Source: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html
Headnotes
- 2 BvR 859/15 -
- 2 BvR 1651/15 -
- 2 BvR 2006/15 -
- 2 BvR 980/16 -
- 1. Where an ultra vires review or an identity review raises questions regarding the validity or the interpretation of a measure taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, the Federal Constitutional Court, in principle, bases its review on the understanding and the assessment of such a measure as put forward by the Court of Justice of the European Union. (118)
- 2. The Court of Justice of the European Union exceeds its judicial mandate, as determined by the functions conferred upon it in Article 19(1) second sentence of the Treaty on European Union, where an interpretation of the Treaties is not comprehensible and must thus be considered arbitrary from an objective perspective. If the Court of Justice of the European Union crosses that limit, its decisions are no longer covered by Article 19(1) second sentence of the Treaty on European Union in conjunction with the domestic Act of Approval; at least in relation to Germany, these decisions lack the minimum of democratic legitimation necessary under Article 23(1) second sentence in conjunction with Article 20(1) and (2) and Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. (112)
- 3. Where fundamental interests of the Member States are affected, as is generally the case when interpreting the competences conferred upon the European Union as such and its democratically legitimated European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ), judicial review may not simply accept positions asserted by the European Central Bank without closer scrutiny. (142)
- 4. The combination of the broad discretion afforded the institution in question together with the limited standard of review applied by the Court of Justice of the European Union clearly fails to give sufficient effect to the principle of conferral and paves the way for a continual erosion of Member State competences. (156)
- 5. For safeguarding the principle of democracy, it is imperative that the bases for the division of competences in the European Union be respected. The finality of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) must not undermine the principle of conferral, one of the fundamental principles of the European Union. (158)
- 6. a) In the context of delimiting the competences between the European Union and the Member States, the principle of proportionality and the overall assessment and appraisal it entails are of great importance with regard to the principles of democracy and the sovereignty of the people. Disregarding these requirements potentially shifts the bases for the division of competences in the European Union, undermining the principle of conferral. (158)
- 6. b) A programme for the purchase of government bonds only satisfies the principle of proportionality if it constitutes a suitable and necessary means for achieving the aim pursued; the principle of proportionality requires that the programme’s monetary policy objective and the economic policy effects be identified, weighed and balanced against one another. Where a programme’s monetary policy objective is pursued unconditionally and its economic policy effects are ignored, it manifestly disregards the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(1) second sentence and Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union. (165)
- 6. c) The fact that the European System of Central Banks has no mandate for economic or social policy decisions does not rule out that effects of a programme for the purchase of government bonds on, for example, public debt, personal savings, pension and retirement schemes, real estate prices and the keeping afloat of economically unviable companies are taken into account in the proportionality assessment pursuant to Article 5(1) second sentence and Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union and – in an overall assessment and appraisal – weighed against the monetary policy objective that the programme aims to achieve and is capable of achieving. (139)
- 7. The determination whether a programme like the Public Sector Purchase Programme manifestly circumvents the prohibition in Article 123(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not hinge on a single criterion; rather, it requires an overall assessment and appraisal of the relevant circumstances. In particular, the purchase limit of 33% and the distribution of purchases according to the European Central Bank’s capital key prevent selective measures being taken under the Public Sector Purchase Programme for the benefit of individual Member States and the Eurosystem becoming the majority creditor of one Member State. (217)
- 8. If the risk-sharing regime for bond purchases under the Public Sector Purchase Programme were subject to (retroactive) changes, this would affect the limits set by the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag and be incompatible with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. It would essentially amount to an assumption of liability for decisions taken by third parties with potentially unforeseeable consequences, which is impermissible under the Basic Law. (227)
- 9. Based on their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ), the Federal Government and the Bundestag are required to take steps seeking to ensure that the European Central Bank conducts a proportionality assessment. They must clearly communicate their legal view to the European Central Bank or take other steps to ensure that conformity with the Treaties is restored. (232)
- 10. German constitutional organs, administrative bodies and courts may participate neither in the development nor in the implementation, execution or operationalisation of ultra vires acts. This generally also applies to the Bundesbank . (234)
Pronounced
on 5 May 2020
Fischböck
Amtsinspektorin
as Registrar
of the Court Registry
- 2 BvR 859/15 -
- 2 BvR 1651/15 -
- 2 BvR 2006/15 -
- 2 BvR 980/16 -
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE
In the proceedings
on
the constitutional complaints of
I. | 1. Dr. W…, |
|
2. | Dr. H…, | |
3. | Dr. A…, |
- authorised representative:
- –
against | 1. the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the Bundestag to take steps to ensure the rescission or non-implementation of Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2015 on an expanded asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10) and Decision of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 (Decision [EU] 2015/774) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, as amended by Decision of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2015 (Decision [EU] 2015/2101), Decision of the European Central Bank of 16 December 2015 (Decision [EU] 2015/2464), Decision of the European Central Bank of 18 April 2016 (Decision [EU] 2016/702), Decision of the European Central Bank of 11 January 2017 (Decision [EU] 2017/100) and Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 13 December 2018, | |
2. the omission on the part of the Bundesbank to bring legal action against the European Central Bank before the Court of Justice of the European Union directed against its involvement in the asset purchase programme, | ||
3. the applicability of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2018 – Case 493/17, Weiss and Others – within the ambit of the Basic Law |
- 2 BvR 859/15 -,
II. | 1. Prof. Dr. L…, | |
2. | Prof. Dr. h. c. H…, | |
3. | Prof. Dr. S…, | |
4. | Mr K…, | |
5. | Mr T…, | |
and 1,729 other complainants, |
- authorised representatives:
- 1. ,
- 2. –
against | 1. the domestic applicability and implementation of Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2015 and Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 (ECB/2015/10) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme), in conjunction with | |
- Decision (EU) 2015/2101 of the European Central Bank of 3 September/5 November 2015 (ECB/2015/33) amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), | ||
- Decision (EU) 2015/2464 of the European Central Bank of 3 December/16 December 2015 (ECB 2015/48) amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, | ||
- Decision (EU) 2016/702 of the European Central Bank of 10 March/18 April 2016 (ECB/2016/8) amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, and | ||
- Decision (EU) 2017/100 of the European Central Bank of 8 December 2016/11 January 2017 (ECB/2017/1) amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/10) on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, | ||
2. the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the German Bundestag , in the exercise of their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ), to take steps to ensure the rescission of the decisions on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme listed in no. 1 above, and to take suitable measures limiting, to the greatest extent possible, the domestic impact arising from the continued implementation of these decisions, | ||
by way of subsidiary application: | ||
the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the German Bundestag, in the exercise of their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ), to actively address the question how the order of competences in the European Union can be restored and Germany’s constitutional identity can be protected with regard to the decisions on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme listed in no. 1 above, and to make a positive determination in this regard |
- 2 BvR 1651/15 -,
III. | Dr. G…, |
- authorised representative:
- –
against | the omission on the part of the Federal Government to take suitable steps against | |
the actions of the European Central Bank in the form of its Secondary Markets Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP), | ||
specifically Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2015 on an expanded asset purchase programme (Expanded Asset Purchase Programme – EAPP; currently known as Asset Purchase Programme – APP), and – regarding the PSPP – Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), as amended by Decision (EU) 2015/2101 of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/33), Decision (EU) 2015/2464 of the European Central Bank of 16 December 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2015/48), Decision (EU) 2016/702 of the European Central Bank of 18 April 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2016/8), Decision (EU) 2016/1041 of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2016 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/300 (ECB/2016/18), and Decision (EU) 2017/100 of the European Central Bank of 11 January 2017 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2017/1), | ||
and in the form of purchases under the PSPP, by which the European Central Bank | ||
a) exceeded its monetary policy mandate, encroaching upon the economic policy competences of the Member States, | ||
b) violated the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State budgets by central banks, | ||
c) violated the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany |
- 2 BvR 2006/15 -,
IV. | 1. Prof. Dr. S…, | |
2. | Prof. Dr. H…, | |
3. | Mr M…, | |
4. | Mr E…, | |
5. | Dr. G…, | |
6. | Ms M…, | |
7. | Dr H…, | |
8. | Dr S…, | |
9. | Prof. Dr. K…, |
-
- authorised representative:
for nos. 1 to 8–
-
Against 1. the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), as announced by the European Central Bank on 22 January 2015, approved by Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10) and effective 15 May 2015, in conjunction with the expansions decided on 3 December 2015 and 10 March 2016 and further specified on 21 April 2016, and currently the restarting of the programme decided on 12 September 2019 with net purchases in the amount of EUR 20 billion as of 1 November 2019 that are expected to run until the ECB starts to raise its key interest rates,
2. the participation of the Bundesbank in the implementation of the Public Sector Purchase Programme of the European Central Bank, especially the expansions set out in the European Central Bank’s Decisions of 3 December 2015, 10 March 2016, 21 April 2016 and 11 January 2017, and in the form of the restarted net purchases at a monthly pace of EUR 20 billion as of 1 November 2019,
3. the inaction of the Bundesbank , the Federal Government and the Bundestag in relation to the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank, especially the expansions set out in the European Central Bank’s Decisions of 3 December 2015, 10 March 2016 and 21 April 2016, and in relation to the restarting of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) as of 1 November 2019 together with the other policy decisions on interest rates taken by the European Central Bank on 12 September 2019; this concerns, in particular, the omission on the part of the Bundesbank representative in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank to call for a vote on 12 September 2019 on the proposal in the Governing Council on 12 September 2019 and the apparent omission on the part of the Bundesbank to issue a declaration that it will not participate in the restarted asset purchase programme.
- 2 BvR 980/16 -
the Federal Constitutional Court – Second Senate –
with the participation of Justices
President Voßkuhle,
Huber,
Hermanns,
Müller,
Kessal-Wulf,
König,
Maidowski,
Langenfeld
held on the basis of the oral hearing of 31 July 2019:
Judgment
- The proceedings 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15 and 2 BvR 980/16 are combined for joint decision.
- The constitutional complaints of the complainants in proceedings I regarding challenges nos. 2 and 3, the constitutional complaints of the complainants in proceedings II regarding challenge no. 1 as well as the constitutional complaints of the complainants in proceedings IV are dismissed as inadmissible.
- The Federal Government and – in relation to the complainants in proceedings I and II – the German Bundestag violated the rights under Article 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Article 20(1) and (2) in conjunction with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law of the complainants in proceedings I, II and III by failing to take suitable steps challenging that
- in Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme, ECB/2015/10, OJ EU L 121 of 14 May 2015, p. 20),
- amended by Decision (EU) 2015/2101 of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/33, OJ EU L 303 of 20 November 2015, p. 106), Decision (EU) 2015/2464 of the European Central Bank of 16 December 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/48, OJ EU L 344 of 30 December 2015, p. 1), Decision (EU) 2016/702 of the European Central Bank of 18 April 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2016/8, OJ EU L 121 of 11 May 2016, p. 24) and Decision (EU) 2017/100 of the European Central Bank of 11 January 2017 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2017/1, OJ EU L 16 of 20 January 2017, p. 51),
- the Governing Council of the European Central Bank neither assessed nor substantiated that the measures provided for in these decisions satisfy the principle of proportionality.
- For the rest, the constitutional complaints are rejected as unfounded.
- [...]
Table of contents
para. |
A. Facts of the case1
I. Subject matter of the proceedings2
1. Design of the programme3
2. Legal bases of the programme 8
II. Submissions of the complainants19
1.Complainants in proceedings I19
a)Specific applications20
b)Admissibility22
c)Merits23
aa)Challenges based on EU law25
bb)Challenges based on constitutional law31
2.Complainants in proceedings II33
a)Violation of Art. 38(1) first sentence of the Basic Law and of the constitutional identity34
b)Violation of the principle of proportionality and of Art. 123(1) TFEU38
c)Violation of the principle of democracy41
3.Complainants in proceedings III42
a)Challenges based on EU law43
b)Challenges based on constitutional law51
c)Challenge on grounds of bias in relation to the President of the ECB52
4.Complainants in proceedings IV53
a)Admissibility54
b)Merits55
c)Budgetary sovereignty of the German Bundestag 58
c)Challenge on grounds of bias in relation to the President of the ECB61
III. Submissions of parties entitled to submit a statement in the proceedings62
1.Parties entitled to submit a statement in the proceedings62
2.Federal Government63
a)Admissibility64
b)Merits65
3.Bundesbank 69
4.European Central Bank75
IV. Procedural history80
1.Request by the Federal Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling 80
2.Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 201881
3.Oral hearing before the Federal Constitutional Court82
4.Applications for a preliminary injunction84
B. Admissibility of the constitutional complaints85
I. Issues challenged in the applications86
1.Modification of the original applications87
2.Admissible challenges89
3.Standing90
4.Continued legal interest in bringing proceedings91
II. Inadmissibility of the constitutional complainants for the rest92
1.Inadmissible challenges93
2.Lack of substantiation96
C. Merits97
I. Standard of review98
1.Fundamental democratic guarantees of Art. 38(1)
first sentence of the Basic Law99
first sentence of the Basic Law99
2.Scope and applicability in the context of European integration101
a)Prohibition on the European Union to create new competences for itself
102
102
b)Safeguarding the Bundestag ’s leeway to design103
3.German state organs’ responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung) 105
a)Legal bases and substantive contents106
b)Ultra vires review110
4.Identity review114
II. Application of the law to the present case116
1.Violations of Art. 119(2) and Art. 127(1) TFEU
resulting from the PSPP117
resulting from the PSPP117
a)Judgment of the CJEU of 11 December 2018 amounting, in part, to an ultra vires act118
aa)Legal view of the Court of Justice on whether the PSPP is compatible with the order of competences120
bb)Methodological deficits rendering the Judgment untenable123
(1)Principle of proportionality124
(2)Application by the Court of Justice127
(3)Undermining the principle of conferral, methodological deficits
133
133
(a)Principle of conferral134
(b)Failure to consider the effects
of the PSPP138
of the PSPP138
(c)Contradiction to the approach
applied in virtually all other
areas of law146
applied in virtually all other
areas of law146
cc)Parts of the judgment that lack binding effect154
(1)Manifest exceeding of the mandate conferred under EU primary law155
(2)Structurally significant exceeding of competences157
(3)Legal consequence: the respective parts of the Judgment lack binding effect
162
162
b)Federal Constitutional Court’s own review regarding the PSPP decisions of the ECB and its Governing Council164
aa)Monetary policy objective166
bb)Manifest violation of the principle of proportionality167
(1)Requirement to conduct a balancing of interests168
(a)Effects on Member State finances170
(b)Effects on the banking sector172
(c)Effects on private households173
(d)Effects on businesses174
(e)Effects on ESCB policy175
(2)Violations of the principle of proportionality resulting from the ECB decisions176
cc)Structural significance178
2.Further proportionality assessment179
3.No violation of Art. 123(1) TFEU resulting from the PSPP180
a)Key considerations of the Court of Justice of the European Union181
b)Concerns raised by the Federal Constitutional Court184
aa)Prior announcements concerning the PSPP185
bb)Observance of blackout period187
cc)Holding of bonds until maturity192
c)No manifest circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU197
aa)Prior announcements concerning the PSPP198
bb)Purchase limits201
cc)Distribution of purchases203
dd)Other relevant factors for preventing circumvention of the prohibition of monetary financing205
ee)Observance of blackout period206
ff)Credit rating207
gg)Holding of bonds until maturity209
hh)Determination of an exit strategy212
d)Overall balancing213
e)Debt instruments with a negative yield to maturity and collective action clauses218
aa)Debt instruments with a negative yield to maturity219
bb)Pari passu clauses221
4.No redistribution of sovereign debt under the provided risk-sharing regime 222
a)No possibility of redistributing debt223
b)Overall budgetary responsibility227
5.Consequences for the Federal Government and the Bundestag in their capacity as constitutional organs229
a)Obligations arising from the responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung) 230
b)Obligations with respect to the PSPP232
6.No precedence of application for the PSPP234
D. Decision on costs236
E. Outcome of the Justices’ vote237
R e a s o n s:
A.
With their constitutional
complaints, the complainants essentially challenge the Public Sector
Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP). The complainants in proceedings IV
furthermore challenge the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP).
Both programmes are components of the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme
(EAPP) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The complainants
contend that the decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB) on which
the programmes are based constitute ultra vires
acts. They argue that the programmes violate the prohibition of
monetary financing (Art. 123(1) TFEU) and the principle of conferral
(Art. 5(1) TEU in conjunction with Art. 119, Art. 127 et seq .
TFEU). They also assert a violation of the constitutional identity
enshrined in the Basic Law to the extent that the programmes infringe
the budgetary powers of the German Bundestag .
I.
The EAPP is a framework programme
comprising four sub-programmes: the Third Covered Bond Purchase
Programme (CBPP3), the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme
(ABSPP), the PSPP and the CSPP. In the – unpublished – decision of 22
January 2015, the ECB Governing Council consolidated the first two
programmes, which had been launched in October and November 2014
respectively, under a common framework; moreover, it announced the PSPP
and defined certain technical features of the programme design. In March
2016, the ECB Governing Council decided to launch the CSPP. As of 10
March 2016, the overall programme is referred to as EAPP. Since then,
the EAPP has undergone various modifications.
1. As set out in the reasoning
communicated by the ECB, the EAPP serves to increase money supply and
thereby ease monetary conditions (cf. ECB, Press Release of 22 January
2015), seeking to increase inflation rates (cf. Bundesbank , Monthly Report June 2016, p. 30 et seq .
[...]). It aims to ease borrowing conditions of households and firms.
This is believed to support investment and consumption, and ultimately
contribute to returning to inflation rates “to levels closer to 2%” (cf.
Recital 2 of Decision 2015/774 of the European Central Bank
of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase
programme , OJ EU L 121 of 14 May 2015, p. 20; cf.
also Bundesbank , Monthly Report June 2016, p. 39).
The volume of monthly asset
purchases under the EAPP was initially limited to EUR 60 billion. It was
announced that the purchases were intended to be carried out until the
end of September 2016 and would, in any case, be conducted until the
Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation
which is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but
close to, 2% over the medium term (cf. Recital 7 of Decision
2015/774). The ECB Governing Council reserved the right “to increase
the programme in terms of size and/or duration” (cf. ECB, Press Release
of 8 December 2016).
From March 2015 to March 2016, the
monthly purchases of securities under the programme averaged EUR 60
billion. In April 2016, it was decided to increase the purchase volume
to a monthly pace of EUR 80 billion on average and to continue the
purchases, in any case until March 2017 (cf. Recital 3 of Decision
2016/702 amending Decision 2015/774 on a secondary
markets public sector asset purchase programme , OJ
EU L 121 of 11 May 2016, p. 24). On 8 December 2016, the ECB Governing
Council decided to continue the EAPP, in any case until the end of 2017.
The purchases continued at a monthly pace of EUR 60 billion from April
2017 to December 2017 (cf. Bundesbank , Monthly Report August 2017, p. 23; Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report November 2017, p. 22), and at a monthly pace of EUR 30
billion on average from January 2018 to September 2018 (cf. Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report May 2018, p. 20). The ECB Governing Council justified
its decision to reduce the purchase volume by stating that confidence in
the gradual convergence of inflation rates towards its inflation aim of
rates below, but close to, 2% has grown (cf. ECB, Press Release of 26
October 2017; Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report November 2017, p. 22). On 13 September 2018, the ECB
Governing Council decided to again reduce the monthly purchase pace to
now EUR 15 billion for the period from October 2018 to December 2018
(cf. ECB, Press Release of 13 September 2018; Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report November 2018, p. 23). On 13 December 2018, the ECB
Governing Council decided to end the net purchases under the asset
purchase programme by 31 December 2018 (cf. ECB, Press Release of 13
October 2018; Bundesbank , Monthly Report February 2019, pp. 22, 26).
At the same time, it decided to
continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing
securities purchased under the asset purchase programme without a
specified end date in order to maintain favourable liquidity conditions
and an ample degree of monetary accommodation (cf. ECB, Press Release of
13 December 2018). This was reaffirmed in the meetings of the ECB
Governing Council held on 24 January 2019, 7 March 2019, 10 April 2019, 6
June 2019 and 25 July 2019 (cf. ECB, Press Releases of 24 January 2019,
7 March 2019, 10 April 2019, 6 June 2019 and 25 July 2019).
On 12 September 2019, the ECB
Governing Council decided to restart net purchases at a monthly pace of
EUR 20 billion as from 1 November 2019 (cf. ECB, Press Release of 12
September 2019, p.1; introductory statement to the press conference held
on 12 September 2019, p. 1).
2. The ECB launched the PSPP with
Decision (EU) 2015/774 of 4 March 2015, which was subsequently amended
by Decisions (EU) 2015/2101, 2015/2464, 2016/702, 2017/100 and Decision
(EU) 2019/1558 of 12 September 2019. The PSPP is by far the biggest
sub-programme of the EAPP. As of 8 November 2019, the total value of the
securities purchased under the EAPP by the Eurosystem, i.e. the ECB and
the national central banks of the euro area (Art. 282(1) second
sentence TFEU), amounted to EUR 2,557,800 million, with purchases under
the PSPP accounting for EUR 2,088,100 million (81.63%) (cf. Bundesbank , Monthly Report November 2019, p. 24).
The PSPP intends to further ease
monetary and financial conditions – including those relevant to the
borrowing conditions of businesses and households –, thereby supporting
aggregate consumption and investment spending in the euro area and
ultimately contributing to a return of inflation rates to levels below,
but close to, 2% (cf. Recital 4 of Decision 2015/774).
Under the PSPP, the Eurosystem
central banks purchase government bonds or other euro-denominated
marketable debt securities issued by central governments of a Member
State whose currency is the euro, and by “recognised agencies”,
international organisations or multilateral development banks located in
the euro area (Art. 3(1) of Decision 2015/774). Under
certain circumstances, Eurosystem central banks may propose public
non-financial corporations as issuers of marketable debt instruments to
be purchased (Art. 3(4) of Decision 2015/774); moreover,
since April 2016, securities issued by regional or local governments may
be purchased (Art. 1 no. 3 of Decision 2016/702).
In addition to the general
eligibility criteria for monetary operations (Guideline ECB/2011/14),
issuers must have a credit quality assessment of at least Credit Quality
Step 3 (BBB- or Baa3) (Art. 3(2) of Decision 2015/774).
Bonds issued by euro area Member States that are subject to a financial
assistance programme may be eligible even if the credit assessment does
not comply with at least Credit Quality Step 3 on condition that “the
application of the Eurosystem’s credit quality threshold is suspended by
the Governing Council pursuant to Article 8 of Guideline ECB/2014/31 (2) ”
(Art. 3(2) lit. c of Decision 2015/774). The ECB made use of
this option in Art. 1(2) of its Decision of 22 June 2016 (cf. Decision
2016/1041 of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2016 on the
eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed
by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision 2015/300
, OJ EU L 169 of 28 June 2016, p. 14). The ECB
Governing Council reserved decision on whether to purchase Greek debt
securities under the PSPP (cf. Art. 3 of Decision 2016/1041).
Initially, the issue share limit
per international securities identification number (ISIN) was set at 25%
(Art. 5 of Decision 2015/774). As from 10 November 2015, the
limit was raised to 33% subject to verification that this would not
lead the Eurosystem central banks to reach blocking minority holdings in
orderly debt restructurings (cf. Art. 1 of Decision
2015/2101 of the European Central Bank amending Decision
2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme
, OJ EU L 303 of 20 November 2015, p. 106). As from
19 April 2016, the limit was raised to 50% for securities issued by
international organisations or multilateral development banks (cf. Art. 1
no. 2(1) lit. a of Decision 2016/702).
Eligible debt securities must have
a remaining maturity of two to 30 years (Art. 3(3) of Decision
<2015>). As from 13 January 2017, the minimum remaining
maturity was decreased to one year in order to broaden the range of
eligible securities (cf. Recital 6 of Decision 2017/100 of
the European Central Bank of 11 January 2017 amending Decision
2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase
programme ). 2015>
Initially, the minimum yield was
set at -0.4% (cf. Art. 3(5) of Decision 2015/774). As from 13
January 2017, “purchases of securities under the [E]APP with a yield to
maturity below the interest rate on the ECB's deposit facility should
[also] be permitted to the extent necessary” (cf. Recital 6 and Art.
