting-demon."

   Life, or animate mechanism, is essentially to my mind a dualism, and any attempt to subordinate either partner is fatal. But the economist is peculiarly liable to mistake for laws of nature the laws of human nature and to dignify this complex of thermodynamical and social phenomena with the term "inexorable economic law."

   Is it any wonder that such crude confusions, such triumphs of mental instincts over reason, experience and common sense, have produced a general sterility of constructive thought ? I cannot do better to illustrate this than to quote Stephen Leacock in his most serious mood, and if it be objected that he is a humorist, I can only retort that he is a professor of economics. It is rather the avowal of the combination that is uncommon.

   "Our studies consist only in the long-drawn proof of the futility of our search after knowledge effected by exposing the errors of the past. Philosophy is the science which proves that we can know nothing of the soul. Medicine is the science which tells us that we know nothing of the body. Political Economy is that which teaches that we know nothing of the laws of Wealth, and Theology is the critical history of those errors from which we deduce our ignorance of God.
   "When I sit and warm my hands, as best I may, at the little heap of embers that is now Political Economy, I cannot but contrast its dying glow with the vainglorious and triumphant science that once it was."

   Against this I would put the paradoxical words of Poincare discussing the doctrine of mathematical probability, which dominates the inanimate world.

“ You wish me to tell you about these complex phenomena. If by ill luck I happened to know the laws which govern them I should be helpless. I should be lost in endless calculations and could never supply you with an answer to your questions. Fortunately for both of us I am completely ignorant about the matter. I can therefore supply you with an answer at once. This may seem odd. But there is something odder still, namely, that my answer will be right."

   It is perhaps fortunate that we know nothing about the ultimate nature of the fundamentals of either the physical or mental worlds. We have pursued each so far as to know that both alike lead away from rather than toward the solution of the problems of life. The sublimated theoretical concepts in either case have long ceased to possess actuality. We have rather to find the interaction between their commonest forms, matter and energy on the one hand and will and direction on the other.

   Let us now leave generalities and concentrate upon the question as to what precisely humdrum mechanical science can contribute to economics. It insists primarily on the fact that life derives the whole of its physical energy or power, not from anything self-contained in living matter, and still less from an external deity, but solely from the inanimate world. It is dependent for all the necessities of its physical continuance primarily upon the principles of the steam-engine. The principles and ethics of human law and convention must not run counter to those of thermodynamics. For men, no different from any other form of heat engine, the physical problems of life are energy problems. You have to consider the source, the sunshine. It supplies a continuous revenue of energy which is consumed by the living engine in its life. Consumption here does not mean destruction, for destruction, like creation in the world of which we speak is an absurdity, but merely the rendering unfit for further use. All the radiant energy received from the sun sooner or later finds its way into the great energy sink, the ocean of heat energy of temperature uniform with the surroundings, and is incapable of any further transformation. This is the form we know most about. It is the energy of the perpetual thermal agitation of the molecules of which Poincaré spoke, and of which we know nothing (of any individual molecule’s motion) and yet know everything (of the statistics of the motion as a whole). And, it is useless.

   We have next to consider the transformation of the form in which nature supplies the energy into the form men can utilise and assimilate. In general, transformation of energy can proceed only in the one direction, much as water only runs downhill. The water may do useful work on the way turning waterwheels, or it may not, but may reach the ocean level quite unutilised. So of the revenue of sunshine which ultimately warms imperceptibly the whole mass of the globe, it may en route energise a man, or, again, it may not.

   As regards the utilisation you have to distinguish very carefully in Cartesian economics two uses. First, there is the fundamental metabolic use in the body for the life process, which I shall for brevity term life-use. Secondly, there is a use in lieu of the first for the doing of external work or labour, better done directly by inanimate energy. This I shall term the labour-use.

   Physically, the life-problem is the reversal of winding a clock. Before any man can confer the animation of his body upon a mechanism as in clock-winding, the animation of nature’s mechanism has first to be conferred upon him. History could be rewritten from the standpoint of how this has been done. At first it was done blindly and intuitively by trial and error, the survival of the fittest and the extravagantly wasteful methods that only the unconquerable resurgence of life can afford. Even now the process is so indirect, being only possible through the agency of vegetable life, that few realise the terms on which they exist or the supreme importance of the original sources and amounts of energy available.

   But the labour-use of natural energy has always been a matter of consciously directed effort and development, since the use of the wind in navigation, and had proceeded far before the formulation of the principles of energetics. But in neither case is the sudden break in the continuity of history, which marked the age of steam, explained by these developments. The key is to be found in this. Pre-nineteenth century man lived on revenue. Present day man augments the revenue within certain well-defined limitations out of capital.

   All forms of energy previously utilised by life, with one or two minor exceptions, as tidal energy and that of hot springs, were forms of the solar revenue. Wind-power, water-power and world fuel are parts of the year-to-year revenue of sunshine no less than cereals and other animal foods. But when coal became king, the sunlight of a hundred million years ago added itself to that of to-day and by it was built a civilisation such as the world had never seen.

   The fundamental fact underlying this civilisation is that whilst men can lighten their external labours by the aid of fuel-fed machinery, they can only feed their internal fires with new sunshine and then only through the good offices of the plant. The vegetable world alone can transform the original flow of inanimate energy into vital energy. The animal, as yet, is constitutionally incapable of effecting this transformation.

