Extracted from: "Athenian Economy and Society - A Banking Perspective" by Edward E. Cohen, Princeton University Press, 1997
https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5125.html
The tale of Theophemos's violent efforts to execute on a judgment illustrates the complex interplay of tax burdens, creditor avoidance, bank deposits, and the invisible economy. Seeking to collect over 1,200 dr., Theophemos attacked a judgment-debtor's home. But instead of the ample personal property that he had anticipated, he was able to carry off only a small amount of furniture. The debtor explains that "through liturgies and capital-tax payments (eisphorai) and my liberality to the state, part of my property had been pledged as security for loans, and the rest had been sold." 76 (In other words, his wealth had been transferred from the visible to the invisible sphere, for protection from such onslaughts by creditors). In their frustration, the raiding party allegedly even maltreated the women of the house. But the debtor, protected by his bankers from taxation and creditors, was able to plead self-righteously: "Theophemos should have followed me to the bank to recover his judgment, instead of seizing property"; "my wife told them that the money was waiting for them at the bank." 77
But these assertions are made only much later: by this time, the assets might have been further transferred or transformed. Perhaps the statements actually reflect some aspect of the truth—since they are made in court in a suit charging Theophemos's associates with perjury! In any event, they reflect a story intended to be credible to the jurors: a claim that a person believed to be wealthy, overwhelmed by taxes and assailed by creditors, kept little tangible property but held large deposits "at the bank" (epi tëi trapezei). As a practical matter, invisible banking assets were not as accessible to third parties as this pleader suggests. Even the prominent Kallippos, proxenos of the Hèrakleotes, inquiring at a bank as to possible deposits belonging to a deceased Hërakleöte, was dismissed by a slave functionary with the derisive, "And what business is it of yours?" 78
Bankers also made loans in secrecy. A prominent example is the loan transaction in which the banker Hërakleidës supplied the bulk of the monies but did not appear as a named creditor (see above, pp. 155—57). Through the process of bank intermediation (dia tës trapezës), trapezai shielded the identity of depositors whose "invisible" assets funded maritime loans (see above, pp. 151—60).
In a lawsuit indirectly relating to bank assets, the bank owner Apollodoros alludes to the role of the Athenian trapeza as an intermediary in providing profitable investment opportunities for monies otherwise concealed by their owners (Dem. 45.64—66; see above, pp. 115—18). Through a number of banks, Demosthenes' ubiquitous father was able to invest in maritime loans and to obtain preferential returns without public disclosure (see above, pp. 121—29).
When silent payments were required to settle political disputes or to forestall prosecutions, bankers frequently provided the funds, anonymously. When a trapezitès merely approached a prominent leader who was planning a politically explosive prosecution, it was widely assumed— "Here we go again!" 79 —that money was being delivered to settle a claim in which the banker himself had no involvement. Hence the ridiculous position forced on Demosthenes, who had been insulted by Meidias during the festival of Dionysos, and was approached shortly thereafter by the banker Blepaios. In order to defuse expectations that Meidias was buying freedom from prosecution for his gross violation of Athenian propriety and law, Demosthenes felt it necessary, even amidst a crowd of spectators, to "let my cloak drop so that I was left almost nude in my tunic," thus showing by his half-nakedness that he was not accept-ing secret payments from the trapezites, 80 a testimonial to the general populace's association of bankers and clandestine arrangements.