1(2) of Decision 2017/100).
No purchases are permitted in a
newly issued or tapped security and the marketable debt instruments with
a remaining maturity that are close in time, before and after, to the
maturity of the marketable debt instruments to be issued, over a period
to be determined by the Governing Council (‘blackout period’); this
serves to allow the formation of a market price for eligible securities
(Art. 4(1) of Decision 2015/774). The blackout period is not
disclosed so as to not jeopardise its purpose.
The Eurosystem accepts the same (pari passu ) treatment as private investors as regards the eligible securities (cf. Recital 8 of Decision 2015/774).
[Of the total value of marketable
debt instruments purchased] under the PSPP, 10% (before April 2016: 12%;
cf. Art. 6(1) of Decision 2015/774) shall be purchased in
securities issued by international organisations and multilateral
development banks, and 90% (previously: 88%) shall be purchased in
securities issued by central governments and “recognised agencies” (cf.
Art. 1 no. 3 of Decision 2016/702). On this basis, the ECB
and national central banks have purchased government bonds and other
eligible debt securities on the secondary markets since 9 March 2015
(Art. 1 of Decision 2015/774). The ECB purchased 10% (before
April 2016: 8%) and the national central banks 90% (previously: 92%)
(Art. 6(2) first sentence of Decision 2015/774; amended by
Art. 1 Decision 2015/2101). The national central banks’ share
is distributed according to the key for subscription of the ECB’s
capital as referred to in Art. 29 of the ESCB Statute (Art. 6(2) second
sentence of Decision 2015/774). Under the current ECB capital
key, which is adjusted periodically, with the most recent adjustment
effected on 1 January 2019, the Bundesbank ’s share is 26.4% (cf. Bundesbank ,
Annual Report 2018, p. 53). These purchases are subject to the
following rules: each national central bank only purchases eligible
securities of its own central governments or issuers of its own
jurisdiction (cf. Bundesbank ,
Annual Report 2015, p. 84); exceptions are only recognised for
international organisation and multilateral development banks as their
securities may be purchased by all national central banks (Art. 6(2) and
(3) of Decision 2015/774).
According to the ECB, the
distribution of purchases under the PSPP between the ECB on the one hand
and the national central banks on the other hand implies a risk-sharing
regime (cf. ECB, Press Release of 10 March 2016) with regard to
“hypothetical losses” resulting from certain securities (cf. ECB, Press
Release of 22 January 2015). In unpublished ECB decisions, it is
asserted that 20% of purchases are subject to such a risk-sharing
regime, namely the 10% of securities purchased by the ECB itself and the
10% of securities issued by European institutions and purchased by the
national central banks (cf. Bundesbank , Monthly Report June 2016, p. 32, fn. 4; Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report July 2018, p. 18). The remaining purchases by the
national central banks are not subject to any loss sharing (cf. Bundesbank ,
Monthly Report June 2016, p. 32 fn. 4). However, none of the ECB
decisions expressly address the question of liability for losses.
II.
1. The complainants in proceedings I challenge the omission on the part of the Bundestag and the Federal Government to take steps against the PSPP; they also challenge that the Bundesbank
failed to bring an action before the Court of Justice to the European
Union (CJEU) directed against its involvement in the PSPP.
a) [...] With regard to the
Decision of the ECB Governing Council of 10 March 2016 on the CSPP (cf.
ECB, Press Release of 10 March 2016) and the Decision of 1 June 2016
(Decision 2016/948 of the European Central Bank of 1 June
2016 on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme,
OJ EU L 157 of 15 June 2016, p. 28), the Second Senate of the Federal
Constitutional Court decided by Order of 14 January 2020 to sever the
proceedings for a separate decision.
[...]
b) [...]
2. The complainants in proceedings
II challenge the domestic applicability and implementation of the ECB
Governing Council’s Decisions of 22 January 2015 and 4 March 2015
together with the subsequent amending decisions. In addition, they
challenge the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the Bundestag
to take steps towards having these decisions rescinded and to take
suitable measures limiting, to the greatest extent possible, the
domestic impact arising from the continued implementation of these
decisions. By way of subsidiary application, they seek a declaration
that the Federal Government and the Bundestag violated their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung )
by failing to actively address, and by failing to seek a positive
determination as to the question how the order of competences in the
European Union can be restored and Germany’s constitutional identity can
be protected. [...]
[...]
3. The complainant in proceedings
III challenges the omission on the part of the Federal Government, with
regard to the ECB decisions on the PSPP and the implementation of that
programme, to take suitable steps against the ECB exceeding its monetary
policy mandate and encroaching upon the Member State’s economic policy
competences, and against the ECB violating the prohibition on central
banks providing monetary financing and infringing the constitutional
identity of the Federal Republic of Germany. [...] Moreover, he
challenges the participation of members of the ECB Governing Council in
the adoption of the relevant decisions on grounds of bias.
[...]
4. The complainants in
proceedings IV challenge the ECB Governing Council’s decisions on the
PSPP and the CSPP, the execution of these programmes by the ECB and the Bundesbank as well as the omission of the Federal Government and the Bundestag
to take action in this regard. By Order of 14 January 2020, the Second
Senate severed the proceedings to the extent that the constitutional
complaint is directed against the CSPP. For the rest, the complainants
seek a declaration that the announcement on the PSPP issued by the ECB
on 22 January 2015 and the corresponding Decision of 4 March 2015
together with the continuing monthly purchases of securities under the
programme exceed the competences conferred upon the ECB under EU primary
law in a sufficiently qualified manner, thereby violating both the
European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) enshrined in the Act of Approval under Art. 23(1) second sentence of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz
– GG) and the principle of the sovereignty of the people under Art.
20(2) first sentence GG as well as the rights of the complainants in
proceedings IV under Art. 38(1) first sentence GG. They further seek an
order enjoining the Bundesbank
from participating in the adoption, implementation, execution and
operationalisation of the PSPP. Lastly, they seek a declaration that the
Federal Government violates their fundamental right deriving from Art.
38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art.
79(3) GG by failing to take action against the relevant ECB decisions
and – as long as the measures continue to have effect – to take suitable
measures limiting the domestic impact to the greatest extent possible.
[...]
III.
1. The Bundestag , the Bundesrat ,
the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, the Federal
Ministry of Finance as well as all Land
governments were notified of the constitutional complaints and of the
opportunity to submit statements in the proceedings. The Court only
received a statement from the Federal Government (see 2 below). Both the
President of the Bundesbank
(see 3 below) and the President of the ECB (see 4 below) submitted a
statement based on the list of questions provided by the Second Senate
in preparation of the oral hearing.
2. The Federal Government contends
that the constitutional complaints are in part inadmissible [...], and
unfounded for the rest [...].
[...]
3. […]
4. […]
IV.
1. By Order of 18 July 2017, the
Second Senate suspended the proceedings and referred the following
question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Art. 267(1)
TFEU (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE 146, 216 <219 em="" nbsp="">et seq 219>
1. Does Decision (EU) 2015/774 of
the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public
sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), as amended by Decision
(EU) 2015/2101 of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2015 amending
Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset
purchase programme (ECB/2015/33), Decision (EU) 2016/702 of the European
Central Bank of 18 April 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a
secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2016/8)
and Decision (EU) 2016/1041 of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2016
on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully
guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/300
(ECB/2016/18), or the manner and method of its implementation, violate
Article 123(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
In particular, is it a violation
of Article 123(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) if, under the secondary markets public sector asset purchase
programme (PSPP),
a) details of the purchases are communicated in a way that establishes de facto certainty on the markets that the Eurosystem will purchase part of the bonds to be issued by the Member States?
b) even after the event, no
details are given about compliance with minimum periods between the
issuing of a debt instrument on the primary market and its purchase on
the secondary market, with the result that a judicial review is not
possible in this regard?
c) none of the bonds purchased are resold but rather held until maturity and thus withdrawn from the market?
d) the Eurosystem purchases marketable debt instruments with a negative yield to maturity?
2. Does the Decision referred to
in no. 1 above violate Article 123 TFEU, at the very least, when, in
view of changes in conditions on the financial markets and in particular
as a result of a shortage of bonds available for purchase, its
continued implementation requires that the originally applicable
purchase rules be steadily relaxed and that the restrictions laid down
in the case-law of the Court of Justice with regard to a bond purchase
programme such as the PSPP lose their effect?
3. Does the current version of
Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015,
referred to in no. 1 above, violate Article 119 and Article 127(1) and
(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as
Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, because it exceeds
the European Central Bank’s monetary policy mandate set out in these
provisions and thus encroaches upon the competences of the Member
States?
Does the European Central Bank exceed its mandate, in particular, by the fact that
a) on account of the volume of the
PPSP, which on 12 May 2017 amounted to EUR 1,534.8 billion, the
Decision referred to in no. 1 above significantly influences the
refinancing conditions of the Members States?
b) in light of the improvement in
refinancing conditions of Member States referred to in lit. a above and
its effect on commercial banks, the Decision referred to in no. 1 above
not only has indirect economic consequences, but rather, its objectively
ascertainable effects suggest that the programme in question pursues an
economic policy objective with at least equal priority, in addition to
its monetary policy objective?
c) on account of its strong
economic policy effects, the Decision referred to in no. 1 above
violates the principle of proportionality?
d) given the absence of a specific
statement of reasons, it is not possible to review whether the Decision
referred to in no. 1 has been necessary and proportionate on an ongoing
basis during the over two-year period of its implementation?
4. Does the current version of the
Decision referred to in no. 1 above violate Article 119 and Article
127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 19 of the Protocol on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank in any case because its volume and its over two-year long
implementation and the resulting economic policy effects thereof give
rise to a different assessment of the necessity and proportionality of
the PSPP and thus, from a certain moment onwards, the Decision
constituted an exceeding of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy
mandate?
5. Does the unlimited sharing of
risks between national central banks of the Eurosystem in the event that
the central governments and equivalent issuers default on bonds, which
is possibly provided for in the Decision referred to in no. 1 above,
violate Article 123 and Article 125 TFEU as well as Article 4(2) of the
Treaty on European Union, if this may require the recapitalisation of
national central banks with funds drawn from the state budget?
2. By Judgment of 11 December 2018 (Weiss and Others ,
C-493/17, EU:C:2018:1000), the CJEU decided on the request for a
preliminary ruling. With regard to the first to fourth questions, it
held that consideration of those questions had disclosed no factor of
such a kind as to affect the validity of Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the
European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public
sector asset purchase programme, as amended by Decision (EU) 2017/100.
The fifth question was found to be inadmissible. In particular, the CJEU
held the following:
Compliance with the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU
30 In that regard, in so far as
concerns the alleged absence of a specific statement of reasons for the
ECB decisions relating to the PSPP, it should be recalled that, in
situations such as that at issue in the present case, in which an EU
institution enjoys broad discretion, a review of compliance with certain
procedural safeguards –– including the obligation for the ESCB to
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the
situation in question and to give an adequate statement of the reasons
for its decisions –– is of fundamental importance (...).
31 According to settled case-law
of the Court, although the statement of reasons for an EU measure, which
is required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, must show
clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author of the measure in
question, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons
for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of
review, it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and
law (...).
32 In particular, in the case of a
measure intended to have general application, which makes clear the
essential objective pursued by the institutions, a specific statement of
reasons for each of the technical choices made by the institutions
cannot be required (...).
33 The question whether the duty
to state reasons has been satisfied must, moreover, be assessed by
reference not only to the wording of the measure but also to its context
and to the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question
(...).
34 In the present case, recitals 3
and 4 of Decision 2015/774 outline the objective of the PSPP, the
economic context justifying the establishment of that programme as well
as the mechanisms for bringing about the intended effects of the
programme.
35 While the statements of reasons
for Decisions 2015/2464, 2016/702 and 2017/100 do not reproduce those
reasons relating to the PSPP, they do include explanations concerning
the considerations underpinning the amendments which those decisions
made to the rules governing the PSPP.
36 Furthermore, various documents
published by the ECB at the time when each of those decisions was
adopted supplement the reasoning given in the decisions by setting out,
in detail, the economic analyses underpinning the decisions, the various
options considered by the Governing Council and the reasons justifying
the choices made, in the light, in particular, of the observed and
anticipated effects of the PSPP.
37 Thus, as the Advocate General
has observed at points 133 to 138 and 144 to 148 of his Opinion, the
successive decisions of the ECB relating to the PSPP have consistently
been clarified by the publication of press releases, introductory
statements of the President of the ECB at press conferences, accompanied
by answers to the questions raised by the press, and by the accounts of
the ECB Governing Council’s monetary policy meetings, which outline the
discussions within that body.
38 In that regard, attention
should be drawn in particular to the fact that those accounts include,
inter alia, explanations of the upward then downward trends in the
monthly volume of purchases of bonds and of the reinvestment of the sums
received on maturity of the bonds. They show, in that context, that the
potential side effects of the PSPP, including its possible impact on
the budgetary decisions of the Member States concerned, were taken into
account.
39 The President of the ECB
explained at successive press conferences that it was the exceptionally
low level of inflation rates, by comparison with the objective of
maintaining price stability by returning annual inflation rates to
levels closer to 2%, that justified establishing the PSPP and making
regular adjustments to that programme. Indeed, prior to the adoption of
Decisions 2015/774, 2015/2464, 2016/702 and 2017/100, the annual rate of
inflation was, respectively -0.2%, 0.1%, 0.3% and 0.6%. It was only at
his press conference on 7 September 2017 that the President of the ECB
announced that the annual rate of inflation had reached 1.5%, thus
approaching the target.
40 In addition to the various
documents mentioned in paragraph 37 of this judgment, which were made
available both at the time when the PSPP was set up and whenever that
programme was reviewed and amended, mention can also be made of the
publication, in the ECB’s Economic Bulletin ,
of general analyses of the monetary situation in the euro area and of a
number of specific studies dealing with the effects of the APP and the
PSPP.
41 It follows from all those
factors that the ESCB explained how persistently low levels of inflation
and the exhaustion of the instruments normally used for the conduct of
its monetary policy led it to consider that the adoption and
implementation, with effect from 2015, of an asset purchase programme
with the features of the PSPP was necessary, both in principle and in
its various practical aspects.
42 Having regard to the principles
referred to in paragraphs 31 to 33 of this judgment, those factors
establish that the ECB duly stated the reasons for Decision 2015/774.
43 As regards the absence of any
subsequent publication of details relating to the black-out period, the
Court observes that, since the purpose of such publication would be to
show the precise content of the measures adopted by the ESCB rather than
the reasons justifying those measures, it cannot be required by virtue
of the obligation to state reasons.
Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB
The powers of the ESCB
46 It should be noted that under
Article 119(2) TFEU, the activities of the Member States and the Union
are to include a single currency, the euro, as well as the definition
and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy (...).
47 As regards more particularly
monetary policy, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU states that the Union is to have
exclusive competence in that area for the Member States whose currency
is the euro (...).
48 Under Article 282(1) TFEU, the
ECB and the central banks of the Member States whose currency is the
euro, which constitute the Eurosystem, are to conduct the monetary
policy of the Union. According to Article 282(4) TFEU, the ECB is to
adopt such measures as are necessary to carry out its tasks in
accordance with Articles 127 to 133 and Article 138 TFEU, as well as
with the conditions laid down in the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB
(...).
49 Within that framework, it is
for the ESCB, pursuant to Article 127(2), Article 130 and Article 282(3)
TFEU, to define and implement that policy, acting independently and in
compliance with the principle of conferral of powers, while it is for
the Court, in the exercise of its power of review, to safeguard, under
the conditions laid down by the Treaties, the principle of conferral
(...).
50 It must be pointed out in this
regard that the FEU Treaty contains no precise definition of monetary
policy but defines both the objectives of monetary policy and the
instruments which are available to the ESCB for the purpose of
implementing that policy (...).
51 Thus, under Articles 127(1) and
282(2) TFEU, the primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy is to
maintain price stability. The same provisions further stipulate that,
without prejudice to that objective, the ESCB is to support the general
economic policies in the Union, with a view to contributing to the
achievement of its objectives, as laid down in Article 3 TEU (...).
52 As to the means assigned to the
ESCB by primary law for the purpose of achieving those objectives,
Chapter IV of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, which describes the
monetary functions and operations assured by the ESCB, sets out the
instruments to which the ESCB may have recourse within the framework of
monetary policy (...).
Delimitation of the Union’s monetary policy
53 The Court has held that in
order to determine whether a measure falls within the area of monetary
policy it is appropriate to refer principally to the objectives of that
measure. The instruments which the measure employs in order to attain
those objectives are also relevant (...).
54 In the first place, so far as
the objectives of Decision 2015/774 are concerned, it is apparent from
recital 4 of that decision that the purpose of the latter is to
contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels below, but close to,
2% over the medium term.
55 In that regard, it is important
to point out that the authors of the Treaties chose to define the
primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy –– namely the
maintenance of price stability –– in a general and abstract manner, but
did not spell out precisely how that objective was to be given concrete
expression in quantitative terms.
56 It does not appear that the
specification of the objective of maintaining price stability as the
maintenance of inflation rates at levels below, but close to, 2% over
the medium term, which the ESCB chose to adopt in 2003, is vitiated by a
manifest error of assessment and goes beyond the framework established
by the FEU Treaty. As the ECB has explained, such a choice can properly
be based, inter alia, on the fact that instruments for measuring
inflation are not precise, on the appreciable differences in inflation
within the euro area and on the need to preserve a safety margin to
guard against the possible emergence of a risk of deflation.
57 It follows that, as the ECB
submits and as the referring court has indeed noted, the specific
objective set out in recital 4 of Decision 2015/774 can be attached to
the primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy, as set out in
Article 127(1) and Article 282(2) TFEU.
58 That conclusion is not called
into question by the fact, to which the referring court draws attention,
that the PSPP allegedly has considerable effects on the balance sheets
of commercial banks as well as on the refinancing terms of the Member
States of the euro area.
59 In the present case, it is
undisputed that, by virtue of its underlying principle and its
procedures, the PSPP is capable of having an impact both on the balance
sheets of commercial banks and on the financing of the Member States
covered by that programme and that such effects might possibly be sought
through economic policy measures.
60 It must be emphasised in that
regard that Article 127(1) TFEU provides, inter alia, that (i) without
prejudice to its primary objective of maintaining price stability, the
ESCB is to support the general economic policies in the Union and that
(ii) the ESCB must act in accordance with the principles laid down in
Article 119 TFEU. Accordingly, within the institutional balance
established by the provisions of Title VIII of the FEU Treaty, which
includes the independence of the ESCB guaranteed by Article 130 and
Article 282(3) TFEU, the authors of the Treaties did not intend to make
an absolute separation between economic and monetary policies.
61 In that connection, it should
be recalled that a monetary policy measure cannot be treated as
equivalent to an economic policy measure for the sole reason that it may
have indirect effects that can also be sought in the context of
economic policy (...).
62 The Court cannot concur with
the referring court’s view that any effects of an open market operations
programme that were knowingly accepted and definitely foreseeable by
the ESCB when the programme was set up should not be regarded as
‘indirect effects’ of the programme.
63 First, both in the judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle (...) and in the judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others
(...), the Court regarded as indirect effects, having no consequences
for the purposes of classification of the measures at issue in the cases
that gave rise to those judgments, effects which, even at the time of
adoption of the measures, were foreseeable consequences of those
measures, which must therefore have been knowingly accepted at that
time.
64 Secondly, the conduct of
monetary policy will always entail an impact on interest rates and bank
refinancing conditions, which necessarily has consequences for the
financing conditions of the public deficit of the Member States (...).
65 More specifically, as the ECB
explained before the Court, the transmission of the ESCB’s monetary
policy measures to price trends takes place via, inter alia,
facilitation of the supply of credit to the economy and modification of
the behaviour of businesses and individuals with regard to investment,
consumption and saving.
66 Consequently, in order to exert
an influence on inflation rates, the ESCB necessarily has to adopt
measures that have certain effects on the real economy, which might also
be sought –– to different ends –– in the context of economic policy. In
particular, when the maintenance of price stability requires the ESCB
to seek to raise inflation, the measures that it must adopt to ease
monetary and financial conditions in the euro area for that purpose may
entail an impact on the interest rates of government bonds because,
inter alia, those interest rates play a decisive role in the setting of
the interest rates applicable to the various economic actors (...).
67 That being so, if the ESCB were
precluded altogether from adopting such measures when their effects are
foreseeable and knowingly accepted, that would, in practice, prevent it
from using the means made available to it by the Treaties for the
purpose of achieving monetary policy objectives and might –– in
particular in the context of an economic crisis entailing a risk of
deflation –– represent an insurmountable obstacle to its accomplishing
the task assigned to it by primary law.
68 In the second place, as regards
the means used in Decision 2015/774 to achieve the objective of
maintaining price stability, it is common ground that the PSPP is based
on the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets.
69 It is clear from Article 18.1
of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, which forms part of Chapter IV
of that protocol, that in order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB
and to carry out its tasks, as provided for in primary law, the ECB and
the central banks of the Member States may, in principle, operate in the
financial markets by buying and selling outright marketable instruments
denominated in euros. It follows that the operations provided for by
Decision 2015/774 use one of the monetary policy instruments for which
primary law provides (...).
70 In view of the foregoing, it
follows that, taking account of its objective and of the means provided
for achieving that objective, a decision such as Decision 2015/774 falls
within the sphere of monetary policy.
Proportionality in relation to the objectives of monetary policy
71 It follows from Article 119(2)
TFEU and Article 127(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 5(4) TEU,
that a bond-buying programme forming part of monetary policy may be
validly adopted and implemented only in so far as the measures that it
entails are proportionate to the objectives of that policy (...).
72 According to settled case-law
of the Court, the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the
EU institutions should be suitable for attaining the legitimate
objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and should not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve those objectives (...).
73 As regards judicial review of
compliance with those conditions, since the ESCB is required, when it
prepares and implements an open market operations programme of the kind
provided for in Decision 2015/774, to make choices of a technical nature
and to undertake complex forecasts and assessments, it must be allowed,
in that context, a broad discretion (...).
74 As regards, first, the
suitability of the PSPP for attaining the ESCB’s objectives, it follows
from recital 3 of Decision 2015/774, from the documents published by the
ECB at the time of adoption of that decision and from the observations
submitted to the Court that Decision 2015/774 was adopted in the light
of a number of factors that materially increased the risk of a decline
in prices over the medium term, in the context of an economic crisis
entailing a risk of deflation.
75 It can be seen from the
documents before the Court that, in spite of the monetary policy
measures adopted, annual rates of inflation in the euro area were at
that time far below the 2% target fixed by the ESCB, as they were no
higher than -0.2% in December 2014, and that the forecasts available at
that time as to how inflation rates would move anticipated that such
rates would remain very low or negative over the following months.
Although monetary and financial conditions in the euro area subsequently
improved gradually, it is the case that, at the date of adoption of
Decision 2015/774 [in the German version and other language versions : 2017/100], actual annual inflation rates continued to be appreciably below 2%, the rate being 0.6% in November 2016.
76 Against that background,
recital 4 of Decision 2015/774 states that, for the purpose of achieving
the objective of inflation rates at levels below, but close to, 2%, the
PSPP is intended to ease monetary and financial conditions, including
those of non-financial corporations and households, thereby supporting
aggregate consumption and investment spending in the euro area and
ultimately contributing to a return of inflation rates to the levels
sought over the medium term.
77 The ECB has referred in this
regard to the practices of other central banks and to various studies,
which show that large-scale purchases of government bonds can contribute
to achieving that objective by means of facilitating access to
financing that is conducive to boosting economic activity by giving a
clear signal of the ESCB’s commitment to achieving the inflation target
set, by promoting a reduction in real interest rates and, at the same
time, by encouraging commercial banks to provide more credit in order to
rebalance their portfolios.
