martedì 27 ottobre 2015

When the IMF Meets: Global Plutocracy’s Pow Wow in Peru

When the IMF Meets: Here's What Happened At the Global Plutocracy’s Pow Wow in Peru
Thu, 10/22/2015 - by Andrew Gavin Marshall
On October 6, the finance ministers, central bankers and development ministers from 188 countries convened for the Annual Meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Lima, Peru. The yearly gathering is one of the top scheduled events on the calendar of economic diplomats, bringing them together for private discussions, seminars and press conferences with journalists. And of course it's a big deal for the thousands of private bankers and financiers who are there to cut deals with the chief financial policymakers in those 188 IMF-member nations.
It was ironic that this year’s meeting took place in Peru at a time when emerging market economies are experiencing increased economic problems: the result of a combined slow-down in economic growth in China, a collapse in commodity prices, and threats by the U.S. Federal Reserve to hike interest rates in the near future. Indeed, talk of China, interest rate hikes and emerging market crisis was plentiful in Peru. Central bankers, unsurprisingly, came out generally in favor of raising rates, with top monetary officials from emerging markets saying they more feared the uncertainty about when rates would rise than the rise itself, and urged the Fed to simply get on with it.

Global Pow Wow
The annual meetings bring together the Board of Governors of the IMF, made up of the central bankers or finance ministers from the Fund’s 188 member nations. But the Governors are given their marching orders from the 24-member International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), made up of ministers and central bank governors from the 24 major constituencies represented on the IMF’s Executive Board, and whose membership largely reflects that of the Group of Twenty (G20).
The IMFC held their meeting in Lima on Oct. 9, presided over by the committee’s chairman, Agustin Carstens, the Governor of the Central Bank of Mexico, and the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde. In attendance were the finance ministers of Japan (Taro Aso), India (Arun Jaitley), Argentina (Axel Kicillof), Brazil (Joaquim Levy), France (Michel Sapin), Italy (Pier Carlo Padoan), Germany (Wolfgang Schauble), Singapore (Tharman Shanmugaratnam), Great Britain (George Osborne) and the United States (Jack Lew), along with top-level central bankers from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Norway, Algeria, Colombia, Belgium and China.
Also participating in the IMFC meeting were Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (FSB); Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice President of the European Commission; Angel Gurria, Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), and other top representatives from OPEC, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
These various financial diplomats met and made prepared statements, but the real work and decision-making took place in the IMFC’s off-the-record discussions. These discussions also included, as usual, a joint meeting between the IMFC and the G20, after which the G20 held a press conference discussing recent agreements made by the world’s top economic diplomats collectively representing roughly 85% of global GDP.
The meetings followed the consistent hierarchy of operations among the world’s most powerful economies, starting with a private gathering of the finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of Seven (G7) nations, including the U.S., Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada. This was followed by a gathering of ministers and monetary chiefs from the G20 nations (consisting of the G7 plus China, Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia and the European Union). The heads of the world’s major international organizations also attended these meetings, functioning effectively as a steering committee for the global economy. The G20 then held a joint session with the IMFC, which functions as the steering committee of the IMF.
The IMFC’s communiqué following its meeting warned that global economic growth was “modest and uneven” with increased “uncertainty and financial market volatility.” Risks to the global economy “have increased,” it noted, in particular for emerging markets.
Apart from the IMFC and G20, a number of other important meetings took place on the sidelines of the annual gathering, many of which prominently featured bankers. One of the most important gatherings of global financiers was the Annual Membership Meeting of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a consortium of roughly 500 global financial institutions including banks, asset managers, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, central banks, credit ratings agencies and development banks.
From Oct. 9-10, the world’s top bankers and financiers then held luncheons and private meetings with the world’s top economic policy-makers, who were also invited to attend or speak at the conference proceedings. The IIF’s opening ceremony was addressed by Peru’s President Ollanta Humala Tasso, and included guest speakers like the finance minister of Indonesia and central bankers from Thailand and Malaysia, as well as the top Swedish central banker, Stefan Ingves, who serves as chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which is responsible for shaping and implementing global banking regulations known as Basel III.
On the second day of the IIF’s meeting, guest speakers included top officials from Brazil’s finance ministry, the World Bank, and a keynote address was delivered by the governor of Canada’s central bank, Stephen S. Poloz. The rest of the day included talks by finance ministers and central bankers from Colombia, Chile and Peru; a top official from the central bank of France; and an official from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is a group of global central banks, finance ministries and regulators responsible for managing stability of financial markets.
Another important gathering in Lima was the Group of Thirty (G30), presided over by its Chairman Jean-Claude Trichet, the former President of the European Central Bank. The G30 was established in 1978 as a nonprofit group of roughly 30 sitting and former central bankers, finance ministers, economists and private bankers, with the aim "to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues” and “to examine the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers.”
Among the G30's current members are former Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker; Mark Carney of the Bank of England and Financial Stability Board; Jaime Caruana of the BIS; Mario Draghi of the ECB; William C. Dudley of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; former U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner; former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King; economist Paul Krugman; Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda; Bank of France Governor and BIS Chairman Christian Noyer; Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan; Tharman Shanmugaratnam of Singapore; former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers; Chinese central banker Zhou Xiaochuan; and top bankers from UBS, JPMorgan Chase, BlackRock and Goldman Sachs.
This year, the G30 held its annual International Banking Seminar in Peru, “an invitation-only, off-the-record forum that allows for frank discussion and debate of the thorniest issues confronting the central banking community,” bringing together “over fifty percent of the world’s central bank governors, the Chairmen and CEOs of the financial sector, and a select few academics to debate financial and systemic issues of global import.”
The meeting included a short speech by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer, who told the audience that the Fed’s interest rate rise was “an expectation, not a commitment.” Fischer acknowledged that “shifting expectations concerning U.S. interest rates could lead to more volatility in financial markets and the value of the dollar, intensifying spillovers to other economies, including emerging market economies.” He reassured his audience, however, that the Fed will “remain committed to communicating our intentions as clearly as possible... to assist market participants, be they in the private or the public sector, in understanding our intentions as they make their investment decisions."

