mercoledì 29 luglio 2015

James Robertson Newsletter No. 51 - July 2015

Newsletter No. 51 - July 2015

 http://www.jamesrobertson.com/newsletter.htm

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
The need for radical change in the ways of human life - the ways we treat one another and the planet on which we depend - is becoming increasingly evident to forward-looking people and organisations. It is very urgent. But most of our leaders worldwide are ignoring it.
One illustration of this has been how our recent UK general election was conducted and how it has resulted.
Another is the hopeless, wasteful way the Eurozone has been dealing with the financial situation in Greece - an example of the thoughtlessness with which our world leaders organise the world's money system in their own interest.
Those events illustrate the injustice and destructiveness with which rich and powerful people and countries cheat the poorer and weaker majority.
We need to deal with this. But how?

1. CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN CIVILISATION
(1) 'Dear Humanity, We Have a Systems Problem': New project aims to promote deep solutions, radical transformation. 'It's time to talk about alternatives', says a team of thinkers behind the Next System Project. See www.commondreams.org/news/2015/04/02/dear-humanity-we-have-systems-problem-new-project-aims-promote-deep-solutions.
 
(2) "Humans are creating a sixth great extinction of animal species", say scientists. “Rapid, greatly intensified efforts” will be needed to stop or slow the extinctions currently underway. By losing species, humanity is losing what enables us to have a good standard of living ourselves. See www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/19/humans-creating-sixth-great-extinction-of-animal-species-say-scientists.
 
(3) Pope Francis's new encyclical on 18 June 2015 is "the first ever dedicated to ecological and planetary problems caused by human activities". He addresses both the degradation of the environment and the challenge of climate change along with how this is impacting the poor and most vulnerable. Thus, social and economic justice is an important theme.
 
(4) "Most climate action has little to do with the UN process". Regardless of whether a UN agreement is reached, clean technologies could continue to transform markets and disrupt traditional business models remarkably quickly. See www.greenallianceblog.org.uk/2015/07/03/most-climate-action-has-little-to-do-with-the-un-process.
Moreover, while scientists and politicians argue fruitlessly about the reality of climate change, they fail to appreciate that the measures advocated to alleviate it are undeniably beneficial in their own right. Those measures should be put undertaken for that reason, and if they also diminish climate change that would be a bonus. See www.britain2020.wordpress.com/2015/07/10/the-government-should-heed-the-latest-scientific-findings-on-climate-change.
(5) "We need to save ourselves from fire". In Walt Patterson's latest book, Electricity vs fire: the fight for our future, he asks simple questions such as: "can electricity save us from fire?" and "Would you be surprised to be told that using too much fire is heating up the planet?"; and he tells us that the crucial innovation we need is a new mindset, a new story, a new way to think about what we do and how we do it.

2. COMMENTS ON THE RECENT UK GENERAL ELECTION
Virtually no attention was given to the challenges facing humanity in the manifestoes of the two major parties, Labour and Conservative. Some of the smaller ones, including the Green Party, were rather more enlightened.
The unexpected result of the election was an outright victory to the Conservatives (Tories). They owed it largely to to the fact that, mostly at the expense of the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won 56 seats in the UK Parliament instead of their previous 6 seats.
The Labour Party is now in some danger of collapse. The possibility of Jeremy Corbyn as its new party leader has put it in a spin. His vision is of a more productive and fairer economy for all - see www.politicalcleanup.wordpress.com/2015/07/23/jeremy-corbyn-cuts-are-not-the-way-to-prosperity-invest-in-the-economy.
That may not seem unreasonable. But I have felt for some time that the Labour Party's concept of work is out of date. It is based on most of the population being compelled to work for a minority of more privileged people who don't have the majority's interests at heart. That concept of work ignores the idea that free people should not be compelled to work for others, but should work at what they see as valuable and take personal reponsibility for it. For more, see my book Future Work (1985) - www.jamesrobertson.com/books.htm#futurework.
The unexpected freedom of action of the Tories in government for the next five years may encourage them to take up policies that confirm their reputation as the party of the rich.
I am not myself a Tory supporter. But I was interested and pleased recently to receive the text of what could be A Tory Manifesto for the economy?. It would make common sense for the next election. 
James Bruges - www.neweranetwork.info/networkers/james-bruges - wrote it and sent it to me. I naturally support what it says. It is well worth reading at www.jamesrobertson.com/a_tory_manifesto.pdf.

3. COMMENTS ON GREECE
(1) Money
The government of Greece is unable to raise the money it needs to meet its current costs and also to pay off its debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank. Its negotiations with those creditors have continued for many months of damaging "austerity" for the people of Greece. That situation continues - with one costly meeting after another of highly paid officials and bankers!
and
and
and
My view is that Greece should drop out of the eurozone. It should stop using the euro and restore the drachma as its currency. The new money supply should be created and put into circulation, not by bankers to interest-paying borrowers as is still the worldwide practice but debt-free by a public agency on behalf of the people as proposed by Positive Money - see www.positivemoney.org/our-proposals.
For an interesting comment from Ronnie Morrison, see www.bellacaledonia.org.uk/2015/06/29/greek-myths.
 
(2) The Greening of Greece
"Greece's economic woes will never be solved by merely moving money around the banking system. The lasting solution is to restore native forests to her barren hills and mountains, invest in large-scale solar power to energise Europe, and create an exemplar of sustainable development for our global future."
Oliver Tickell writes in The Ecologist about a sustainable alternative - "creating a European powerhouse of renewable energy, a land of milk, honey, trees, rivers and deep soils, and an exemplar of low-carbon, climate friendly development for all to follow."

4. SOME POINTERS TO THE FUTURE
(1) The Co-operative Advantage. This new multi-authored book edited by Ed Mayo outlines 50 co-operative innovations to boost the British economy. "In an innovation economy, where knowledge is the new currency, businesses must co-operate to compete. We call this the co-operative advantage". An important book.
 
(2) Local Economies Are Developing. Totnes is giving a lead to other localities in bringing entrepreneurs, investors, and other change makers together to learn from each other, form new relationships, and hopefully, to begin working together on new enterprises.
 
(3) Cuba's Sustainable Agricultural Revolution. See the recent report by the Schumacher Center for Economics in the USA at www.forhumanliberation.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/1785-cubas-sustainable-agricultural.html.
A few years ago Alison and I visited Cuba and were similarly impressed with what we saw of the Cuban agricultural system: “beautiful, healthy fruits and vegetables being grown on urban, suburban, and rural farms without petroleum inputs". 
 
(4) Keeping Fossil Fuel in the Ground. "Keep the oil in the soil, keep the coal in the hole".
 
(5) The power of public investment. This should create jobs for the thousands of unemployed across our continent while simultaneously enabling the investment in green infrastructure that is long overdue.
 
(6) A Universal, Unconditional Income. This would solve problems facing the UK's benefits system, tackle poverty, and improve social cohesion and economic efficiency.
and
 
(7) The Great Acceleration: "What should the UK do to protect Natural Systems".


5. SOME FAULTS TO DEAL WITH
(1) This section begins with an important new series of books by Fred Harrison. They are titled: As Evil Does: Handbook on Humanity 1 - Anatomy of a Killing Cult; and the second Handbook will be on Autopsy of Civilisation: The Great Depletion, and the third will be on Ascent of the Sublime: Divine Right.
As Evil Does is published by Geophilos at £12. More details here - www.amazon.co.uk/As-Evil-Does-Handbook-Humanity/dp/0993339808.
I have only just received my copy so I have not had time to read it fully yet. But I do warmly recommend Fred's call for a broad national debate as a therapeutic process that liberates our minds. From that should emerge a consensus leading to "the democratisation of the public's finances, which is nothing less than the restoration of our humanity".

(2) American democracy no longer exists. Instead, America's political system has transformed into an oligarchy, with the wealthy elite steering the direction of the country, regardless of the will of the majority of voters. See www.nationofchange.org/2015/04/08/how-america-became-an-oligarchy.
“As American Independence Day was celebrated earlier this month many will have wryly reflected that the country freed itself from one master only to embrace a far more formidable one – the multinational corporate sector, aka “a grubby cabal of privateers”. See www.politicalcleanup.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/can-corporate-ruled-america-really-be-described-as-independent-and-truly-successful.

(3) In the UK "building a decent infrastructure is serious, unglamorous work with little political dividend, so our system is hopeless at long-term planning . . .".

(4) "Let's not fool ourselves. We may not bribe, but corruption is rife in Britain". See www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/ mar/18/corruption-rife-britain.