78 Accordingly, in view of the
information before the Court, it does not appear that the ESCB’s
economic analysis –– according to which the PSPP was appropriate, in the
monetary and financial conditions of the euro area, for contributing to
achieving the objective of maintaining price stability –– is vitiated
by a manifest error of assessment.
79 It must therefore be
determined, in the second place, whether the PSPP does not go manifestly
beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.
80 In that regard, the PSPP
programme was adopted in a context which the ECB described as
characterised, on the one hand, by persistently low inflation that
risked triggering a cycle of deflation and, on the other, by an
inability to counter that risk by means of the other instruments
available to the ESCB for increasing inflation rates. Concerning the
latter point, it is to be noted, inter alia, that key interest rates
were at levels close to the bottom of their conceivable range and that
the ESCB had, for several months, already been implementing a programme
of large-scale purchases of private sector assets.
81 In those circumstances, in view
of the foreseeable effects of the PSPP and given that it does not
appear that the ESCB’s objective could have been achieved by any other
type of monetary policy measure entailing more limited action on the
part of the ESCB, it must be held that, in its underlying principle, the
PSPP does not manifestly go beyond what is necessary to achieve that
objective.
82 As regards the procedures for
implementing the PSPP, the way that programme is set up also helps to
guarantee that its effects are limited to what is necessary to achieve
the objective concerned, in particular because, since the PSPP is not
selective, the ESCB’s action will have an impact on financial conditions
across the whole of the euro area and will not meet the specific
financing needs of certain Member States of that area.
83 Likewise, the decision,
reflected in Article 3 of Decision 2015/774, to make the purchase of
bonds under the PSPP subject to stringent eligibility criteria has the
effect of limiting that programme’s impact on the balance sheets of
commercial banks, by ensuring that the programme is not implemented in
such a way as to allow those banks to resell securities with a high
level of risk to the ESCB.
84 In addition, the PSPP has, from
the start, been intended to apply only during the period necessary for
attaining the objective sought and is therefore temporary in nature.
85 It thus follows from recital 7
of Decision 2015/774 that it was initially anticipated that the PSPP’s
period of application would run until the end of September 2016. That
period was subsequently extended until the end of March 2017 and then
until the end of December 2017, as is stated in recital 3 of Decision
2015/2464 and recital 4 of Decision 2017/100 respectively. To that end,
the decisions taken in that regard were incorporated into Article 2(2)
of the Guideline on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase
programme (ECB/2015/NP3) (‘the Guideline’), which is binding on the
central banks of the Member States in accordance with Article 12(1) of
the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB.
86 It does not appear that that
initial period or the successive extensions thereof manifestly go beyond
what was necessary to achieve the objective sought, since they always
covered relatively short periods and were decided upon in view of the
fact that the observed changes in inflation rates were not sufficient to
achieve the objective sought by Decision 2015/774.
87 As to the volume of bonds that
can be purchased under the PSPP, it must first be emphasised that a set
of rules has been adopted to limit that volume in advance.
88 Thus, that volume was, from the
outset, circumscribed by setting a monthly asset purchase amount under
the APP. That amount, which was regularly revised in order to restrict
it to what was necessary in order to achieve the stated objective, is
found in recital 7 of Decision 2015/774, recital 3 of Decision 2016/702
and recital 5 of Decision 2017/100 and was incorporated in Article 2(2)
of the Guideline. It also follows from the last-mentioned provision that
priority is given to bonds issued by private operators for the purpose
of reaching the monthly asset purchase volume under the APP as a whole.
89 In addition, the extent of the
ESCB’s possible intervention on secondary markets, within the framework
of the PSPP, is also restricted by the rules in Article 5 of Decision
2015/774, which lay down strict purchase limits per issue and per
issuer.
90 Next, although it is true that,
despite those various limits, the total volume of securities that may
be acquired under the PSPP remains substantial, the ECB has made the
valid point that the efficacy of such a programme through the mechanisms
described in paragraph 77 of this judgment depends on a large volume of
government bonds being purchased and held. That means not only that the
volume of purchases must be sufficient, but also that it may prove
necessary — in order to achieve the objective pursued by Decision
2015/774 –– to hold the bonds purchased on a lasting basis and to
reinvest the sums realised when those bonds are repaid on maturity.
91 In that regard, the fact that
that reasoned analysis is disputed does not, in itself, suffice to
establish a manifest error of assessment on the part of the ESCB, since,
given that questions of monetary policy are usually of a controversial
nature and in view of the ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be
required of the ESCB apart from that it use its economic expertise and
the necessary technical means at its disposal to carry out that analysis
with all care and accuracy (...).
92 Finally, having regard to the
information in the documents before the Court and to the broad
discretion enjoyed by the ESCB, it is not apparent that a
government-bonds purchase programme of either more limited volume or
shorter duration would have been able to bring about –– as effectively
and rapidly as the PSPP –– changes in inflation comparable to those
sought by the ESCB, for the purpose of achieving the primary objective
of monetary policy laid down by the authors of the Treaties.
93 In the third place, as the
Advocate General has stated in point 148 of his Opinion, the ESCB
weighed up the various interests involved so as effectively to prevent
disadvantages which are manifestly disproportionate to the PSPP’s
objective from arising on implementation of the programme.
94 In particular, as the Court has already had occasion to note, in paragraph 125 of the judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others
(...), the open market operations authorised by the authors of the
Treaties inevitably entail a risk of losses. However, the ESCB has
adopted various measures designed to circumscribe that risk and to take
it into account.
95 Thus, the rules mentioned in
paragraphs 83 and 89 of this judgment also reduce that risk, by limiting
the ESCB’s exposure in the event of a default of the issuer of some of
the bonds purchased and by ensuring that bonds with a significant
default risk cannot be purchased under the PSPP. It follows, moreover,
from Article 4(3) of the Guideline that the ECB monitors the central
banks of the Member States on an ongoing basis to ensure that they are
complying with those rules.
96 In addition, in order to
prevent the position of a central bank of one Member State from being
weakened in the event of an issuer in another Member State failing to
make a repayment, Article 6(3) of Decision 2015/774 provides that each
national central bank is to purchase eligible securities of issuers of
its own jurisdiction.
97 If, despite those preventive
measures, the purchase of securities under the PSPP were to result in,
possibly significant, losses, the information provided to the Court
indicates that the rules on loss allocation, which were established
right at the start of the programme and have subsequently been
maintained, provide that, in the case of any losses of a national
central bank that are related to the programme, the only losses to be
shared are those generated by securities issued by eligible
international organisations; under Article 6(1) of Decision 2015/774,
such securities represent 10% of the total value of the PSPP. By
contrast, the ESCB has not adopted any rule allowing for the sharing of
losses of a central bank of a Member State that derive from securities
issued by issuers of that Member State. Nor has the adoption of such a
rule been announced by the ESCB.
98 It follows from the foregoing
that the ESCB duly took into consideration the risks to which the
substantial volume of asset purchases under the PSPP might possibly
expose the central banks of the Member States and that, having
considered the interests involved, it took the view that it was not
appropriate to establish a general rule on loss sharing.
99 As regards possible
PSPP-related losses of the ECB, especially in the event of its
purchasing, within the limit of the 10% share allocated to it by Article
6(2) of Decision 2015/774, exclusively or predominantly securities
issued by national authorities, it must be observed that the ESCB has
not adopted – beyond the safeguards against such a risk that are
afforded both by the high eligibility criteria set out in Article 3 of
that decision and by the purchase limits per issue and per issuer under
Article 5 of the decision – any rule derogating from the general scheme
for the allocation of losses of the ECB under Article 32(5) of the
Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB in conjunction with Article 33 thereof.
It follows, in essence, that such losses may be offset against the
ECB’s general reserve fund and, if necessary, following a decision by
the Governing Council, against the monetary income of the relevant
financial year in proportion and up to the amounts allocated to the
national central banks in accordance with the rule that allocation is in
proportion to their respective paid-up shares in the capital of the
ECB.
Article 123(1) TFEU
102 According to the wording of
Article 123(1) TFEU, that provision prohibits the ECB and the central
banks of the Member States from granting overdraft facilities or any
other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the
Union and of Member States and from purchasing directly from them their
debt instruments.
103 It follows that that provision
prohibits all financial assistance from the ESCB to a Member State, but
does not preclude, generally, the possibility of the ESCB purchasing
from the creditors of such a State, bonds previously issued by that
State (...).
104 As regards Decision 2015/774,
it should be observed that under the PSPP the ESCB is not entitled to
purchase bonds directly from public authorities and bodies of the Member
States, but only to do so indirectly, on the secondary markets. The
intervention by the ESCB provided for by that programme thus cannot be
equated with a measure granting financial assistance to a Member State.
105 However, the Court has held
that Article 123(1) TFEU imposes two further limits on the ESCB when it
adopts a programme for purchasing bonds issued by the public authorities
and bodies of the Union and the Member States.
106 First, the ESCB cannot validly
purchase bonds on the secondary markets under conditions which would,
in practice, mean that its intervention has an effect equivalent to that
of a direct purchase of bonds from the public authorities and bodies of
the Member States (...).
107 Secondly, the ESCB must build
sufficient safeguards into its intervention to ensure that the latter
does not fall foul of the prohibition of monetary financing in Article
123 TFEU, by satisfying itself that the programme is not such as to
reduce the impetus which that provision is intended to give the Member
States to follow a sound budgetary policy (...).
108 The safeguards which the ESCB
must provide so that those two restrictions are observed will depend
both on the particular features of the programme under consideration and
on the economic context in which that programme is adopted and
implemented. Whether those safeguards are sufficient must then be
determined by the Court in the event of the programme being challenged.
The alleged equivalence of intervention under the PSPP and the purchase of bonds on the primary markets
109 The referring court considers
that the PSPP procedures may create, for private operators, de facto
certainty that the bonds that they may acquire from the Member States
will subsequently be purchased by the ESCB on the secondary markets.
110 In that regard, it should be
observed that the ESCB’s intervention would be incompatible with Article
123(1) TFEU if the potential purchasers of government bonds on the
primary markets knew for certain that the ESCB was going to purchase
those bonds within a certain period and under conditions allowing those
market operators to act, de facto, as intermediaries for the ESCB for
the direct purchase of those bonds from public authorities and bodies of
the Member State concerned (...).
111 In the present case, it is
true that the foreseeability of the ESCB’s intervention under the PSPP
is –– deliberately –– increased by publishing in advance a set of
features of that programme, which, as the Commission and the ECB have
emphasised, is intended to contribute to the effectiveness and
proportionality of the programme, by limiting the volume of bonds that
actually have to be purchased to achieve the objective sought.
112 In particular, the
announcement, both in decisions of the ESCB and in communications
intended for the public, of the monthly volume of asset purchases
envisaged under the APP, the expected duration of that programme, the
rules for allocating those volumes between the various central banks of
the Member States, or the eligibility criteria governing the purchase of
a security, is such as to enable private operators to foresee, to some
extent, significant aspects of the ESCB’s future actions on the
secondary markets.
113 However, the ESCB has put in
place various safeguards with a view to ensuring that a private operator
is not able to act as if it were an intermediary of the ESCB.
114 Thus, observance of the
blackout period provided for in Article 4(1) of Decision 2015/774, which
is monitored by the ECB pursuant to Article 9 of the Guideline, ensures
that bonds issued by a Member State cannot be purchased by the ESCB
immediately after they are issued.
115 Although Article 4(1) of
Decision 2015/774 does not specify the precise duration of the blackout
period, which is fixed in Article 15 of the Guideline, the ECB has
stated, in its written observations, that the length of the period is
measured in days rather than weeks. Such a duration does not, however,
give operators who are potential purchasers of government bonds on the
primary markets the certainty that the ESCB is going to purchase those
bonds very shortly thereafter.
116 Indeed, the absence of any
publication, either in advance or after the event, of information
concerning the duration of the blackout period, and the fact that the
period in question is only a minimum period, on expiry of which the
purchase of a security is permitted, avoid a situation in which a
private operator is able to act, de facto ,
as an intermediary of the ESCB, since those factors limit the
foreseeability, in terms of timing, of the ESCB’s interventions on the
secondary markets. The fact that a purchase may thus take place several
months or several years after a bond has been issued increases the
uncertainty of private operators all the more, given that the ESCB has
the option of reducing the monthly volume of bond purchases under the
APP and has, moreover, already made use of that option on a number of
occasions.
117 In addition, the ESCB has
introduced a number of safeguards specifically to prevent private
operators from predicting with certainty whether particular bonds will
in fact be purchased on the secondary markets under the PSPP.
118 First, although the ESCB
discloses the total volume of projected purchases under the APP, it does
not disclose the volume of bonds issued by public authorities and
bodies of a Member State which will in the normal course of events be
purchased in a given month under the PSPP. In addition, the ESCB has
laid down rules intended to ensure that that volume cannot be precisely
determined in advance.
119 In that regard, first, the
rules laid down in Article 2(2) of the Guideline provide that the volume
set out therein applies for the whole of the APP and that PSPP
purchases may be made only up to the residual amount. It follows that
the volume of those purchases having to be made can vary from month to
month depending on how many bonds issued by private operators are
available on the secondary markets. That provision also enables the
Governing Council to depart, by way of exception, from the monthly
forecast volume, when specific market conditions so demand.
120 Secondly, although Article
6(2) of Decision 2015/774 provides that purchases are to be distributed
among the central banks of the Member States in accordance with the key
for subscription of the ECB’s capital, it cannot be deduced with
certainty therefrom that the amount thus allocated to a central bank of a
Member State will be used, to the extent provided for in Article 6(1)
of that decision, for the purchase of bonds originating from public
authorities and bodies of that Member State. Indeed, the allocation of
securities purchased under the PSPP, as provided for in Article 6(1) of
Decision 2015/774, is, under the second sentence of that provision, to
be subject to revision by the Governing Council. Decision 2015/774 also
includes various mechanisms that inject a degree of flexibility into
purchases under the PSPP, in particular by permitting, in Article 3(3)
and(4), substitute purchases to be carried out and, in Article 6(3), the
Governing Council to allow ad hoc deviations from the specialisation
scheme for the allocation of securities purchased under the PSPP.
Article 2(3) of the Guideline enables the Eurosystem central banks to
depart from the monthly purchase guidance in order to react
appropriately to market conditions.
121 Next, it is apparent from
Article 3(1), (3) and (5) of Decision 2015/774 that the ESCB has
authorised the purchase of diversified securities under the PSPP,
thereby reducing the possibilities for determining in advance the nature
of the purchases that will be made for the purpose of achieving the
programme’s monthly purchase targets.
122 Thus, it is possible in that
context for not only bonds issued by central governments but also those
issued by regional or local governments to be purchased. Similarly,
those bonds can have a maturity of between 1 year and 30 years and 364
days and their yield may, where necessary, be negative, or even below
the deposit facility rate.
123 It must also be noted that
Decisions 2015/2464 and 2017/100 rightly amended, on these points, the
scheme initially set up in order to extend the scope of asset purchases.
Those decisions thus further limited, in the light of the changes in
market conditions, the foreseeability of the ESCB’s purchases of Member
State bonds.
124 Lastly, under Article 5(1)
and(2) of Decision 2015/774, the Eurosystem central banks cannot
purchase more than 33% of a particular issue of bonds of a central
government of a Member State or more than 33% of the outstanding
securities of one of those governments.
125 It follows from those purchase
limits, compliance with which is monitored on a daily basis by the ECB
in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Guideline, that the ESCB is not
permitted to buy either all the bonds issued by such an issuer or the
entirety of a given issue of those bonds. As has been pointed out by the
governments that have taken part in the present proceedings and by the
ECB, it follows that, when bonds are purchased from a central government
of a Member State, a private operator necessarily runs the risk of not
being able to resell them to the ESCB on the secondary markets, as a
purchase of all the bonds issued is in all cases precluded.
126 The uncertainty that those
purchase limits create in that regard is heightened by the restrictions
which Article 8 of Decision 2015/774 places on the publication of
information concerning the bonds held by the ESCB. As a result of those
restrictions, only aggregate information is published, to the exclusion
of any indication as to the proportion of bonds actually held by the
ESCB following a given issue.
127 It follows from all the
foregoing that, assuming that, as mentioned by the referring court, the
ESCB is faced with a severe shortage of bonds issued by certain Member
States –– which has been strongly disputed by the ECB ––, the safeguards
built into the PSPP ensure that a private operator cannot be certain,
when it purchases bonds issued by a Member State, that those bonds will
actually be bought by the ESCB in the foreseeable future.
128 Accordingly, it must be found,
as the Advocate General has stated in point 79 of his Opinion, that the
fact that the PSPP procedures make it possible to foresee, at the
macroeconomic level, that there will be a purchase of a significant
volume of bonds issued by public authorities and bodies of the Member
States does not afford a given private operator such certainty that he
can act, de facto, as an intermediary of the ESCB for the direct
purchase of bonds from a Member State.
Allegedly reduced impetus to conduct a sound budgetary policy
129 The referring court asks
whether Decision 2015/774 is compatible with Article 123(1) TFEU
inasmuch as the certainty that that decision might create with regard to
the ESCB’s intervention may distort market conditions by reducing the
impetus for Member States to pursue a sound budgetary policy.
130 It should be borne in mind
that the fact that implementation of an open market operations programme
to some extent facilitates financing for the Member States concerned is
not decisive, since the conduct of monetary policy will always entail
an impact on interest rates and bank refinancing conditions, which
necessarily has consequences for the financing conditions of the public
deficit of the Member States (...).
131 Accordingly, although such a
programme may make it foreseeable that, in the months ahead, a not
inconsiderable proportion of the bonds issued by a Member State is
likely to be purchased by the ESCB, which can facilitate that Member
State’s financing, that does not in itself mean that the programme is
incompatible with Article 123(1) TFEU.
132 However, in order to avoid a
situation in which the Member States’ impetus to pursue a sound
budgetary policy is reduced, the adoption and implementation of such a
programme may not create certainty regarding a future purchase of Member
State bonds, in consequence of which Member States might adopt a
budgetary policy that fails to take account of the fact that they will
be compelled, in the event of a deficit, to seek financing on the
markets, or in consequence of which they would be protected against the
consequences which a change in their macroeconomic or budgetary
situation may have in that regard (...).
133 In that context, it must be
stated, in the first place, that, according to recital 7 of Decision
2015/774, the PSPP is intended to be implemented only until the
Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation
which is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but
close to, 2% over the medium term. Although the actual period of
anticipated application of the PSPP has nonetheless been extended on a
number of occasions, that principle has never been called into question
when it was decided to adopt those extensions, as is confirmed by
recital 3 of Decision 2015/2464 and recital 5 of Decision 2017/100.
134 It follows that the ESCB has,
in its successive decisions, provided for the purchase of government
bonds only in so far as necessary for the maintenance of price
stability, that it has regularly revised the PSPP volume and that it has
consistently preserved the temporary nature of that programme.
135 The programme’s temporary
nature is also reinforced by the fact that, under Article 12(2) of the
Guideline, the ESCB has retained the option of selling purchased bonds
at any time, which enables it to adapt its programme according to the
attitudes of the Member States concerned and means that the operators
involved cannot be certain that the ESCB will not make use of that
option (...).
136 Accordingly, Decision 2015/774
does not enable the Member States to determine their budgetary policy
without taking account of the fact that, in the medium term, continuity
in the implementation of the PSPP is in no way guaranteed and that they
will thus be compelled, in the event of a deficit, to seek financing on
the markets without being able to take advantage of the easing of
financing conditions that implementation of the PSPP may entail (...).
137 In the second place, it is
important to note that Decision 2015/774 and the Guideline contain a
series of safeguards designed to limit the effects of the PSPP on the
impetus to pursue a sound budgetary policy.
138 First, the scale of the PSPP’s
impact on the financing conditions of the Member States of the euro
area is limited by the measures restricting the volume of Member State
bonds eligible to be purchased under the PSPP (...).
139 In that regard, it can be seen
from the considerations in paragraph 88 of this judgment that the total
volume of those bonds is limited, de jure, both by the setting of a
monthly purchase amount under the APP and by the subsidiary nature of
the PSPP within the APP, as described in Article 2(2) of the Guideline.
140 In addition, as the ECB has
argued, the distribution, in accordance with Article 6(2) of Decision
2015/774, of those purchases between national central banks in
accordance with the key for subscription of the ECB’s capital, as
referred to in Article 29 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB,
rather than in accordance with other criteria such as, for example, the
level of the respective debts of each Member State, in conjunction with
the rule set out in Article 6(3) of that decision that each national
central bank is to purchase securities of public issuers of its own
Member State, means that the considerable increase in a Member State’s
deficit resulting from the possible abandonment of a sound budgetary
policy would reduce the proportion of that Member State’s bonds
purchased by the ESCB. Implementation of the PSPP does not therefore
enable a Member State to avoid the consequences, so far as financing is
concerned, of any deterioration in its budgetary position.
141 Moreover, as a result of the
purchase limits per issue and per issuer set out in Article 5(1) and (2)
of that decision, in every case only a minority of the bonds issued by a
Member State can be purchased by the ESCB under the PSPP, which means
that that Member State has to rely chiefly on the markets to finance its
budget deficit.
142 Next, Article 3(2) of Decision
2015/774 lays down stringent eligibility criteria based on a credit
quality assessment, from which it is possible to depart only if the
Member State concerned is subject to a financial assistance programme.
Article 13(1) of the Guideline provides in addition that, in the event
of a downgrade of the rating of a Member State’s bonds or of a negative
review of a financial assistance programme, the Governing Council will
have to decide whether to sell the bonds of the Member State concerned
that have already been purchased.
143 It follows, as the Advocate
General has stated in point 87 of his Opinion, that a Member State
cannot rely on the financing possibilities to which the implementation
of the PSPP may give rise in order to abandon a sound budgetary policy,
without ultimately running the risk (i) of the bonds that it issues
being excluded from the PSPP because they have been downgraded or (ii)
of the ESCB selling the bonds of that Member State which it had
previously purchased.
Holding bonds until maturity and purchasing bonds at a negative yield to maturity
146 As regards, in the first
place, the possibility of the ESCB holding bonds purchased under the
PSPP until maturity, it must be recalled that such a practice is in no
way precluded by Article 18.1 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB
and that it does not imply that the ESCB waives its right to payment of
the debt, by the issuing Member State, once the bond matures (...).
147 The ESCB is thus entitled to
evaluate, on the basis of the objectives and characteristics of an open
market operations programme, whether it is appropriate to envisage
holding the bonds purchased under that programme; selling the bonds is
not to be regarded as the rule and holding them as the exception to that
rule.
148 In the present case, although
Decision 2015/774 does not provide any further details concerning the
possible sale of bonds purchased under the PSPP, it is clear from
Article 12(2) of the Guideline that the ESCB retains the option of
selling such bonds at any time and without any specific conditions.
149 Furthermore, the absence of
any obligation to sell the bonds purchased is not sufficient to
establish an infringement of Article 123(1) TFEU.
150 First, the mere fact that the
ESCB has the option of selling, should it so wish, all or part of the
purchased bonds helps to maintain the impetus to conduct a sound
budgetary policy, since –– as has been stated in paragraph 135 of this
judgment –– that option allows the ESCB to adapt its programme according
to the attitudes of the Member States concerned.
151 Secondly, should the ESCB
continue to hold those bonds, that does not, in itself, mean that that
impetus of the Member States concerned is diminished, particularly
because, as the ECB has pointed out, such retention of the bonds is not
accompanied by any obligation for the ESCB to purchase the new bonds
which a Member State that ceased to follow a sound budgetary policy
would inevitably have to issue.
152 Although such holding of bonds
is nonetheless liable to have some influence on the functioning of the
primary and secondary sovereign debt markets, that effect is inherent in
purchases on the secondary markets which are authorised by primary law.
That effect is, moreover, essential if those purchases are to be used
effectively in the framework of monetary policy (...) and are thereby to
contribute to the objective of maintaining price stability, mentioned
in paragraph 51 of this judgment.
153 As regards, in the second
place, the purchase of government bonds at a negative yield to maturity,
the first point to make is that Article 18.1 of the Protocol on the
ESCB and the ECB authorises open market operations and does not provide
that such operations must concern bonds with a minimum yield.