   The technical features of this subject are not without significance. Whatever the origin of the energy, the penultimate step must always be its storage by the plant precedent to its use by animals for food. It is possible to draw upon the energy of a water-fall and to store it up in various chemical compounds by electro-chemical methods, and in this form to supply it as a fertiliser to the plant. Increased crops are so produced supporting an increased population. The reversal of clock-winding has been consciously achieved. The falling weight of Niagara’s waters work the man. There is no technical objection to utilising the energy of coal in the same way, other than that of prime cost. But for practical purposes it is true that the great capital store or energy in fuel is not yet utilised for the life-use, but only primarily for the labour-use of energy by life. The life-use demands the intermediary of the plant, and though coal was once alive it is long since dead. The laborious and wasteful travail, through farming and agriculture, has once again to be gone through. In spite of the striking advances of the past century, the agriculturalist, peasant and farm-labourer form the dominant economic class, and will remain so until some new discovery of science deposes them. To my mind this is one of the least obvious and yet most fundamental facts of economics and social science at the present time.

 It certainly has not been sufficiently realised by economists, particularly in this country. In the flamboyant period of the utilisation of the capital store of energy in fuel which is now closing, so far at least as this country is concerned, we could and did by machinofacture make almost every sort of commodity and all sorts of labour-saving machinery in exchange for the food which we could not so make and did not make. The population of Great Britain rose on account of this exchange of capital for revenue, of factory products for food, from 10.5 millions in 1801 to 40.9 millions in 1911. Whereas in Ireland, which has not coal, it fell from 5 to 4.3 millions over the same period. Cartesian economics is capable of diagnosing instantly the root of the Irish trouble, as Sir Leo Chiozza Money has pointed out.

   By this process of exchange of factory products the whole world gradually drew more and more for its labour-use upon the capital energy of fuel, and used it to widen the area under cultivation and to transport the harvests from the most distant regions of the globe and so indirectly augmented the revenue of sunshine upon which it is still entirely dependent for its life-use.

   But this is a very passing phase. New countries grow old. Their populations tend to expand to the limit of their food supply, and their industries and manufactures become developed by the aid of their own resources. For a double reason, therefore, the flamboyant period of prosperity through which Great Britain has passed is destined to be short-lived. "Imperialism" marks its final bid for survival.

   Coal is the real capital, out of the consumption of which the capitalist civilisation has been built up, but, as regards the means of livelihood of the swollen population that has accompanied its exploitation, its use in this respect, has been indirect and will cease. This is the great paradox of Capitalism. It is capitalistic as regards the accessories, conveniences and luxuries of existence. As regards its necessities it is still, to coin a word, revenual. Even Adam Smith could say, “When food is provided it is easy to find the necessary clothing and lodging." Today, by the development of mechanical power, it is vastly easier than then. But, once this has done all it can to develop new countries and increase the food supply, it can meet the demand for bread only by offering a stone. True, by the advances of chemical and biological science, by the development of agricultural chemistry and the breeding of better brands of wheat, much may be done, but scarcely as much as will provide for the requirements of a four or five-fold increase of population.

   The industrialised countries are, with an enthusiasm reminiscent of a lunatic asylum, turning out an ever-increasing plethora of mere factory products and sending them forth to compete in ever-shrinking markets in exchange for food, and are pouring forth an ever-increasing stream of armaments to fight amongst themselves for markets. The only goal in sight is war and yet war, the blowing up of the plethora and the permanent devitiation of the stock of the white race, at the time, too, when, by reason of failing fecundity, the prospect of its having to fight about something other than markets is becoming evident.

   Physical science thus answers precisely, and, I think for the first time, the problem of political economy, or, as one Marxian writer puts it, “ What are the sources of our society's wealth, that is, the means of subsistence and comforts of the individuals comprising it ?" The means of subsistence are derived from the daily revenue of solar energy, through the operations of agriculture. The accessories of life, clothes, houses and fuel, as well as its comforts and luxuries, are derived in great part by the augmentation of this revenue out of a capital store of energy preserved from bygone geological times. Life depends from instant to instant on a continuous flow of energy, and hence wealth, the enabling requisites of life, partakes of the character of a flow rather than a store.

   [Had Karl Marx lived after instead of before the establishment of the modern doctrine of energy there am be little doubt that his acute and erudite mind would easily have grasped its significance in the social sciences. As it was, in fairness to him it must be said that he did not attempt to solve the real nature of wealth, but concentrated entirely upon the problem of its monetary equivalent, that is, upon exchange- value rather than use-value. Lest I be misunderstood I may emphasize here that I am using the term energy throughout these lectures in the strictest scientific sense, for potential or kinetic energy as understood by the physical scientist and engineer, and never in the vague and misleading sense of mental energy which 1 have rather termed the guidance and direction of physical energy. In this strict sense of the word it cannot be maintained that wealth wholly originates in human labour, for there is no real distinction in physical science between animate and inanimate energy. But since wealth is not available energy merely, but rather available energy usefully directed, or some embodiment of it, human "labour" (that is, some form or intelligent human activity which may need only a minimum of physical energy) is usually, though not necessarily, an essential factor in its creation.]

   This answer, though of fundamental importance to social science and to political philosophy, has little application to present economical systems, because these are founded upon a simple confusion between wealth and debt, or, to put it another way, between the wealth of the community and the wealth of the individual member of the community.

   The wealth of the community is its revenue, which, in the last analysis, is a revenue of energy available for the purposes of life. That being given, in sufficient amount and in form capable of being utilised by the existing knowledge of the time, everything requisite for the life of the society can be maintained. It is impossible to save or store this flow to any appreciable extent. True, you can dam a river, at great expense, and make a reservoir. But, even if not used, the accumulated waters evaporate and leak away. You can under the same, but even more unfavourable terms, store electric energy. But to contemplate storing wealth on a national scale for even a day is something like contemplating a storage battery large enough to satisfy the demand of the world for electric power for one day. True, nature has stored it in coal by processes requiring geological epochs, but what we do is to unstore it, an easier matter, and to convert it into a flow before it is of the least possible use to us. Again, for short periods, the flow may be embodied in some concrete commodity, in food which rots, in houses which fall into desuetude if not kept perpetually under repair, and in all the tangible assets of our civilisation, in railroads, roads, and public works, factories, wharves, shipping and the like. All alike are subject to a process of compound decrement, needing ever larger annual expenditure of new wealth to maintain them in order, and even then rapidly, with each fresh advance of science, becoming out of date. Such accumulated assets, at best, are classified not as accumulated wealth, but as aids and accessories in the maintenance and increase of wealth out of the available revenue of energy. The wealth is the revenue, and it cannot be saved.