(5) "Predatory capitalism eats away at society as people lose faith in any sense of justice, fairness and democracy". See www.politicalcleanup.wordpress.com/2015/03/18/professor-sikka-politicians-seek-to-serve-corporations-rather-than-ensuring-that-corporations-serve-the-people.

(6) Seeing the people who make most money as the creators of that wealth is wrong. "Wealth creation in the real economy is a much more collaborative activity than we are led to believe, and depends to a great extent on publicly funded services. ... This could be something to bear in mind the next time a politician talks about ‘wealth creators'". See www.ekklesia.co.uk/nod of thee/21697.


6. AN IMPORTANT ANNUAL EVENT
10-13 September, Chicago. American Monetary Institute, 2015 Conference. Details at www.monetary.org/2015-ami-monetary-reform-conference.
 
James Robertson
29 July 2015

lunedì 27 luglio 2015

Bank Robbery: Economists and the Banking System

Home » Blog » 2015 » July » 10 » Bank Robbery: Econo… Screenshot 2015-07-10 14.06.03 Chapter 4 (Read the Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)
http://positivemoney.org/2015/07/bank-robbery-economists-banking-system-medieval-times-adam-smith/

1. From Medieval times to Adam Smith

Over the years, many economists have noticed how bank-created money skews the economy, affecting distribution of power and wealth across time and influencing what gets manufactured, built, destroyed. Their observations – and often the economists too – have gone in and often out again of what is ‘generally recognised and known’. This chapter and the next will offer brief glimpses of how economists have noticed the following facts – and how some have suggested reforms, so that money might be created more equitably:
1. Bankers create more in ‘credit’ than they have in ‘cash’;
2. ‘Credit’ becomes money when it circulates in making payments;
3. When credit replaces cash, interest payments on the credit are effectively a ‘tax raised by the powerful on the productive’;
4. Large credit allocations by banks increase the powers of government and concentrations of capital (i.e. money intended for investment and speculation as opposed to spending).
5. Bank-credit feeds war, predatory nationalism and national debt.
6. Bank-credit allocates power in a way destructive to the human and natural world: to the environment, freedom, equality, and to other conditions that make human happiness a widespread possibility.
For roughly two thousand years, from the days of Aristotle to the end of the Middle Ages, economists (such as they existed) were not scientists: first and foremost, they were moral philosophers. During the Middle Ages they were employed by the Christian Church, which held a great deal of worldly power. Sword-wielding bishops went into battle, Popes led armies, papal territories grew and shrank: but mostly (and more to the point) the Church’s authority relied on its assertion of a moral order. The Church was made up of human beings so of course it was open to the normal corruptions of greed, hypocrisy, ambition etcetera, and in many respects its moral precepts differ from those we would live by today. The authority of its pronouncements were backed up by a system of Church Law capable of meting out punishment, and also by the threat of damnation – which for many was a serious consideration.
In one of the great ironies of history, economists of the Christian Church (the ‘Scholastics’) ignored Christ’s recommendation (in the Parable of the Talents) that money SHOULD be lent at interest: in keeping with more ancient Greek and Jewish traditions, they maintained that taking interest (‘usury’) was sinful. Princes, merchants, moneylenders and bankers found ways around these laws. Princes ignored them. For investors, there were exemptions if the lender was to suffer loss of some sort. As for bankers, they used falsified exchanged rates and currency transactions to confuse the authorities.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing the differences between moneylending and banking. Moneylending is the straightforward lending of money already in existence. Banking creates new money, as claims on money owned by the banker (nowadays we call these claims ‘credit’ although that word has actually a much wider meaning – as will be explained later). In medieval times, moneylending was allowed by Christian authorities to Jews under the authority of monarchs (who would then habitually rob moneylenders of their accumulated wealth). Banking, on the other hand, grew out of a practice (the Exchanges) which was forbidden to Jews. It was ring-fenced not just by social and racial prejudice, but also by the compulsory taking of Christian oaths. The historical remnants of this separation linger today in the different kinds of institution that call themselves ‘bank’. Commercial banks (along with their governments) create money in a legally privileged and protected procedure; ‘merchant banks’ lend it. The name ‘merchant bank’ is itself a misnomer, assumed by merchant moneylenders when the word ‘bank’ came to sound more respectable than the word ‘moneylender’. All of which means that, looking at the present for a moment, extremist agitators are being historically and conceptually illiterate (along with whatever else) when they blame the systemic robbery of banking on ‘the Jews’.
Preoccupied with their job of suppressing usury – the taking of interest – among Christians, Scholastic economists ‘paid scant attention to the operation of the economic system’ (de Roover). In other words, they did not fully analyse the process of credit creation. Late Spanish Scholastics came closest to identifying what was going on. Luis de Molina, (Tratado sobre los cambios, 1597) recognised that bank-credit was in practice a way of making payment (and therefore a form of money): ‘Though many transactions are conducted in cash, most are carried out using documents which attest either that the bank owes money to someone or that someone agrees to pay, and the money stays in the bank.’[1]This comes close to the simple truth stated publicly by the Venetian banker and Senator Tommaso Contarini in 1584, that a banker may create means of payment (money) “by merely writing two lines in his books”. Many economists today are in denial of this simple, long-established truth, and insist that bankers are merely intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
As medieval society diversified during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from a society composed of ‘those who work, those who fight and those who pray’ to a more complex world centred on enterprise, trade and capital, so people outside the Church began writing on economics: humanist philosophers, public administrators, merchants and financiers. These people, living in the practical worlds of administration and business, were bound to notice that banks were creating lot of credit on rather few assets.
Those practical economists are today known as ‘Mercantilists’. Mercantilists disagreed with each other about most things, including the desirability of banking, but they were agreed on one thing: a State should maintain a healthy balance of trade in order to accumulate money for emergencies such as wars, and also to avoid running out of circulating coin. In an age when cash was gold-and-silver, bad decisions by rulers could result in a kingdom being drained of coin. When there was a shortage of coin, people had to resort to barter, improvised local currencies – and to various forms of credit.
Money-creation by banks was a familiar fact. A sentence written in the 1560’s (perhaps by Elizabeth I’s diplomat-financier Sir Thomas Gresham) that bankers ‘do greate feates having credit and yet be nothing worth’ was repeated almost word-for-word by the businessman Malynes in 1622: bankers ‘do great feats having credit and yet be nought worth’. Malynes went on to notice bank-credit rested on very little money. ‘What is this credit? – or, what are the payments of the Banks, but almost or rather altogether imaginative or figurative?’ He went on to explain in detail how payments are made in-bank, by debiting and crediting from one account to another without involving the transfer of hard cash, and how bankers quickly amass vast fortunes from this practice: ‘without that any money is touched, but remaineth in the bankers hands, which within a short time after the erection of the Bank cometh to amount unto many millions.’
Malynes called banking the ‘Canker (cancer) of England’s Commonwealth’. He listed some of the bad results of bank-created credit: it fuels wars, it raises prices, allows bankers to engrosse (amass) commodities and trade for their own benefit and to manipulate the exchanges for their profit. A pro-banking opponent, Thomas Mun, replied (in another pamphlet) that Malynes’ objections were mostly ‘all one matter in divers [different] forms’ and that every idiot knew them (‘such froth also, that every Idiot knows them’). Since anyone with good credit can borrow and do the same, Mun went on, why pick on bankers? We see here the beginning of an argument that might be had today – if the facts of banking were publicly and openly acknowledged.
The Mercantilists were publishing their pamphlets around the time of the birth of modern banking in seventeenth century England. It was a time of wars: a Civil War at home, and wars with the Dutch abroad. For a while (1649-60) England dispensed with kings and queens altogether and found itself under a military dictator, Oliver Cromwell. Parliament sent a deputation imploring him to take the Kingship because at least people knew the limits of a King’s power: no one knew the limits of Cromwell’s. Another ‘humble offering’ put to Cromwell was a proposal by one ‘Samuel Lamb, merchant’ to set up a national bank. Cromwell’s response is not known, but the proposal survives. A national bank, Lamb said, was desirable for the same characteristics that foreign banks were undesirable: to be able to monopolise and sell at a profit, to create credit out of nothing, instead of having to pay for it; to finance war by means of ‘imaginary money’; even, in what seems a very modern touch, to use bank-credit to purchase natural resources abroad to ‘save our own timber here until a time of need’. Fast-forward a few hundred years and we see Japan still heavily-forested, having stripped many Pacific Islands of their trees.
So banks, like weapons systems, were needed to counter foreign banks: along with armies and navies, bank-credit was a weapon of predation. For national self-defence, ‘what the neighbours have, we must have too’. With the Mercantilists, the economics of nationalism were born, and they are with us still. Later (1816) Thomas Jefferson would describe banks as ‘more dangerous than standing armies’. None of these observers would be surprised to see, today, the peoples of Mediterranean countries brought to their knees by predatory credit.
Before leaving the mercantilists, it’s worth mentioning an insight of Josiah Child (1630-99). He chose to ignore the credit-creation aspect of banking, but nevertheless warned of the destructive power of foreign lending. It is sometimes forgotten how much wisdom was taken by Christians from their Old Testament, the Jewish Bible. This observation of Child’s rings true today and is worth quoting: ‘the Wisdom of God Almighty did prohibit the Jews from lending upon Use one to another, but allowed them to lend to Strangers for the Enriching of their own (i.e. the Jewish) Nation and Improvement of their own Territory, and for the Impoverishing of others, those to whom they were permitted to lend, being such only whom they were commanded to destroy or at least to keep Poor and Miserable, as the Gibeonites, etc., Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water.’ Rich nations are today finding predatory credit as effective as war used to be, in the struggle to dominate and exploit.
The next character in economic history is an almost cartoon-style foretaste of modern power. Sir William Petty is known as the founder of modern statistical economics. Petty was a man of immense energy and imagination, obsessed with mathematical calculations and schemes for the general improvement of humanity, and he made an enormous fortune out of what was perhaps the first modern genocide. By Petty’s own calculation, 504,000 people, more than a third of the people of Ireland, ‘perished and were wasted by sword, plague, famine, hardship and banishment, between the 23rd of October 1641, and the same day 1652’ – that is, during Cromwell’s war of attrition and depredation in Ireland.[2] Petty was on the spot: his job was surveying and allocating the newly-emptied lands to Cromwell’s soldiers and ‘adventurers’ – people who had invested in the ‘war’ to make a profit. Many of these people sold their plots on cheap to Petty, not wanting to settle in a land far from home where the few remaining natives hated them.[3]
With Petty, we emerge from economics as a branch of moral philosophy into the economics of the modern world: control (and seizure) of resources, maximised productivity and social engineering. Petty, at the very outset of this development, expressed himself in an unusually direct manner. The labouring class, being ‘licentious only to eat, or rather to drink,’ should be restricted in what they could consume. Surplus goods should be put in storehouses rather than wasted in over-feeding the ‘vile and brutish part of mankind… and so indisposing them to their usual labour.’[4] Independence and freedom were for the higher orders; social management for the rest.