Only occasionally, in exceptional circumstances, did the actual arrangements underlying this public perception became publicly known. In the most spectacular example, the sacred Opisthodomos, part of the Acropolis complex, was actually burned down by the Treasurers of Athena in a desperate effort to avoid disclosure of their secret bank deposits of public monies supposed to be lying in their trust untouched on the sacred hill. When the trapezai were unable to repay the deposits, the Treasurers resorted to arson in a vain attempt to keep their bank activity secret. The ensuing investigation revealed their wrongdoing, resulting in their imprisonment—and confirming the popular association of banking with the unseen economy. 81
Athens was threatened with serious diplomatic contretemps when Satyros, the king of Pontos, sought the return of funds which had been brought to Athens by the son of an important royal associate who had later fallen into disfavor (Isok. 17.3ff.). Because the enormous sums were all that had been salvaged from the family's wealth, the son was reluctant to hand over the funds. 82 But since Athens was highly dependent for food on imports from the Pontic kingdom, 83 the son's outright refusal to return the monies would have resulted in the Athenians' returning him to Pontos 84—as required by traditional notions of xenia and practical political considerations. 85 In the world of disclosed assets, no satisfactory resolution was available. But in the parallel economy of invisible assets, a Solomonic solution was provided by the son's banker: "Agree to do everything that the king has ordered; hand over the monies that are visible (phanera); but as to the funds on deposit at the bank, not only deny their existence, but even reveal (phainesthai) that you are in debt on yield-bearing obligations to the bank and others." 86 The son claims that he did so. After a reconciliation between his father and the king, the Pontian was now free to withdraw his deposits from the bank and return them to the "visible" world. 87 But when he seeks to recover these funds, the banker claims that the son's earlier assertions had been true: there were no net funds on deposit at the bank, only loans. 88
Although the actual facts underlying the parties' dispute cannot be determined - indeed, we can only speculate as to who prevailed in the litigation 89 - the case provides unique information about otherwise hidden business and trapezitic practices, and insight into the scale and functioning of banking in the unseen economy. Unlike similar situations where the parties' mutual interests and fears might have kept the dispute out of court and the transactions secret, this litigation could be safely and openly pursued through an Athenian tribunal, even though it exposes the "unseen" economy of Athens: the Bosporan plaintiff had sought to evade not Athenian taxes, but Bosporan claims, and his family's reconciliation with the ruler of the Pontic kingdom left him free to claim the funds without fear of the Bosporan authorities.
Thus we glimpse bank activity that would otherwise have remained unseen and undisclosed. The Bosporan's deposits were significant enough to secure loans of no less than seven talents (42,000 dr.; §44); he had exchanged gold bullion for currency having a value of about four talents (24,000 dr.). 90 These sums represented enormous purchasing power, many thousands of days of skilled labor. 91 Yet in argumentation based on proofs from "probability" and "plausibility," 92 as was usual in Athenian courts, there is no suggestion that these huge amounts were incredibly beyond the normal scope of trapezitic operations (although this argument would have significantly aided the banker's defense). To the contrary, we are told explicitly that Athenian bankers, because of their reputation for integrity, were able, in secrecy, to obtain and work with large amounts of currency. 93
This link at Athens between banking and the hidden economy was fostered by business procedures: the unique lack of witnesses for banking obligations, 94 and the special legal recognition accorded to banking records. 95 All other Athenian commercial transactions required witnesses, even for written obligations; 96 the simple written receipt was unknown. 97
These considerations evoked, in nonbanking transactions, strong dependence on third-party witnesses, and a correspondent lack of confidentiality. In contrast, funds delivered to a trapezitës were known only to the banker, or at most to the group of family members who helped in the operation of the trapeza (see above, pp. 70—82).
Indeed, the widespread use of bankers to effectuate and monitor business transactions seems an effort to obtain the advantages of bankers' commitment to secrecy. 98 Although bankers normally did maintain written records of their transactions, the verb aphanizein ("to erase") came to refer to banking transactions that were omitted even from the banks' internal records. 99
In foregoing written references to the deposit of funds, the trapezitai themselves ran no financial risk. To the contrary, in the event of dispute the banker could rely on his records—with their high evidentiary significance—to establish the absence of deposits, and thus to avoid a claim for return of funds. (The banker's defense in Isokrates 17 is based on this contention.) But loans engendered more complex considerations. To forestall later denials by debtors, lenders needed witnesses who could confirm that the requisite monies had actually been advanced to the borrowers. 100 This public procedure necessarily rendered visible (phaneron) funds that had been held as "invisible" assets. 101
Since borrowers would seek similar public knowledge of repayment, return of monies generally occurred before an assemblage of onlookers: the bank loan of 3,000 dr. in Demosthenes 33, for example, was repaid before a large crowd, which also witnessed the destruction of the relevant loan documentation. 102 This publicity provided prime motivation for the making of maritime loans "through the bank." For persons seeking to keep their assets unseen, direct loans were not feasible. But bankers used as intermediaries would keep assets "invisible."
Identification of a banker as "the lender" revealed nothing as to the true source of funds. Because of the bankers' intermingling of trapezitic funds with depositors' money, even the limited use of depositors' money could not be assumed by spectators observing the disbursement or repayment of bankers' loans.
Where trapezitai held documents, the public would know nothing about the actual source of funds—especially since the loan documents were destroyed at the time of the repayment. Where individuals did make loans with their own funds and in their own names, 103 the public acknowledgment inherent in such financings could be followed by the return of the repaid funds to the invisible (aphanes) sphere — by deposit with a banker ! 104
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