   The wealth of an individual, on the other hand, is something totally different. The ordinary modern individual member of the community in the vast majority of cases does not possess enough wealth to keep him alive for a week. By means of a token, legalised as a form of currency, whether a cowrie stone or a metal counter, but now, more and more exclusively, a simple paper note, the community acknowledges its indebtedness to the holder of the token, and empowers the individual to indent upon the revenue of real wealth flowing through the markets at any time. Even at this stage we see the interests of the community opposed diametrically to those of the individual members. As Ruskin puts it, it is the rule and root of all economy that what one person has, another person cannot have, and the more the private individual is able to indent upon the revenue the less is left for public services and the carrying on of enterprises designed to increase the revenue for the general benefit rather than private profit. The concern of the scientific man is with the revenue and with how it may be increased in the directions most essential for the general well-being. If and in so far as political economy can claim to be a science, that, also, should be its first concern. The individual, on the other hand, is concerned only to obtain a larger share of the revenue for his own private use. In so far as he can only do so by increasing, or aiding in increasing, the real revenue of wealth for the purpose of use rather than of usury the community gains. A very real complaint that the worker has with the existing system is that it provides much more easy and lucrative means of making money without any contribution to the general wealth, and sometimes actually by destroying it, by individuals possessed of sufficient of the power conferred by money to hold up the revenue for usury.

   Ruskin appears to have had a very much clearer conception of the real nature of wealth than either earlier or later economists. He pointed out, and his view would now be understood by anyone who has suffered from the dearth of servants on account of the war, that the art of becoming rich was to get more relatively than other people, so that those with less may be available as the servants and employees of those with more. In this acute and original analysis of the real nature of the individual’s wealth — power over the lives and the labour of others — Ruskin disclosed probably the most important difference between the interests of the individual and the interest of the State, and the main reason why the mastery of man over nature has hitherto resulted in so meagre a contribution to the perfection of human life. For this reason the community in its struggle with nature resembles an army officered almost entirely by the enemy. Of what use are the discoveries of scientific men into new modes and more ample ways of living so long as the laws of human nature turn all the difficultly won wealth into increased power of the few over the lives and labours of the many ?

   In another respect Ruskin was vastly ahead of his own, not to say our own, time. He and Marx both fully appreciated the main contention of present day exponents of economics from the point of view of the creator and producer of wealth rather than that of the financier or merchant. The wealth of a community can only be increased by production and discovery, not by acquisition and exchange. In commerce and exchange “ for every plus there is a precisely equal minus.” But the pluses wax magnificent and the minuses retire into back streets or underground, ”which renders the algebra of the science peculiar.” (“Unto This Last,” John Ruskin, 1877.)

   This, then, is my main quarrel with orthodox economics, that it confuses the substance and the shadow. It mistakes debt for wealth and is guilty of the same mistake as the old lady, who, when remonstrated with for overdrawing her account, promptly sent her banker a cheque for the amount. The confusion enters even into the attempt of the earlier economists to define the main subject matter of their studies — "Wealth," though the modern economist seems to be far too wary a bird to define even that. Thus we find that wealth consists, let us say, of the enabling requisites of life, or something equally unequivocal and acceptable, but, if it is to be had in our limited abundance, like sunshine or oxygen or water, then it is not any longer wealth in the economic sense, though without either of these requisites life would be impossible.

   Now it is the object of science to render the enabling requisites of life, such as food, warmth and other forms or embodiments of energy necessary for a decent existence, so abundant that they shall cease to be wealth in the sense of the economist. By increasing a real quantity you do not diminish it, nor by increasing it without limit do you destroy it. The object of science is to destroy wealth in the economist’s sense of doubt altogether by increasing real wealth without limit.

   At the first blush and before they have had time to think, most youthful students of economics will probably tell me that I am playing with words by using the word wealth in two senses equally well understood by the economist. The fact is that the economist, ignorant of the scientific laws of life, has not arrived at any conception of wealth, apart from the elaborate code of enactments and legal conventions which give to the individual in actual non-possession of wealth the right to acquire it, whereas I, from the application of the laws of energy to the problem of how men live, have arrived at such a conception.

   In conclusion, I may devote my attention to the commonest form of debt, money, because I believe that until correct views are more widely diffused about this convention, and the purchasing power of money is fixed as definitely as are the standards of weights and measures, there can be no peace in society and he whole elaborate political and social system will remain merely a dreary and elaborate make-believe.

   Once more owing to the war, the real nature of money can be apprehended by anybody. It ought to bear precisely the same relation to the revenue of wealth as a food ticket bears to the food supply or a theatre ticket to a theatrical performance. Whereas, as a matter of fact, at present there is no more connection between the currency and the revenue than there is between the birth-rate and the barometer. The revenue depends upon the chances of the harvest, and all the causes such as the prevalence or absence of disease, tempests, drought and suns] line which affect the productivity of nature. The currency is, or was, left to the luck of the gold prospector, and his spasmodic discoveries, to the state of knowledge of extracting the precious metals in which a single innovation, such as cyaniding, may enormously increase the supply, the invention of such a system as that of cheques, the solemn carting around of gold from one capital to another to concertina the prices up and down to suit the hierarchy who have made of money a mystery and of the currency a never-failing confidence trick.