‘Supernumeraries’ – that is, humans not needed in Petty’s system of maximised productivity – should be paid to do entirely useless things like building pyramids: for ‘at worst this would keep their minds to discipline and obedience, and their bodies to a patience of more profitable labours when need shall require it’ (Keynes repeated this suggestion in slightly different words in Book Three of his 1936 General Theory). Maximization of productivity should be pursued not to provide plenty for everyone, says Petty, but to increase the wealth and strength of the nation. And once that is achieved, Petty asks himself: ‘What then should we busy ourselves about? I answer, in ratiocinations upon the Works and Will of God.’[5] One wonders what sort of God was floating around in Petty’s mind.
Petty recognised that banking increased the money supply and he recommended it for that reason. In a pamphlet titled Quantulumcunque he asks himself: ‘What remedy is there, if we have too little money? – We must erect a bank, which well computed, doth almost double the effect of our coined money: and we have in England materials for a bank which shall furnish stock enough to drive the trade of the whole Commercial World.’ His ‘almost double’ was a low estimate, but his prediction that English banking could ‘drive the trade of the whole commercial world’ proved pretty much true. Three hundred years later, a banking historian would write: ‘By 1914, the great loan-issuing houses could not unjustly claim that it was largely by their efforts that Britain held in fee not only the Gorgeous East, but the greater part of the rest of the world as well.’[6]
Petty’s recommendation of banks included no assessment of how the new money, its creation and allocation, might advantage some and disadvantage others. His preoccupation was: will the new money be put to productive use? (if so, good); or will it be frittered away in idle consumption? (if so, bad). This way of thinking has come to dominate economic thinking. A third possibility, not mentioned by Petty and often ignored since, was that credit can be used in sheer speculation. This potentiality would soon show its power in the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles (both of which burst in 1720).
Soon after Petty’s death (1687) came two developments, both central to subsequent history and both remarked on in Chapter Three: the establishment of the Bank of England (at that time a private bank) and the Promissory Notes Act of 1704. The Bank of England (1694), according to Thorold Rogers ‘put into circulation nearly 1.1 million of notes’ on ‘a reserve of less than £36,000 in cash’: i.e., it issued thirty times as much credit as it had cash to back it up.[7] It ‘invested nearly the whole of its funds in Government securities’ – i.e. in loans for war. Those who supplied the finance were making large profits, and they were mostly of the ruling Whig party – so much so that Bagehot and Holdsworth referred to it as a ‘Whig finance company’.[8]
The Bank of England came under repeated attacks from rival bankers and political opponents. In 1696, when coin was scarce because of re-coining, the Bank was almost driven under in a run organised by its enemies. In 1705, there was a proposal to replace this private bank with a public institution of National Credit, as explained in a pamphlet: An Essay Upon the National Credit of England.
This remarkable proposal foreshadowed in many ways what Henry C. Simons would propose more than three centuries later, during the Great Depression. The idea was that the government should pay contractors and suppliers with its own notes of credit, instead of borrowing expensively from banks and private profiteers.[9] These credit notes would circulate as money, on the security and surety of the assets and labour of the English people – who would also be reaping the benefits.
‘It will certainly be an exact piece of justice,’ Broughton wrote, ‘to make the credit of the public beneficial to the public, instead of its being diverted into other methods for the benefit of private persons; and that too, not without danger, as well as loss to the public.’
Here it is worth pointing out that our modern use of the word ‘credit’ is a narrow use of the word. ‘Credit’ is Latin for ‘believes’. Today, ‘credit’ means the belief of customers that a bank will pay out, on demand, some of its own money either to themselves or to a third party. In its wider meaning, ‘credit’ means any money that has value only because others believe in it. Paper notes and figures in a bank account are credit-money: without general credibility they are worthless. Gold coin is not ‘credit’ because it can be melted down and sold if it’s no longer wanted as money. Credit is money in its purest form: no more (nor less) than the ability to purchase what is offered for sale. How credit is created must be one of the most important factors in any economic system.
Broughton points out some differences in outcome between his National Credit and government borrowing. The differences, if not exactly ‘froth known to any idiot’, would have been quickly understood then by those in public life. In both cases, the government is creating new money-assets. In the case of National Credit, it is printing notes. In the case of borrowing, on the other hand, gives the lender a government bond (of the same value as the loan) that can be traded among merchants and financiers, and so is effectively new money.[10] The most substantial difference between the two outcomes is that in the second case, the government commits future taxes to pay interest – a drain into perpetuity on the nation’s resources into the pockets of lenders.[11]
Concerning over-issue and consequent inflation, Broughton relies on Parliament to determine how much should be issued, to prevent the executive from abusing its power. He contrasts this with the ‘boundless power of bankers’ to ‘extend the credit’. Here the proposal differs from that of Henry Simons (referred to above): during the intervening 250 years, legislatures had become less trusted. Simons proposed an independent authority, governed by single objective of keeping the value of currency steady, which would command the government in how much to issue (or withdraw from circulation).
Broughton points out that the government, by issuing notes, will not be issuing credit ‘as a banker does’ but ‘as a merchant does, which is to extend his credit to serve his own occasions.’ Confidence in a merchant’s credit rests upon his trustworthiness and solvency; the same would be true of National Credit, which must rest on the honesty, solvency (and hard work) of ‘the Parliament and Estates of England’ – ‘Estates’ meaning people of all ranks and occupations.[12] National Credit is suitable, he says, when governments are strong but limited, and not ‘arbitrary’. His final words praise (flatter?) the government: it is ‘admirably qualified to assist, and equally restrained from oppressing, those under its happy influence.’
Broughton predicted that objectors in the main would be ‘people who have large incomes and make great gains by the present methods.’ Indeed! – And such people were the ruling party! How did he ever think his proposal would be accepted? Lawmakers of the time were notoriously concerned with their own interests: in the words of Sir Lewis Namier, candidates for election ‘no more dreamt of a seat in the House in order to benefit humanity than a child dreams of a birthday cake that others may eat it.’[13] In retrospect, the plan’s rejection was inevitable – and perhaps as great a missed opportunity as England’s failure to develop institutions of local democracy (described by F.W. Maitland as the ‘great blunder of English law’ and a ‘national misfortune’).
Similar plans to Broughton’s – governments should issue money not by borrowing, but as ‘national credit’ – have occasionally been put into operation elsewhere. This happened usually in a time of war or revolution, when the special interests of the governing class were temporarily forgotten or overruled by necessity; or when the governing class itself was being replaced. In such conditions, notes were usually issued in excess. Detailed studies of responsible issues, however, show them to have been very successful: of which, more in a subsequent chapter.[14]
How much notice was taken of Broughton’s suggestion at the time, and how much did it become part of public discourse? His Essay was published and re-published, and thirty years later the influential philosopher and economist Bishop (George) Berkeley repeated the propositions in a book consisting of a series of questions (The Querist, 1735, Questions 199-275). In a second edition of 1750, Berkeley omitted the questions concerning Broughton: the public had lost interest. The new ruling class of ‘capitalists’ was firmly established, and the new poor of England were having a hard time making ends meet. As in England, so in America: Thomas Jefferson (1725) noted ‘an aristocracy, founded on banking institutions and moneyed incorporations under the guise and cloak of their favored branches of manufactures, commerce and navigation, riding and ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry.’[15] Bishop Berkeley added, concerning his omission: ‘It may be Time enough to take again in Hand, when the Public shall seem disposed to make Use of such an Expedient.’ Perhaps now, some three hundred years later?
Broughton’s suggestion would have eliminated at least three toxic outcomes of private commercial banks creating the money-supply: 1, the provision of currency at permanent and continual interest; 2, new money provided in bulk to investors and speculators on prospect of mere profit; 3, new money created for governments and capitalists at the expense of the rest.
Consideration of justice in the matter of money-creation was now taking a back seat. We see it already in Locke, the quintessentially respectable ‘philosopher of government by the gentry’ (Acton). Locke wrote a great deal on money. He recognised that inequality was a threat to national happiness and even blamed it on money (gold and silver); but he included no recognition of bank-credit’s special role in enhancing it.
The second development referred to above was the Promissory Notes Act of 1704, which authorised claims on imaginary assets as currency. This excited the imaginations of speculators and ‘projectors’ – the word then used for inventors of dubious schemes to benefit the human race and – incidentally, of course – themselves.
One of these projectors was a Scotsman, John Law (1671-1729), a professional gambler who escaped from an English prison after killing a fellow gambler in a duel. Law had no trouble recognising that ‘credit is money’.[16] If bank-credit could circulate as money, why not claims on other things? In 1700, Law presented a plan for a ‘land bank’ (its notes to represent claims on land) to the Parliament of Scotland (known at the time as the ‘Parliament of Drunkards’).
His plan was rejected and he made his way to mainland Europe. In France, Law directed his attention to two other kinds of paper claim which could perhaps circulate and become currency, or at least the basis for currency: certificates of government debt and shares in colonial ventures licensed by the monarch. Why could not this kind of paper take over, displacing gold and silver altogether? Charming his way round the gambling salons of Paris, Law found a willing listener and co-conspirator in the Regent (and effective ruler) of France: Philippe D’Orléans, a man suspected of many crimes including incest with his daughter and the murders of several close relations.
Together with the help of royal decrees, the two men merged a variety of paper claims – government debt paper, bank-notes and share certificates – into shares of a new French colonial monopoly, the Mississippi Company. Shares could be purchased with small payments upfront. More bank-paper was issued in extravagant quantities, and by the time second payments were due, the value of the shares had already soared. Speculation fever took hold: an immense financial bubble grew and burst. The finances of France were plunged into disarray. The year was 1720 – the same year as the South Sea Bubble burst in England.
A lesson was learned from these bubbles (temporarily at least): the engine of credit-creation would have to be managed with restraint, otherwise it would run amok and shake down the whole edifice of property and power.
Meanwhile the visible nature of bank-credit had changed: it was no longer mostly numbers in deposit accounts, but promissory notes issued by banks. Bank-notes were displacing coin as domestic currency; but they were not acceptable for foreign payments. For the next hundred years, the word ‘bank’ would tend to provoke discussion about whether paper money issued by banks was a good thing for the internal economy of a nation. Discussion of the predatory nature of banking – Thomas Mun’s ‘froth known to every Idiot’simply disappeared.
So – what of justice, in this new world of enterprise and money created out of air? Justice in economic thinking was removed from the arena of ‘what must be worked on by human effort and care’ and given over to a genuine piece of voodoo – an ‘invisible hand’. Curiously, perhaps, this piece of voodoo – and Adam Smith, its inventor – would inaugurate what is now called ‘scientific’ economics. Consideration of all that will have to wait for the next chapter.