Behind Closed Doors
But the true importance of the annual IMF meetings is not what happens in formal proceedings and seminars, but the various secret meetings of finance ministers, central bankers and private financiers that take place on the sidelines of the official conference. In these closed-door events, a select group of government and monetary officials, primarily those from the G7 and G20 nations, were invited to wine and dine with bankers at decadent dinners and lavish parties, and speak to private gatherings of the world’s top investors and money managers. It's here, in these various meetings, where the world’s chief financial diplomats were able to meet, greet and receive praise or criticism from their true constituents: the global financial elite.
As usual, the annual pow wow of the global plutocracy came and went with little comment outside the financial press. But as always, the annual IMF meetings – and the more secretive, simultaneous gatherings of global economic diplomats and financiers on the sidelines – represented the core of global economic governance, manifest in the various ad-hoc committees that in essence rule the world.
These individuals' main interactions were not with the populations in their home nations – the people who suffer under austerity, who have to "adjust" to the restructuring of their societies into "market economies" – but rather with those from whom they have the most to gain: bankers, billionaires and financiers. And rest assured, when the officials retire from their central bank and finance ministry positions, they will be stepping out of their membership in the G7, G20 and IMFC, and into the boardrooms of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, BlackRock, Barclays and Deutsche Bank. They will be well rewarded, with large salaries and bonuses for a job well done while in public office. And the revolving door of global economic governance will keep turning.

lunedì 26 ottobre 2015

Group of Thirty Members as of June 19, 2015

Group of Thirty Members as of June 19, 2015.

Paul A. Volcker
Chairman Emeritus, Group of Thirty
Former Chairman, President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board
Former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Jacob A. Frenkel
Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Group of Thirty
Chairman, JPMorgan Chase International
Former Governor, Bank of Israel
Former Professor of Economics, University of Chicago
Former Counselor, Director of Research, International Monetary Fund

Jean-Claude Trichet
Chairman, Group of Thirty
Former President, European Central Bank
Former Governor, Banque de France

Geoffrey L. Bell
Executive Secretary and Treasurer, Group of Thirty
President, Geoffrey Bell & Company, Inc.

Leszek Balcerowicz
Professor, Warsaw School of Economics
Former President, National Bank of Poland
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Poland

Mark Carney
Governor, Bank of England
Chairman, Financial Stability Board
Member, Board of Directors, Bank for International Settlements
Former Governor, Bank of Canada

Jaime Caruana
General Manager, Bank for International Settlements
Former Financial Counsellor, International Monetary Fund
Former Governor, Banco de España
Former Chairman, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Domingo Cavallo
Chairman and CEO, DFC Associates, LLC
Former Minister of Economy, Argentina

Mario Draghi
President, European Central Bank
Member, Board of Directors, Bank for International Settlements
Former Governor, Banca d’Italia
Former Chairman, Financial Stability Board
Former Vice Chairman and Managing Director, Goldman Sachs International