   Whereas, if money is to fulfil its function as a measure of value, it is clear that the currency must be regulated pari-passu with the changing revenue, issued as the latter expands and destroyed as the latter contracts. Since it would neither be given away in the first nor taken away in the second event, but used to buy back old, or taken in exchange for new State loans, the community as a whole would share the prosperity of good times as well as the stringency of bad ones, instead of only the latter as under the existing system.

   I remember reading as a young man, in some book on economics which I have not since been able to trace, of the almost mystical virtues of gold in human welfare and how each successive discovery of that metal in California, South Africa and Australia was followed by a boom of trade and increased national prosperity. To a chemist the mystical virtues of any metal, even gold, seemed a wholly chimerical illusion, but I waited twenty years before the real explanation became obvious. Last century was a time, when, wholly beyond the understanding of those who lived in it, science was increasing the revenue of the world by leaps and bounds by the consumption of the store of energy preserved in coal. If the food supply is increased without a corresponding issue of new food tickets, every holder of an old ticket gets proportionately more. Whereas if the ticket issue is increased pari-passu with the food supply, the old ticket holders get the same as before and fresh people get the surplus of food. Hence every increase of currency in that flamboyant era of prosperity, whether it resulted from the discovery of gold-mines or the invention of cheques, meant that the increased prosperity did not go to the community’s creditors, but a part corresponding with the increase of currency went to fresh people and general prosperity was the result. How much easier it would have been simply to print the money and use the issue to repay the National Debt. But the opportunity passed and the like may not occur again.

   I shall be asked by those who are unaware of the proposals made by Gesell on the Continent and by Kitson in this country how is it possible to fix the purchasing power of money. The answer is simple enough. By fixing it, that is, by printing more as average prices, determined by index numbers, tend to fall and by withdrawing it from circulation as they tend to rise. As it is, these matters, which are the most vital factors of all that enter into the economic welfare of the community, are left to the oddest combination of natural luck and human cunning to which, surely, any race ever entrusted its destinies.

   Money, I shall be told, must function not merely as a measure of value, but as a medium of exchange and as a store of value.

   As regards the latter, humanity is crying for the moon. Wealth is a flow, not a store. After the search-light of the war, I can conceive no nation so barbaric as to regard gold as a store of value. Demonetise it and where is its value ? Not a gold mine would be at work on the morrow. The world has enough gold to stop its teeth and gild the inside of its tea-spoons for hundreds of years. Nor, as a medium of exchange, can anyone, after the experience of the war, really find any fault with paper, provided of course its issue were directed to the end of maintaining average prices constant from century to century.

   Civilised nations maintain at great expense elaborate testing institutions to fix with meticulous accuracy and disseminate replicas of all quantities that enter into one side of every commercial transaction involving buying and selling. They maintain an army of officials and inspectors to suppress the hollow pound weight, the elastic yard-wand and the telescopic quart pot. What an elaborate fraud upon the public all this one- sided passion for accuracy is ! The public are not interested in the absolute magnitude of weights and measures. What is solely of practical importance is the relative measure, not merely how much coal there is in the sack or how much beer in the mug, but how much coal and how much beer for how much money.

   Do we keep a National Economic Bureau to stabilise the purchasing power of money and an elaborate organisation of inspectors, the counterpart of those who suppress petty fraud, to deal with organisations to concertina the pound sterling ? Our system is precisely analogous to sealing up only one arm of a balance and making an imposing parade of protecting it from the wind and tamperers, while leaving the calibrating arrangements of the other arm to the manipulation of a class of persons deriving their livelihood from the business. It is on record that a group of American financiers on one occasion, having sold British and bought American securities in advance, removed £11,000,000 from the Bank of England and put it into circulation in America, with the result that the prices of the securities they had sold fell greatly in value and those they had bought rose correspondingly. Since gold never constitutes more than a few per cent, of the total currency, a reduction or increase of the gold basis in a country is followed by an enormously larger total fall or rise of values, and financiers in the position to cart about a few millions of the “ precious ” metal at their will can very easily and certainly acquire other people’s wealth.

   No doubt the instance quoted is an extreme one, but when one enquires further as to who is in charge of the calibration arrangements that fix the purchasing power of money, much that has hitherto seemed inexplicable about our time becomes clear. These powers are wielded, by private banks, like the Bank of England, in the steadfast interests not of the community but of the creditors of the community. Whereas no changes of revenue, so long as the currency remains constant, affect the relative proportion of the whole revenue secured by the creditors, any increase of currency diminishes their relative share and hence is known as inflation, while any decrease increases their relative share, and hence is called sound finance.

   Even so far as we have yet got in disentangling current misconceptions of wealth from reality, it is not difficult to understand why the blessings conferred by science have been of so limited incidence. Civilisation has been, in its most vital interests, not in the hands of those who have contributed most to its wealth, but of those to whom in a very literal sense it is indebted, and is likely, under this system, to become ever more indebted. This gives a short practical remedy for the most obvious of the ills that civilisation is heir to. Institute a complete organisation for ascertaining, on every public proposal, the feeling of the City, and the views of the captains of finance and banking, but act in precisely the opposite direction. From the point of view of the welfare of the community rather than of its creditors, you could hardly fail to be right every time.


Second Lecture. — Chairman, Principal Senter.

   Some questions I was asked at the end of last lecture seem to indicate the necessity of first clearing away some misconceptions, partly, perhaps, due to my citing Ruskin as an economist. Although my views are very similar in some respects to those arrived at long ago by Ruskin, I may be permitted to remark that I have deduced them, without at the time being aware of Ruskin's writings on this subject, from the principles of the heat-engine, rather than from those of ethics. I know it is a burning question whether economics ought to concern itself with ethics at all, but of its obligation to understand the engineering of life I do not think there can be two minds. If it is a science at all, it is, in Huxley’s words, concerned with truth as " veracity of thought and action, and the resolute facing of the world as it is when the garment of make-believe with which pious hands have hidden its uglier features has been stripped off.” Neither the ethical nor statistical sides of make-believe are to-day of any very great interest, but economics has still to achieve the emancipation which, in Huxley’s day, the biological sciences accomplished. It is just because the application of the every-day principles of engineering to the living engine offers such a powerful corrective to the make-believes of the economic systems of society that I have ventured to address you on the subject.