[1] Huerta De Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles.
[2] Petty, Tracts, Chiefly Relating to Ireland. Petty published his estimate to counter the opinion that ‘not one eighth of them (the Irish) remained at the end of the wars.’
[3] Petty: Tracts, Chiefly Relating to Ireland, and The Life of Sir William Petty by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice.
[4] Political Arithmetick.
[5] Verbum Sapienti.
[6] W.J. Thorne, Banking (1948).
[7] Thorold Rogers, The First Nine Years of the Bank of England.
[8] Bagehot, Lombard Street; and Holdsworth, A History of English Law.
[9] Downloadable at https://archive.org/details/essayuponnationa00daveuoft
[10] In the words of Adam Smith some sixty years later, ‘The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his trading capital.’
[11] From an earlier, moral point of view, these interest payments might have been justifiable if the lender was forgoing the use of the money lent, as opposed to gaining an resource of equal value.
[12] When Maitland addressed this question two hundred years later (from the point of view of creditors of the National Debt) he came up with almost exactly the same answer: ‘the creditor has nothing to trust but the honesty and solvency of that honest and solvent community of which the King is the head and ‘Government’ and Parliament are organs.’ The Crown as Corporation; also Moral Personality and Legal Personality,
[13] Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III.
[14] Consideration of these will have to wait for another chapter. Some examples, and discussions of their later disparagement by economic writers, can be found in Richard A. Lester, Monetary Experiments and Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War.
[15] Letter to William B. Giles, Dec. 1825.
[16] Money & Trade Considered.

martedì 21 luglio 2015

Grexit or Jubilee? How Greek Debt Can Be Annulled

Grexit or Jubilee? How Greek Debt Can Be Annulled

The crushing Greek debt could be canceled the way it was made – by sleight of hand. But saving the Greek people and their economy is evidently not in the game plan of the Eurocrats.