William Dudley
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Member, Board of Directors, Bank for International Settlements
Former Partner and Managing Director, Goldman Sachs and Company

Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.
President and CEO, TIAA-CREF
Former Chairman, Swiss Re America Holding Corporation
Former Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Arminio Fraga
Founding Partner, Gávea Investimentos
Former Chairman of the Board, BM&F-Bovespa
Former Governor, Banco Central do Brasil

Timothy Geithner
President, Warburg Pincus
Former Secretary of the United States Treasury
Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Gerd Häusler
Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Bayerische Landesbank
Former Chief Executive Officer, Bayerische Landesbank
Member of the Board of Directors and Senior Advisor, RHJ International
Former Managing Director and Member of the Advisory Board, Lazard & Co.
Former Counselor and Director, International Monetary Fund

Philipp Hildebrand
Vice Chairman, BlackRock
Former Chairman of the Governing Board, Swiss National Bank
Former Partner, Moore Capital Management

Gail Kelly
Former Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, Westpac

Mervyn King
Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom
Former Governor, Bank of England
Former Professor of Economics, London School of Economics

Paul Krugman
Professor of Economics, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Former Member, Council of Economic Advisors

Haruhiko Kuroda
Governor, Bank of Japan
Former President, Asian Development Bank

Christian Noyer
Governor, Banque de France
Chairman, Bank for International Settlements

Guillermo Ortiz
Chairman of the Advisory Board, Grupo Finaciero Banorte
Former Governor, Banco de México
Former Chairman of the Board, Bank for International Settlements
Former Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico

Raghuram G. Rajan
Governor, Reserve Bank of India
Professor of Economics, Chicago Booth School of Business
Former Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance, India
Economic Advisor to Prime Minister of India

Kenneth Rogoff
Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy and Economics, Harvard University
Former Chief Economist and Director of Research, IMF

Tharman Shanmugaratnam
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister for Finance, Singapore
Chairman, Monetary Authority of Singapore
Former Chairman of International Monetary & Financial Committee, IMF

Masaaki Shirakawa
Special Professor of International Politics, Economics and Communications, Aoyama-
Gakuin University
Former Governor, Bank of Japan
Former Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors, Bank for International Settlements
Former Professor, Kyoto University School of Government

Lawrence H. Summers
Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard University
Former Director, National Economics Council for President Barack Obama
Former President, Harvard University
Former Secretary of the Treasury

Adair Turner
Chairman of the Governing Board, Institute for New Economic Thinking
Former Chairman, Financial Services Authority
Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom

Kevin M. Warsh
Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Lecturer, Stanford University Graduate School of Business
Former Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Axel A. Weber
Chairman, UBS
Former Visiting Professor of Economics, Chicago Booth School of Business
Former President, Deutsche Bundesbank

Ernesto Zedillo
Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University
Former President of Mexico

Zhou Xiaochuan
Governor, People's Bank of China
Member, Board of Directors, Bank for International Settlements
Former President, China Construction Bank
Former Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade

SENIOR MEMBERS

E. Gerald Corrigan
Managing Director, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Guillermo de la Dehesa
Vice Chairman & Member of the Executive Committee, Grupo Santander
Chairman, Aviva Grupo Corporativo
Chairman, Centre for Economic Policy Research
Former Deputy Managing Director, Banco de España
Former Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Spain

Martin Feldstein
Professor of Economics, Harvard University
President Emeritus, National Bureau of Economic Research
Former Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

David Walker
Former Chairman, Barclays PLC
Former Senior Advisor, Morgan Stanley International, Inc.
Former Chairman, Morgan Stanley International, Inc.
Former Chairman, Securities and Investments Board, U.K.

Yutaka Yamaguchi
Former Deputy Governor, Bank of Japan
Former Chairman, Euro Currency Standing Commission

EMERITUS MEMBERS

Abdlatif Al-Hamad
Chairman, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
Former Minister of Finance and Minister of Planning, Kuwait

Jacques de Larosière
President, Eurofi
Conseiller, BNP Paribas
Former President, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Former Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
Former Governor, Banque de France

Richard A. Debs
Advisory Director, Morgan Stanley
Former President, Morgan Stanley International
Former COO, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Gerhard Fels
Former Director, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft

Toyoo Gyohten
President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
Former Chairman, Bank of Tokyo

John G. Heimann
Founding Chairman, Financial Stability Institute
Former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency

Erik Hoffmeyer
Chairman, Politiken-Fonden
Former Chairman, Danmarks Nationalbank

William McDonough
Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Sylvia Ostry
Distinguished Research Fellow, Munk Centre for International Studies, Toronto
Former Ambassador for Trade Negotiations, Canada
Former Head, OECD Economics and Statistics Department

William R. Rhodes
President and CEO, William R. Rhodes Global Advisors
Senior Advisor, Citigroup
Former Senior Vice Chairman, Citigroup

Ernest Stern
Partner and Senior Advisor, The Rohatyn Group
Former Managing Director, JPMorgan Chase
Former Managing Director, World Bank

Marina v N. Whitman
Professor of Business Administration & Public Policy, University of Michigan
Former Member, Council of Economic Advisors

mercoledì 21 ottobre 2015

FT: On the profitability of SPECTRE Capital LLP

On the profitability of SPECTRE Capital LLP

And why Spectre should consider diversifying their James Bond idiosyncratic risk.
You know Spectre. It’s the fictional global criminal syndicate and terrorist organization featured in the James Bond novels by Ian Fleming.
It’s also the title of the latest James Bond movie featuring Daniel Craig to be released on October 26.
But, in an era where it’s becoming quite hard to differentiate a classical Bond villain from a modern fantastical corporate billionaire – such as those who want to nuke mars, start colonies in space, control all the data and generally run the world — it’s worth asking whether Spectre as an organisation might actually be a profitable unicorn, decacorn investment option? Could it be run like a conventional VC firm?

What madcap bond villain schemes would and would not get funded?
What would the returns on a long-term position in Spectre Capital LLP be like?
The governance would presumably look like this?