154 Secondly, Article 123(1) TFEU
is not to be interpreted as preventing the ESCB from purchasing such
bonds within the framework of the PSPP.
155 Although the issue of bonds at
a negative yield to maturity is advantageous in financial terms for the
Member States concerned, those bonds can be purchased, under the PSPP,
only on the secondary markets and they do not therefore give rise to the
grant of overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility in
favour of public authorities and bodies of the Member States, or to the
direct purchase from them of their debt instruments.
156 As to the question whether the
purchase by the ESCB of government bonds at a negative yield to
maturity has an effect equivalent to that of a direct purchase of bonds
from the public authorities and bodies of the Member States, it should
be pointed out that, in the economic context in which Decision 2015/774
was adopted, authorising the purchase of bonds at a negative yield to
maturity does not make it easier for private operators to identify the
bonds that the ESCB will buy. It is more likely to reduce the certainty
of operators on that point by broadening the range of bonds eligible for
purchase under the PSPP. The easing of the yield criteria which
Decision 2017/100 effects is, moreover, likely further to reinforce the
safeguards adopted by the ESCB in that regard.
157 In addition, as the ECB has
stated, since bonds with a negative yield can be issued only by Member
States whose financial situation is assessed positively by operators in
the sovereign debt markets, the purchase of such bonds cannot be
considered to reduce the impetus of the Member States to follow a sound
budgetary policy.
The fifth question
162 In that regard, it should be
noted that primary law includes no rules providing for the losses
sustained by one of the central banks of the Member States in the course
of open market operations to be shared between those central banks.
163 Moreover, it is undisputed
that the ECB decided not to adopt a decision entailing sharing of the
entirety of losses made by the central banks of the Member States during
implementation of the PSPP. As the referring court points out, the ECB
has, up until now, provided, so far as such losses are concerned, only
for the sharing of losses generated by securities issued by
international issuers.
164 It follows, first, that the
potential volume of those losses is circumscribed by the rule, set out
in Article 6(1) of Decision 2015/774, limiting the proportion of those
securities to 10% of the book value of purchases under the PSPP and,
secondly, that the losses that may be shared, should the case arise,
between the central banks of the Member States cannot be the direct
consequence of the default of a Member State, to which the referring
court alludes.
165 In that regard, the Court has
consistently held that, although questions concerning EU law enjoy a
presumption of relevance, it must refuse to give a ruling on a question
referred by a national court where it is quite obvious that the
interpretation, or the determination of validity, of a rule of EU law
that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action
or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court
does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a
useful answer to the questions submitted to it (...).
166 Accordingly, the Court cannot,
if it is not to exceed its powers, reply to the fifth question by
delivering an advisory opinion on a problem which is, at this stage,
hypothetical (...).
3. On 30 and 31 July 2019, the
Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court conducted an oral
hearing, in which the parties amended and further specified their
submissions. Pursuant to § 27a of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG), the following expert third parties were heard: Jens Ulbrich, Director General Economics of the Bundesbank ; and Dr. Andreas Guericke, Director General Legal Services of the Bundesbank;
furthermore Prof. Dr. Volker Wieland, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University
(Frankfurt am Main); Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars Feld, Director of the
Walter Eucken Institute (Freiburg); Dr. Klaus Wiener, Executive Board
Member of the German Insurance Association (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e.V. ); Volker Hofmann, Director of Economics of the Association of German Banks (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken ); Dr. Tammo Diemer, CEO of the German Finance Agency GmbH (Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Finanzagentur GmbH ); Dr. Ulrich Kater, Chief Economist at DekaBank – Deutsche Girozentrale; Dr. Johannes Mayr, Head of Investment Research at Bayerische Landesbank; and Dr. Bernd Volk, Head of Covered Bond Research at Deutsche Bank – Zurich Branch.
The ECB chose not to participate in the oral hearing.
4. The Second Senate rejected the
applications for a preliminary injunction filed on 27 September 2017 (by
the complainants in proceedings I), on 6 October 2017 (by the
complainants in proceedings II), on 26 September 2017 (by the
complainant in proceedings III), as well as the application for a
preliminary injunction filed on 24 May 2017 together with the
application filed on 22 October 2019 against the decision of the ECB
Governing Council of 12 September 2019 to restart the PSPP as from 1
November 2019 (both by the complainants in proceedings IV). In its
reasoning, the Senate referred to the prohibition to prejudice the
decision in the principal proceedings, and further held that following
the order of referral requesting a preliminary ruling, the complainants
no longer had a recognised legal interest in seeking an injunction
obliging the Federal Government to bring an action before the CJEU (cf.
BVerfGE 147, 39 <46 em="">et seq 46>
B.
The constitutional complaints of
the complainants in proceedings I to III are admissible to the extent
that they challenge – with different nuances – that the Federal
Government and the Bundestag
failed to take action against the PSPP (see I below). For the rest, the
constitutional complaints are inadmissible (see II below).
I.
It has no bearing on the
admissibility of the constitutional complaints that the complainants in
proceedings I to III have only raised the challenge directed against the
omission on the part of the Federal Government and the Bundestag
to take action against the PSPP later in the proceedings, after partly
modifying and withdrawing the original applications set out in their
constitutional complaints (see 1 below). The challenge directed against
the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the Bundestag
is admissible in constitutional complain proceedings (see 2 below). The
complainants in proceedings I to III have standing to the extent that
they assert, in a sufficiently substantiated manner, that with the PSPP
the Eurosystem manifestly exceeded its competences in a structurally
significant manner and violated Art. 123(1) TFEU; they also have
standing as regards the assertion that possible changes to the
risk-sharing regime could infringe the overall budgetary responsibility (haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung ) of the German Bundestag
(see 3 below). Moreover, the complainants in proceedings I and III
continue to have a recognised legal interests in bringing proceedings (Rechtsschutzinteresse ) (see 4 below).
1. The modifications made by the
complainants in proceedings I to III in respect of their original
applications, in the course of the constitutional complaint proceedings,
were permissible. [...]
The motion to modify the
applications was based on the Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June
2016, which was rendered only after the original applications had been
lodged; in this Judgment, the Second Senate clarified that acts of
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union cannot
be directly challenged before it (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <180 em="" nbsp="" para.="">et seq. 180>
2. By directing their constitutional complainants against the omission on the part of the Federal Government and the Bundestag
in relation to the PSPP, the complainants in proceedings I to III bring
admissible challenges with their complaints. In its review, the Federal
Constitutional Court may consider – as a preliminary question – acts of
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union where
these affect fundamental rights holders in Germany (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123
<180 98="" para.="">). This is the case if these acts either provide
the basis for measures taken by German state organs (cf. BVerfGE 126,
286 <301 em="">et seq 301>180>
3. The complainants in proceedings I to III have standing. [...]
4. The complainants in proceedings
I to III continue to have a recognised legal interest in bringing
proceedings, even though the challenged omission on the part of the
Federal Government and the Bundestag
concerns ECB decisions that have in part already been implemented.
Firstly, the execution of the programme until the end of 2018 continues
to have noticeable consequences given that the ECB decided to continue
reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for an
unspecified period of time. Secondly, the ECB restarted the asset
purchase programme in November 2019.
II.
The constitutional complaints are
inadmissible for the rest. The complaints are partly inadmissible as
regards the challenged acts (see 1 below), and partly not sufficiently
substantiated (see 2 below).
1. The constitutional complaints
of the complainants in proceedings I are inadmissible to the extent that
the complainants seek a declaration that the Judgment of the CJEU of 11
December 2018 is not applicable within the ambit of the Basic Law. In
this respect, they directly challenge a legal act of an EU institution,
which is not an admissible challenge in constitutional complaint
proceedings. In its case-law, the Second Senate has clarified that acts
of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union do
not constitute ‘acts of public authority’ within the meaning of Art.
93(1) no. 4a GG and § 90(1) BVerfGG and thus cannot be directly
challenged by means of a constitutional complaint (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123
<179 180="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of
30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 112). 179>
This also applies with regard to
the constitutional complaints of the complainants in proceedings II and
IV to the extent that they directly challenge the ECB Governing
Council’s decisions on the PSPP and the domestic applicability and
implementation of these decisions.
The constitutional complaints of
the complainants in proceedings II and IV are also inadmissible to the
extent that they challenge an omission on the part of the Bundesbank . It is true that the Bundesbank may not participate in acts of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union that amount to ultra vires acts or violate the constitutional identity guaranteed in Art. 79(3) GG and that the Bundesbank
– like any other German state body – must independently assess whether
this is the case if there are indications to this effect. However, as an
institution established under public law (bundesunmittelbare Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts ) pursuant to § 2 of the Bundesbank Act (Bundesbankgesetz – BBankG), the Bundesbank
constitutes an administrative body that forms part of indirect state
administration; according to established case-law of the Second Senate,
the sole addressees of the specific responsibility with regard to
European integration (Integrationsverantwortung) are constitutional organs – and the Bundesbank is no such organ (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <352 em="">et seq 352>
2. Lastly, the constitutional
complaints of the complainants in proceedings IV do not satisfy the
substantiation requirements under § 23(1) second sentence, § 92 BVerfGG
insofar as they are directed against an omission on the part of the
Federal Government and the Bundestag and thus indirectly challenge the PSPP. […]
C.
The constitutional complaints of
the complainants in proceedings I to III are well-founded to the extent
that they challenge the omission on the part of the Federal Government
and the Bundestag
to take suitable steps to ensure that the ECB, by means of purchasing
securities under the PSPP, does not exceed its monetary policy
competence and encroach upon the economic policy competence of the
Member States. For the rest, the constitutional complaints are – to the
extent that they are not already inadmissible – unfounded.
I.
Art. 38(1) first sentence GG guarantees the individual the right to vote in elections to the German Bundestag. This
right is not limited to the formal legitimation of (federal) state
power (see 1 below). The citizens’ right to democratic
self-determination also applies with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung)
(see 2 below). Within the scope of application of Art. 23(1) GG, it
protects against a manifest and structurally significant exceeding of
competences by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
European Union (see 3 below). It furthermore affords protection where
acts of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union
exceed the limits set by the principles enshrined in Art. 1 and Art. 20
GG, which Art. 79(3) GG declares inviolable (see 4 below).
1. The right to vote in elections to the German Bundestag ,
guaranteed as an individual right in Art. 38(1) GG, is not limited to
the formal legitimation of (federal) state power but also protects the
basic democratic contents of the right to vote (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155
<171>; 97, 350 <368>; 123, 267 <330>; 129, 124
<168>; 134, 366 <396 51="" para.="">; 142, 123 <189 123="" para.="">; 146, 216 <249 45="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second
Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 115; cf.
also BVerfGE 135, 317 <386 nbsp="" para.="">). These contents include the
principle of the sovereignty of the people enshrined in Art. 20(2)
first sentence GG as well as the corresponding right of citizens to be
subjected only to such public authority as they can legitimate and
influence (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <189 nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment
of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -,
para. 115). It requires that any act of public authority exercised in
Germany can be traced back to its citizens (cf. BVerfGE 83, 37 <50 51="" and="">; 93, 37 <66>; 130, 76 <123>; 137, 185 <232 131="" para.="">; 139, 194 <224 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <191 nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2
BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 117). This prohibits subjecting
citizens to a political authority they cannot escape and in regard of
which they cannot in principle influence, on free and equal terms,
decisions on the persons in power and on substantive issues (cf. BVerfGE
123, 267 <341>; 142, 123 <191 128="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment
of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -,
para. 117). 191>341>191>224>232>123>66>50>189>386>249>189>396>168>330>368>171>
Art. 38(1) first sentence GG does
not, however, confer a right upon citizens to subject democratic
majority decisions to a review of lawfulness that goes beyond what is
necessary to safeguard the right to democratic self-determination
enshrined in Art. 20(1) and (2) in conjunction with Art. 79(3) in
conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG. The purpose of this fundamental right is
not to subject the contents of democratic decision-making to substantive
review but to facilitate democratic decision-making processes as such
(cf. BVerfGE 129, 124 <168>; 134, 366 <396 397="" 52="" and="" para.="">; 142, 123 <190 126="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second
Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 118). 190>396>168>
2. Art. 23(1) first and third
sentence GG affirms that the right to democratic self-determination
enshrined in Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1)
and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG applies, in principle, also with regard to
European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ).
The democratic legitimation by the people of public authority exercised
in Germany belongs to the essential contents of the principle of the
sovereignty of the people and thus forms part of the Basic Law’s
constitutional identity protected in Art. 79(3) GG; it is therefore
beyond the reach of European integration in accordance with Art. 23(1)
third sentence in conjunction with Art. 79(3) GG (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155
<182>; 123, 267 <330>; 129, 124 <169>; 142, 123
<191 nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July
2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 119). It follows that the
Basic Law does not authorise German state organs to transfer sovereign
powers to the European Union in such a way that the European Union were
authorised, in the independent exercise of its powers, to create new
competences for itself (see a below). The manner and scope of the
transfer of sovereign powers must satisfy democratic principles. The
substantive leeway to design afforded the Bundestag – especially in the form of its budgetary powers – must be preserved (see b below). 191>169>330>182>
a) The Basic Law does not
authorise German state organs to transfer sovereign powers to the
European Union in such a way that the European Union were authorised, in
the independent exercise of its powers, to create new competences for
itself. It prohibits conferring upon the European Union the competence
to decide on its own competences (Kompetenz-Kompetenz )
(cf. BVerfGE 89, 155 <187 188="" 192="" 199="" and="" nbsp="">; 123, 267
<349>; cf. also BVerfGE 58, 1 <37>; 104, 151 <210>;
132, 195 <238 105="" para.="">; 142, 123 <191 192="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">;
146, 216 <250 nbsp="" para.="">). In any case, dynamic treaty provisions
must be subject to suitable safeguards that enable the German
constitutional organs to effectively exercise their responsibility with
regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) (cf. BVerfG, Judgment of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 121). 250>191>238>210>37>349>187>
b)The manner and scope of the
transfer of sovereign powers must satisfy democratic principles. Art.
38(1) first sentence GG protects the holders of the right to vote from a
loss in substance of their sovereign power – a power that is crucial
for the constitutional order – resulting from the rights of the Bundestag
being considerably curtailed, as such a loss would diminish the leeway
to design vested in the one constitutional organ that is established
based on the principles of free and equal elections (cf. BVerfGE 123,
267 <341>; 142, 123 <190 nbsp="" para.="">). When sovereign powers
are transferred to the European Union in accordance with Art. 23(1) GG,
it must be ensured that the German Bundestag
retain for itself functions and powers of substantial political
significance (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155 <182>; 123, 267 <330 356="">; 142, 123 <195 138="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second
Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 122). 195>330>182>190>341>
Art. 38(1) first sentence, Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG protect, in particular, the budgetary powers of the German Bundestag (cf.
BVerfGE 123, 267 <359>; 129, 124 <177 181="">) and its
overall budgetary responsibility as indispensable elements of the
constitutional principle of democracy (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <359>;
129, 124 <177>; 132, 195 <239 106="" para.="">; 135, 317 <399 161="" 400="" and="" para.="">; 142, 123 <195 138="" para.="">; 146, 216 <253 254="" 54="" and="" para.="">). It is for the German Bundestag ,
as the organ directly accountable to the people, to take all essential
decisions on revenue and expenditure; this prerogative forms part of the
core of Art. 20(1) and (2) GG, which is beyond the reach of
constitutional amendment (cf. BVerfGE 70, 324 <355 356="" and="" nbsp="">; 79,
311 <329>; 129, 124 <177>; 142, 123 <195 138="" para.="">).
It falls to the Bundestag
to determine the overall financial burden imposed on citizens and to
decide on essential expenditure of the state (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267
<361>). Thus, a transfer of sovereign powers violates the
principle of democracy at least in cases where the type and level of
public spending are, to a significant extent, determined at the
supranational level, depriving the Bundestag
of its decision-making prerogative (cf. BVerfGE 129, 124 <179>;
BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14,
2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 123). 179>361>195>177>329>355>253>195>399>239>177>359>177>359>
3. Against this backdrop, Art.
38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) first
sentence GG affords voters a right vis-à-vis the Federal Government, the
Bundestag and, as the case may be, the Bundesrat ,
compelling these constitutional organs to monitor whether institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union adhere to the
European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ),
to refrain from participating in the adoption and implementation of
measures that exceed the limits of the integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ),
and, where such measures constitute a manifest and structurally
significant exceeding of EU competences, to actively take steps to
ensure conformity with the integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) and respect for its limits (see a below). The Federal Constitutional Court conducts an ultra vires review to assess whether these standards are met (see b below).
a)The supremacy of the
Constitution (Art. 20(3) GG) obliges constitutional organs participating
in the execution and in the further shaping and development of the
integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) to ensure that its limits are respected (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <351 em="">et seq 351>
This right is primarily directed against the Federal Government and the Bundestag as the two constitutional organs vested with special competences in the area of foreign affairs (cf. BVerfGE 90, 286 <381 em="" nbsp="">et seq 381>
In the exercise of their powers,
the constitutional organs can only discharge their lasting
responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) if they continuously monitor the execution of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ).
This applies all the more where public authority is exercised by bodies
that have only weak links to democratic legitimation (cf. BVerfGE 130,
76 <123 124="" and="">; 136, 194 <266 177="" 267="" and="" nbsp="" paras.="">;
142, 123 <208 165="" 209="" and="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second
Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 146). 208>266>123>
Where measures taken by
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union exceed
the limits of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) in a manifest and structurally significant manner, it is incumbent upon the Federal Government and the Bundestag
to actively address the question how the order of competences can be
restored and to make a positive determination as to which course of
action to pursue (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <397 53="" para.="">; 142, 123
<209 167="" 210="" and="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of
30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 147).
Constitutional organs are afforded wide political latitude in this
context. They may retroactively legitimate an exceeding of competences
by initiating – within the limits set by Art. 79(3) GG – an amendment of
EU primary law (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <365>; 134, 366 <395 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <211 170="" para.="">) and, by way of the
procedure set out in Art. 23(1) second and third sentence GG, formally
transfer the sovereign powers that were exercised ultra vires .
However, where this is either not possible or not wanted, the
constitutional organs are required to use legal or political means to
work towards the rescission of acts not covered by the European
integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ),
and – as long as such acts continue to have effect – to take suitable
action seeking to limit the domestic impact of such acts to the greatest
extent possible (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <395 396="" 49="" and="" para.="">;
142, 123 <211 em="">et seq 211>395>211>395>365>209>397>
b) The conditions under which the Federal Constitutional Court conducts an ultra vires review are well-established (BVerfGE 126, 286 <302 em="">et seq 302>
While the Federal Constitutional Court must review substantiated ultra vires
challenges regarding acts of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
of the European Union, the Treaties confer upon the CJEU the mandate to
interpret and apply the Treaties and to ensure uniformity and coherence
of EU law (cf. Art. 19(1) subpara. 2 TEU, Art. 267 TFEU); it is
imperative that the respective judicial mandates be exercised in a
coordinated manner. If any Member State could readily invoke the
authority to decide, through its own courts, on the validity of EU acts,
this could undermine the precedence of application accorded to EU law
and jeopardise its uniform application. Yet if the Member States were to
completely refrain from conducting any kind of ultra vires review,
they would grant EU organs exclusive authority over the Treaties even
in cases where the EU adopts a legal interpretation that would
essentially amount to a treaty amendment or an expansion of its
competences. Though cases in which institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the European Union exceed their competences are
exceptionally possible, it is to be expected that these instances remain
rare due to the institutional and procedural safeguards enshrined in EU
law. Nevertheless, where they do occur, the constitutional perspective
might not perfectly match the perspective of EU law given that, even
under the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States remain the ‘Masters of the
Treaties’ and the EU has not evolved into a federal state (cf. BVerfGE
123, 267 <370 371="" and="">). In principle, certain tensions are thus
inherent in the design of the European Union; they must be resolved in a
cooperative manner, in keeping with the spirit of European integration,
and mitigated through mutual respect and understanding. This reflects
the nature of the European Union as a union based on the multi-level
cooperation of sovereign states, constitutions, administrations and
courts (Staaten-, Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungsverbund ) (BVerfGE 140, 317 <338 44="" para.="" span="">
338>370>
The ultra vires review
must be exercised with restraint, giving effect to the Constitution’s
openness to European integration. The interpretation and application of
EU law, including the determination of the applicable methodological
standards, primarily falls to the CJEU, which in Art. 19(1) second
sentence TEU is called upon to ensure that the law is observed when
interpreting and applying the Treaties. The methodological standards
recognised by the CJEU for the judicial development of the law are based
on the (constitutional) legal traditions common to the Member States
(cf. also Art. 6(3) TEU, Art. 340(2) TFEU), which are notably reflected
in the case-law of the Member States’ constitutional and apex courts and
of the European Court of Human Rights. The application of these methods
and principles by the CJEU cannot and need not completely correspond to
the practice of domestic courts; yet the CJEU also cannot simply
disregard such practice. The particularities of EU law give rise to
considerable differences with regard to the importance and weight
accorded to the various means of interpretation. Yet the mandate
conferred in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU is exceeded where the
traditional European methods of interpretation or, more broadly, the
general legal principles that are common to the laws of Member States
are manifestly disregarded. Against this backdrop, it is not for the
Federal Constitutional Court to substitute the CJEU´s interpretation
with its own when faced with questions of interpreting EU law, even if
the application of accepted methodology, within the established bounds
of legal debate, would allow for different views (BVerfGE 126, 286
<307>). Rather, as long as the CJEU applies recognised
methodological principles and the decision it renders is not objectively
arbitrary from an objective perspective, the Federal Constitutional
Court must respect the decision of the CJEU even when it adopts a view
against which weighty arguments could be made. The mandate, conferred
upon the CJEU in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU, to ensure that the law
is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties
necessarily entails that the CJEU be granted a certain margin of error
(cf. BVerfGE 126, 286 <307>; 142, 123 <200 149="" 201="" and="" para.="">). 200>307>307>
At the same time, establishing
that a decision amounts to a manifest exceeding of competences does not
require that absolutely no dissenting legal views have been put forward
on the issue in question. The fact that commentators in legal
scholarship, politics or the media have argued for the permissibility of
certain measures does not generally rule out that such measures can be
found to constitute a manifest exceeding of competences. An exceeding of
competences may be regarded as ‘manifest’ even where this finding
derives only from a careful and meticulously reasoned interpretation
(cf. BVerfGE 82, 316 <319 320="" and="" nbsp="">; 89, 243 <250>; 89, 291
<300>; 95, 1 <14 15="" and="">; 103, 332 <358 em="">et seq 358>14>300>250>319>
4. Art. 38(1) first sentence GG in
conjunction with the constitutional organs’ responsibility with regard
to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung )
protects citizens entitled to vote not only against the transfer of
sovereign powers beyond the areas open to integration, in violation of
Art. 23(1) third sentence in conjunction with Art. 79(3) GG, but also
prevents the implementation of acts of institutions, bodies, offices,
and agencies of the European Union that have an equivalent effect and at
least de facto
amount to a transfer of competences in violation of the Basic Law (cf.
BVerfGE 142, 123 <195 139="" 196="" and="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the
Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para.
154). The responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung )
requires constitutional organs to protect and promote the rights of the
individual enshrined in Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with
Art. 20(2) first sentence GG (BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of
30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 154). 195>
Where acts of institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union give rise to effects
that bear on Germany’s constitutional identity enshrined in Art. 1 and
Art. 20 GG, they exceed the limits of open statehood set by the Basic
Law (cf. BVerfGE 113, 273 <296>; 123, 267 <348>; 134, 366
<384 27="" para.="">; 142, 123 <195 137="" para.="">). This concerns the
protection of the human dignity core enshrined in fundamental rights
under Art. 1 GG (cf. BVerfGE 140, 317 <341 nbsp="" para.="">) as well as
the basic tenets that inform the principles of democracy, the rule of
law, the social state and the federal state within the meaning of Art.