Greece’s creditors have finally brought the country to its knees, forcing President Alexis Tsipras to agree to austerity and privatization measures more severe than those overwhelmingly rejected by popular vote a week earlier. No write-down of Greece’s debt was included in the deal, although the IMF has warned that the current debt is unsustainable.
Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis calls the deal “a new Versailles Treaty” and “the politics of humiliation.” Greek defense minister Panos Kammenos calls it a “coup d’état” done by “blackmailing the Greek prime minister with collapse of the banks and a complete haircut on deposits.”
“Blackmail” is not too strong a word. The European Central Bank has turned off its liquidity tap for Greece’s banks, something all banks need, as explained earlier here. All banks are technically insolvent, lending money they don’t have. They don’t lend their deposits but create deposits when they make loans, as the Bank of England recently confirmed. When the depositors and borrowers come for their money at the same time, the bank must borrow from other banks; and if that liquidity runs dry, the bank turns to the central bank, the lender of last resort empowered to create money at will. Without the central bank’s backstop, banks must steal from their depositors with “haircuts” or they will collapse.
What did Greece do to deserve this coup d’état? According to former World Bank economist Peter Koenig:
[T]he Greek people, the citizens of a sovereign country . . . have had the audacity to democratically elect a socialist government. Now they have to suffer. They do not conform to the self-imposed rules of the neoliberal empire of unrestricted globalized privatization of public services and public properties from which the elite is maximizing profits – for themselves, of course. It is outright theft of public property.
According to a July 5th article titled “Greece – The One Biggest Lie You’re Being Told By The Media,” the country did not fail on its own. It was made to fail:
[T]he banks wrecked the Greek government, and then deliberately pushed it into unsustainable debt . . . while revenue-generating public assets were sold off to oligarchs and international corporations.
A Truth Committee convened by the Greek parliament reported in June that a major portion of the country’s €320 billion debt is “illegal, illegitimate and odious” and should not be paid.
How to Cut the Debt Without Loss to the Bondholders
The debt cannot be paid and should not be paid, but EU leaders justify their hard line as necessary to save the creditors from having to pay – the European taxpayers, governments, institutions, and banks holding Greek bonds. It is quite possible to grant debt relief, however,
without hurting the bondholders. US banks were bailed out by the US Federal Reserve to the tune of more than $16 trillion in virtually interest-free loans, without drawing on taxes. Central banks have a printing press that allows them to create money at will.
The ECB has already embarked on this sort of debt purchasing program. In January, it announced it would purchase 60 billion euros of debt assets per month beginning in March, continuing to at least September 2016, for a total of €1.14 trillion of asset purchases. These assets are being purchased through “quantitative easing” – expanding the monetary base simply with accounting entries on the ECB’s books.
The IMF estimates that Greece needs debt relief of €60 billion – a mere one month of the ECB’s quantitative easing program. The ECB could solve Greece’s problem with a few computer keystrokes. Moreover, in today’s deflationary environment, the effect would actually be to stimulate the European economy. As financial writer Richard Duncan observes:
When a central bank prints money and buys a government bond, it is the same thing as cancelling that bond (so long as the central bank does not sell the bond back to the public).
. . . The European Central Bank’s plans to create €1.1 trillion over the next 20 months will effectively cancel the combined budget deficits of the Eurozone national governments in both 2015 and 2016, with a considerable amount left over.
Quantitative Easing has only been possible because it has occurred at a time when Globalization is driving down the price of labor and industrial goods. The combination of fiat money and Globalization creates a unique moment in history where the governments of the developed economies can print money on an aggressive scale without causing inflation.
They should take advantage of this once-in-history opportunity to borrow more in order to invest in new industries and technologies, to restructure their economies and to retrain and educate their workforce at the post-graduate level. If they do, they could not only end the global economic crisis, but also ensure that the standard of living in the developed world continues to improve, rather than sinking down to third world levels.
That is how it works for Germany after World War II. According to economist Michael Hudson, the most successful debt jubilee in recent times was gifted to Germany, the country now most opposed to doing the same for Greece. The German Economic Miracle followed massive debt forgiveness by the Allies:
All domestic German debts were annulled, except employer wage debts to their labor force, and basic working balances. Later, in 1953, its international debts were written down.
Why not do the same for the Greeks? Hudson writes:
It was easy to write down debts that were owed to Nazis. It is much harder to do so when the debts are owed to powerful and entrenched institutions – especially to banks.
Loans Created with Accounting Entries Can Be Canceled with Accounting Entries
That may be true for non-bank creditors. But for banks, recall that the money owed to them is not taken from the accounts of depositors. It is simply created with accounting entries on the books. The loans could be canceled the same way. To the extent that the Greek debt is owed to the ECB, the IMF and other financial institutions, that is another option for canceling it.
British economist Michael Rowbotham explored that possibility in 1998 for the onerous Third World debts owed to the World Bank and IMF. He wrote that of the $2.2 trillion debt then outstanding, the vast majority was money simply created by commercial banks. It represented a liability on the banks’ books only because the rules of banking said their books must be balanced.  He suggested two ways the rules might be changed to liquidate unfair and oppressive debts:
The first option is to remove the obligation on banks to maintain parity between assets and liabilities, or, to be more precise, to allow banks to hold reduced levels of assets equivalent to the Third World debt bonds they cancel.  Thus, if a commercial bank held $10 billion worth of developing country debt bonds, after cancellation it would be permitted in perpetuity to have a $10 billion dollar deficit in its assets.  This is a simple matter of record-keeping.
The second option, and in accountancy terms probably the more satisfactory (although it amounts to the same policy), is to cancel the debt bonds, yet permit banks to retain them for purposes of accountancy.
The Real Roadblock Is Political
The Eurocrats could end the economic crisis by writing off odious unrepayable debt either through quantitative easing or by changing bank accounting rules. But ending the crisis is evidently not what they are up to. As Michael Hudson puts it, “finance has become the modern-day mode of warfare. Its objectives are the same: acquisition of land, raw materials and monopolies.” He writes:
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and other debtor countries have been under the same mode of attack that was waged by the IMF and its austerity doctrine that bankrupted Latin America from the 1970s onward.
Prof. Richard Werner, who was on the scene as the European Union evolved, maintains that the intent for the EU from the start was the abandonment of national sovereignty in favor of a single-currency system controlled by eurocrats doing the bidding of international financiers. The model was flawed from the beginning. The solution, he says, is for EU countries to regain their national sovereignty by leaving the euro en masse. He writes:
By abandoning the euro, each country would regain control over monetary policy and could thus solve their own particular predicament. Some, such as Greece, may default, but its central bank could limit the damage by purchasing the dud bonds from banks at face value and keeping them on its balance sheet without marking to market (central banks have this option, as the Fed showed again in October 2008). Banks would then have stronger balance sheets than ever, they could create credit again, and in exchange for this costless bailout central banks could insist that bank credit – which creates new money – is only allowed for transactions that contribute to GDP in a sustainable way. Growth without crises and large-scale unemployment could then be arranged.
But Dr. Werner acknowledges that this is not likely to happen soon. Brussels has been instructed by President Obama, no doubt instructed by Wall Street, to hold the euro together at all costs.
The Promise and Perils of Grexit
The creditors may have won this round, but Greece’s financial woes are far from resolved. After the next financial crisis, it could still find itself out of the EU. If the Greek parliament fails to endorse the deal just agreed to by its president, “Grexit” could happen even earlier. And that could be the Black Swan event that ultimately breaks up the EU. It might be in the interests of the creditors to consider a debt jubilee to avoid that result, just as the Allies felt it was in their interests to expunge German debts after World War II.
For Greece, leaving the EU may be perilous; but it opens provocative possibilities. The government could nationalize its insolvent banks along with its central bank, and start generating the credit the country desperately needs to get back on its feet. If it chose, it could do this while still using the euro, just as Ecuador uses the US dollar without being part of the US. (For more on how this could work, see here.)
If Greece switches to drachmas, the funding possibilities are even greater. It could generate the money for a national dividend, guaranteed employment for all, expanded social services, and widespread investment in infrastructure, clean energy, and local business. Freed from its Eurocrat oppressors, Greece could model for the world what can be achieved by a sovereign country using publicly-owned banks and publicly-issued currency for the benefit of its own economy and its own people.
____________
Ellen Brown is an attorney, founder of the Public Banking Institute, and author of twelve books including the best-selling Web of Debt. Her latest book, The Public Bank Solution, explores successful public banking models historically and globally. Her 300+ blog articles are at EllenBrown.com.

venerdì 17 luglio 2015

Why you can’t technically default on the IMF

It’s a nuance, but an important nuance.
The IMF isn’t a creditor in the usual sense of the word. It’s a collateralised bilateral swap agent that exists to help countries balance international payment obligations so that they don’t have to start wars, grab resources or asset-strip trade partners when they abuse their trust.
The clue comes in the ‘F’ of the IMF acronym, which of course stands for fund not force.
But even that is a misdirection, since the fund is actually made up of capital commitment quotas, not pre-paid lump sums of capital. Pre-paying would be dumb, you see — a waste of perfectly good capital. What if there’s no crisis to allocate the funds to? That capital just goes to waste, unused.