Lucky for us, FT Alphaville reader Simon Warner has crunched the theoretical business model and come up with a good hypothesis on the likely returns of some of those madcap ventures based on past performance and what not. Here’s a sample of his extremely readable analysis (our emphasis):
The track record of Ernst Stavro Blofeld’s SPECTRE organisation is analysed and quantified. I find that within the timeline of the books, prior to Thunderball, SPECTRE produced annualised returns of 119% and a multiple of invested capital (MoIC) of 10.5 times. This track record compares favourably to the available data on real world venture capital (VC) returns.
The SPECTRE project that forms the basis of Thunderball is assessed in detail. Data is extracted from the book and the film to form a full cost model of the project. This model allows us to calculate an expected return on capital from the project of 23.13 times. This expected return compares favourably with the typical investment criteria of VCs for 10 times.
The Thunderball project would be approved and funded. The quality of risk management at SPECTRE is poor. There is a high level of key person risk within the organisation. Blofeld is an extremely capable criminal but suffers from hubris. The organisation is unlikely to survive in his absence. The capital at risk in the Thunderball project was excessive and its failure resulted in a change in the business model.
In the timeline of the films, SPECTRE was forced to use considerably more external financing in subsequent projects. International criminal organisations such as SPECTRE should consider diversifying their James Bond idiosyncratic risk. If Blofeld and Auric Goldfinger had shared the risk of their projects they would have diversified Bond risk and it is highly probable that they would have generated vastly superior risk adjusted returns.
As Warner points out, the Ian Fleming Bond series features many potentially profitable ventures.
Take Hugo Drax as an example, he dared to put colonies in space before Elon Musk had even finished primary school and tested the Bank of England’s reserve decades before the Quantum Fund ever thought it could do the same:
Drax is a commodity trader who has made a fortune by cornering the market in Columbite, a metal that is supposed to be used in the manufacture of jet engines. It is possible that Fleming’s time in the City gave him this idea as during his time at Cull and Company the firm floated a trading company that attempted to corner the pepper market. Towards the end of Moonraker, Drax shorts Sterling ahead of his dastardly plot being put into operation. However, he foolishly uses his own trading company as the broker and as the Bank of England intervenes to support Sterling, it sees the source of the selling pressure. Ironically, the Drax name lives on in the trading world today as JB Drax, a leading broker.
But is Spectre anything like a VC fund?
According to Warner, VCs claim to add value by sourcing deals, helping entrepreneurs in areas where they lack expertise and by helping businesses scale. Spectre’s business model is not dissimilar:
SPECTRE sources ideas for criminal ventures and implements only the best, it contributes to the success of its ventures by providing expertise (e.g. connections with hit-men), operates globally and helps connect the members with new and bigger opportunities for criminality.
One critical difference with a typical VC firm is that SPECTRE personnel conceive and operate each venture. This is contrary to the normal model of VCs taking stakes in companies run by largely independent management.
A second difference between SPECTRE and most VC companies is that SPECTRE operatives are all partners in the business. VCs source the bulk of their capital from passive external investors. Incentives for VCs come from management fees and carried interest (a share of the upside of the fund). SPECTRE appears to be funded by its managing partner, Ernst Stavro Blofeld, with each of the other active partners also participating in the return that the firm generates.
Blofeld’s skill-set and experience, meanwhile, also matches up quite nicely with the skill-sets expected of the greatest modern information industrial military complex leaders:
Blofeld was born on May 28th 1908 in Gdynia, Poland. Blofeld has superb credentials as a criminal and has the track record of an astute investor. He obtained an economics and political history degree from University of Warsaw before studying engineering and radionics at the Warsaw Technical Institute. He had a keen sense of the importance of information, getting a job in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs because “he had decided that fast and accurate communication lay, in a contracting world, at the very heart of power”, a statement as pertinent today as it was in 1961.
Blofeld even got ahead with hacking skills:
He first made money from insider trading by watching the cables that he processed and trading on margin. His next business was a fake spy network that capitalised on selling information to the Germans the Swedes and Americans. He made USD200k before the start of the war. Blofeld clearly had a keen sense of risk management and closed his business before war broke out. He bought Shell bearer bonds with the proceeds and had them placed in a safety deposit box in Zurich. He then set up another espionage network in Turkey and finished the war with USD500k in Swiss banks before leaving for South America (Thunderball, Ch 5).
As for the rest of the management team:
The rest of the SPECTRE management team are similarly well-established and proven criminals. They are a diverse group, complementing each other in terms of experience, skill set and geographic focus. Emile Largo is an experienced and expert Italian criminal who represented Italy in the Olympic foils (Thunderball, Ch 10). There are two scientists, Kotze (German physicist) and Kandinsky (Polish electronics expert). The other 18 members were deliberately recruited as six groups of three, selected from the world’s top criminal and subversive organisations. Members come from the Unione Siciliano, the Union Corse, SMERSH, the Sonderdienst of the Gestapo, General Tito’s Secret Police and Turks who worked with Blofeld during the war (Thunderball, Ch 5). This represents a well-credentialed and varied group with skills and contacts that allow SPECTRE to initiate and enact a varied of operations. There can be little doubt that SPECTRE represents a unique group of the world’s most skilled and seasoned crooks.
And with respect to management style and respective shareholdings in the business:
Blofeld is the senior partner in the business and is supported by Emile Largo, the established successor. This is a highly capable management team and would inspire confidence in any potential external investor. However the depth of management talent in the organisation is shallow.
The pay out model for SPECTRE is known, with 10% of revenue devoted to working capital and overheads, 10% to Blofeld and an even 4% to each of the other 20 members (Thunderball, Ch 6). These economics are largely comparable to the market for VC companies. The 20% of revenue that is paid to SPECTRE and Blofeld is in line with market norms for carried interest.
Here, in any case, is a snapshot of Spectre’s investment record and performance to date based on information garnered from the 1965 film Thunderball :

Warner says Blofeld’s HR policies are unconventional but his commitment to the culture of the organisation is without question. Furthermore, his determination to weed out even high performing partners who do not demonstrate a commitment to the whole team is admirable. The parallel to hedge fund investing and investment banking is not lost there.
Spectre returns equaled about 28 times average UK income in 1961, which was a reasonable sum but according to Blofeld “barely adequate remuneration for members’ services”.
So would the Thunderball plot (Plan Omega) get financed today based on the tests of a modern VC?
Given that the pay off was about $1.73bn in today’s money, Warner says it would definitely have qualified as Spectre’s first attempted “unicorn” venture.
Here’s what the capital costs would have looked like:

All of which represents a step change in Spectre’s risk profile, since the venture would risk more than 200 per cent of the firm’s capital and they would have to be open to new investors to finance the whole project.
After accounting for personal expenses and the equity stakes of operatives, Warner is left with a 71.45 per cent stake for Spectre or a potential return of 46.55m for a capital investment of £3m, which is 23.13 times.
We can therefore conclude that if Spectre was a modern day VC, it would have approved financing for the Thunderball caper.
With hindsight, of course, Warner says it’s clear Spectre’s risk management was lacking. James Bond could have been risk accounted for.
For example, had Blofeld partnered with Auric Goldfinger and co-funded the Goldfinger and Thunderball ventures simultaneously, a far superior risk adjusted return would have been achieved. Most importantly, he concludes, the Bond risk factor could have been diluted:
At worst, the chances of one project succeeding would have increased markedly and at best Bond would have spread his effort across both plots and they may have both been pulled off.
Related links:
Rise of the Bond villains – FT Alphaville
What can James Bond’s nemeses teach us? – The Economist
Casino Royale was all about the financial crisis – The Economist