   On the strength of a quotation from Ruskin, that there was no profit in exchange, Ruskin was condemned by one distinguished economist, I think unfairly. I am well aware that it is the fashion to regard Ruskin as out-of-date as an economist, though as a matter of fact the times are even yet hardly ripe for a judgment on this point. But on the actual statement that there can be no profit in exchange there can surely be merely a difference of meaning to be attached to the word profit.

   There is much making of money but no making of wealth by exchange, much advantage to Society for which the merchant is highly remunerated, much acquisition by the merchant of wealth, but no profit, for the sum total of wealth is unaffected by exchange and against the merchant’s plus there is a precisely equal minus.

   The word economics was coined by Aristotle as signifying household management in contradistinction to money and trade (chrematistics). What Aristotle meant 2,250 years ago, I pointed out again last lecture when I charged "economists" with confounding debt for wealth. A ham merchant working on what he is pleased to call a 10 per cent, basis of profit, may buy ten hams for the same sum as he sells nine. He may be pleased to think he has made a profit of one ham, but he certainly has not made a ham. There were and remain ten, whereas if anyone had made a profit of one ham, there should now be eleven. These hams represent the life-time profit of a certain number — 2 1\2 to be precise — of pigs, fed, according to nursery tradition, on the skins of potatoes, which in turn derived their feeding value from the sunshine. Wealth being some form of embodied useful energy, the law of the conservation of energy applies to wealth in that for every plus there is a minus. But fortunately in this case the earth is credited with the plus while the sun is debited with the minus, and that is as good as an actual creation of wealth from the terrestrial point of view. Nearer than that the laws of matter and energy do not allow.

   The opposite (for every minus there is a plus) is not true of wealth, because we are dealing with the availability of energy rather than with its total amount, and because of the natural tendency of all available or wealth-forming energy to pass, more or less quickly, into the waste heat of uniform temperature of the surroundings.

   The exposure of the shams of economic systems is a time-consuming task, and, as we have still to consider the nature of capital and usury, it is as well first to say something about the realities. How' is wealth produced and what, if any, are the limitations to the wealth of an intelligently directed community ?

   The first factor, a continuous flow of energy of an available form, has so far only been considered. If that were unlimited in amount and under human control in the same way as the energy of fuel now is, this factor would impose no limit on the production of wealth. Even the distinction Which it is at present so necessary to make, between the life-use and the labour-use of energy, would be of less importance, for it is not so much that the synthetic production of food-stuffs, except by the aid of the plant, is impossible as that it is impracticable with energy at its present value. Last century it must have appeared, to any one following the line of thought we are pursuing, that the limitations of this first factor of wealth must always limit human ambition and expansion. But now we know that it is not so. The extraordinary developments since the beginning of the century in the study of radioactivity and of the internal structure of the atom have proved that there is resident in ordinary materials amounts of energy of the order of a million times that which can be obtained from fuel during combustion, but that to liberate this store the transmutation of the elements one into another must first be made possible. The radioactive elements are in course of a natural transmutation, which, while it is impossible to stop, is likewise impossible to imitate. The energy of radium, the element which for thousands of years emits as much heat every two days as its own weight of fuel in burning, is derived from this hitherto unsuspected store of energy in the structure of the radium atom in its change into atoms of lead and helium.

   No ! it is the second factor in the production of wealth that now limits, and probably will always limit, human properity. It is knowledge, or rather ignorance. For untold years men froze on the site of what now are coal mines, and starved within sound of the Niagara that is now at work providing food. Every single factor in wealth production existed prior to tie phenomenal expansion of the last century except one, the knowledge how to control and utilise for life the capital store of sunlight preserved in fuel. It is precisely the same to-day. We are as far from utilising the stones of energy, which we know exist all round us in unlimited abundance, as savage men, who had not yet learned how to kindle a fire, were from utilising the power which has made our owm age great. The whole matter could not compete in public interest with a ball game or a prize-fight, and, as has been recently said, civilisation depends for its future on the long vacations when the scientific men in the Universities get the opportunity for a few weeks’ uninterrupted and continuous research.

   Although it is far from my own view of the matter to divide, as is sometimes done, the winning of knowledge into two water-tight compartments, pure and applied, academic and technical, or discovery and invention, and to elevate the former upon a pinnacle attainable only by the few and to depress the latter to a level only a little above the capacity of the ordinary efficient routine worker, it is undeniable that in point of time at least, pure scientific knowledge, acquired for the sake of knowledge only and with no definite utilitarian end in view, must invariably precede any great advance in technology and invention. But in both fields the qualities of mind and temperament required are much alike, and in both, in their highest expressions, attain that undefinable and elusive quality we characterise as genius. All genius in this respect is alike — it creates, and in all creation the whole is invariably incomparably greater than the sum of the component parts. Those whose philosophy consists in passing by little steps, each almost trivial apparently, from the electron to the soul, try also to pass from the humblest beginnings of intelligence above the animal level to the present heights of intellectual achievement attained in the exact sciences. Genius to such is "only" the cumulative sum of infinitely little steps in intellectual progress which began with man himself. To my mind you might as well describe an old master as a cumulative effect of infinitely little daubs of paint, or a symphony of an accumulation of sound vibrations. The whole is greater than the parts, but even so, that is not the chief point that is missed. Everyone knows the difference between reading or translating a foreign language and speaking it. Some of us, who are being required now to spend a year of research work before taking the degree may realise the difference between knowing all about every important advance ever made in the subject of our study as well as or better than those who actually made these discoveries, and achieving the most infinitesimal advance therein ourselves.