What the quotas really are then are capital pledges. This loosely translates to signed up IMF members agreeing to freeze their own potential counter claims on trade partners who can’t afford to balance their IMF account, until the country in question can afford to honour them. In the event the “creditor” nations don’t have counter claims, they simply agree to assign claims on their own capital resources, and so forth, in exchange for eventual claims on the country in question.
That’s why you can’t actually technically default. It’s not a loan. It’s a swap. A swap of one country’s relatively crappy currency, for currencies that can actually get you stuff on the market.
And the whole thing, of course, is balanced by way of the SDR — the IMF’s own unit of account which floats freely versus the combined value of what are considered to be the world’s most liquid currencies, the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound.
Simple, right?
Here in any case are the mechanics as set out in the IMF’s own Financial Operations document:
Members draw on the IMF’s pool of members’ currencies and SDRs through a purchase-repurchase mechanism. The member purchases either SDRs or the currency of another member in exchange for an equivalent amount (in SDR terms) of its own currency; the borrowing member later reverses the transaction through a repurchase of its currency held by the IMF with SDRs or the currency of another member. The Fund only draws for its GRA financing operations on those members that are considered to be in a sufficiently strong balance of payments and reserve position. These members are included in the Financial Transactions Plan (FTP) which is reviewed by the Board on a quarterly basis (Section 2.2.1)
They go on:
A member that provides SDRs or other member’s currency to the IMF as part of its quota subscription payment or whose currency is used in GRA lending operations receives a liquid claim on the IMF (reserve tranche position) that can be encashed on demand to obtain reserve assets to meet a balance of payments financing need.20 These claims earn interest (remuneration) based on the SDR interest rate and are considered by members as part of their international reserve assets (Figure 2.2). When IMF loans are repaid (repurchased) by the borrower with reserve assets, these funds are transferred to the creditor countries in exchange for their currencies, and their creditor position in the IMF (reserve tranche) is reduced accordingly.
And here’s the key point:
The purchase-repurchase approach to IMF lending affects the composition of the IMF’s resources but not the overall size. An increase in loans outstanding reduces the IMF’s holdings of usable currencies and increases the IMF’s holdings of the currencies of countries that are borrowing from the IMF.
Got it?
But here’s why the whole arrangement breaks down with Greece and why this particular crisis must involve a tri-partite rescue committee. Greece is a user not an issuer of one of the four core “usable currencies” that are supposed to offer debt relief to member states. Greece, as a consequence, has no currency of its own to pledge in exchange for more euro currency.
This is problematic for the IMF which was set up to dish out “usable currencies” against inferior currencies as debt relief. Greece poses an oxymoronic situation for the fund as a result. Greece can’t just pledge its own currency; it first needs to establish access to that currency from the ECB, which in turn needs authority from the European Commission to break rules about the terms with which it is allowed to dish out fresh liquidity. As we all know, dishing out liquidity against non-existent collateral and/or to an insolvent entity, is a considered a big no-no in Frankfurt.
The IMF’s role here, consequently, is about facilitating an internal transfer between eurozone IMF members vis-a-vis their outright obligations to the fund.
That’s why there’s a bit of a hierarchy in the repayment schedule. The IMF itself hasn’t lent anything. It has simply facilitated a conditional swap that now allows non-euro countries greater claims over the eurozone as a whole, and that can be through a reduction of eurozone claims over other non-euro members or greater claims of non-euro countries over the eurozone. This doesn’t count as euro monetisation for as long as it remains an offset comprising of potential claims. The arrangement is closed out, meanwhile, as soon as the euros are repurchased from non-euro members. Conditions are added to the arrangement to ensure the country in question can be sure to meet the demands of claimants in actual output terms once the arrangement is closed out.
In this case, the true defaulting determinant isn’t the IMF, it’s the ECB, because it has the power to reject potential euro claims if it believes they weren’t issued in good faith. Which is why it all comes down to the collateral that sits on the ECB’s books which supports the euro claims in the system.
Let’s get back to the IMF specifics:
The total of the IMF’s holdings of SDRs and usable currencies broadly determines the IMF’s overall (quota-based) lending capacity (liquidity). Although the purchase-repurchase mechanism is not technically or legally a loan, it is the functional equivalent of a loan. Financial assistance is typically made available to members under IMF lending arrangements that provide for the phased disbursement of financing consistent with relevant policies and depending on the needs of the member. The arrangement normally provides specific economic and financial policy conditions that must be met by the borrowing country before the next installment is released. As a result, these arrangements are similar to conditional lines of credit. The IMF levies a basic rate of interest (charges) on loans that is based on the SDR interest rate and imposes surcharges depending on the level and length of total credit outstanding on the part of the borrower (level and time based surcharges; see Chapter 5).
What this amounts to from the perspective of the IMF borrower is a credit agreement, wherein another more creditworthy country underwrites the borrower’s claims on the international system whilst bolstering the domestic position by preventing too many claims from being redeemed against the borrower at the same time.
So why is the Greek crisis shaking the IMF to its core? And why is the IMF suddenly so eager to guarantee Greek debt relief?
Because it’s all fundamentally about the international system’s potential claims over the eurozone as a whole. The problem for the IMF is that there’s no easy way to unbundle these in the event the ECB decides that some euro claims are more equal than others. But it’s also the case that for as long as the eurosystem as a whole remains in credit vis-a-vis the rest of the system, there is no reason for it to chop one of its core organs off.
The eurosystem can afford the luxury of retaining Greece, especially in its currently saving obsessed mode. What’s more debt relief is an internal issue, not an international one, thus as far as the rest of the world is concerned there’s no-one out there that has to consume less because Europe as a whole insists on consuming more than it’s entitled to consume. Forcing Greece to repay principle at the cost of reduced consumption consequently serves nobody’s interests as a whole.
The only rationale in forcing Greece to consume less is if other eurozone members are prepared to consume more.
On which note, a relevant extract from Keynes about the pre-war generation’s tendency not to consume, by way of Brad Delong:
On the one hand, the laboring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded, or cajoled by custom, convention, authority, and the well-established order of society into accepting, a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and nature and the capitalists were cooperating to produce and on the other hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice.
The duty of “saving” became 9/10 of virtue, and the growth of the cake the object of true religion. There grew around the nonconsumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world has neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. and so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated. Individuals be exhorted not so much to abstain as to defer, to cultivate the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory–the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you, nor by your children after you.
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mercoledì 15 luglio 2015

The big bank boondoggle

The big bank boondoggle*

http://newint.org/features/2015/05/01/banking-keynote/
May 2015
 
The authors of the worst financial fiasco since the 1930s expect to make their resurrection a foregone conclusion. David Ransom suggests more sensible ways forward.
Hong Kong demonstrator asleep [Related Image]
Under the influence: a protester makes his feelings felt during demonstrations in Hong Kong, October 2014. © Getty/Bloomberg/Brent Lewin 
 
*Boondoggle: ‘a project that is considered a useless waste of both time and money, yet is often continued due to extraneous policy or political motivations.’ Wikipedia 
Brief though the episode was, between late 1968 and early 1970 I was a trainee banker. A class of callow youths (all white males) gathered in the City of London to be mentored by a retired manager out of Tierra del Fuego. We probed the elusive mysteries of double-entry book-keeping and fractional banking. Labelled ‘ambitious, but quiet and dignified’, I was dispatched to Montevideo in Uruguay.
A few months later the clerks there walked out on strike for decent pay. They were promptly ‘militarized’ – charged with desertion if they failed to return to work. A corpulent colonel occupied the manager’s office while troopers frogmarched a few captured clerks back to their desks. I made my escape, convinced that the key to successful banking lay hidden far too deep in the excruciating tedium of it all.
So I’m prejudiced. Never before or since have I experienced boredom as a physical pain. Whenever I hear of a banking culture built on cocaine, I am not shocked. It makes perfect sense to me for expensive rehab clinics to set up shop nearby. I know what it is to sit at a telex machine all day encoding the sale of illicit gold from the Amazon to a boilerplate company in Bermuda. I quite understand why bankers get injured by the repetitive strain of making money out of thin air. I too have felt their subliminal tendency to panic.
Though sometimes I marvel at their irrational exuberance, I would not say that bankers possess anything like a culture. Instead, I’d call it cod ideology, and in Uruguay I learned what it does in practice.
Within a couple of years, the rest of the country had been militarized as well. A place with a long progressive tradition began to imprison, torture, exile and disappear proportionately more of its own people than anywhere else on earth. The banks may not have been primarily responsible – the military blamed Tupamaro leftist guerrillas – but they were certainly the principal beneficiaries.
For this was the dawn of corporate globalization and deregulated financial markets. In an ailing Uruguayan economy, the spiralling private debts of the rich and their banks were transferred by military dictatorship to the Uruguayan people, who were thereby signed up to the ‘Third World’ debt (meaning banking) crisis.
Under the supervision of swivel-eyed generals and a Washington Consensus at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, ‘structural adjustment’ across Latin America dictated the privatization of public assets and the export of basic commodities, fewer jobs and public services, lower wages, regressive taxation, the plundering of the natural environment, the suppression of human rights and anything that threatened to resemble a vibrant culture; a jumble of experimental measures slapped together in the name of saving democracy from itself and paying private banks for debts that were entirely their own.
The net result was that no-one except the rich could afford to buy anything, economies staggered to a halt and, in Uruguay, absolute poverty began to scar a society where once it had been almost unknown.
Zombie banks are kept alive by public subsidies and bailouts because it is too troublesome to close them down, even though they are worthless and do nothing useful
In this way I came to think of banks and financial markets as less interested in productive finance than in this cod ideology, soon to be styled ‘neoliberalism’ across much of the Majority World.
If, since 2008, the term has become more familiar to the Minority World, that’s because ‘austerity’ is also its progeny. Listen closely to prevailing financial wisdom today, particularly when applied to Greece, and you may hear ‘austerity’ mis-spoken as ‘structural adjustment’.
Neoliberalism has spread relentlessly, from free-trade agreements and the World Trade Organization, to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its sibling the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), bearing the promise of fool’s gold – with carefree financial markets and banks in the lead.
Paradoxical as it may seem, financial meltdowns have been part of the process. By one estimate there were 147 banking crises worldwide between 1970 and 2011, ever more frequent and extreme as they headed for the Great Recession1, but always with the same desired result – public bailouts followed by some form of neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’.
The sheer scale of what the banks were really getting up to has not lost its capacity to astonish even me: money-laundering, sanctions-busting, tax evasion, insurance scams, pervasive ‘mis-selling’, interest- and exchange-rate manipulation, compulsive gambling, personal avarice and enrichment – the indictments of a ‘service’ that treats its customers as fodder have infested almost everything it does.
All of it certified by a cartel of credit-rating and audit corporations funded by the banks and overlooked by light-touch regulators who have been ‘captured’ by the banks. And all of it orchestrated by financial markets that have no firm foundation in anything other than ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’. It’s enough to cast doubt on the legendary instinct for self-preservation of capitalism itself.
A great deal of public anger has been directed at the way bank bosses have continued to reward themselves regardless. The bonus culture in finance is indeed a driver behind the growth of inequality and social injustice.
The further you want to clamber up the gradients of personal wealth, the more you need to be a banker or financier. If you reach the summit and the richest 0.1 per cent of the population, they outnumber both their fellow CEOs from the rest of the corporate club and the growing band of heirs to personal hoards put together.2