COMERS v. Bank of Canada: Canadians Still Fighting

COMERS v. Bank of Canada: Canadians Still Fighting to Restore their National Public Bank

A few days ago, on October 14, the Canadian Court of Appeals heard another attempt from the Crown (representing the Bank of Canada) to dismiss a case against it--a case that argues the Bank has retreated from its mandate to operate as a public bank. The Canadian government is now repeating arguments it has already made concerning justiciability, and is throwing in some other procedural objections. The plaintiffs are confident that this will be the last round of procedural appeals, and that the case will actually go to trial.
In some ways, this was the Don Quixote of court cases: a small group of individuals, and a small economic think tank known as the Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform sued the Bank of Canada, a national entity under the juridsiction of the Crown, for abandoning its original mandate to be a public bank. Bank of Canada did this in 1974, and since then, has functioned largely as a middleman to funnel public money into the hands of international private banks, and to arrange loans from those private entities for the financing of Canadian needs. The money lost in interest (since B of C, functioning as a public bank, would have lent at low interest and subsequently collected the interest back itself) has been in excess of a trillion dollars.
As I wrote several months ago on the heels of an earlier procedural win for the plaintiffs:
The plaintiffs alleged that the Bank of Canada “is the only central bank among the G-8 countries that is a ‘public’ bank created by statute and accountable to the legislative and executive branches of Government.” They also argued that the bank’s secretive dealings and particular accounting practices further undermine the ability of the government to meet its constitutional obligations to provide economic security to the Canadian people.
Betty Krawczyk cites the plaintiff's arguments as follows:
1.The Bank and Crown refuse to provide interest free loans for capital expenditures;2.The Crown uses flawed accounting methods in describing public finances, which provides the rational for refusing to grant interest-free loans, and3.These and other harms are caused by the Bank being controlled by private foreign interests.
The case is still in its typically long procedural motion stage, but that stage is coming to a close now. The plaintiffs have won some solid victories, including the declaration of public standing (which allows a plaintiff to assert a “genuine interest” in a policy question even if they are not personally affected by the policy, a legal status not allowed in the U.S.) and the ability to amend their claim to make it stronger.
CanadaCurrency.jpgAn interview with plaintiff's attorney and well-known populist lawyer Rocco Galati immediately following the October 14 hearing was posted at Max Resistance. Galati seems calm and confident during the video.  "After the federal court of appeals decision," Galati said, "the government tried an abusive second stab at striking the whole claim, largely on the same basis that they lost in 2013 and 2014 in the federal court of appeal. And they also tried to strike the new, amended portion, which they had a right to try to do. Basically it was another motion to strike and the judges reserved and we'll see what happens from here."
The Crown hopes that people will lose energy and momentum, Galati said. But "the plaintiffs here are not walking away."
Someone then asked: "Why should Canadians care about this?"
"Because," Galati answered, "they're paying $30-40 billion a year in useless interest since [19]74. $1.1 trillion in useless interest alone. To fraudsters."
Galati also answered a time frame question--how long will this last if the case goes to trial? "If we get this onto trial," he answered, "it would take a couple of years to finish." Which sounds about right.

martedì 20 ottobre 2015

Italian central bank governor investigated in fraud, corruption probe

Italian central bank governor investigated in fraud, corruption probe: report

Italian central bank governor Ignazio Visco has been put under investigation in relation to a probe into alleged corruption and fraud, according to a report of Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Il Fatto Quotidiano reported on Tuesday that the alleged fraud and corruption occurred when a bank based in central Italy, Banca Popolare di Spoleto (BPS), was put in the hands of administrators and subsequently sold last year to another bank, Banco Desio.

But later the Italian highest administrative court revoked the order following claims of BPS shareholders who suffered consistent damage because of the sale.

Another seven people have been reportedly put under investigation besides Visco in relation to the probe, including the then administrators and the current BPS President Stefano Lado, who is also Vice President of Banco Desio.

"Regarding the report on BPS which appeared today in the press, the Bank of Italy has no knowledge of any initiatives by the judicial authorities," sources of the Italian central bank were quoted as saying by Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Fraud and corruption in the Italian financial and political world have often made the headlines in the local press in recent years.