20 GG. With a view to the principle of democracy enshrined in Art. 20(1)
and (2) GG, it must inter alia be ensured that the German Bundestag
retain for itself functions and powers of substantial political
significance (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155 <182>; 123, 267 <330 356="">; 142, 123 <195 138="" para.="">) and that it remain capable of
exercising its overall budgetary responsibility (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267
<359>; 129, 124 <177>; 131, 152 <205 206="" and="">; 132,
195 <239 106="" para.="">; 135, 317 <399 161="" 400="" and="" para.="">; 142,
123 <195 138="" para.="">; cf. also BVerfGE 146, 216 <261 68="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR
1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 123). 261>195>399>239>205>177>359>195>330>182>341>195>384>348>296>
II.
Based on these standards, the Federal Government and the German Bundestag
violated the rights of the complainants in proceedings I to III under
Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) in
conjunction with Art. 79(3) GG by failing to take suitable steps
challenging that the ECB, in Decision (EU) 2015/774 as amended by
Decisions (EU) 2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU)
2017/100, neither assessed nor substantiated that the measures provided
for in these decisions satisfy the principle of proportionality. In
light of this, Decision (EU) 2015/774 and amending Decisions
(EU) 2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702, (EU) 2017/100 constitute a
qualified, i.e. manifest and structurally significant, exceeding of the
competences assigned to the ECB in Art. 119, Art. 127 et seq . TFEU and Art. 17 et seq .
ESCB Statute. The differing view of the CJEU set out in its Judgment of
11 December 2018 does not merit a different conclusion, given that on
this point, the judgment is simply not comprehensible so that, to this
extent, the judgment was rendered ultra vires (see
1 below). Nevertheless, it cannot yet be definitively determined
whether the ECB decisions at issue satisfy the principle of
proportionality (see 2 below). Even though certain details of the CJEU’s
arguments raise considerable concerns, the interpretation of Art. 123
TFEU undertaken by the CJEU can still be considered tenable from a
methodological perspective. On this basis, the ECB decisions at issue
cannot be found to violate the prohibition of monetary financing (see 3
below). It essentially follows from the replies of the CJEU, especially
in consideration of the fifth question referred for a preliminary
ruling, that the PSPP does not pose a risk to the overall budgetary
responsibility of the Bundestag .
It can thus be ruled out that the decisions at issue affect Germany’s
constitutional identity (see 4 below). In the exercise of their
responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ), the Federal Government and the Bundestag
are obliged, in their capacity as constitutional organs, to take
suitable steps to ensure adherence to the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ).
Moreover, they have an obligation to monitor the further execution of
the PSPP to ensure timely action countering any risks regarding
adherence to the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) and/or the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag (see 5 below). The Bundesbank
may in principle not participate in the implementation and execution of
Decision (EU) 2015/774 and the subsequent Decisions (EU) 2015/2101,
(EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100 (see 6 below).
1.In light of Art. 119 and Art. 127 et seq . TFEU as well as Art. 17 et seq .
ESCB Statute, the ECB Governing Council’s Decision of 4 March 2015 (EU)
2015/774 and the subsequent Decisions (EU) 2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464,
(EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100 must be qualified as ultra vires
acts. It is true that, in its replies to the third and fourth question
referred by the Second Senate, the CJEU expressed a different view and
that the interpretation put forward by the CJEU is, in principle,
binding upon the Federal Constitutional Court. However, in this case the
delimitation of competences undertaken by the CJEU is simply untenable
(see a below). Ultimately, the objections arising from the order of
competences in relation to the PSPP Decision of the ECB Governing
Council of 4 March 2015 (EU) 2015/774 and the subsequent Decisions (EU)
2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100 have not been
refuted (see b below).
a) Where an ultra vires review
or an identity review raises questions regarding the validity or
interpretation of a measure taken by institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the European Union, the Federal Constitutional Court, in
principle, bases its review on the understanding and the assessment of
such a measure as put forward by the CJEU. However, this no longer
applies where the interpretation of the Treaties is simply not
comprehensible and thus objectively arbitrary (see paras. 112 and 113).
In its Judgment of 11 December
2018, the CJEU held that the Decision of the ECB Governing Council on
the PSPP and its subsequent amendments were still within the ambit of
the ECB’s competences (see aa below). This view manifestly fails to give
consideration to the importance and scope of the principle of
proportionality (Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU), which
also applies to the division of competences, and is no longer tenable
from a methodological perspective given that it completely disregards
the actual effects of the PSPP (see bb below). Therefore, the Judgment
of the CJEU of 11 December 2018 manifestly exceeds the mandate conferred
upon it in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU, resulting in a structurally
significant shift in the order of competences to the detriment of the
Member States. To this extent, the CJEU Judgment itself constitutes an ultra vires act and thus has no binding effect [in Germany] (see cc below).
aa) According to the Judgment of
the CJEU of 11 December 2018, the determination whether Decision (EU)
2015/774 and its amending decisions fall within the sphere of monetary
policy, which is the exclusive competence of the ECB, or economic
policy, which in principle remains a competence of the Member States,
primarily hinges on the objectives of the measure and the instruments
the measure employs to attain those objectives (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 11
December 2018, Weiss and Others , C-493/17, EU:C:2018:1000 loc. cit.
According to the CJEU, the
conclusion that Decision (EU) 2015/774 and its amending decisions fall
within the sphere of monetary policy within the meaning of Art. 127(1),
Art. 282(2) TFEU is not called into question by the fact that the PSPP
allegedly has considerable effects on the balance sheets of commercial
banks as well as on the refinancing terms of the Member States in the
euro area (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 58). The CJEU recognises that it is undisputed that, by virtue of
its underlying principle and its procedures, the PSPP is capable of
having an impact both on the balance sheets of commercial banks and on
the financing of the Member States covered by that programme and that
such effects might possibly be sought through economic policy measures
(cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 59). However, the CJEU emphasises that the ESCB must act in
accordance with the principles laid down in Art. 119 TFEU and that the
ESCB is to support the general economic policies in the EU as set out in
Art. 127(1) TFEU; according to the CJEU, this illustrates that within
the institutional balance established by the provisions of Title VIII of
the TFEU, which includes the independence of the ESCB guaranteed by
Art. 130 and Art. 282(3) TFEU, the authors of the Treaties did not
intend to make an absolute separation between economic and monetary
policies (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 60). In that regard, the CJEU states that a monetary policy
measure cannot be treated as equivalent to an economic policy measure
for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects that can also be
sought in the context of economic policy (cf. CJEU, loc. cit , para. 61, with references to Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle , C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 56, and Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 52).
The CJEU does not concur with the
view of the Second Senate that any effects of an open market operations
programme that were knowingly accepted and definitely foreseeable by the
ESCB when the programme was set up should not be regarded as (merely)
‘indirect effects’ of the programme (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 62). Firstly, the CJEU recalls that both in Pringle (Judgment of 27 November 2012, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756) and in Gauweiler (Judgment
of 16 June 2015, C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400), it regarded as indirect
effects, having no consequences for the purposes of classification of
the measures at issue as measures of monetary policy or economic policy
in the cases that gave rise to those judgments, effects which, even at
the time of adoption of the measures, were foreseeable consequences of
those measures, which must therefore have been knowingly accepted at
that time (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 63). Secondly, the CJEU contends that the conduct of monetary
policy will always entail an impact on interest rates and bank
refinancing conditions, which necessarily has consequences for the
financing conditions of the public deficit of the Member States; more
specifically, the transmission of the ESCB’s monetary policy measures to
price trends takes place via, inter alia ,
facilitation of the supply of credit to the economy and modification of
the behaviour of businesses and individuals with regard to investment,
consumption and saving (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 64 and 65). Based thereon, the CJEU concludes that in order to
exert an influence on inflation rates, the ESCB necessarily has to adopt
measures that have certain effects on the real economy, which might
also be sought – to different ends – in the context of economic policy
(cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 66). Accordingly, the CJEU holds that if the ESCB were precluded
altogether from adopting such measures when their effects are
foreseeable and knowingly accepted, that would, in practice, prevent it
from using the means made available to it by the Treaties for the
purpose of achieving monetary policy objectives and might – in
particular in the context of an economic crisis entailing a risk of
deflation – represent an insurmountable obstacle to its accomplishing
the task assigned to it by primary law (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 67).
bb) The CJEU’s approach to
disregard the actual effects of the PSPP for the purposes of assessing
the measure’s proportionality (see (1) below) and to refrain from
conducting an overall assessment and appraisal in this regard (see (2)
below) does not satisfy the requirements of a comprehensible review as
to whether the ESCB and the ECB observe the limits of their monetary
policy mandate. Applied in this manner, the principle of proportionality
cannot fulfil its corrective function for the purposes of safeguarding
the competences of the Member States, as provided for in Art. 5(1)
second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU. The interpretation undertaken by the
CJEU essentially renders meaningless the principle of conferral set out
in Art. 5(1) first sentence and Art. 5(2) TEU (see (3) below).
(1) The principle of
proportionality is a general principle of EU law that is codified in
Art. 5(2) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU. It was developed in common
law [...] and, in particular, German law (for a general overview cf.
BVerfGE 3, 383 <399> […]). Facilitated by the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights [...] and the CJEU, it is now recognised
in all (partial) legal orders in Europe [...]. 399>
In applying the principle of proportionality, German law distinguishes between the elements of suitability (Geeignetheit ), necessity (Erforderlichkeit ) and appropriateness (Angemessenheit )
(cf. BVerfGE 16, 147 <181>; 16, 194 <201 202="" and="">; 30, 292
<316 317="" and="">; 45, 187 <245>; 63, 88 <115>; 67, 157
<173>; 68, 193 <218>; 81, 156 <188 189="" and="">; 83, 1
<19>; 90, 145 <172 173="" and="">; 91, 207 <221 em="">et seq 221>172>19>188>218>173>115>245>316>201>181>
In its established case-law, the
CJEU, too, has recognised the principle of proportionality as an
unwritten principle of EU law [...]. It requires “that acts of the EU
institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives
pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what
is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those objectives” (cf.
the leading decision CJEU, Judgment of 29 November 1956, Fédération Charbonnière , C-8/55, ECR 1956, I-302 <311>; cf. also CJEU, Judgment of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco , C-491/01, ECR 2002, I-11550 <11590 122="" para.="">; Judgment of 8 July 2010, Afton Chemical , C-343/09, ECR 2010, I-7062 <7078 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich , C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28, para. 50; Judgment of 17 October 2013, Schaible , C-101/12, EU:C:2013:661, para. 29; Judgment of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights and Others , C-293/12 inter alia ,
EU:C:2014:238, para. 46). The application of this principle in the
CJEU’s case-law is often characterised by the terms ‘suitable’,
‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’, although the CJEU does not necessarily
attach the same meaning to these terms as German terminology and
doctrine [...]. According to the case-law of the CJEU, a measure is
appropriate [or suitable] (geeignet )
if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain the objective in a
consistent and systematic manner (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 9 September
2010, Engelmann , C-64/08, ECR 2010, I-8244 <8256 35="" para.="">; Judgment of 16 December 2010, Josemans , C-137/09, ECR 2010, I-13054 <13077 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 21 December 2011, Commission v Austria ,
C-28/09, ECR 2011, I-13567 <13605 126="" para.="">); in this context,
the CJEU frequently limits its review to whether the relevant measure is
manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued (cf.
CJEU, Judgment of 7 February 1972, Schroeder v Germany , C-40/72, ECR 1973, I-126 <142 143="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 21 February 1979, Stölting , C-138/78, ECR 1979, I-713 <722 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 11 July 1987, Schräder , C-265/87, ECR 1989, I-2263 <2270 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 5 October 1994, Germany v Council , C-280/93, ECR 1994, I-5039 <5068 5069="" 90="" and="" para.="">; Judgment of 13 May 1997, Germany v Parliament and Council , C-233/94, ECR 1997, I-2441 <2461 56="" and="" nbsp="" paras.="">; Judgment of 8 February 2000, Emesa Sugar , C-17/98, ECR 2000, I-712 <733 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco , C-491/01, ECR 2002, I- 11550 <11590 123="" para.="">; Judgment of 14 December 2004, Swedish Match, C-210/03, ECR 2004, I-11900 <11919 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment 21 July 2011, Etimine ,
C-15/10, ECR 2011, I-6725 <6762 nbsp="" para.=""> […]). Regarding the
element of necessity, the CJEU reviews whether recourse can be had to
less onerous means for attaining the objectives pursued (cf. CJEU,
Judgment of 10 November 1982, Rau v De Smedt , C-261/81, ECR 1982, I-3962 <3973 17="" para.="">; Judgment of 12 July 2001, Jippes , C-189/01, ECR 2001, I-5693 <5720 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 8 July 2010, Afton Chemical , C-343/09, ECR 2010, I-7062 <7078 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 21 July 2011, Beneo-Orafti , C-150/10, ECR 2011, I-6881 <6911 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 4 May 2016, Poland v Parliament and Council ,
C-358/14, EU:C:2016:323, para. 78 […]), whereas little to no
consideration is given to whether the measure is actually proportionate
in the strict sense [also referred to as Angemessenheit in German] (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 29 April 1982, Merkur , C-147/81, ECR 1982, I-1389 <1397 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 13 November 1990, FEDESA , C-331/88, ECR 1990, I-4057 <4063 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 5 May 1998, National Farmers Union , C-157/96, ECR 1998, I-2236 <2258 60="" para.="">; Judgment of 12 Mai 2002, Omega Air and Others , C-27/00 inter alia , ECR 2002, I-2599 <2621 60="" para.="">; Judgment of 28 July 2011, Agrana Zucker , C-309/10, ECR 2011, I-7337 <7354 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others , C-581/10 inter alia ,
EU:C:2012:657, para. 71; […]). As a general rule, the CJEU refrains
from reviewing proportionality in the strict sense (cf. CJEU, Judgment
of 23 February 1983, FORMA , C-66/82, ECR 1983, I-396 <404 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 17 July 1997, Affish ,
C-183/95, ECR 1997, I-4362 <4372 nbsp="" para.=""> […]). Moreover, recent
decisions show a tendency to merge the elements of appropriateness and
necessity (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 8 June 2010, Vodafone and Others , C-58/08, ECR 2010, I-5026 <5045 53="" 54="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 12 May 2011, Luxembourg v Parliament and Council , C-176/09, ECR 2011, I-3755 <3779 3780="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 17 October 2019, Cirigliana , C-569/18, EU:C:2019:873, para. 43 […]). 3779>5045>4372>404>7354>2621>2258>4063>1397>6911>7078>5720>3973>6762>11919>11590>733>2461>5068>2270>722>142>13605>13077>8256>7078>11590>311>
(2) The specific manner in which
the CJEU applies the principle of proportionality in the case at hand
renders that principle meaningless for the purposes of distinguishing,
in relation to the PSPP, between monetary policy and economic policy,
i.e. between the exclusive monetary policy competence conferred upon the
EU (Art. 3(1) lit. c TFEU) and the limited conferral upon the EU of the
competence to coordinate general economic policies, with the Member
States retaining the competence for economic policy at large (Art. 4(1)
TEU; Art. 5(1) TFEU).
The CJEU emphasises that the
authors of the Treaties did not intend to make an absolute separation
between economic and monetary policies (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 60) and that it therefore follows from Art. 119(2) and Art.
127(1) TFEU in conjunction with Art. 5(4) TEU that a bond-buying
programme forming part of monetary policy may be validly adopted and
implemented only in so far as the measures that it entails are
proportionate to the objectives of that policy (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16
June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 66; loc. cit. ,
para. 71). This is informed by the notion that a generous
interpretation of the specific competence conferred may, to a certain
extent, be compensated by a sound proportionality assessment. The CJEU
thus agrees that acts of EU institutions must be suitable for attaining
the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and may
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives (cf. CJEU,
Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 67; loc. cit. , para. 72).
Following the finding that the ESCB must be afforded broad discretion (CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 73, 91) – curtailing the competences of the Member States –, the
CJEU essentially assesses the proportionality of the PSPP in three
steps:
In a first step, the CJEU states
that at the time the relevant measures were adopted, annual inflation
rates in the euro area were far below the close-to-2% target fixed by
the ECB, and that in determining this target the ESCB had referred to
the practices of other central banks and to various studies, which
showed that large-scale purchases of government bonds can contribute to
achieving that objective. The CJEU concludes that there is no “manifest
error of assessment” on the part of the ESCB with regard to the PSPP’s
suitability (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 74 et seq .).
In a second step, the CJEU
assesses the necessity of the PSPP. In this context, the CJEU states
that it would not have been possible to counter the risk of deflation,
as described by the ECB, by other means, such as by lowering key
interests rates or by purchasing private sector assets (cf. CJEU, loc. cit .,
paras. 80 and 81), and that the way the PSPP is set up helps to
guarantee that its effects are limited to what is necessary to achieve
the objective concerned. With regard to the latter, the CJEU notes, in
particular, that the PSPP is not selective, that purchases are subject
to stringent eligibility criteria, that the PSPP is temporary in nature,
that the volume of bonds that can be purchased is limited, that
priority is given to bonds issued by private operators, and that the
PSPP framework sets out purchase limits per issuer and per issue (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 82 et seq .).
The CJEU also states that the programme’s overall volume does not stand
in the way of its suitability since, based on valid information
provided by the ECB, it is not apparent that an asset purchase programme
of either more limited volume or shorter duration would have been as
effective. Given the complexity of monetary policy questions, the CJEU
holds that nothing more can be required of the ESCB apart from that it
use its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its
disposal (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 90 et seq .).
Lastly, in a third step, the CJEU
states that the ECB weighed up the various interests involved so as
effectively to prevent, upon implementation of the programme,
disadvantages which are manifestly disproportionate to the objectives
pursued (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 93). In terms of substance, however, the CJEU only touches upon
the rules designed to reduce the risk of losses (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 94 et seq .);
it finds the PSPP to be proportionate based on the argument that the
ECB has taken sufficient measures to circumscribe the risk of losses
related to the PSPP, for instance by limiting the sharing of losses to
only a small share of the securities purchased under the programme and
by setting out strict credit quality requirements (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 93 et seq .).
In that regard, the CJEU does not make it clear which opposing
interests these two safeguards serve; objectively, it can be assumed
that they serve the budgetary autonomy of Member States and thus promote
fiscal policy interests, which do not fall within the ambit of monetary
policy, as follows from Art. 126 TFEU. However, it appears that other
opposing interests are not taken into consideration.
(3) When applied in this manner,
as undertaken by the CJEU, the principle of proportionality enshrined in
Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU cannot fulfil its
corrective function for the purposes of safeguarding the competences of
the Member States. The complete disregard of the PSPP’s economic policy
effects means that already the determination of the ESCB’s objectives is
not comprehensible from a methodological perspective (see a below). As a
result, the review of proportionality is rendered meaningless, given
that suitability and necessity of the PSPP are not balanced against the
economic policy effects – other than the risk of losses – arising from
the programme to the detriment of Member States’ competences, and that
these adverse effects are not weighed against the beneficial effects the
programme aims to achieve (see b below). This contradicts the
methodological approach taken by the CJEU in virtually all other areas
of EU law (see c below). Ultimately, the Judgment of the CJEU of 11
December 2018 allows the ESCB to conduct economic policy as long as the
ECB asserts that it uses the means set out or provided for in the ESCB
Statute (cf. Art. 20(1) ESCB Statute) and that it aims to achieve the
inflation target fixed by the ECB itself.
(a) In its OMT
Judgment of 21 June 2016, the Second Senate voiced considerable
concerns in relation to how the CJEU specified, by way of judicial
interpretation, the contents of Art. 119 and Art. 127 et seq . TFEU in Gauweiler
with regard to the principle of conferral, and to the judicial review
exercised by the CJEU vis-à-vis the ECB when determining the ECB’s
mandate; in this regard, the Senate expressed doubts regarding the
CJEU’s approach to simply accept the monetary policy objective asserted
by the ECB without questioning the underlying factual assumptions or at
least reviewing whether the respective reasoning was comprehensible, and
without testing these assumptions against other indications that
evidently argue against the qualification as a monetary policy measure.
The OMT Judgment further reads:
Generously accepting as fact
proclaimed objectives of EU institutions while at the same time granting
them wide margins of assessment and considerably decreasing the
intensity of judicial review is capable of enabling institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the EU to decide autonomously upon the
scope of the competences that the Member States have transferred to them
(...). Such an understanding of competences does not sufficiently take
into account the constitutional dimension of the principle of conferral
(cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <217 182="" 218="" and="" em="" para.="">et seq 217>
In its Order of Referral of 18
July 2017, the Second Senate reiterated this criticism, emphasising that
determining whether an act constitutes a measure of monetary policy or
economic policy should not be limited to assessing the objective pursued
and the means employed but should also give consideration to relevant
effects resulting from the measure in question (cf. referred question 3
lit. a to c and referred question 4). In view of this, the Court
recalled that such effects can only be considered ‘indirect’ if they are
connected to the challenged measure only through additional
intermediate measures and if they do not constitute consequences that
are foreseeable with certainty. By contrast, effects can no longer be
qualified as being indirect in nature if the economic policy effects of a
measure are intended or knowingly accepted, and these effects are at
least comparable in weight to the monetary policy objective pursued (cf.
BVerfGE 146, 216 <285 286="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). It further states that
if the purchasing of government bonds by the ESCB essentially amounted
to granting financial assistance to Member States, it would qualify as
an economic policy measure for which the EU has no competence (cf.
BVerfGE 146, 216 <280 108="" 109="" 281="" and="" paras.="">). 280>285>
As regards the distinction between
economic policy and monetary policy, the CJEU accepts the proclaimed
objectives of the ECB as fact without further scrutiny and without
regard to foreseeable and/or intended – perhaps even primarily so –
consequences of the programme in the areas of economic and fiscal
policy, the possibility of which the ECB at the very least knowingly
accepted; in doing so, the CJEU allows the ESCB to decide autonomously
on the scope of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States
(cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <218 219="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216 <285 119="" 286="" and="" para.="">). Such an understanding of competences does not
sufficiently give consideration to the principle of conferral and the
necessity of interpreting the ECB’s mandate in a restrictive manner
(BVerfGE 142, 123 <218 219="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">), given that it de facto affords the ECB a (limited) competence to decide on its own competences. 218>285>218>
The CJEU expressly acknowledges
the economic policy dimension of the asset purchase programme yet
declares this aspect to be irrelevant in view of the monetary policy
objective purportedly pursued. As a result, the CJEU allows asset
purchases even in cases where the purported monetary policy objective is
possibly only invoked to disguise what essentially constitutes an
economic and fiscal policy agenda. In this respect, the CJEU simply
accepts, as it did in Gauweiler ,
the ECB’s assertion – despite the substantiated objections challenging
this assertion – that the PSPP pursued a monetary policy objective,
without questioning the underlying factual assumptions or at least
reviewing whether the respective reasoning is comprehensible, and
without testing these assumptions against other indications that
evidently argue against the classification as a monetary policy measure.
Therefore, it is not discussed at all whether there is or was a
possibility that Member States of the euro area could deliberately issue
low-yield government bonds as a means to improve their refinancing
conditions, that certain Member States benefitted more than others from
the programme, that recent economic studies did not find evidence of the
purported monetary policy effects [...] and that the programme
significantly boosted the economic situation and credit rating of
commercial banks (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <286 287="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">
[…]). In its reasoning, the CJEU argues that the ESCB must not be
precluded altogether from adopting such measures even if their effects
are foreseeable and knowingly accepted, as this would, in practice,
prevent it from using the means made available to it by the Treaties for
the purpose of achieving monetary policy objectives and might – in
particular in the context of an economic crisis entailing a risk of
deflation – represent an insurmountable obstacle to its accomplishing
the task incumbent upon it (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 67). However, what this reasoning entails is that it would not be
possible to prevent such purchases even if they constituted an abuse of
law. 286>
(b) As the economic policy effects
of the PSPP are disregarded completely, the application of the
principle of proportionality by the CJEU cannot fulfil its purpose,
given that its key element – the balancing of conflicting interests – is
missing. As a result, the review of proportionality is rendered
meaningless.