   Just as I am constrained to put a barrier between life and mechanism in the sense that there is no continuous chain of evolution from the atom to life, so I put a barrier between the assimilation and the creation of knowledge. Each one of these infinitesimal steps of intellectual progress which look so small in retrospect, once had a different character. Otherwise why, for example, was it left for Newton to discover the law of gravitation or Benjamin Franklin the nature of lightning ? We have here a rather remarkable peculiarity of the human mind. Every teacher knows how apt his best pupils are to acquire and follow the achievements of the past and present, so that at the age of twenty they often may have a vaster range of knowledge than any of the pioneers who contributed to the subject. Yet how rare, so far at least, is it to find these uniquely equipped and finished repositories of knowledge capable of making a single step forward, that is not merely imitative, and which a hundred years hence will survive to the honour of appearing trivial ? Possibly we are on the eve of understanding something about the nature of intellectual creation as distinct from mimicry. But until we do, the wealth of the world, material no less than spiritual, has, ultimately, to be ascribed to the work of singularly few minds.

    After energy and genius we come to Labour, the one factor in wealth production which hitherto has been adequately recognised. So far at least this factor has not limited the expansion of wealth, but rather expands pari-passu with it, though, in this respect, in all the European countries and also Australia, the increase of population appears definitely to have been checked. It is probable, at least of our own day, that any definite retrogression, as regards knowledge once attained, is unlikely, and even if civilisation has to pass through a time in the future analogous to the Dark Ages of the past, the intellectual achievements of the present day will remain preserved. Granted a certain stage in the technology of wealth production, it is probable that this, without any further aid from what I regard as the essentially creative type of mind, can be maintained from generation to generation by Labour in its widest sense, including in that term every kind and grade of routine and imitative worker, whether by hand or brain.

   Thus we have three factors, two of the character of a continuous never-ending contribution, a flow of energy and the unremitting attention, whether physical or mental, required for its utilization, and one, the creation of knowledge, of the character of a definite step forward made once and ever afterwards available for all time. The latter factor limits the rate of expansion of wealth but, strictly speaking, contributes nothing to its actual production. It will ever be the prerogative of genius to endow posterity rather than its own day.

   More and more as time goes on, this character of wealth, essentially as a flow rather than something that can be stored, forces itself upon our attention as we grow out of the merely subjective views we derive from our own means of livelihood and bank balance. The time is fully ripe that the world should reconsider from a scientific basis the conventions by which it empowers individuals to “save” and amass “riches.” Broadly, the object of such conventions should be definitely directed to provide for the period of childhood, adolescence and old age, for genius and for the dissemination and diffusion of its results and for similar work of a publicly beneficial character. These must be charges on the revenue rather than debts handed on by private individuals to their heirs and successors and swollen by the ridiculous pretensions of the usurer to an absurdity.

   With the growing appreciation of the general public, made wise because of the war, of the real nature of money, the much vexed question of what is usually called capital should not give us much difficulty. Just as money is a paper indent upon the revenue, capital is the paper receipt for the expenditure of wealth. Economists brought up on the mythical origin of man, as recorded in the book of Genesis, used to be fond of inventing, to explain the origin of capital, a mythical Robinson Crusoe, of exceptional industry and acumen, as the primitive capitalist. With the advance of knowledge the real Adam has turned out to be an animal, and now the original capitalist proves to have been a plant !

   The material and scientific greatness of our day is due to the primitive accumulation of the solar energy of the forests of the carboniferous era, and preserved to this day as coal. The plant accumulated, we spend.

   When coal is burnt it is burnt. You cannot both burn it and keep it in the cellar, and still less can you go on drawing interest from it for ever at so much per cent., as is the case with the so-called capital of the economist and the business world. Here again the economist is mistaking our old friend debt for wealth. The wealth has been spent, not saved, and exchanged for some form of receipt, giving the holder a purely conventional right to so much per cent, per annum until the debt is repaid.

   The capitalist wishes to have it both ways, to be regarded as a public benefactor because he spends his wealth, not in drinking himself to death, but in enterprises designed to increase the revenue. If he did this he would indeed be a public benefactor. But the community having spent his wealth, as regards himself he expects it all back in due course with interest on the loan. The consequences of his abstinence are that civilisation has got inextricably "into the hands of the Jews.” Compared with this, the wildest profligacy on the part of the original capitalist would have been a relatively minor evil.

   It is of course a colossally hard task wisely to expend wealth so as to increase the revenue. All honour is due to the business energy and enterprise of the commercial and technical managers and the workers who effect the conversion of capital wealth into increased revenue. But as regards the people who merely lend the wealth spent, the ordinary dividend holder of a joint-stock company for example, he is of course simply that peculiar type of benefactor which used to be termed a usurer. We are all in it now, ever since it became possible to buy a £i War Saving Certificate bearing compound interest for 15s. 6d. The extraordinary changes of legal and social conventions with respect to interest and usury, recorded in history, make it quite clear that political economy, which depends upon such factors quite as much as upon the laws of energy, can never be a science in the same exact sense as physics or chemistry. To Aristotle a usurer was a person beneath contempt. To-day, even the Vice-Chancellors of the ancient Universities, which purport to hold up to reverence Greek thought and culture, are as enamoured as anyone of the excellence of compound interest.

   Of all hard critics of the usurer, Martin Luther is easily first, and in his vigorous denunciation there is a certain perspicuity which we moderns seem to lack. Otherwise few could tolerate the economics of an ordinary daily newspaper or social club.

   “ The heathen were able by the light of reason to conclude that a usurer is a double-dyed thief and murderer. We Christians, however, hold them in such honour that we fairly worship them for the sake of their money. . . . Usury is a great huge monster, like a were-wolf, who lays waste all, more than any Cacus.... For Cacus means the villain that is a pious usurer and steals and robs and eats everything. And will not own that he has done it and thinks no one will find him out, because the oxen drawn backwards into his den make it seem from their footsteps that they have been let out. So the usurer would deceive the world as though he were of use and gave the world oxen while he however rends and eats all alone."