Carry on ballooning

But I think this can also be something of a distraction. What really matters is what keeps the giant boondoggle in play. We’re not talking magic here, however much neoliberalism defers to the ‘hidden hand’ of market forces.
It can’t be the banks’ usefulness to society. An increasing proportion of their lending – by now approaching 60 per cent – still clings to private property and mortgages.3 Lest we forget, this was what triggered the 2008 meltdown.
Property may be the easiest and most lucrative way for banks to securitize their activities and spin derivatives off into convoluted deals that never touch the real economy, but no-one claims that property is productive. Property bubbles may, for a few and for a while, generate more cash than can be earned from work. But for the rest, and particularly for the next generation, homes are made unaffordable.
When the 2007 credit crunch struck, the banks had no idea what anything was worth and stopped lending altogether, even to each other. They were, technically speaking, dead.
There is, however, a weird form of resurrection available only to them. They can be kept alive by public subsidies and bailouts because it is too troublesome to close them down, even though they are worthless and do nothing useful. Such banks are said to have first emerged when the Savings and Loans fiasco hit the US in 1987, and survived in Japan long after its own banking crisis in 1993. They came to be known as ‘zombie’ banks.4
REUTERS/Pool/Antony Devlin
Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney: quite relaxed about ballooning private debt. REUTERS/Pool/Antony Devlin 
 
And that, to my mind, describes accurately enough what all private banks have now become. You can tell from the frantic public efforts to prod them into some recognizable form of useful life. Forget all the unconditional bailouts and bribes. Trillions of dollars of free public money have been pumped into them by quantitative easing, in a last-ditch technical wheeze to get them lending productively. An exact equivalent would have been to drop ‘helicopter money’, or free cash, directly onto the heads of the population at large.
The result of pumping it in to the banks instead: bigger profits and bonuses, a bubble in the price of assets owned by the rich – chiefly property, of course – and abstruse disputes between economists as to whether it has made any difference to the real economy.
And so it goes on. ‘Systemic’ megabanks are said to be at once too big to fail and too cumbersome to function. Result: they get bigger and fewer, a monopolistic handful bestriding each national banking system, feeding from a public subsidy amounting to perhaps $300 billion every year in the euro area alone5 because financial markets choose to assume – all the more so since 2008 – they will be bailed out again, which means they borrow more cheaply and lend more riskily.
They must raise more of their own capital (the only money that is actually theirs) to reduce the risk of bailout. Result: entrenched evasion, bare minimum levels of capital and still no increase in productive lending.6 So they must be more tightly regulated. Result: fresh opportunities to play with the rules (‘arbitrage’), and shadow banking, which is scarcely regulated, proliferates. Any attempt to relate the size of bank bonuses to reason is futile.
Meanwhile, financial markets just keep on ballooning. Their assets (loans) in Britain have already grown to about four times the size of the country’s entire annual output. They are set to be 10 times the size by 2050. The Governor of the Bank of England is quite relaxed about this, advising that size (and, of course, lucrative business) is of less regulatory concern than safety.7
But what if government deficits were set to do the same? What makes private debts any less problematic than public ones? And who could bail this lot out?
In 2010 Andrew Haldane, then-Director of Financial Stability, now Chief Economist at the Bank of England, estimated that the crisis caused by the banks had cost between $60 and $200 trillion (thousand billion) in worldwide output and other losses.8
That’s quite some debt. Assuming a systemic crisis recurs on average every 20 years, Haldane calculated that banks should properly be charged in excess of $1.5 trillion every year in repayment – more than their entire market capitalization. But collecting this debt would, he confided, ‘risk putting the banks on the same trajectory as the dinosaurs’. So there were no plans to do so. Some debts, and those of the banks in particular, are evidently less worthy of collection than others.
Dinosaurs or zombies, take your pick. Why should we be transfixed by fossils or the living dead? At some point, we will come to our senses. Then the darkness of neoliberalism will disperse with the realization that some financial home truths have been staring us in the face all along.

Boom, bust and naked self-interest

Even the most cursory narrative of banking and financial crises makes it obvious that finance is a public utility, not private property. What is it that makes possible the endless bailing out of private banks, and therefore their continued existence, if not their automatic claim on public resources and tax revenues? Who with any say in the matter willingly hands over the power of taxation and economic policy to anything other than a halfway democratic government?
Is not the most profound and enduring objection to structural adjustment or austerity – even supposing that they actually work – that they violate this basic principle of democracy, ceding political power to naked self-interest? How did the leading exponents of tax evasion ever acquire the right to any political representation at all? Come to that, when was a bailout last subjected to democratic debate before it was an accomplished fact?
Private banks have also acquired a public licence, through the generation of credit, to create virtually all the money in circulation. This has given them quite disproportionate economic as well as political power.
One outcome has been exaggerated boom-and-bust economic cycles which societies struggle to counteract, having no effective means of doing so. No single measure is more likely to restore some sanity to finance than withdrawing from private banks their licence to print money.9
Matilde Campodonico/AP/Press Association Images
José Mujica sets a refreshing example at his home outside Montevideo. Matilde Campodonico/AP/Press Association Images 
 
This is within easy reach of long-established democratic prerogatives. So too is the withdrawal of deposit guarantees from anything other than retail, high-street banks, which are the only reason why most people need banks at all.
Other stipulations might usefully be added: that these banks should be mutuals serving only the interests of their customers; that they should be small and local, operating in communities they have learned to understand; that their priority must be to enhance resilience in the face of climate change, and to promote productive, sustainable employment. Self-styled democratic governments might even be prompted at long last to do their job.
They would be equally well-advised to place less reliance on regulation and more on what might actually work. For example, transaction taxes – on things like currency and commodity exchanges – have the simultaneously beneficial effect of restraining dangerous speculation and replenishing public funds.
They are also relatively difficult to evade. And they reflect more accurately what underpins all financial systems: taxation, surely best raised from the system itself. That argument goes uncontested, stalled only by the power of the banks. The European Union is still thinking about it.
There would then be a realistic prospect of returning the zombie megabanks to the grave from which they have so rashly been raised.
Let them survive, if they can, without a public prop that neoliberalism opposes for anything else. Let there be an end to the damage they can do, the blackmail they can threaten at every turn. With another meltdown more probable with the passing of every wasted year, we need to be forearmed as well as forewarned.
There is, after all, no greater folly than repeating the same mistake and expecting a different result.
In any event, showdowns between financial markets and democracy look set to intensify, especially in the rich world, which is now by far the largest debtor of all. To some extent, the impact of the Great Recession on ‘emerging’ economies has been mitigated because a degree of democracy and social justice has been asserting itself there.
Which takes me back to Uruguay, where I stayed for a while quite recently. For five years, until 1 March 2015, its elected president was José Mujica, a former Tupamaro guerrilla who was tortured by the military and spent 2 of his 13 prison years locked up inside some sort of horse trough.
As president, he continued growing chrysanthemums and living with his partner on her smallholding, stuck to his own relaxed style of dress and gave away 90 per cent of his presidential salary. Any adult Uruguayan who wishes to can now cultivate a couple of marijuana bushes in a back yard; anyone who is gay can marry; women have access to legal abortions. Finance, according to Mujica, is by no means the most precious gift of life.10
The country is not in chaos as a result of Mujica’s unconventional leadership. On the contrary, it has blossomed.
One balmy evening outside Montevideo, a young friend said to me: ‘I’m not particularly political, but I do feel that my views count.’ No-one had said anything like that to me for a very long while. Uruguay may not be Utopia – you can still get mugged. But, no question, there is dawn after the darkness.