Relying on the principle of
proportionality to distinguish between monetary policy and economic
policy (Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU) implies that a
programme’s effects can render it disproportionate. Thus, assessing the
consequences of such a programme is a necessary step in the delimitation
of competences. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s approach does not require
weighing the PSPP’s actual contribution to achieving the objectives
pursued, even though such a contribution is far from apparent given that
interest rates remain at permanently low levels, that the requirements
deriving from Art. 126 TFEU and from the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (SCG
Treaty) must be borne in mind, and that the risk of “reversal effects”
discussed in public finance research increases over time [...]. Nor does
the review of proportionality conducted by the CJEU give consideration
to the economic and social policy effects of the PSPP. The fact that the
ESCB has no mandate for economic or social policy decisions, even when
using monetary policy instruments, does not rule out taking into
account, in the proportionality assessment pursuant to Art. 5(1) second
sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU, the effects that a programme for the
purchase of government bonds has on, for example, public debt, personal
savings, pension and retirement schemes, real estate prices and the
keeping afloat of economically unviable companies, and – in an overall
assessment and appraisal – weighing these effects against the monetary
policy objective that the programme aims to achieve and is capable of
achieving.
In the manner applied by the CJEU,
the principle of proportionality is neither a suitable means for
compensating the insufficient limits of the ESCB’s competences in terms
of its elements (‘broad discretion’) nor for weighing the encroachment
upon the competences of the Member States [...]. Rather, the CJEU’s
approach ultimately entails that the ECB is free to choose any means it
considers suitable even if the benefits are rather slim – compared to
possible alternative means –, while collateral damage is high.
Despite the overlap between
economic policy and monetary policy, the CJEU regards as irrelevant the
indications that argue against the classification of the programme as a
monetary policy measure and, from the outset, refrains from conducting
an overall assessment and appraisal for the purposes of distinguishing
between those two policy areas (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <416 100="" 417="" 99="" and="" nbsp="" paras.="">; 142, 123 <218 183="" 219="" and="" para.="">); as a
result, the CJEU does not conduct an effective review as to whether the
ECB exceeds its competences. It is true that the ECB is afforded a
margin of appreciation as regards the assessment and appraisal of the
consequences of its actions and the weighing of such consequences in
relation to the objectives pursued by the asset purchase programme.
However, from a methodological perspective, it is not tenable that the
CJEU attaches no legal relevance whatsoever to the effects of the asset
purchase programme, neither in determining the objectives pursued by the
ESCB nor in reviewing the proportionality of the programme. 218>416>
This standard of review applied by
the CJEU fails to give effect to the function of the principle of
conferral as a key determinant [in the division of competences] and to
the consequences this entails, in terms of methodology, for the review
as to whether that principle is observed. Where fundamental interests of
the Member States are affected, as is generally the case when
interpreting the competences conferred upon the European Union as such
and its democratically legitimated European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ),
judicial review may not simply accept positions asserted by the ECB
without closer scrutiny (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <219 186="" 220="" and="" para.="">). This applies all the more as Art. 119 and Art. 127 et seq . TFEU as well as Art. 17 et seq .
ESCB Statute confer upon the ESCB a mandate that is limited to matters
of monetary policy, beyond which the ESCB is merely authorised to
support the general economic policies within the European Union (cf.
BVerfGE 146, 216 <277 100="" para.="">). The CJEU’s findings are
incompatible with these standards – specifically where the CJEU finds
that because the ESCB is subject to the principles laid out in Art. 119
TFEU while also being called upon to support the general economic
policies within the EU as provided for in Art. 127(1) TFEU, it follows
that within the institutional balance established by the provisions of
Title VIII of the TFEU, which include the independence of the ESCB
guaranteed by Art. 130 and Art. 282(3) TFEU, the authors of the Treaties
did not intend to make an absolute separation between economic and
monetary policies (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 60); this reasoning is flawed not least given that the European
Union only has an exclusive competence for monetary policy [but not for
matters of economic policy] (Art. 3(1) lit. c TFEU). 277>219>
It is furthermore imperative that
the mandate of the ESCB be subject to strict limitations given that the
ECB and the national central banks are independent institutions (Art.
130, Art. 282(3) third and fourth sentence TFEU, Art. 88(2) GG), which
means that they operate on the basis of a diminished level of democratic
legitimation. The independence afforded the ECB relates only to the
powers conferred upon it in the Treaties and the substantive exercise of
such powers but is not applicable with regard to defining the extent
and scope of the ECB’s mandate. To ensure that the ECB cannot validly
adopt a programme that, contrary to the principle of conferral, exceeds
the monetary policy mandate vested in the ECB under primary law, it is
imperative that adherence to limits of the ECB’s competence be subject
to full judicial review (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155 <207 em="">et seq 207>
Such an interpretation would also
run counter to the requirements deriving from Art. 6 ECHR, Art. 47 of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [hereinafter: the Charter] and Art.
23(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 19(4) first sentence GG
(on Art. 19(4) first sentence GG, cf. BVerfGE 15, 275 <282>; 61,
82 <110 111="" and="">; 78, 214 <226>; 84, 59 <77>; 129, 1
<20>; 149, 346 <363 34="" 35="" 364="" and="" paras.="">; on Art. 47 of
the Charter, cf. CJEU, Judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi , C-584/10 P inter alia , EU:C:2013:518, para. 119; Judgment of 18 July 2015, Schindler , C-501/11, EU:C:2013:522, paras. 36, 38; Judgment of 18 June 2015, Ipatau , C-535/14, EU:C:2015:407, para. 42; Judgment of 17 December 2015, Imtech , C-300/14, EU:C:2015:825, para. 38; Judgment of 18 February 2016, Bank Mellat , C-176/13, EU:C:2016:96, para. 109; Judgment of 21 April 2016, Bank Saderat , C-200/13, EU:C:2016:284, para. 98 […]; for a more restrictive interpretation, cf. CJEU, Judgment of 15 October 2009, Enviro Tech , C-425/08, ECR 2009, I-10035, para. 62; Judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica de España , C-295/12, EU:C:2014:2062, para. 55). 363>20>77>226>110>282>
In other contexts, the CJEU itself
has held that the review of compliance with legal criteria would be
deprived of effect if, in the event of doubt as to that compliance, the
review would be left to the organisation intending to carry out the
contested measure (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V. ,
C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257, para. 46). It is not ascertainable why a
different standard should apply in relation to EU institutions such as
the ECB, especially given that the CJEU has repeatedly emphasised the
legitimising function of judicial review (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 9 March
2010, Commission v Germany , C-518/07, ECR 2010, I-1897 para. 42; Judgment of 22 January 2014, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C-270/12, EU:C:2014:18, paras. 45, 53).
(c) Lastly, completely
disregarding the economic policy effects of the PSPP contradicts the
methodological approach taken by the CJEU in virtually all other areas
of EU law.
This holds true with regard to the
fundamental rights protected under EU law. European law has long
recognised factual restrictions on fundament rights (cf. CJEU, Judgment
of 6 December 1984, Biovilac , C-59/83, ECR 1984, I-4058 <4079 nbsp="" para.="">; Order of 23 September 2004, Springer v Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein and Others , C-435/02 inter alia, ECR 2004, I-8667 <8683 nbsp="" para.=""> […]). 8683>4079>
The same is true for indirect discrimination arising from factual circumstances (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 12 February 1974, Sotgiu , C-152/73, ECR 1974, I-154 <164 165="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 16 February 1978, Commission v Ireland , C-61/77, ECR 1978, I-418 <451 nbsp="" paras.="">; Judgment of 15 July 1978, Defrenne , C-149/77, ECR 1978, I-1366 <1377 1378="" 16="" 19="" and="" nbsp="" paras.="">; Judgment of 12 July 1979, CRAM v Toia , C-237/78, ECR 1979, I-2646 <2653 12="" para.="">; Judgment of 10 April 1984, Colson and Kamann , C-14/83, ECR 1984, I-1892 <1907 18="" para.="">; Judgment of 15 December 1994, Stadt Lengerich and Others v Helmig and Others , C-399/92, ECR 1994, I-5738 <5753 20="" para.="">; Judgment of 6 December 2007, Voß v Land Berlin , C-300/06, ECR 2007, I-10592 <10605 nbsp="" para.="">; Opinion of Advocate General Warner of 28 January 1981, Jenkins v Kingsgate , C-96/80, ECR 1981, I-929 <937> […]). 937>10605>5753>1907>2653>1377>451>164>
As regards the freedoms of the
single market, the notion of measures of equivalent effect is
well-established (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 11 July 1974, Dassonville , C-8/74, ECR 1974, I-838 <852 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgement of 31 March 1993, Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg , C-19/92, ECR 1993, I-1689 <1697 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 30 November 1995, Gebhard , C-55/94, ECR 1995, I-4186 <4197 37="" 4198="" and="" para.="">; Judgment of 27 January 2000, Graf v Filzmoser , C-190/98, ECR 2000, I-513 <523 23="" para.="">; Judgment of 10 February 2009, Commission v Italy ,
C-110/05, ECR 2009, I-519, para. 37 […]). In the judicial review of
whether quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, or measures of
equivalent effect, are justified under Art. 36 TFEU, the CJEU requires
an objective examination, through statistical or ad hoc
data or by other means, whether it may reasonably be concluded from the
evidence submitted by the Member State concerned that the means chosen
are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives pursued and whether
it is possible to attain those objectives by measures that are less
restrictive of the free movement of goods (cf. CJEU, Judgment of
19 October 2016, Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung , C-148/15, EU:C:2016:776, para. 36). 523>4197>1697>852>
This is applied accordingly in
relation to general principles such as the principle of effectiveness
(cf. CJEU, Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend & Loos , C-26/62, ECR 1963, I-7 <26>; Judgment of 4 December 1974, van Duyn , C-41/74, ECR. 1974, I-1338 <1348 12="" para.="">; Judgment of 1 February 1977, Nederlandse Ondernemingen , C-51/76, ECR 1977, I-114 <126 127="" and="" nbsp="" paras.="">; Judgment of 21 September 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor , C-205/82 inter alia , ECR 1983, I-2635 <2665 19="" 2666="" and="" para.="">; Judgment of 20 September 1988, Beentjes , C-31/87, ECR 1988, I-4652 <4655 11="" para.="">; Judgment of 20 September 1988, Borken v Moormann , C-190/87, ECR 1988, I-4714 <4723 27="" para.="">; Judgment of 15 September 1998, Edis , C-231/96, ECR 1998, I-4979 <4990 34="" 35="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 9 February 1999, Dilexport , C-343/96, ECR 1999, I-600 <611 25="" 26="" 612="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer , C-360/09, ECR 2011, I-5186 <5200 28="" 29="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 26 June 2019, Kuhar v Addiko Bank , C-407/18, EU:C:2019:537, paras. 46, 48; Judgment of 7 November 2019, Flausch , C-280/18, EU:C:2019:928, paras. 27, 29, 43 and 44 […]). 5200>611>4990>4723>4655>2665>126>1348>26>
The CJEU has taken a similar approach with regard to the principle of equivalence (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 21 September 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor , C-205/82 inter alia , ECR 1983, I-2635 <2665 19="" 2666="" and="" para.="">; Judgment of 8 February 1996, FMC , C-212/94, ECR 1996, I-404 <422 52="" para.="">; Judgment of 10 July 1997, Palmisani , C-261/95, ECR 1997, I-4037 <4046 27="" 33="" 4047="" 4048="" and="" nbsp="" para.="" paras.="">; Judgment of 15 September 1998, Edis , C-231/96, ECR 1998, I-4979 <4986 34="" 4990="" 4991="" nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 9 February 1999, Dilexport , C-343/96, ECR 1999, I-600 <610 25="" 611="" nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 19 September 2002, Austria v Huber , C-336/00, ECR 2002, I-7736 <7755 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 26 June 2019, Kuhar v Addiko Bank , C-407/18, EU:C:2019:537, paras. 46 and 47; Judgment of 7 November 2019, Flausch , C-280/18, EU:C:2019:928, paras. 27 and 28 […]). 7755>610>4986>4046>422>2665>
Lastly, even in relation to
provisions allocating competences the CJEU takes the actual effects of a
contested measure into account in its legal review, for instance, when
interpreting the competence for harmonisation measures concerning the
internal market pursuant to Art. 114 TFEU (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 2 May
2006, C-217/04, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council , ECR 2006, I-3789 <3805 nbsp="" para.="">; Judgment of 22 January 2014, C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council , EU:C:2014:18, para. 113; Judgment of 4 May 2016, C-358/14, Poland v Parliament ,
EU:C:2016:323, para. 32) or reviewing compliance with the regime on aid
granted by Member States pursuant to Arts. 107 and 108 TFEU (cf. CJEU,
Judgment of 10 December 1969, Commission v France , C-6/69 inter alia , ECR 1969, I-525 <540 18="" 20="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 17 September 1980, Philip Morris v Commission , C-730/79, ECR 1980, I-2672 <2688 11="" 12="" 2689="" and="" paras.="">; Judgment of 16 April 2014, Trapeza , C-690/13, EU:C:2015:235, para. 23 […]). 2688>540>3805>
It is not discernible, neither from the CJEU’s Judgment of 11 December 2018 nor from its earlier decisions in Pringle (CJEU, Judgment of 27 November 2012, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756) and Gauweiler
(CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400), why a
different standard should apply with regard to delimiting the
competences for monetary policy and economic policy at issue here.
Without providing further reasons to justify this different approach,
the interpretation undertaken by the CJEU is not comprehensible from a
methodological perspective.
cc) The interpretation of the
principle of proportionality undertaken by the CJEU in its Judgment of
11 December 2018 and the determination of the ESCB’s mandate based
thereon, manifestly exceed the judicial mandate conferred upon the CJEU
in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU (see (1) below) and result in a
structurally significant shift in the order of competences to the
detriment of the Member States (see (2) below). In this regard, the
aforementioned judgment thus constitutes an ultra vires act that is not binding upon the Federal Constitutional Court (see (3) below).
(1) It follows from the reasons set out above (see para. 134 et seq .),
that the Judgment of the CJEU of 11 December 2018 manifestly exceeds
the mandate conferred upon the CJEU in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU to
the extent that it finds the PSPP to be proportionate.
With self-imposed restraint, the
CJEU limits its review to whether there is a “manifest error of
assessment” on the part of the ECB (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 56, 78, 91), whether the PSPP “manifestly” goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its objective (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 79, 81, 92), and whether its disadvantages are “manifestly” disproportionate to the objectives pursued (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 93 et seq .);
this standard of review is by no means conducive to restricting the
scope of the competences conferred upon the ECB, which are limited to
monetary policy. Rather, it allows the ECB to expand – gradually and in a
manner that is not necessarily noticeable from the outset – its
competences on its own authority; at the very least, it largely or
completely exempts such action on the part of the ECB from judicial
review. This combination of the broad discretion afforded the
institution in question together with the limited standard of review as
to whether that institution manifestly exceeded its competences may well
be in line with traditional case-law in other areas of EU law. Yet it
clearly fails to give sufficient effect to the principle of conferral
[...] and paves the way for a continual erosion of Member State
competences.
(2) To this extent, the Weiss
Judgment also results in a structurally significant shift in the order
of competences to the detriment of the Member States (cf. BVerfGE 126,
286 <309>; 146, 216 <260 261="" 66="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). This gives rise
to the risk of a continual erosion – beyond the control of the Member
States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ – of their competences in economic
policy and fiscal policy matters and of further weakening the democratic
legitimation of the public authority exercised by the Eurosystem, which
would not be compatible with the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366
<395 48="" para.="">; 142, 123 <192 134="" 193="" 194="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216 <250 251="" 48="" and="" para.=""> […]). 250>192>395>260>309>
The principle of conferral is not
solely a principle of EU law but also incorporates constitutional
principles from the Member States (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <350>;
142, 123 <219 nbsp="" para.="">). It is integral to justifying the
decrease in the level of democratic legitimation of the public authority
exercised by the European Union; in Germany, this decrease in
democratic legitimation not only affects objective tenets of the
Constitution (Art. 20(1) and (2) GG) but also bears upon the citizens’
right to vote and their right to democracy (Art. 38(1) first sentence
GG). For safeguarding the principle of democracy, it is thus imperative
that the bases for the division of competences in the European Union be
respected. The finality of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) must not lead to the de facto
suspension or undermining of the principle of conferral, one of the
fundamental principles of the European Union (cf. Declaration no. 42 on
Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference; CJEU,
Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, ECHR Accession , ECR 1996, I-1783 <1788 nbsp="" para.="">),). 1788>219>350>
The distinction between economic
policy and monetary policy is a fundamental political decision with
implications beyond the individual case and with significant
consequences for the distribution of power and influence within the
European Union. The classification of a measure as a monetary policy
matter as opposed to an economic or fiscal policy matter bears not only
on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member
States; it also determines the level of democratic legitimation and
oversight of the respective policy area, given that the competence for
monetary policy has been conferred upon the ESCB as an independent
authority pursuant to Arts. 130, 282 TFEU (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 9 March
2010, Commission v Germany ,
C-518/07, ECR 2010, I-1897, para. 42; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second
Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 132 et seq .).
Rendering the principle of
proportionality more or less meaningless, resulting in a failure to
conduct an overall assessment and appraisal of relevant circumstances,
carries significant weight for the principle of democracy and the
principle of the sovereignty of the people. As explained above (see
para. 158 et seq .),
these dynamics potentially shift the bases for the division of
competences in the European Union, undermining the principle of
conferral (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <201 202="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216
<259 260="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). The adoption of economic policy measures
by the ESCB would necessitate a treaty amendment pursuant to Art. 48 TEU
(cf. CJEU, Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, ECHR Accession ,
ECR 1996, I-1783 <1788 nbsp="" para.="">), which in turn would require
involvement of the German legislature (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <201 151="" 202="" and="" para.="">; 146, 216 <259 260="" 63="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). 259>201>1788>259>201>
Based on the Judgment of the CJEU
of 11 December 2018, a distinction between economic policy and monetary
policy would be largely impossible. At the same time, this approach
jeopardises the independence of the ECB guaranteed in Art. 130 TFEU, as
it possibly exposes the ECB to political pressure that it make use of
the leeway afforded it by the CJEU. The broader the scope of the ECB’s
mandate, and the further it reaches into areas reserved to economic and
fiscal policy, the greater the risk that interested parties try to
influence the ECB’s decision-making [...].
(3) In its Judgment of 11 December
2018, the CJEU largely abandoned the distinction between economic
policy and monetary policy given that, for the purposes of reviewing the
PSPP’s proportionality, it simply accepted the proclaimed objectives of
the ECB and its assertion that less intrusive means were not available.
Thereby, the CJEU allows the ESCB to pursue an economic policy agenda
by means of bonds purchases. This has no basis in primary law.
The interpretation of the ECB’s
monetary policy mandate, as undertaken by the CJEU, encroaches upon the
competences of the Member States for economic and fiscal policy matters.
With few exceptions (cf. Arts. 121 and 122, Art. 126 TFEU), the
competence of the European Union in economic policy matters is
essentially limited to coordinating the policies of the Member States
(Art. 119(1) TFEU). The ESCB is to merely support the general economic policies in
the European Union (Art. 119(2), Art. 127(1) second sentence TFEU; Art.
2 second sentence ESCB Statute); it is not, however, authorised to
pursue its own economic policy agenda. To the extent that the Weiss
Judgment of the CJEU essentially affords the ECB the competence to
pursue its own economic policy agenda by means of an asset purchase
programme, and refrains from subjecting the ECB’s actions to an
effective review as to conformity with the order of competences on the
basis of the principle of proportionality, including a balancing of the
economic and fiscal policy effects of the PSPP against its monetary
policy objective, the Judgment of the CJEU exceeds the judicial mandate
deriving from Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU (cf. also BVerfGE 126, 286
<306>). The CJEU thus acted ultra vires, which is why, in that respect, its Judgment has no binding force in Germany. 306>
b) The determination under constitutional law whether the Federal Government and the Bundestag discharged their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung )
hinges on the preliminary question whether the ESCB’s actions in terms
of adopting and implementing the PSPP remain within the competences
conferred upon it. Given that, for the reasons set out above, the
Federal Constitutional Court cannot rely on the Weiss Judgment
of the CJEU in this regard, it must conduct its own review to decide
this preliminary question. Based on its own review, the Second Senate
concludes that, due to the lack of sufficient proportionality
considerations, Decision (EU) 2015/774 together with Decisions (EU)
2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100 are neither
covered by the monetary policy competence of the ECB (Art. 127(1) first
sentence TFEU) nor by its merely supporting competence regarding the
Member States’ economic policies (Art. 127(1) second sentence TFEU.
A programme adopted by the ESCB
for the purchase of government bonds, such as the PSPP, that has
significant economic policy effects must satisfy the principle of
proportionality (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 66 et seq .; loc. cit. ,
para. 71). This requires that the programme constitute a suitable and
necessary means for achieving the aim pursued; it further requires that
the programme’s monetary policy objective and its economic policy
effects be identified, weighed and balanced against one another. The
PSPP’s monetary policy objective is in principle not (yet) objectionable
(see aa below). However, by pursuing that objective unconditionally
while ignoring the economic policy effects resulting from the programme,
the ECB manifestly disregards the principle of proportionality
enshrined in Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU (see bb below).
This violation of the principle of proportionality is structurally
significant so that the actions of the ECB constitute an ultra vires act (see cc below).
aa) It is true that there are
doubts as to the PSPP’s suitability, for instance in light of persistent
low interest rates (cf. German Council of Economic Experts, Annual
Report 2016/2017, p. 194 ; Annual Report 2017/2018,
p. 174 ; Association of German Public Banks, 3
Jahre EZB-Wertpapierankäufe, p. 11 <30 2017="" november="">) and the
resulting dampening effect on inflation, which the ECB decisions at
issue fail to address, just like they do not mention the possible risk
of “reversal effects” that could result from the programme – at least if
it were continued for a longer duration. This notwithstanding, the
conclusion that the PSPP is suitable for achieving the ECB’s inflation
target of levels below, but close to, 2% is – in accordance with the
CJEU’s findings – in principle not objectionable. The objective of the
PSPP to increase inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2% is in
principle permissible as a specific manifestation of the ECB’s task to
maintain price stability; moreover, Art. 18.1 ESCB Statute expressly
authorises the purchasing of marketable instruments as a means available
to the ECB in carrying out its tasks (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June
2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 54; loc. cit. , paras. 69, 146, 153; BVerfGE 146, 216 <284 em="" nbsp="">et seq 284>30>
bb) However, it is not
ascertainable from Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the ECB Governing Council
of 4 March 2015 on the PSPP nor from subsequent Decisions (EU)
2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702, (EU) 2017/100 and the Decision
of 12 September 2019 that these decisions contained, or were based on,
the required balancing of the monetary policy objective against the
economic policy effects resulting from the means used to achieve it (see
(1) below). As a result, the foregoing decisions violate the principle
of proportionality enshrined in Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4)
TEU (see (2) below).
(1) The decisions at issue merely
assert that the ECB’s declared inflation target of levels below, but
close to, 2% has not yet been achieved and that less intrusive means
were not available. Firstly, this does not make it clear what kind of
burdens were taken into consideration in the assessment of the
programme’s necessity. Secondly, the relevant decisions contain neither a
prognosis as to the PSPP’s economic policy effects nor an assessment of
whether any such effects were proportionate to the intended advantages
in the area of monetary policy.
Therefore, it is not ascertainable
that the ECB Governing Council did in fact consider and balance the
effects that are inherent in and direct consequences of the PSPP, as
these effects invariably result from the programme’s volume of more than
EUR 2 trillion and its duration of now over three years. As the PSPP’s
negative effects increase the more it grows in volume and the longer it
is continued, a longer programme duration gives rise to stricter
requirements as to the necessary balancing of interests.