   One must admit that it would be difficult to find a better description of usury than is given here," Oxen drawn back into the den which, from their footsteps appear to have been let out."  Current orthodox economics gives the credit that rightly belongs to the scientific discoverer, the expander of wealth, to the usurer, the expander of debt.

    I shall be told that there is something to show for capital expenditure and that against the paper receipts there are tangible assets. Thus, if a railway is taken as an example, there are the rolling stock and the rails. But admittedly these would have but a scrap metal value if railways ceased to pay and the shareholders wanted their money back. As the world gets older all this initial expenditure has to be periodically renewed to make good depreciation, and, further, the plant and the methods of operation become, with the advance of knowledge, out of date. The indebtedness to the original shareholders does not, however, usually cease on that account. Railways continue to pay dividends on all capital expended, though, as in the case of the canal systems purchased, much of it altogether ceases to bring in revenue. It seems to me to be merely a matter of time before this happens with every form of capital expenditure. The normal old-age form of capital is simple debt, a permanent lien upon the future revenue of wealth. The assets are much overrated. If the world worked as hard on construction as it did during the war on destruction, and was permitted by the usurer to do so, all civilisation could probably be rebuilt upon an up-to-date plan and the Augean stable of a modern industrialised community cleaned up in less time than the war took.

   The vast heritage of wealth which science made available at the commencement of the 19th century, in so far as it has been spent, has been replaced by paper receipts for the expenditure which bear interest in perpetuity. Capital merely means unearned income divided by the rate of interest and multiplied by 100. If I invent a process bringing in £1,000 a year revenue, its capital value is £20,000 if the rate of interest is 5 per cent., and I can sell it for some such sum. The capital of the world in this sense to-day aggregates to an altogether inconceivable sum. There never has existed at one time such an amount of wealth. It represents the accumulated capital expenditure of generations of men. During the war the capital of the country was increased by some £7,000,000,000, which brings in £350,000,000 a year permanent interest. I may be told that everyone will admit that this is debt, whereas it is in fact, in this respect, precisely on the same footing as so-called productive capital expenditure, a private lien upon the revenue, wealth to the individual owner and debt to the community. As regards the national accounts this £350,000,000 a year is a simple transference, rather than an item of expenditure. The sum is collected from the taxpayer, and paid to the holders of War securities. It amounts to £8 13s. 4d. per head of population, and includes the small item of 10s. per head in respect of the Napoleonic wars. There can be only one possible end to this process. Though for a time the advances of science may so increase the revenue from year to year as to render these payments by way of interest possible, in the end the whole of the revenue must be in the control of the usurer. A small part of the population will get into the position of a great rentier class living on interest, and most of the rest will be reduced to starvation in so far as they are not kept alive by State doles. How far this process has already gone in this country is obvious, since something like a quarter of the population at the present time is unemployed and the expenditure on national education is only about a quarter as much as that upon the holders of war securities.

   Wealth is a flow and it cannot be saved. Spent it must be as it accrues, whether on consumption or on capital outlay designed to produce future wealth. As regards the first, life is consumption from the cradle to the grave, consumption of that pristine flow of energy we owe to the sun. The efforts of the financier and monied person to make life a balance-sheet with the debit and credit sides in agreement are untrue to nature. Life is a continuous expenditure of wealth and in this point again Ruskin, rather than the modern chrematist, was absolutely in agreement with science. And, as regards the second, capital expenditure, even though it is designed to increase the flow of wealth, and admittedly, over a certain natural period which is not infinite, it does achieve this object, it is expenditure as much as the other. The river of wealth is thus divided, but a part is metered carefully and recorded as an accumulation of capital indebtedness against the community.

   Scientific men, in the innocence of their hearts and the benevolence of their souls, fondly imagine that by increasing the revenue available for life they benefit the community. But do they ? The larger the revenue, and the greater the flow above that required for immediate consumption, the greater the debts incurred by the community and the impossibility of their ever being repaid. Meantime, though real wealth rots if stored, the meter readings spontaneously bear interest and increase ad infinitum. The principles and ethics of human conduct and convention have their own code and standards, but whatever they may be, they must conform to and not run counter to the principles of thermodynamics. A chauffeur may have a soul above the mechanism of his car, but if it led him to try to run it on already consumed petrol, none the less he would be considered a great ass.

   The usurer in Martin Luther’s time had not achieved the colossal success "in deceiving the world as though he were of use and gave to the world oxen " that he can claim to-day. The professional economist seems to be an easy conquest. Thus Mr. J. M. Keynes, in his “ Economic Consequences of the Peace,” seriously seems to think that the law of compound interest is the law of increment of wealth rather than that of debt, and offsets it against the Malthusian law of increase of population ! “ One geometrical ratio might cancel another and the 19th century was able to forget the fertility of the species in a contemplation of the dizzy virtues of compound interest.” To him capital is a vast accumulation of fixed wealth, in danger of being prematurely consumed in war. He likens it to a cake, which one day, owing to the dizzy virtues of usury, may be large enough to go round. “In that day overwork, overcrowding and underfeeding would come to an end, and men secure of the comforts and necessities of the body could proceed to the nobler exercise of their faculties.” Cake happens to be the one material of which it has been well said that you cannot eat it and have it too, and I would suggest that this is the real reason for Mr. Keynes's somewhat mystical references to a peculiarity of capital considered as accumulated cake, that this “ is only in theory — the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed.” In a similar vein we have Major Douglas and Mr. Orage advocating the salvation of the economic system by the bringing of the dizzy virtues of dividends within the reach of the many rather than of the few. I do not mean to imply that their system might not be a great improvement upon the present one. Indeed, any system almost must be an improvement upon one that is administered solely in the interests of the creditors, rather than the creators and consumers of the community’s wealth. But my analysis would lead me to class their suggestion rather as a temporary palliative, for no system founded upon usury can be stable.