Jargon buster

Reading about banks can be like wading through swamps of jargon. So here are some terms you might bump into, with simplified meanings attached. Bon voyage!
Asset: on a bank’s balance sheet, lending (eg loans to customers).
Balance sheet: statement of assets and liabilities.
Bankrupt: inability to pay bills.
Bond: tradable loan for a fixed period and rate of interest.
Capital: whatever is owned by the bank itself, primarily its ‘equity’ or shares.
WANG ZHAO/AFP/Getty Images

Jargon buster

Reading about banks can be like wading through swamps of jargon. So here are some terms you might bump into, with simplified meanings attached. Bon voyage!
Asset: on a bank’s balance sheet, lending (eg loans to customers).
Balance sheet: statement of assets and liabilities.
Bankrupt: inability to pay bills.
Bond: tradable loan for a fixed period and rate of interest.
Capital: whatever is owned by the bank itself, primarily its ‘equity’ or shares.
WANG ZHAO/AFP/Getty Images
The Chinese property bubble, as imagined on a construction site hoarding in Beijing. WANG ZHAO/AFP/Getty Images
Capital ratio: capital as a proportion of assets.
Compound interest: added to ‘principal’ and charged on new total.
Derivative: a tradable ‘instrument’ depending for its value on the performance of something else – usually an ‘underlying asset’ such as a bond, currency or property.
Double-entry book-keeping: every transaction, except cash, recorded as a ‘credit’ to one account and a ‘debit’ to another. Beloved of chartered accountants.
Equity: usually shares conveying ownership and dividends.
Fire / Chinese Wall: formal separation between functions, such as retail and investment.
Fractional banking: creating credit by lending more than is held on deposit.
Hair cut: reduction in the repayment of a bond.
Hedge fund: investment fund aiming for high returns from aggressive trading strategies.
Illiquidity: assets not easily convertible into cash.
Insolvency: no cash or assets convertible into cash.
Investment bank: provides services for large companies and investors, including trading on financial markets, mergers, acquisitions and the like.
Junk bond: high risk of non-repayment, attracting high interest or ‘yield’.
Leverage: debt, usually measured as a proportion of capital.
Liability: on a bank’s balance sheet, borrowing (eg customer deposits).
Limited liability: risk to owners, usually shareholders, legally limited to the value of their shares.
Long: a ‘position’ in the market that depends for its profitability on a rise in the value of assets, like shares or currency, acquired by a trader.
Margin: difference between buying and selling price.
Money market: short-term borrowing and lending.
Moral hazard: reward for sin, likely to encourage a repeat.
Off-balance sheet: financing – such as a lease or ‘special purpose vehicle’ – that is not technically a debt and so is neither an asset nor a liability.
Option: entitlement to buy or sell an asset at a given price before a specified date.
Over-the-counter: transaction directly between individual traders.
Peer-to-peer (P2P): transaction directly between lender and borrower.
Private equity: funds injected into private companies by ‘specialized’ investors seeking high returns.
Quantitative easing: when interest rates are close to zero and can be reduced no further, central banks ‘print’ money electronically as another way of stimulating an economy.
Retail bank: sometimes known as ‘high street’ or ‘boring’, takes deposits from the general public.
Securitization: creating a tradable ‘security’ backed by the income from an asset like a mortgage or bond.
Short: a ‘position’ in the market that depends for its profitability on a fall in the value of assets, like shares or currency, acquired by a trader.
Swap: an exchange between traders designed to reduce interest rate or currency risk.
Systemic: A bank that’s considered so big that its failure would threaten the collapse of the global financial system.
Universal bank: combines retail and investment functions.
Venture capital: start-up funding for new companies.
  1. Cited in Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, Penguin, London, 2014.
  2. Brian Bell and John Van Reenan, Bankers and Their Bonuses, London School of Economics Research Online, John Wiley and Son, London, 2013.
  3. The Economist, 31 January 2015.
  4. See, for example, Sheila Bair and Yalman Onaran, Zombie Banks, Bloomberg, 2011.
  5. IMF upper estimate cited in Peter Stalker, The Money Crisis, New Internationalist Publications, Oxford, 2015.
  6. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2013.
  7. The Financial Times, 8 December 2014.
  8. Andrew G Haldane, The $100 Billion Question, Bank for International Settlements Review 40/2010.
  9. For a lucid account of this difficult topic (and many others raised here), see Peter Stalker, The Money Crisis, op cit.
  10. Mujica has been succeeded by his predecessor, Tabaré Vásquez, from the same ‘Broad Front’ progressive coalition. Uruguayan presidents are limited to one five-year term at any one time.
Front cover of New Internationalist magazine, issue 482 This special report appeared in the global banking issue of New Internationalist. You can buy this magazine or, to get stories like this one through your door every month, subscribe.
- See more at: http://newint.org/features/2015/05/01/banking-keynote/#sthash.nXWPDk5H.dpuf
The Chinese property bubble, as imagined on a construction site hoarding in Beijing. WANG ZHAO/AFP/Getty Images 
 
Capital ratio: capital as a proportion of assets.
Compound interest: added to ‘principal’ and charged on new total.
Derivative: a tradable ‘instrument’ depending for its value on the performance of something else – usually an ‘underlying asset’ such as a bond, currency or property.
Double-entry book-keeping: every transaction, except cash, recorded as a ‘credit’ to one account and a ‘debit’ to another. Beloved of chartered accountants.
Equity: usually shares conveying ownership and dividends.
Fire / Chinese Wall: formal separation between functions, such as retail and investment.
Fractional banking: creating credit by lending more than is held on deposit.
Hair cut: reduction in the repayment of a bond.
Hedge fund: investment fund aiming for high returns from aggressive trading strategies.
Illiquidity: assets not easily convertible into cash.
Insolvency: no cash or assets convertible into cash.
Investment bank: provides services for large companies and investors, including trading on financial markets, mergers, acquisitions and the like.
Junk bond: high risk of non-repayment, attracting high interest or ‘yield’.
Leverage: debt, usually measured as a proportion of capital.
Liability: on a bank’s balance sheet, borrowing (eg customer deposits).
Limited liability: risk to owners, usually shareholders, legally limited to the value of their shares.
Long: a ‘position’ in the market that depends for its profitability on a rise in the value of assets, like shares or currency, acquired by a trader.
Margin: difference between buying and selling price.
Money market: short-term borrowing and lending.
Moral hazard: reward for sin, likely to encourage a repeat.
Off-balance sheet: financing – such as a lease or ‘special purpose vehicle’ – that is not technically a debt and so is neither an asset nor a liability.
Option: entitlement to buy or sell an asset at a given price before a specified date.
Over-the-counter: transaction directly between individual traders.
Peer-to-peer (P2P): transaction directly between lender and borrower.
Private equity: funds injected into private companies by ‘specialized’ investors seeking high returns.
Quantitative easing: when interest rates are close to zero and can be reduced no further, central banks ‘print’ money electronically as another way of stimulating an economy.
Retail bank: sometimes known as ‘high street’ or ‘boring’, takes deposits from the general public.
Securitization: creating a tradable ‘security’ backed by the income from an asset like a mortgage or bond.
Short: a ‘position’ in the market that depends for its profitability on a fall in the value of assets, like shares or currency, acquired by a trader.
Swap: an exchange between traders designed to reduce interest rate or currency risk.
Systemic: A bank that’s considered so big that its failure would threaten the collapse of the global financial system.
Universal bank: combines retail and investment functions.
Venture capital: start-up funding for new companies.
  1. Cited in Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, Penguin, London, 2014.
  2. Brian Bell and John Van Reenan, Bankers and Their Bonuses, London School of Economics Research Online, John Wiley and Son, London, 2013.
  3. The Economist, 31 January 2015.
  4. See, for example, Sheila Bair and Yalman Onaran, Zombie Banks, Bloomberg, 2011.
  5. IMF upper estimate cited in Peter Stalker, The Money Crisis, New Internationalist Publications, Oxford, 2015.
  6. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2013.
  7. The Financial Times, 8 December 2014.
  8. Andrew G Haldane, The $100 Billion Question, Bank for International Settlements Review 40/2010.
  9. For a lucid account of this difficult topic (and many others raised here), see Peter Stalker, The Money Crisis, op cit.
  10. Mujica has been succeeded by his predecessor, Tabaré Vásquez, from the same ‘Broad Front’ progressive coalition. Uruguayan presidents are limited to one five-year term at any one time.
Front cover of New Internationalist magazine, issue 482 This special report appeared in the global banking issue of New Internationalist. You can buy this magazine or, to get stories like this one through your door every month, subscribe.
- See more at: http://newint.org/features/2015/05/01/banking-keynote/#sthash.LR9tcJnC.dpuf

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