(a) The PSPP improves the
refinancing conditions of the Member States as it allows them to obtain
financing on the capital markets at considerably better conditions than
would otherwise be the case. To the extent that the PSPP, with a volume
of more than EUR 2 trillion, has a substantial impact on the Member
States’ refinancing conditions, it has far-reaching consequences for the
matters governed by Art. 123 TFEU – which fall within the area of
fiscal policy. This was also expressly recognised by the CJEU (cf. CJEU,
loc. cit .,
paras. 130 and 131, 136) and confirmed by expert third parties in the
oral hearing. It is therefore undisputed that the budgetary situations
of Member States benefit from the reduction of general interests rates
facilitated by the PSPP [...]. This gives rise to the risk – despite the
“safeguards” referred to by the CJEU – that necessary consolidation and
reform measures will either not be implemented or discontinued [...].
Thus, the PSPP has a significant
impact on the fiscal policy terms under which the Member States operate
and furthermore affects the policy matters governed by Art. 126 TFEU,
the SCG Treaty and further specifying provisions of secondary law (cf.
Regulation No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of
budgetary surveillance in the euro area ; Regulation No. 1174/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area
; Regulation
No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation No. 1466/97 on
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the
surveillance and coordination of economic policies ; Regulation No. 1176/2011 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances , Council Regulation
No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation
No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure ; Regulation No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial
stability ; Regulation
No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the
Member States in the euro area ; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements
for budgetary frameworks of the Member States ). In particular, the PSPP could – as the
CJEU, too, concedes (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 130, 136, 143) – have the same effect as financial assistance instruments pursuant to Art. 12 et seq .
ESM Treaty. Despite the safeguards cited by the CJEU, the volume and
duration of the PSPP may render the effects of the programme
disproportionate – even where these effects are initially in conformity
with primary law – if they prevent Member States from adopting own
measures to pursue a sound budgetary policy and, more generally, result
in “monetary dominance”, with the ECB determining fiscal policies of the
Member States. At the time Decision (EU) 2015/774 was adopted, it was
already foreseeable that several Member States of the euro area would
increase new borrowing in order to boost the economy with investment
programmes (cf. European Commission, General Government Data, General
Government Revenue, Expenditure, Balances and Gross Debt, Part II:
Tables by series, Autumn 2016, p. 158).
(b) Moreover, the effects of the
PSPP on the banking sector must be taken into account. The programme
affects balance sheets in the commercial banking sector by transferring
large quantities of government bonds, including high-risk ones, to the
balance sheets of the Eurosystem, which significantly improves the
economic situation of the relevant banks and increases their credit
rating. At the same time, it creates an incentive for banks to increase
lending despite the low level of interest rates [...].
(c) Relevant economic policy
effects of the PSPP furthermore include the risk of creating real estate
and stock market bubbles as well as the economic and social impact on
virtually all citizens, who are at least indirectly affected inter alia as
shareholders, tenants, real estate owners, savers or insurance policy
holders. For instance, there is a considerable risk of losses for
private savings. This has direct consequences for (private) pension
schemes and the returns they generate [...]. Both factors lead to, in
part excessive, portfolio shifts [...], while risk premiums are in
decline. Real estate prices are on the rise with trends of sometimes
particularly sharp increases – especially regarding residential property
in major cities – [...], which possibly already come close to creating a
“market bubble”, as the oral hearing confirmed. It is not for the
Federal Constitutional Court to decide in the current proceedings how
such concerns are to be weighed exactly in the context of a monetary
policy decision; rather, the point is that such effects, which are
created or at least amplified by the PSPP, must not be completely
ignored.
(d) As the PSPP lowers general
interest rates, it allows economically unviable companies to stay on the
market since they gain access to cheap credit [...].
(e) In addition, the longer the
programme continues and the more its total volume increases, the greater
the risk that the ESCB becomes dependent on Member State politics as it
can no longer simply terminate and undo the programme without
jeopardising the stability of the monetary union.
(2) In view of the considerable
economic policy effects resulting from the PSPP – not all of which are
discussed here –, it would have been incumbent upon the ECB to weigh
these effects and balance them, based on proportionality considerations,
against the expected positive contributions to achieving the monetary
policy objective the ECB itself has set. It is not ascertainable that
any such balancing was conducted, neither when the programme was first
launched nor at a any point during its implementation; it is therefore
not possible to review whether it was still proportionate to tolerate
the economic and social policy effects of the PSPP, problematic as they
may be in respect of the order of competences, or, possibly, at what
point they have become disproportionate. Neither the ECB’s press
releases nor other public statements by ECB officials hint at any such
balancing having taken place.
For this lack of balancing and
lack of stating the reasons informing such balancing, the ECB decisions
at issue violate Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU and, in
consequence, exceed the monetary policy mandate of the ECB deriving from
Art. 127(1) first sentence TFEU.
cc) The violation of the principle
of proportionality is structurally significant. In this regard, the
considerations set out above in relation to the Judgment of the CJEU in Weiss apply accordingly (cf. para. 124 et seq .). Therefore, the ECB’s actions amount to an ultra vires act.
2. At present, it cannot yet be determined whether the Federal Government and the Bundestag did actually violate their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung)
by failing to actively advocate for the termination of the PSPP. This
determination is contingent upon a proportionality assessment by the
Governing Council of the ECB, which must be substantiated with
comprehensible reasons. In the absence of such an assessment, it is not
possible to reach a conclusive decision as to whether the PSPP in its
specific form is compatible with Art. 127(1) TFEU.
3. The CJEU’s conclusion in its
Judgment of 11 December 2018 that the PSPP does not violate Art. 123(1)
TFEU (see a below) does meet with considerable concerns (see b below).
However, on condition that the “safeguards”, which, according to the
CJEU, prevent circumvention of the prohibition of monetary financing,
are strictly observed (see c below), it follows from an overall
balancing that a manifest violation of Art. 123(1) TFEU is not
ascertainable (see d below). The fact that the purchases by the
Eurosystem also include government bonds with a negative yield to
maturity and collective action clauses (CAC) does not merit a different
conclusion (see e below).
a) Art. 123 TFEU prohibits the ESCB from granting monetary financing to Member States (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paras. 94 and 95; loc. cit. ,
paras. 102 and 103; BVerfGE 134, 366 <411 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123
<225 198="" 199="" 226="" and="" paras.="">; 146, 216 <264 265="" 78="" and="" para.=""> […]). This provision aims to encourage Member States to follow a
sound budgetary policy (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <265 78="" para.="">) and
to prevent excessively high levels of debt or excessive Member State
deficits (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 100; loc. cit. , para. 107). 265>264>225>411>
Art. 123(1) TFEU also precludes
measures circumventing this prohibition, which applies to purchases of
government bonds on the secondary markets by the Eurosystem (cf. CJEU,
Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paras. 97, 101; BVerfGE 134, 366 <411 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <225 226="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216
<264 265="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). Bond purchases on the secondary markets
must not have an effect equivalent to direct purchases of government
bonds from the issuer (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 97; loc. cit. ,
para. 106; BVerfGE 142, 123 <225 198="" 226="" and="" para.="">; 146, 216
<264 265="" 78="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). It must thus be ensured in determining
their budgetary policy, the Member States do not know for certain that
the Eurosystem will at a future point purchase their government bonds on
secondary markets (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 113). 264>225>264>225>411>
It is by now established case-law
of the Federal Constitutional Court that the review of a programme for
the purchase of government bonds may, in principle, refer to the
“safeguards” set out by the CJEU in its Gauweiler
Judgment. The criteria developed in this context allow for the
determination whether a measure circumvents the prohibition of Art. 123
TFEU. While the weight and indicative value of these criteria may differ
depending on the design of the respective programme, they nevertheless
provide a comprehensive framework for a meaningful assessment (cf. CJEU,
Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 4 October 2018, Weiss and Others ,
C-493/17, EU:C:2018:815, para. 48). Whether these “safeguards” suffice
to achieve their intended purpose depends on the particular
circumstances of the individual case (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 108). Whether an asset purchase programme is permissible (under
primary law) thus depends on the effectiveness of the safeguards built
into it.
b) In the view of the Second Senate, the manner in which the CJEU applied some of these criteria in its Weiss Judgment gives rise to considerable concerns. In relation to Art. 123 TFEU, the Judgment in Weiss is
essentially based on a consideration of the safeguards built into the
PSPP to ensure that the prohibition of Art. 123 TFEU is not
circumvented. Yet the CJEU neither subjects these safeguards to closer
scrutiny nor does it test them against counter indications (cf. the
criticism set out in BVerfGE 142, 123 <217 182="" 218="" and="" para.="">;
146, 216 <267 em="">et seq 267>217>
aa) According to the Judgment of the CJEU in Gauweiler ,
it is generally impermissible for the ECB to make a prior announcement
concerning either the decision to carry out purchases of government
bonds or the volume of purchases envisaged. The CJEU states that this inter alia prevents
the conditions of issue of government bonds from being distorted by the
certainty that those bonds will be purchased by the ESCB after their
issue, ensuring that implementation of a programme such as the PSPP will
not, in practice, have an effect equivalent to that of a direct
purchase of government bonds from public authorities and bodies of the
Member States (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paras. 106 and 107). The Second Senate
concurred with this finding (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <229 206="" para.="">). However, in its Judgment of 11 December 2018, the CJEU now
argues that announcing in advance the monthly volume of asset purchases,
the rules for allocating those volumes between the various central
banks of the Member States in accordance with the capital key, the
eligibility criteria governing the purchase of a security and the
expected duration of that programme contributed to the effectiveness and
proportionality of the PSPP (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 111 and 112). This is not only contradictory but also undermines
the criterion of relative uncertainty on the part of Member States and
market operators regarding bond purchases by the Eurosystem. 229>
The prior announcement of asset
purchases with detailed information on the features of the programme
may, in principle, be regarded as an indication that such a programme
potentially circumvents Art. 123(1) TFEU. In this respect, the Judgment
of 11 December 2018 particularly emphasises that uncertainties regarding
the envisaged purchases under the PSPP remain, which the CJEU views as
essential “safeguards” designed to ensure that the prohibition of
Art. 123(1) TFEU is not circumvented. According to the CJEU, the
adoption and implementation of the PSPP may not create certainty
regarding future purchases of government bonds, ensuring that Member
States would still be compelled, in the event of a deficit, to seek
financing on the markets (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 132, 135, 138 et seq ., with references to the Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 112 et seq .).
What the CJEU regards as decisive is whether potential purchasers of
government bonds can know for certain that the Eurosystem is going to
purchase those bonds within a certain period and under conditions
allowing those market operators to act, de facto , as intermediaries for the Eurosystem (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 110). Yet, such certainty can not only arise from a legal
obligation to purchase the bonds in question, but also from specific
factual circumstances (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <267 271="" 272="" 81="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). Therefore, the underlying factual circumstances must
not be disregarded completely. 267>
bb) It is furthermore clarified in
both the case-law of the CJEU and of the Second Senate that a blackout
period must be observed between the issue of a security on the primary
markets and its purchase by the Eurosystem on the secondary markets, in
order to prevent the conditions of issue of government bonds from being
distorted, ensuring that the prohibition of monetary financing is not
circumvented (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paras. 106 and 107; loc. cit. , para. 114 et seq .;
BVerfGE 134, 366 <414 92="" para.="">; 142, 123 <226 199="" 227="" nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216 <265 272="" 273="" 93="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">).
Thus, the determination and observance of this blackout period is of
considerable importance (cf. already CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General
Villalón, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:7, para. 262). 265>226>414>
To ensure that purchases do not
result in a circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU, Art. 4(1) of Decision
(EU) 2015/774 provides that no purchases are permitted in a newly issued
or tapped security and the marketable debt instruments with a remaining
maturity that are close in time, before and after, to the maturity of
the marketable debt instruments to be issued, over a period to be
determined by the Governing Council (‘blackout period’). However, no
further information on the duration of the blackout period is provided,
nor are any reasons specified in this regard. The CJEU accepts this,
stating that it contributes to the aim of limiting the foreseeability,
in terms of timing, of the Eurosystem’s interventions on the secondary
markets. According to the CJEU, this lack of information increases the
uncertainty of private market operators given that a purchase may thus
take place several months or several years after a bond has been issued
and given that the Eurosystem has the option of reducing the monthly
volume of bond purchases under the PSPP (cf. on the EAPP as a whole,
CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 115 and 116). At the same time, the CJEU limits its finding in
this context to the assertion that the length of the blackout period is
measured “in days rather than weeks”. The CJEU concludes from the mere
existence of the blackout period – without any further information –
that it constitutes a sufficiently effective “safeguard”; in this
regard, it must be noted that the CJEU chose not to request further
information that the ECB had actually offered to provide (cf. ECB,
Statement of 30 November 2017). The CJEU does not even consider it
necessary that further information on the blackout period be disclosed ex post .
On this basis, it is not possible
to conduct a judicial review. The mere existence of a blackout period
does not justify the conclusion that purchases of government bonds were
not foreseeable or would only occur at a time when an independent market
price has formed for eligible securities. In this context, the CJEU
states that the uncertainty of private operators is increased by the
fact that the blackout period is only a minimum period and a purchase
may thus take place several months or several years after a bond has
been issued and by the fact that the ESCB has the option of reducing the
monthly volume of bond purchases (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 116); ultimately, however, this does not support the
aforementioned conclusion. Moreover, by simply accepting the assertions
of the ECB without scrutiny, the CJEU contradicts its own case-law; in
other cases, the CJEU held that where an EU institution enjoys broad
discretion, judicial review is of fundamental importance. In the case at
hand, the CJEU fails to sufficiently distinguish between a publication
in advance and ex post
disclosure of information on the relevant blackout period. The CJEU’s
reasoning is persuasive insofar as it finds publication of the relevant
information not to be appropriate where such publication potentially
jeopardises the effectiveness of the PSPP in the future (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 112, 115). For the same reasons, the Second Senate argued [in
its Order of Referral] that publication of detailed information on the
relevant blackout period should not be required if such disclosure
undermined the very purpose of the blackout period (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216
<273 95="" para.="">). With regard to the publication of detailed
information in advance, the risk of undermining the blackout period’s
purpose is obvious; the same cannot be said, however, for ex post disclosure of such information. Rather, ex post disclosure
of the relevant information is a prerequisite for conducting an
effective judicial review of whether the purchases circumvent the
prohibition of monetary financing (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <223 nbsp="" para.="">; 146, 216 <272 273="" and="" em="" nbsp="" para.="">et seq 272>223>273>
In this context, the CJEU observes that a requirement to publish ex post details
relating to the blackout period cannot be derived from the obligation
to state reasons laid down in Art. 296(2) TFEU, given that the purpose
of such publication would be to show the precise content of the measures
adopted by the ESCB rather than the reasons justifying those measures
(cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 43 […]). Again, this view is not convincing. The statement of
reasons for an EU measure required under Art. 296(2) TFEU must enable
the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to
enable the Court to exercise its power of review (cf. CJEU, Judgment of
16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 70). In this regard, however, the CJEU
invokes, without explanation, the requirements regarding statement of
reasons applicable to legislative acts and applies them accordingly to
simple administrative action on the part of the Eurosystem (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 32), rendering effective judicial review of the PSPP on the basis of Art. 123(1) TFEU de facto impossible
(cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <273 274="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). As a result, it is
neither possible to review whether the envisaged blackout period is
even suitable for protecting the formation of market prices on the
secondary markets [...], nor whether the blackout period is actually
observed in practice. With this approach, the CJEU undermines its own
assertion that the blackout period serves as one of the safeguards
ensuring that private market operators cannot act as intermediaries of
the ESCB (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 113 and 114). 273>
The criterion of a blackout
period, as interpreted and applied by the CJEU, is manifestly unsuitable
for preventing a circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU. It effectively
deprives its steering function of any effect; in fact, it is not
possible to review whether the blackout period has any steering effect
at all. The assertion that the ESCB’s risk management committee might be
better placed than a court to assess whether the blackout period is
adequate (cf. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 4 October
2018, Weiss and Others ,
C-493/17, EU:C:2018:815, para. 60) does not merit a different
conclusion. This committee is part of the very institution whose actions
are under review here; therefore, it is neither called upon to provide
effective legal protection nor to ensure democratic legitimation of the
ECB’s actions (cf. BVerfG, Judgment of Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2
BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, paras. 137, 212, 274 et seq .).
cc) The holding of government
bonds until maturity has a significant impact on the secondary markets
for government securities (cf. CJEU, Opinion of General Advocate
Villalón of 14 January 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:7, para. 243) and constitutes an important
indication for monetary financing of state budgets. According to the
Judgment of the CJEU in Gauweiler ,
this practice affects the impetus for Member States to follow a sound
budgetary policy. The resulting effects were, however, limited by the
option of selling the purchased bonds at any time, which – as per the
reasoning provided in Gauweiler – means that the consequences of purchasing those bonds “may be temporary” (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 117). The CJEU submits that the holding
of bonds until maturity is in any case only permissible if it is
necessary to achieve the objectives sought. It further states that, in
any event, it must be ensured that the market operators involved cannot
be certain that the ESCB will make use of that option (cf. CJEU,
Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 118). Based on these considerations, the
Second Senate has found that the prohibition of measures circumventing
Art. 123(1) TFEU is not violated if – inter alia –
the purchased securities are only exceptionally held until maturity and
that the merely temporary purchase and holding of such assets remains
the rule (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <227 em="">et seq 227>
By contrast, the CJEU finds, in its Judgment in Weiss ,
that there is no obligation to only hold securities purchased by the
Eurosystem until maturity in exceptional cases (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 147). Yet at the same time, the CJEU emphasises that the
purchases under the PSPP are potentially only temporary in nature (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 135, 150). The CJEU contends that the possibility of holding
government bonds purchased by the Eurosystem until maturity does not
imply a waiver of the right to payment of the debt, by the issuing
Member State, once the bond matures (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 146; cf. already CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 118), and that Decision (EU) 2015/774
does not provide any further details concerning the possible sale of
bonds purchased under the PSPP so that the Eurosystem retains the option
of selling such bonds at any time and without any specific conditions
in accordance with Art. 12(2) of the Guideline. According to the CJEU,
the mere fact that the Eurosystem has the option of selling the
purchased bonds at any time helps maintain the impetus to conduct a
sound budgetary policy, since that option allows the Eurosystem to adapt
its programme according to the attitudes of the Member States
concerned. The CJEU lastly states that the ESCB is under no obligation
to purchase bonds from Member States that ceased to follow a sound
budgetary policy (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 148 et seq .; similar observations were already made in CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paras. 117, 120).
What appears problematic is that
the CJEU, in its Judgment of 11 December 2018, emphasises the merely
temporary nature of the PSPP (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 134 and 135) but without making any determination as to what
consequences this actually entails. The CJEU rejects any obligation on
the part of the Eurosystem to sell bonds with an indefinite or very long
duration purchased under the programme on the grounds that the PSPP is
subject to the principle of necessity and that market operators lack
specific certainty regarding the holding and selling of bonds. The CJEU
also fails to make any determination on the necessity of an exit
strategy.
However, if the Eurosystem were to
refrain from reselling purchased government bonds indefinitely, it
would assume the role of a permanent source of finance for the Member
States. This is especially true if – as is currently the case under the
PSPP – payments received upon maturity are reinvested for purchasing new
government bonds. These sovereign debts would then be permanently tied
up in the Eurosystem and would become almost entirely irrelevant for the
markets – especially with regard to the credit rating of the issuing
Member States and thus also the refinancing conditions available to them
(cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <274 em="" nbsp="">et seq 274>
Moreover, whether the purchases in
question are necessary for achieving the monetary policy objectives – a
criterion invoked by the CJEU in this context (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 152) – should not actually be relevant for determining whether
the purchases amount to a circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU. This
provision sets out an absolute prohibition of monetary financing. It
does not leave room for interferences on the grounds that the relevant
measures are necessary and justifiable. Rather, where a measure amounts
to a circumvention of the prohibition of monetary financing, Art. 123(1)
TFEU sets a definitive limit that restricts the means available to the
Eurosystem in pursuing its monetary policy objectives.
c) Nevertheless, the decisions on
the adoption and implementation of the PSPP ultimately do not amount to a
qualified violation of Art. 123(1) TFEU given that, based on a proper
application of the criteria recognised by the CJEU, it is not
ascertainable that the purchases under the PSPP manifestly circumvent
the prohibition of monetary financing. It is true that the approach
taken by the CJEU in Weiss
renders some of these criteria practically meaningless; in an overall
assessment, however, the remaining valid criteria still suffice to rule
out a manifest circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU. In this regard, the
CJEU thus remains within the judicial mandate conferred upon it in Art.
19(1) second sentence TEU (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <215 nbsp="" para.="">).
Therefore, the interpretation undertaken by the CJEU provides the basis
for the review of the PSPP Decisions in question by the Second Senate
(cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <353>; 126, 286 <304>; 134, 366
<385 27="" para.="">; 140, 317 <339 46="" para.="">; 142, 123 <215 176="" para.="">). 215>339>385>304>353>215>
aa) The CJEU does not question, as
such, the criterion that purchases of government bonds not be announced
in advance. The CJEU’s finding that neither issuing Member States nor
market operators can essentially be certain that specific government
bonds will indeed by purchased under the PSPP is ultimately not
objectionable.
Nonetheless, it is true that
Member States and market operators knew in advance the purchase volume,
the distribution of purchases between the national central banks in
accordance with the ECB’s capital key, the eligibility criteria for
securities and the (initial) duration of the PSPP so that from their
perspective there was a high probability that a significant proportion
of eligible issues would be purchased by the Eurosystem. German bonds,
for example, accounted for 23.6951% of the purchases made until end
2018, which – based on the monthly volume of net purchases in the amount
of EUR 60 billion – translates to a monthly purchase pace of EUR 11.37
billion (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <269 270="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). Similarly,
it was possible to deduce, with respect to the announced purchase
volumes and limits, which specific bonds would meet the eligibility
criteria for the PSPP. In addition, the temporary shortage of eligible
securities (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 127 and 128) issued by Germany, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Portugal increased the likelihood of purchases for
certain ISIN, especially since the purchase limit per issue refers not
to the proportion of securities available on the secondary markets but
to the total volume of the relevant issue (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <267 em="" nbsp="">et seq 267>269>
Despite these strong indications,
however, it was not ascertainable in the oral hearing that issuing
Member States and market operators could essentially be certain that
newly issued government bonds would indeed be purchased by the
Eurosystem on the secondary markets.
bb) For ensuring that Art. 123(1)
TFEU is observed, in particular for ensuring that Member States and
market operators cannot essentially be certain of purchases under the
PSPP, it is particularly significant that the purchase volume is
determined in advance and, more importantly, subject to limits.
According to the Judgment of the CJEU of 11 December 2018, this
requirement is satisfied by the purchase limit set out in Art. 5(1) and
(2) of Decision 2015/774, which provides that the Eurosystem central
banks cannot purchase more than 33% of a particular issue of bonds of a
central government of a Member State or more than 33% of the outstanding
securities of one of those governments (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 124 et seq .).
The CJEU found that due to the purchase limit only a small proportion
of the bonds issued by one Member States may be purchased by the
Eurosystem, so that the respective Member State still has to rely
chiefly on the markets to finance its public deficit. In the view of the
CJEU, those purchase limits, compliance with which is monitored on a
daily basis by the ECB in accordance with Art. 4(3) of the Guideline,
ensure that a private operator necessarily runs the risk of not being
able to resell bonds to the ESCB on the secondary markets, as a purchase
of all the bonds issued is in all cases precluded (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 125).
It follows that, even though the
purchase limit of 33% is determined not by the proportion of securities
available on the secondary market, as identified by the ISIN, but by the
total volume of the issue, it remains uncertain for both issuing Member
States and market operators, at least if the purchase limit is
observed, which eligible instrument from the total volume of eligible
securities will actually be purchased – provided that a large enough
volume is available on the markets. It was established in the oral
hearing that the purchase limit of 33% still allows for a sufficient
“safety margin” ensuring that there is no actual certainty regarding
purchases of bonds by the Eurosystem; it was also established that only
on this condition can it be assumed that the market is not dominated by
the Eurosystem, which is imperative for preventing Member States and
market operators from being largely certain that newly issued government
bonds will be purchased by the ESCB.
cc) The distribution of the
purchase volume according to the key for subscription of the ECB’s
capital (Art. 6(2) and (3) Decision 2015/774) also
contributes to preventing a circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU. It
constitutes an objective criterion that is independent of the economic
and budgetary situation of the respective Member States of the euro
area. Therefore, it can be ruled out that this criterion could be used
to purposely direct bond purchases to support struggling Member States.