   It is wonderful how people, who never come up against reality from the cradle to the grave, and live all their lives a purely artificial existence in some city divorced from all contact with primitive nature, get into the habit of supposing that the conventions which regulate their businesses and livelihoods can be applied to the economy of the world at large. It would be quite impossible for any member of the agricultural community, for example, accustomed to the ways on which wealth is really produced, to fall down and worship the institution of usury in such a naive fashion, or for a Labour Government, to be guilty of the confusions between wealth and debt which are characteristic of orthodox politicians at the present time. We have in the hitherto association of the function of Government almost entirely with those who live by rent, interest and profit, and thus take from rather than contribute to the revenue of the wealth of the community, a further justification for the view already expressed, that the community in its struggle for existence resembles an army officered almost entirely by the enemy.

   You cannot permanently pit an absurd human convention, such as the spontaneous increment of debt, against the natural law of the spontaneous decrement of wealth. This applies whether it is simple or compound interest which regulates the increment of debt. For obvious reasons the law of compound interest over great periods of time rarely as yet has fully operated. But the significant and distressing fact is that this absurd law, with the concentration of money in the hands of trusts and combines of financiers, now tends to operate more and more fully every day. Some of you may have heard of the story of the reward asked of the Emperor of China by the man who taught him chess. It looked modest enough. He wanted one grain of corn for the first square of the chess-board, two for the second, four for the third, eight for the fourth, and so on in a geometrical progression to the 64th square. The story goes that the first half of the board was easily accounted for, but before three-quarters had been so dealt with, the Emperor had to cry off, as his couriers came back to him reporting that there was not such a quantity of corn (actually 23 million tons) in the Empire. If the matter lad been pushed to the bitter end, at the 64th square, the number of grains would have been one less than 264 — just about one million million tons — more than the present population of the world could consume in a period of time longer than that covered by the records of history. This is the law of compound interest. To-day £1 of debt doubles itself in about 12.5 years, and becomes £1,024 in 125 years and over a million in 250 years at 5.5 per cent compound interest. If this is to be the inevitable consequence of scientific men increasing the wealth of the world, enthusiasm in well-doing may well dry up. Nevertheless, on no other terms than a perpetual increase of the revenue by scientific discovery can such a system of " economics ” be maintained, and, even so, were the 20th century as prolific in discovery as the 19th, there is no escape for it from ruin under the law of usury and the rule of the usurer.

   Let us, in conclusion, put in the light of the analysis of wealth and wealth production which has been attempted, the aspect of this mad system which is now uppermost in the minds of many thoughtful people, its inevitable end in world- war. Remember that it is impossible to save. The revenue of wealth must be spent as it accrues either in consumption or in capital expenditure. The latter is for the purpose of securing a lien on the future revenue, by producing more goods or services out of which a profit can be made. But as the masses do not receive the profit, they cannot buy this increased production. It was the discovery of the classical economists that wages are the purchasing power necessary to maintain a supply of labour, that is to provide food and shelter for the labourer and his family in the particular condition of life necessary and customary for that kind of labour. Man-power is now cheapened by being pitted against the infinitely greater and more docile power of inanimate nature. For a brief period, which is now closing, though only after terrible hardship and suffering, the displaced labour found an outlet ultimately by reason of the increased fraction of the revenue devoted to capital expenditure. But the world fills up. Its markets, at first open to the excess production of the industrialised nations in exchange for food, tend to close as time goes on. The fiercest international rivalry for markets ensues, and to industrialised nations armaments are, as products of machino-facture, the one thing that can be turned out in almost limitless abundance. But armaments and war do not produce food. They merely determine the distribution as between competing nations, and tend to destroy food-producing power to an extent that makes even the victors actual losers. In this Ruskin was again far ahead of his own times. He alone seems to have had sufficient veracity of thought and power of penetrating below the conventions of society to realise that, in the frenzied pursuit of gain, the objective was illusory in a physical sense.

" Capital is a root which does not enter into the vital function till it produces fruit. Capital producing nothing but capital is root producing root, bulb issuing in bulb, never in tulip. The Political Economy of Europe has hitherto devoted itself to the multiplication of bulbs. It never saw nor conceived such a thing as a tulip. Nay ! boiled bulbs they might have been, glass bulbs — Prince Rupert's drops consummated in powder — well if it were glass powder and not gunpowder.”

   I do not pretend to be able to have got further in my own conclusions than this, that the rule of the usurer in political and social affairs has become impossible and that he has to go. During a time of expanding revenue, or before the burden of interest charges on the revenue from accumulated debts equals the annual expansion, he may be an efficient, if brutal, task-master, and the lure of private interest and gain may be a safe principle in place of government. But at a time like the present, when the usurers of the world, if cheated of their expectations, like Shylock are bent on a pound of flesh next to the heart, their pretentiousness and futility is obvious, and some form of government according to economic, rather than chrematistic, principles will have to be resumed. The laws of energy under which men live furnish an intellectual foundation for sociology and economics, and make crystal clear some of the chief causes of failure not only of our own but, I think also, of every preceding great civilisation. They do not give the whole truth, but, in so far as they are correct to physics and chemistry, they cannot possibly be false. I think with but little amplification and modification they might furnish a common scientific starting point from which all men concerned with the public rather than with their own private interests might start to rebuild the world more in conformity with the great intellectual achievements which have distinguished the present age. The first step towards such a scientific Utopia would be the due delimitation of the rights of the community’s creditors — the curbing of the demon of debt which masquerades among the ignorant as wealth.

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