martedì 5 maggio 2020

German court criticises ECB crisis bond-buying

Judgment of 05 May 2020 - 2 BvR 859/15
Source:  https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html
to the Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020
.>):
.>; Federal Constitutional Court , Order of 30 October 2019 - 2 BvR 980/16 -, para. 8 et seq .).
>). By limiting their applications to measures under the PSPP, the complainants in proceedings I to III responded to the order of referral of the Second Senate of 18 July 2017 pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU (cf. BVerfGE 146, 216), which solely concerned that specific sub-programme.
.>; 134, 366 <382 nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <180 99="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 101) or trigger obligations, deriving from the responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) and incumbent upon German constitutional organs, to take or refrain from certain actions (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <394 em="">et seq . para. 44 et seq .>; 135, 317 <393 146="" 394="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <180 99="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 101). Thus, it is only admissible to challenge acts of secondary or tertiary EU law by means of a constitutional complaint for the purposes of asserting that German constitutional organs violated their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) either by implementing such acts or, subsequently, by failing to actively take steps to ensure that conformity with the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) is (re-)established (BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, paras. 102 and 103). In relation to such acts, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether they remain within the ambit of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) and observe the limits otherwise imposed by the Basic Law in respect of Germany’s membership in the European Union (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <354>; 126, 286 <298 em="">et seq .>; 134, 366 <394 44="" em="" para.="">et seq .>; 140, 317 <334 em="">et seq . para. 36 et seq .>; 142, 123 <180 100="" 99="" and="" paras.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 101).
., 389 et seq ., 413 et seq .>; 126, 286 <306 307="" and="">; 129, 124 <181>; 132, 195 <238 110="" 239="" 241="" 270="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 134, 366 <394 395="" 47="" and="" para.="">; 135, 317 <392 141="" 160="" 165="" 224="" 393="" 399="" 402="" 424="" 425="" and="" para.="">; 142, 123 <174 111="" 130="" 175="" 184="" 191="" 192="" 207="" 83="" and="" em="" para.="" paras.="">et seq . para. 163 et seq .>; 146, 216 <250 47="" para.="">).
., 435>; 129, 124 <180 181="" and="" nbsp="">; 135, 317 <399 em="">et seq . para. 159 et seq .>; 142, 123 <208 164="" para.="">). In this regard, constitutional organs have a lasting responsibility for ensuring that institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the European Union adhere to the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <352 em="">et seq ., 389 et seq ., 413 et seq .>; 126, 286 <307>; 129, 124 <181>; 132, 195 <238 105="" 239="" and="" para.="">; 134, 366 <394 395="" 47="" and="" para.="">; 142, 123 <208 nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 141). This responsibility corresponds to a right afforded citizens as the electorate vis-à-vis the constitutional organs, enshrined in Art. 38(1) first sentence GG, which compels the constitutional organs to ensure that the restriction of their right to democratic self-determination resulting from the execution of the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) does not go beyond what is justified by the permissible transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union (cf. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 142).
.>; 121, 135 <156 em="" nbsp="">et seq .>; 131, 152 <195 em="">et seq .>; 140, 160 <187 em="">et seq . para. 67 et seq .>; 142, 123 <209 nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 143). In the event of a manifest and structurally significant exceeding of competences by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, these constitutional organs must, in the exercise of their powers, actively take steps to ensure conformity with the integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm ) and respect for its limits (cf. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 142). This duty may also extend to the Bundesrat (cf. Art. 23(4) to (6) as well as the Act on the Cooperation of the Federation and the Länder in European Union Matters) or the Federal President.
. para. 170 et seq .>; BVerfG, Judgment of the 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 149).
.>; 134, 366 <382 em="" nbsp="">et seq . para. 22 et seq .>; 142, 123 <198 em="">et seq . para. 143 et seq .>; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 140 et seq .). The Court may only hold that an act violates the principle of conferral where institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union have exceeded the limits of their competences in a manner that specifically runs counter to the principle of conferral (Art. 23(1) GG); in other words, it must be established that the violation of competences is sufficiently qualified. This requires that the act manifestly exceeds EU competences, resulting in a structurally significant shift in the division of competences to the detriment of the Member States. A structurally significant shift of competences to the detriment of the Member States results where the exceeding of competences has a considerable impact on the principle of conferral and on the extent to which respect for the legal order, as part of the rule of law, is upheld (cf. BVerfGE 126, 286 <304>). This is generally the case if the exercise of the competence in question by an institution, body, office, or agency of the European Union were to require a treaty amendment in accordance with Art. 48 TEU or an evolutionary clause (Evolutivklausel ) (cf. CJEU, Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, ECHR Accession , ECR 1996, I-1783 <1788 nbsp="" para.="">), requiring action on the part of the German legislature pursuant to either Art. 23(1) second sentence GG or the Act on the Bundestag ’s and the Bundesrat ’s Responsibility With Regard To European Integration (Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz ) (cf. BVerfGE 89, 155 <210>; 142, 123 <201 151="" 202="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 153).