Moreover, the CJEU rightly points out that the PSPP is not selective –
setting it apart from the programme reviewed in Gauweiler (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 89) – and will have an impact on
financial conditions across the whole of the euro area as opposed to
merely meeting the specific financing needs of certain Member States
(cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 82). This in in line with the view adopted by the Second Senate
in earlier decisions (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <406 412="" 87="" nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <217 182="" 218="" and="" para.="">). 217>406>
In the CJEU’S view, the
distribution of the purchase volume according to the capital key
furthermore means that the considerable increase in a Member State’s
deficit resulting from the possible abandonment of a sound budgetary
policy would reduce the proportion of that Member State’s bonds
purchased by the ESCB and the PSPP does not therefore enable a Member
State to avoid the consequences, so far as financing is concerned, of
any deterioration in its budgetary position (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 140).
dd) The CJEU considers that
several other factors contribute to ensuring that Art. 123(1) TFEU is
not circumvented, although the relevance of these factors depends on
discretionary decisions of the ECB. One of these factors is that
pursuant to Art. 8 of Decision 2015/774 the ECB only publishes aggregate
information on the volume of bonds originating from public authorities
and bodies of one Member State that are purchased under the PSPP (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 126). The CJEU further states that the Eurosystem laid down rules
intended to ensure that the purchase volume cannot be precisely
determined in advance: For instance, the CJEU points out that purchases
under the PSPP are subsidiary to purchases under other sub-programmes of
the EAPP (Art. 2(2) of the Guideline) so that the volume of PSPP
purchases can vary from month to month; furthermore, the Governing
Council is authorised to depart from the monthly forecast volume, when
specific market conditions so demand. Moreover, the CJEU finds that
neither Member States nor market operators can deduce with certainty
that the amount allocated to a national central bank for the purchase of
bonds originating from public authorities and bodies of that Member
State will indeed be used (Art. 6(1) Decision 2015/774). The
CJEU also submits that the allocation of securities to the national
central banks according to the capital key is subject to revision by the
Governing Council. The CJEU also refers to Art. 3(1), (3) and (5) of
Decision (EU) 2015/774, holding that the ESCB has authorised the
purchase of diversified securities under the PSPP, thereby reducing the
foreseeability of purchases, as it is possible in that context for not
only bonds issued by central governments but also those issued by
regional or local governments to be purchased. Furthermore, as the CJEU
points out, those bonds can have a maturity of between one year and 30
years and 364 days and their yield may, where necessary, be negative, or
even below the deposit facility rate. Lastly, the CJEU submits that
Decisions (EU) 2015/2464 and (EU) 2017/100 further limited the
foreseeability of the Eurosystem’s purchases of Member State bonds (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 118 et seq .)
ee) In Weiss ,
the CJEU in principle also agrees with the requirement of observing a
‘blackout period’ between the issue of a debt security and its purchase
by the Eurosystem (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 115 and 116). However, the CJEU did not review whether the
duration of the blackout period envisaged in Art. 4(1) of Decision (EU)
2015/774 was sufficient and whether it was actually observed until the
end of 2018; as the relevant information was not provided by the ECB, it
was also not possible for the Second Senate to make any determination
in this regard. Yet, on the basis of Art. 4(1) of Decision (EU)
2015/774, together with the ECB’s assertion that the blackout period was
measured in “days rather than weeks” and the statements made by the
expert third parties in the oral hearing, it can reasonably be assumed
that the blackout period was in fact observed.
ff) Purchases under the PSPP are
furthermore limited to government bonds of Member States that achieve a
certain credit rating (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
paras. 142 and 143). In addition to the general eligibility criteria
for monetary operations, under Guideline ECB/2011/14, issuers must have a
credit quality assessment of at least Credit Quality Step 3 (Art. 3(2)
of Decision 2015/774). Bonds of euro area Member States that
are subject to a financial assistance programme may be eligible if the
application of the Eurosystem's credit quality threshold is suspended by
the Governing Council pursuant to Art. 8 of Guideline ECB/2014/31
(Art. 3(2) lit. c of Decision 2015/774). The ECB exercised
this option in Art. 1(2) of Decision (EU) 2016/1041 in relation to the
Hellenic Republic, following the decision of the ESM to grant further
financial assistance (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216 <236 15="" para.="">).
According to the CJEU, Art. 3(2) of Decision (EU) 2015/774 lays down
stringent eligibility criteria based on a credit quality assessment,
from which it is possible to depart only if the Member State concerned
is subject to a financial assistance programme. The CJEU further points
out that Art. 13(1) of the Guideline provides in addition that, in the
event of a downgrade of the rating of a Member State’s bonds or of a
negative review of a financial assistance programme, the Governing
Council will have to decide whether to sell the bonds of the Member
State concerned that have already been purchased. From this, the CJEU
concludes that if a Member State abandoned a sound budgetary policy, it
would thus run the risk of the bonds that it issues being excluded from
the PSPP because they have been downgraded or of the Eurosystem selling
the bonds already purchased (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 138 et seq .). 236>
It must be noted, of course, that
the ECB’s Governing Council has gradually relaxed the criteria regarding
the credit rating of eligible securities over the course of the
programme. Any further lowering of the criteria below a rating complying
with at least Credit Quality Step 3 would – as was confirmed in the
oral hearing – no longer meet the aforementioned standards in terms of
credit quality assessment.
gg) Another relevant factor in
determining whether the PSPP circumvents Art. 123(1) TFEU is whether the
purchased bonds are held until maturity. In Weiss ,
the CJEU in principle agrees with this criterion; however, it also
points out that Art. 18 ESCB Statute does not give rise to any
obligation to sell the purchased bonds before they reach maturity (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 146 et seq .).
Nonetheless, the CJEU emphasises – even though the duration of the PSPP
was extended by Decision (EU) 2015/2464 and again by Decision (EU)
2017/100 – that the programme is of a merely temporary nature, which is
reinforced by the fact that, under Art. 12(2) of the Guideline,
purchased bonds can be sold at any time. The CJEU concludes that, on
this basis, the programme can be adapted to the attitudes of the Member
States concerned and that the operators involved cannot be certain that
the Eurosystem will not make use of its option to sell (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 132 et seq .; cf. already CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 114).
Even though neither Art. 1 of
Decision (EU) 2015/774 nor any of its subsequent amendments expressly
provide for the option to sell the bonds purchased by the Eurosystem,
they also do not preclude this option. Nevertheless, government bonds
purchased under the PSPP have so far – with few exceptions in particular
cases – not been sold before maturity. So far the ECB only sold
individual assets in exceptional cases for technical reasons, e.g., in
order to comply with the purchase limits. This does not, however, call
into question the relevance of this criterion as such, especially since
it is not manifestly untenable to assume that the monetary purpose
pursued by the PSPP has so far precluded sales before maturity due to
the (still) limited duration of the programme. Any sale of bonds
purchased under the PSPP would reduce the money supply when it is the
programme’s objective to actually increase liquidity. Thus, the holding
of bonds by the Eurosystem for a certain period of time is an essential
feature of the programme, given that there must be a sufficient increase
in market liquidity in order to lead to the rebalancing of the
portfolio that the programme aims to achieve (cf. CJEU, Opinion Wathelet
of 4 October 2018, Weiss and Others , C-493/17, EU:C:2018:815, para. 71). This was confirmed in the oral hearing.
However, even though it must be
assumed – in accordance with the CJEU’s view – that the holding of
government bonds until maturity is not precluded by Art. 18(1) ESCB
Statute, it is still imperative to ensure that the relationship between
rule and exception not be reversed regarding the sale and holding until
maturity of bonds. The greater the volume of purchased bonds in the
balance sheets of the Eurosystem, the greater the risk that the
prohibition of monetary financing is circumvented. This is especially
true with regard to the PSPP given the massive volume of the programme
and its now quite considerable overall duration.
hh) If a binding exit strategy,
which sets sufficiently specific criteria for ending the programme, was
already decided on at the time a programme such as the PSPP was adopted,
this would significantly minimise the risk of a circumvention of Art.
123(1) TFEU. In the oral hearing, the expert third parties have
repeatedly emphasised that determining an exit strategy is imperative
and that the criteria set out therein must ensure that the selling of
bonds purchased under the programme does not become a mere theoretical
possibility. Yet the decisions at issue do not contain any such exit
strategy.
d) Ultimately, based on a proper
application of the criteria set out by the CJEU in its Judgment of 11
December 2018, it is not ascertainable that the purchases under the PSPP
manifestly circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing. In an
overall assessment, the “safeguards” built into the PSPP still suffice
to rule out a manifest circumvention of Art. 123(1) TFEU.
At the same time, it must be noted
that the CJEU did render some of these “safeguards” largely
ineffective; this is true, for instance, with regard to the prohibition
of prior announcements, the blackout period, the holding of bonds until
maturity and the requirement to decide on an exit strategy. Moreover,
given that the CJEU refrained from conducting a more thorough review,
some of these “safeguards” cannot be comprehensibly assessed as to
whether they even constitute suitable means for ensuring the necessary
level of uncertainty on the part of Member States and market operators
in relation to the bond purchases, especially as their effectiveness
depends on the willingness of the ECB Governing Council to actually make
use of these means during the implementation of the programme, which
can neither be legally enforced nor reviewed. The CJEU does not examine,
for any of the aforementioned “safeguards”, whether these have already
been put to use; nor does the CJEU look into the question if and to what
extent the failure to use certain options reinforces market
expectations that might actually lead to certainty on the part of market
operators.
Nonetheless, the determination
whether a programme like the PSPP manifestly circumvents the prohibition
in Art. 123(1) TFEU does not hinge on a single criterion; rather, it
requires an overall assessment and appraisal of the relevant
circumstances (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <412 416="" 417="" 87="" 99="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <222 223="" 227="" and="" nbsp="" para.=""> […]). This
was also confirmed by the statements made by the expert third parties
in the oral hearing. 222>412>
Based on the required overall
assessment, and despite the concerns set out above in relation to the
Judgment of the CJEU of 11 December 2018, a manifest circumvention of
Art. 123(1) TFEU is ultimately not ascertainable, which is mainly due to
the following reasons:
even though certain information
is published by the ECB [in advance] (see paras. 186 and 187, 200) no
specific information is provided in relation to individual ISIN;
the volume of the purchases is limited from the outset;
only aggregate information on the purchases carried out by the Eurosystem is published;
the purchase limit of 33% is observed;
purchases are carried out according to the capital key of the ECB;
bonds of public authorities may
only be purchased under the PSPP if the issuer has a minimum credit
quality assessment that provides access to the bond markets; and
purchases must be restricted or
discontinued, and purchased securities sold on the markets, if
continuing the intervention on the markets is no longer necessary to
achieve the inflation target.
The purchase limit of 33% and the
distribution of purchases according to the ECB’s capital key, in
particular, have so far prevented selective measures being taken under
the PSPP for the benefit of individual Member States (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 140 and 141; cf. already CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others ,
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 95) and the Eurosystem becoming the
majority creditor of one Member State. To this extent, these are the
crucial “safeguards” based on which it can be concluded that possible
circumventions of the prohibition in Art. 123(1) TFEU are not
sufficiently manifest for finding a violation.
e) The CJEU has declared
irrelevant the fact that Art. 3(5) of Decision (EU) 2015/774 allows
purchases of securities at a negative yield to maturity under the PSPP –
initially, this concerned government bonds with a yield at the deposit
facility rate of y -0.4% at that time; since 1 January 2017, purchases
at an even lower yield to maturity are possible; similarly, the CJEU
regards collective action clauses (CAC) as irrelevant in this context.
Both conclusions are comprehensible (on securities with a negative
yield, see aa below; on collective action clauses, see bb below).
aa) In its reasoning, the CJEU
submits that the open market operations [that may permissibly be carried
out by the Eurosystem] are not limited to bonds with a minimum yield,
although the issue of such bonds is advantageous in financial terms for
the Member States concerned, as they can thus realise net profits –
which in this scenario are financed by the Eurosystem. The CJEU points
out that those bonds can be purchased only on the secondary markets and
the programme does not therefore give rise to the grant of overdraft
facilities or any other type of credit facility in favour of public
authorities and bodies of the Member States, or to the direct purchase
from them of their debt instruments. In addition, the CJEU contends that
easing the yield criteria is more likely to reduce the certainty of
operators on that point by broadening the range of bonds eligible for
purchase under the PSPP. The CJEU states, lastly, that the purchase of
bonds at a negative yield cannot be considered to reduce the impetus of
the Member States to follow a sound budgetary policy given that such
bonds can be issued only by Member States whose financial situation is
assessed positively by operators in the sovereign debt markets (cf.
CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 153 et seq .).
Assuming that the formation of
market prices remains possible under the PSPP, the profits realised by
Member States through bonds issued at a negative yield result, in
economic terms, from the behaviour of the initial purchasers on the
primary markets. It has not been proven whether this is actually the
case. But neither did the oral hearing prove the opposite.
bb) The fact that the Eurosystem
does not demand privileged creditor status in the context of purchases
under the PSPP (cf. Recital 8 of Order 2015/774) does not
give rise to a manifest violation of Art. 123(1) TFEU either. In its OMT
Judgment, the Second Senate already concurred with the view of the CJEU
that the risk of a debt cut does not necessarily render such purchases
incompatible with the prohibition of monetary financing provided that
the purchases are limited to bonds of Member States that have access to
the bond markets (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <228 204="" para.="">; CJEU,
Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 126). These considerations apply accordingly to the PSPP. 228>
4. The scheme for the allocation
of risk between the national central banks provided for in Art. 6(3) of
Decision 2015/774 and its subsequent amendments does not enable a
redistribution of sovereign debt between the Member States of the euro
area (see a below) and thus does not affect the overall budgetary
responsibility of the German Bundestag (see b below).
a) The CJEU found the fifth question inadmissible on the grounds that it is clearly hypothetical in nature (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 166). In this regard, the CJEU points out that the ECB decisions
at issue do not entail the sharing of the entirety of losses incurred by
the national central banks during implementation of the PSPP; rather,
the PSPP provides only for the sharing of losses generated by securities
issued by international issuers. The CJEU submits that the potential
volume of those losses is circumscribed by Art. 6(1) of Decision (EU)
2015/774, which limits the proportion of those securities to 10% of the
book value of purchases under the PSPP, and that the losses that may be
shared, should the case arise, between the national central banks cannot
be the direct consequence of the default of a Member State (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 162 et seq .).
The CJEU also found that in order to prevent the position of a central
bank of one Member State from being weakened in the event of an issuer
in another Member State failing to make a repayment, Art. 6(3) of
Decision 2015/774 provides that each national central bank is to
purchase only eligible securities of issuers of its own jurisdiction
(cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 96). According to the CJEU, this ensures that the PSPP does not
enable a Member State to avoid the consequences, so far as financing of
its public deficit is concerned, of any deterioration in its budgetary
position (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , para. 140).
Moreover, the CJEU notes that
primary law includes no rules providing for the losses sustained by one
of the national central banks in the course of open market operations to
be shared between those central banks. The CJEU emphasises that the
Treaties do not confer the competences necessary in this regard under
Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(2) TEU (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 162) so that, under EU law, adopting any such rule would require a
treaty amendment in accordance with Art. 48 TEU, whereas such a rule
could not be adopted through acts of secondary or tertiary law,
including decisions by the ECB. Against this backdrop, the finding of
the CJEU declaring the fifth question inadmissible has specific
consequences in terms of substantive law: it rules out any future acts
of secondary or tertiary law creating such a loss-sharing regime given
that, on the basis of the current European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ),
the CJEU regards the creation of such a rule of EU law as hypothetical
on the grounds that it is not only uncertain in factual terms but also
legally impossible. If the ECB were authorised to adopt such a
loss-sharing regime on the basis of the current Treaties, the fifth
question would not have been hypothetical at the time the CJEU rendered
its decision. In the balance sheets of national central banks, the value
of bonds purchased under the PSPP accounted for more than EUR 2
trillion, which would by far have exceeded the amount of existing
reserves at least in the event of a large Member State defaulting. At
the time the question was referred for a preliminary ruling, there was
reason to believe, in terms of a real possibility, that the ECB were
indeed free in deciding on the modalities of risk sharing given that a
different risk-sharing regime had been applied in the past, for instance
in the case of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) (cf. BVerfGE 146,
216 <293 nbsp="" para.=""> with references to Bundesbank , Annual Report 2010, p. 175). 293>
Moreover, it follows from the
CJEU’s replies to the first four questions referred that retroactive
changes to the risk-sharing regime are prohibited. A regime providing
for full risk-sharing would enable individual Member States to avoid the
consequences of any deterioration in its budgetary position (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. ,
para. 140) and retroactively compromise the “safeguards” built into the
PSPP for the purposes of preventing a circumvention of Art. 123(1)
TFEU. It follows from the observations of the CJEU, in the sense of an acte éclairé ,
that the risk-sharing regime is a determinant factor in assessing the
proportionality of the PSPP, which precludes any ‘retroactive’ changes
in this regard.
Moreover – with the exception of
the indemnifications provided for in Art. 32.4 ESCB Statute – any
redistribution of losses resulting from open market operations carried
out by the national central banks under the PSPP would violate the EU
principle of national budget autonomy enshrined in Arts. 123 and 125
TFEU, as one of the constitutive principle of the monetary union (cf.
BVerfGE 129, 124 <181 182="" and="" nbsp="">; 132, 195 <248 nbsp="" para.="">;
134, 366 <393 nbsp="" para.="">; 135, 317 <407 nbsp="" para.="">). The
Treaties do not allow a redistribution among national budgets (cf.
BVerfG 134, 366 <393 nbsp="" para.=""> […]), despite the fact that the ‘no
bail-out clause’ in Art. 125 TFEU does not prohibit all forms of
financial assistance (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle ,
C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 136). Rather, the Treaties ensure that
the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they
enter into debt (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle ,
C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 135). Full sharing of possible losses
would be manifestly incompatible with Art. 32.4 ESCB Statute and amount
to direct monetary financing of state budgets. According to Art. 1(1)
lit. b of Regulation (EC) 3603/93, the term ‘other type of credit
facility’ within the meaning of Art. 123 TFEU means, in particular, “any
financing of the public sector's obligations vis-à-vis third parties”.
If national central banks of other Member States assumed actual (or
impending) losses incurred by one national central bank through the
purchasing of bonds under the PSPP, they would essentially finance the
securitised obligations vis-à-vis the national central bank holding the
relevant debt security. According to the case-law of the CJEU, such
retroactive granting of financial assistance to a Member State clearly
does not fall within monetary policy (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 27 November
2012, Pringle , C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 57). 393>407>393>248>181>
b) In light of the volume of bond
purchases under the PSPP, which amounts to more than EUR 2 trillion,
such a risk-sharing regime, at least if it were subject to (retroactive)
changes, would affect the limits set by the overall budgetary
responsibility of the German Bundestag ,
as recognised by the Second Senate in its case-law (cf. BVerfGE 129,
124 <179>; 132, 195 <240 nbsp="" para.="">; 135, 317 <401 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <231 nbsp="" para.="">), and be incompatible with
Art. 79(3) GG. As this could possibly entail a recapitalisation of the Bundesbank
(cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <232 217="" 233="" and="" para.="">; 146, 216 <291 nbsp="" para.="">), it would essentially amount to an assumption of
liability for decisions taken by third parties with potentially
unforeseeable consequences, which is impermissible under the Basic Law
(cf. BVerfGE 129, 124 <179 em="" nbsp="">et seq 179>291>232>231>401>240>179>
However, in its current design,
the PSPP does not provide for such a risk-sharing regime in relation to
bonds of the Member States purchased by the national central banks.
According to the information provided by the ECB in the present
proceedings, the adoption of such a risk-sharing regime is not intended,
and would in any case be prohibited under primary law, as set out
above. Against this backdrop, it can be ruled out that the PSPP affects
the constitutional identity of the Basic Law (Art. 23(1) in conjunction
with Art. 79(3) in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) GG) in general
and the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag in particular.
5. Based on their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) (see a below), constitutional organs have a duty to take active steps against the PSPP given that it constitutes an ultra vires act (see b below).
a) The responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung )
requires the constitutional organs to protect and promote the right to
democracy enshrined in Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with
Art. 20(2) first sentence GG (see para. 115).
In the event of a manifest and
structurally significant exceeding of competences by institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, the constitutional
organs must use the means at their disposal to actively take steps
seeking to ensure adherence to the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm )
and respect for its limits. If it is either not possible or not wanted
to transfer sovereign powers [for the purposes of rectifying the lack of
EU competences], the constitutional organs are – within the scope of
their competences – required to use legal or political means to work
towards the rescission of acts that are not covered by the EU
integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm) ,
and – as long as these acts continue to have effect – to take suitable
action to limit the domestic impact of such acts to the greatest extent
possible (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <395 396="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">). To this
end, they must take suitable action to ensure adherence to the European
integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm )
(cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <353 364="" 365="" 389="" 390="" 391="" 392="" 413="" 414="" 419="" 420="" and="">; 134, 366 <395 396="" 397="" 49="" 53="" and="" para.="">). In certain legal and factual circumstances, the
responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) may indeed give rise to a specific obligation to act. 395>353>395>
b) As the PSPP constitutes an ultra vires
act, given the ECB’s failure to substantiate that the programme is
proportionate, their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) requires the Federal Government and the Bundestag
to take steps seeking to ensure that the ECB conducts a proportionality
assessment in relation to the PSPP. This duty does not conflict with
the independence afforded both the ECB and the Bundesbank (Art. 130, Art. 282 TFEU, Art. 88(2) GG), as was already decided by the Second Senate. The Federal Government and the Bundestag
must clearly communicate their legal view to the ECB or take other
steps to ensure that conformity with the Treaties is restored.
This applies accordingly with
regard to the reinvestments under the PSPP that began on 1 January 2019
and the restart of the programme as of 1 November 2019 (cf. Decision of
the ECB Governing Council of 12 September 2019). In this respect, the
competent constitutional organs also have a duty to continue monitoring
the decisions of the Eurosystem on the purchases of government bonds
under the PSPP and use the means at their disposal to ensure that the
ESCB stays within its mandate.
6. To the extent that the Federal
Constitutional Court finds an act of institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the European Union to exceed the limits set by the European
integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) in conjunction with Art. 23(1) second sentence and Art. 20(2) first sentence GG, this ultra vires act does not partake in the precedence of application of EU law (Anwendungsvorrang ). As a result, the ultra vires
act is not to be applied in Germany, and has no binding effect in
relation to German constitutional organs, administrative authorities and
courts. These organs, courts and authorities may participate neither in
the development nor in the implementation, execution or
operationalisation of ultra vires acts (cf. § 31(1) BVerfGG; BVerfGE 89, 155 <188>; 126, 286 <302 em="">et seq 302>188>
Following a transitional period of no more than three months allowing for the necessary coordination with the ESCB, the Bundesbank
may thus no longer participate in the implementation and execution of
Decision (EU) 2015/774, the amending Decisions (EU) 2015/2101, (EU)
2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100, and the Decision of 12
September 2019, neither by carrying out any further purchases of bonds
nor by contributing to another increase of the monthly purchase volume,
unless the ECB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demonstrates
in a comprehensible and substantiated manner that the monetary policy
objectives pursued by the ECB are not disproportionate to the economic
and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme. On the same
condition, the Bundesbank
must ensure that the bonds already purchased under the PSPP and held in
its portfolio are sold based on a – possibly long-term – strategy
coordinated with the ESCB.
D.
[...]
E.
This decision was taken with 7:1 votes.
Voßkuhle | Huber | Hermanns | |||||||||
Müller | Kessal-Wulf | König | |||||||||
Maidowski | Langenfeld |
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