On Tuesday the first hearing of a major trial called "Capital Mafia," a graft scandal which involved the former head of the Rome street-cleaning agency as well as other high-level officials, took place in the Italian capital. (Cihan/Xinhua)

sabato 17 ottobre 2015

Positioning the Euro as the world currency

Positioning the world for a transitional euro reserve system

We missed this earlier this month, but it is worth a reprise.
How do you create a global reserve currency?
Some clues by way of a speech by Benoît Cœuré, ECB board member, earlier this month:
At constant exchange rates, the euro’s share of global foreign exchange reserves has remained broadly unchanged since 2007-08. The decline in 2014 in the share of the euro at market exchange rates was a reflection of the depreciation of the euro. There is therefore no evidence that global foreign exchange reserve managers actively rebalanced their portfolios away from the euro in 2014, or in 2011-2012 for that matter. This year the euro has been increasingly used as a funding currency by international borrowers, owing to the historically low interest rates in the euro area. Investment-grade corporations in advanced economies, mainly the United States, were particularly active issuers of international bonds denominated in euro, whose proceeds are swapped back into dollars. In April 2015 Mexico became the first sovereign state to issue a bond denominated in euro with a maturity of 100 years. Moreover, the share of the euro as an invoicing or settlement currency for extra-euro area trade remained broadly stable again last year. Finally, the euro is used as a reference currency for the anchoring of exchange rates, mainly in countries neighbouring the euro area and countries that have established special institutional arrangements with the EU or its Member States.
While Cœuré goes on to note that the ECB’s position on the international use of the euro is neutral, the ECB neither hindering nor promoting it, believing that ultimately the scope of any international role is determined by market forces, he does note there are benefits as well as costs associated with reserve status.
The benefits include:
1) Seigniorage: interest-free loans to the issuing central bank from non-residents who hold the international currency. In the current environment of low interest rates, this benefit is arguably very limited.
2) Efficiency gains in financial intermediation and lowers transaction costs (it’s so much cheaper to do business if everyone takes your currency).
3) Exorbitant privilege: International currency issuers can issue debt to non-resident investors at lower interest rates than other issuers (to the extent that the currency is perceived as safe and liquid) and moreover they can invest the proceeds in higher-yielding foreign assets. The magnitude of this differential remains a subject of heated debate, however (says Cœuré).
4) Shock insulation: Recent studies suggest that exchange rate pass-through to import prices and domestic prices declines significantly, even at distant horizons, if a significant share of imports of goods and services is invoiced in the domestic currency.
As for the costs:
1) Widens the central bank remit: “It may make monetary developments more difficult to interpret, with shifts in non-resident demand for banknotes and deposits having a direct impact on money aggregates. It may complicate the conduct of monetary policy if money demand and capital flows become unstable as a result of external shocks, as the experiences of the Deutsche Mark and the Swiss franc after the demise of the Bretton Woods system starkly illustrate.”
2) Exorbitant duty: International currency issuers provide insurance to the rest of the world in times of global financial market stress, which gives rise to potentially large financial transfers between economies.
3) With great privilege comes great responsibility: With international currency status come greater responsibilities and challenges at the international and domestic level.
Regarding those responsibilities, Cœuré offers some insight into why the current global reserve provider may be back-peddling from many of these duties (our emphasis):
At the international level, one challenge is about global liquidity risk. For instance, central banks in major advanced economies have been called upon by emerging markets to establish a structured network of currency swap agreements to mitigate the risks of international currency liquidity shortages. Such agreements are however possible to the extent that they are in line with the domestic mandate of the central bank of issue, i.e. in case of concerns that liquidity stress in global markets could materially impair the pursuit of domestic policy goals. Further progress in global and regional financial safety nets would help overcome this limitation.
At the domestic level, another challenge is about foreign exchange risk. In this respect, the marked rise in foreign currency-denominated borrowing since the financial crisis, in particular in US dollars and more recently also in euro, could lead to increased demand for currency swap agreements. Currency mismatches may create financial stability risks in some emerging market economies in the event of a significant appreciation of the international currency, and the central bank of issue may be called to the rescue as “hedger of last resort” of foreign currency risk, which falls clearly outside of its domestic mandate.
That’s important stuff. Why would any sovereign wish to be the global liquidity provider of last resort if it needn’t be? Especially if it no longer has to send out bucket loads of IOUs to cover for its energy deficit?
On which note, do read the FT’s Martin Sandbu review of the latest piece by BP chief economist (and former BoE man) Spencer Dale, which draws attention to the new monetary and energy balance in the world. He who requires the spice, is doomed to pump endless IOUs into the international system.
Dale notes that BP expects the US to become self-sufficient in energy by the early 2020s and in oil by the early 2030s:

To the contrary, China and India are likely to account for around 60 per cent of the global increase in oil demand over the next 20 years:
This increase in oil demand will far outstrip local supplies, such that by 2035, China looks set to import around three-quarters of the oil it consumes and India almost 90%.
What this means is that a key element in the global imbalances has completely changed. And in Dale’s opinion the reduction in the US energy deficit has certainly contributed to the dollar’s appreciation in recent years.
There are geopolitical consequences of this precisely because it releases the US from its exorbitant duty responsibility:
It is inconceivable that the reduced dependency of the US on oil imports won’t affect its relationship with some of the key oil producers. Perhaps even more importantly, China’s increasing reliance on energy imports to fuel its future growth – and the associated concerns this brings about energy security – is likely to have an increasing influence on China’s foreign relations. Indeed, it seems likely that the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – and the associated “one belt, one road” policy which has been a centre piece of President Xi Jingping’s first term – stems in no small measure from these energy security concerns.
But, as Martin Sandbu notes, there is another important factor that relates to all of this. The diminishing amount of “rent” making its way into the global system, on account of both the US backing away from its dollar reserve position, but also because of the entry of shale to the market.
Rent, as Sandbu explains, is politically potent because it represents a windfall to be distributed or spent at will by those who have economic leverage in the system. For decades sovereign oil producers have benefitted from this extraordinary privilege to charge an essential “tax” on oil consumers.
But shale changes this quite dramatically precisely because it resembles a manufacturing process which increases the elasticity in the oil market and by doing so reduces the ability of large producers to extract undue amounts of rent.
As Sandbu notes:
…it is harder to sustain economic rent if new production can easily be brought on stream to compete away the profit margin — then the politics of oil may well follow the same course.
That disadvantages any country that doesn’t have the capacity or will to indulge in shale production, and makes it the growing target of oil producing rent extractors.
Going back to Cœuré and the euro, it could well be that because of the manufacturing oil production effect, there simply won’t be a predominantly global reserve currency at all.
Such a framework is known as a multi-polarity system.
On paper of course this sounds great — no exorbitant privilege or duty for anyone!
But as Cœuré observes, be careful what you wish for.
Global imbalances may have caused all sorts of confusion for the system, but they may also have led to a unique period of global cooperation and de-risking thanks to the provision of a financial shock absorbing effect.
Or as Cœuré puts it, some people are worried that a multipolar currency system might increase global financial instability:
They argue that the likelihood of self-fulfilling runs on reserve currencies would increase, insofar as investors could switch more easily from one currency to another, seeking to convert their holdings first for fear of suffering losses down the line.
Cœuré himself suggests that this fear may be overblown because sovereigns will likely act as countercyclical agents, loading up on inventories in the style of dealer banks before them:
These concerns might be overblown, however. First, the extent of price adjustments would depend significantly on the degree of substitutability between reserve assets and on whether reserve currencies would be seen by investors as substitutes or complements. Second, official reserve managers have a longer time horizon than private market participants and are therefore more likely to act as stabilising rather than destabilising investors. Third, the sub-prime and euro area crises showed that, even when large shocks occur in reserve-issuing countries, rebalancing in reserve portfolios may remain limited.
But we’re not there yet. While Cœuré seems confident the global monetary system will evolve towards a multi-polarity system over time, it’s more likely that in the interim the euro crisis has paradoxically improved the euro’s prospects as an international currency.
As he concludes:
In the light of this, a stronger international role for the euro, while not being an objective per se, would be an indicator not only of the continued confidence of the rest of the world in the single currency and in the euro area, but also of the success of the EU in completing EMU. And vis-a -vis the latter outcome the ECB is definitely not neutral.
Behold ladies and gentlemen, the upcoming transition towards the PetroEuro.
Related links:
New Economics of Oil – BP
Hello world. I’m the PetroEuro! – FT Alphaville
Is the end of the oil era nigh? – FT Alphaville
China’s defence against supply chain disruption - FT Alphaville
On the hypothetical eventuality of no more petrodollars – FT Alphaville
With petrodollars also go global reserves – FT Alphaville
Goldman on the commodity/EM financing negative feedback loop – FT Alphaville

Post in evidenza

The Great Taking - The Movie

David Webb exposes the system Central Bankers have in place to take everything from everyone Webb takes us on a 50-year journey of how the C...