.>; 142, 123 <201 150="" para.="">). In this respect, general principles apply accordingly in the context of an ultra vires review (cf. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 152). If the CJEU crosses the limit set out above, its actions are no longer covered by the mandate conferred in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU in conjunction with the domestic Act of Approval; at least in relation to Germany, its decision then lacks the minimum of democratic legitimation necessary under Art. 23(1) second sentence in conjunction with Article 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <201 149="" para.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 151).
>, para. 50 et seq .). Firstly, the CJEU refers to Recital 4 of Decision (EU) 2015/774, according to which the purpose of the PSPP is to contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term, and thus finds that the specific objective of the programme can be attached to the primary objective of the EU’s monetary policy (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 54, 57). Secondly, the CJEU submits that Decision (EU) 2015/774 relies on the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets as a means to achieve its objectives, and thus uses one of the monetary policy instruments for which primary law provides (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 68 and 69). In view of the foregoing, the CJEU concludes that, taking account of its objective and the means provided for achieving that objective, Decision (EU) 2015/774 falls within sphere of monetary policy within the meaning of Art. 127(1) TFEU, Art. 282(2) TFEU (cf. CJEU, loc. cit. , paras. 57, 70).
.>; 95, 173 <183>; 96, 10 <21>; 101, 331 <347>; 120, 274 <321 322="" and="">; 141, 220 <265 93="" para.="">). The French Conseil constitutionnel , too, assesses the proportionality of acts of public authority in these three steps [...], as do the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional [...] and the Swedish Högsta domstolen [...]. The Italian Corte Costituzionale takes a similar approach with the additional element of reasonableness, which entails a balancing of constitutional values [...] Similar approaches are reflected in the jurisdictions of Austria […], Poland [...], Hungary [...] or the United Kingdom [...].
.>).
., 211 and 212>; 134, 366 <399 400="" 59="" and="" para.="">; 142, 123 <219 em="">et seq . para. 187 et seq .>; 146, 216 <278 102="" 103="" and="" paras.="">; BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, paras. 134, 139, 211). It is incompatible with this restrictive interpretation, which is mandated under German constitutional law, to interpret the specific conferral of monetary policy competences in a manner that, in the context of asset purchases, regards the mere assertion of monetary policy objectives as sufficient while disregarding as irrelevant the economic and fiscal policy effects of the PSPP for both the delimitation of competences and the proportionality assessment, even where such effects are foreseeable, knowingly accepted or might actually be (tacitly) intended.
. para. 115 et seq .>).
. para. 81 et seq .> […]). In accordance with the above considerations (cf. para. 140 et seq .), this does not satisfy the requirements relating to effective judicial review of measures potentially circumventing the prohibition of monetary financing, and contradicts the approach applied by the CJEU in other areas of law (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 8 December 2011, Chalkor v Commission , C-386/10 P, ECR 2011, I-13085; Judgment of 6 November 2012, Otis , C-199/11, EU:C:2012:684, para. 59 et seq .).
.>). As was confirmed in the oral hearing, no objective reason is ascertainable as to why details on the blackout period cannot be disclosed ex post , especially since the ECB can simply modify its purchase strategy for the future so that information on past operations does not necessarily provide insights into future operations. The oral hearing furthermore confirmed that no negative effects on the government bond market would have to be expected in the event that information on the blackout period provided for in Art. 4(1) of Decision 2015/774 was disclosed ex post . According to the statements made in the oral hearing, market operators assume in practice that the blackout period lasts between five and 14 days and have adjusted their behaviour accordingly. For the formation of prices on the primary markets, the precise duration of the blackout period is in any case irrelevant.
. paras. 202, 206>; 146, 216 <266 274="" 78="" 96="" para.="">). It follows that the holding of purchased bonds until maturity without limitations in terms of duration or volume is at least an indication that such purchases amount to monetary financing that is impermissible under Art. 123(1) TFEU.
. paras. 97 and 98>). This would amount to a violation of the objective prohibition laid down in Art. 123(1) TFEU, regardless of whether or not market operators had certainty that specific bonds would be purchased by the Eurosystem.
. para. 82 et seq ., 269 et seq . para. 86 et seq .>; German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report 2017/2018, p. 167 ).
.>; 134, 366 <418 102="" para.="">; 146, 216 <291 129="" para.="">).
.>; 134, 366 <387 387="" and="" nbsp="" para.="">; 142, 123 <207 162="" para.="">). This generally also applies to the Bundesbank , all the more as it is called upon to advise the Federal Government in monetary policy matters pursuant to § 13(1) BBankG.
Voßkuhle Huber Hermanns
Müller Kessal-Wulf König
Maidowski Langenfeld

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