Talibankers Have Attacked Us Already

Forget Islam, Bankers and Globalists Have Attacked Us Already


World War II was an all-out four year war between the world's then leading economic powers. Global bankers hedged by financing both sides.

The current economic deficit is rooted in the all-out war against two Third World countries, neither of which could launch an attack against the U. S. unless the U. S. intelligence assigned a black op team to do it for them.

Moral and ethical corruption based on perpetual war set the stage for the poor moral climate that quickly spread into the wider economy itself. It is argued that World War II got the U. S. out of the Great Depression - but the costly War on Terror contributed to the economic slowdown and then collapse that is reflected in the current Undeclared Depression.

As for World War 2 being "classical Keynesian" that economic philosophy has inflation as an important component and as Keynes himself said:

"By a continuing process of inflation, government can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens."

Only this time the global banker consortium is only financing one side of the War on Terror since the opposition consists of ragged, desperate freedom fighters who are not running up debt to buy weapons of destruction.

Meanwhile, the government has allowed investment bankers and corporations to obliterate the American production capacity with greater devastation and accuracy than the Islamic terrorists could ever accomplish. Thank you Council on Foreign Relations, Trilateralists and all you investment bankers and government regulators. .

Why Wikipedia can't tell the truth on banking

Wiki-Rath

The Soros Connection

March 2010 -- Although Jimmy Wales, the public figurehead of Wikipedia, tries to give the world the impression that his website is an independent entity, the reality is that the Wikimedia Foundation, of which Wikipedia is a project, is directly dependent upon support from super-wealthy benefactors with connections to the pharmaceutical investment business.

George Soros (Image credit: Wikipedia)

One of the most notable of the Wikimedia Foundation’s supporters is the so-called “Open Society Institute”, founded by the chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC, George Soros.

Links between George Soros, the Wikimedia Foundation and the drug industry

George Soros is a Hungarian-born currency speculator and multi-billion dollar stock market wheeler-dealer who has been convicted of insider trading in France. Accused in court by the Dr. Rath Foundation of having funded the ARV drug-promoting Treatment Action Campaign to the tune of 1.4 million South African Rand, Soros has invested heavily in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors over the years, buying large holdings in companies such as Pfizer, Merck and Monsanto.

Significantly, therefore, Melissa Hagemann, Senior Program Manager of the Soros Open Society Institute’s Information Program, currently sits on the advisory board of the Wikimedia Foundation, which operates Wikipedia. Hagemann has also worked with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – an organization that, like Soros, has previously invested heavily in the drug industry and, according to the Los Angeles Times, reaps vast financial gains every year from investments that contravene its claims to good works.

Similarly, Ethan Zuckerman, a member of the Wikimedia advisory board since its formation in January 2007, simultaneously sits on a funding board for the Information Program of the Soros Open Society Institute.

Another member of the Wikimedia advisory board, Trevor Neilson, is currently President of the so-called Global Philanthropy Group and has notably advised the likes of Bono, Bill Gates and former U.S. president Bill Clinton – all of whom have been prominent promoters of ARV drugs – on HIV/AIDS. Moreover, Neilson has also served as Executive Director of the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS (GBC), which was created with investments from Soros, Gates and the American media tycoon Ted Turner. GBC has close connections to the drug industry and the members of its inaptly-named “Health Systems Strengthening” intervention include the drug multinationals Merck; Sanofi-Aventis; Abbott; Pfizer; Schering-Plough and others. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations – whose honorary chairman is the key drug industry investor David Rockefeller – Neilson is said to have recruited over 100 companies to join GBC.

Soros and currency speculation

Currently said to be at the centre of a plot to cash in on the fall in value of the euro, and to be placing large bets against it, Soros has a long history of engaging in morally dubious currency speculation schemes for personal gain.

In early 1992, for example, he decided that the British pound would have to be devalued on the grounds he considered it had entered the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – the currency exchange rate system that prepared for the introduction of the euro – at too high a rate. As a result, he spent months building up a gigantic trading position with the aim of profiting on a colossal scale. Reportedly borrowing around 6.5 billion British pounds, Soros converted his holdings into a mixture of German Deutschmarks and French francs. On 16 September 1992, now known as “Black Wednesday”, his gamble paid off and brought him a fortune. Over the following days, he unwound his positions, causing a tidal wave of selling the pound on foreign exchanges, with the result that the value of the pound plummeted and Britain was forced to drop out of the ERM. As a result, Soros made a profit of around £1 billion and became known as "The man who broke the Bank of England."

However, defending the pound against Soros’ enormous bets on the international currency markets cost Britain around £3.3 billion and the resulting financial turmoil in the country was widely viewed at the time as a national disaster.

To Soros, however, engaging in massive currency speculation gambles for personal gain is all in a day’s work. Said to dabble daily in currency markets to the tune of $1 trillion, his alleged role in sparking the 1997 Asian economic crisis led to a group of southeast Asian countries calling for him to be prosecuted as a criminal.

Business associates of Soros

According to the New Statesman, Soros’ business partners have included the Carlyle Group, where he is reported to have invested more than $100m. One of the world's largest private equity funds, the Carlyle Group is believed to make most of its money from work as a defence contractor. At various times, its advisors and investors are said to have included the former U.S. secretary of state James Baker, former U.S. defence secretary Frank Carlucci, former U.S. president George Bush senior and even relatives of Osama Bin Laden.

Money for nothing?

The involvement of Soros and his so-called Open Society Institute in the Wikimedia Foundation, and the latter’s open admittance that it relies on the “expertise & generosity” of Soros and its other benefactors, plainly raises a number of questions.

For one thing, are we supposed to believe that Soros and the Wikimedia Foundation’s other super-wealthy backers have not asked for anything in return for their money and support? Frankly, given the evidence that the facts aren’t welcome on Wikipedia when you challenge the interests of the multi-billion dollar drug industry, we suspect that some people might find this rather difficult to accept. This is especially the case given the longstanding unanswered questions regarding the relationship the Wikimedia Foundation has with venture capitalists.

This issue aside, arguably the most important matters that need to be urgently addressed by Jimmy Wales and the Wikimedia Foundation at the current time are the fact that Soros has been convicted of insider trading and that a group of southeast Asian countries want him prosecuted as a criminal for his role in sparking the 1997 Asian economic crisis. After all, if the Wikimedia Foundation is happy to accept the support of a man like Soros, what does this suggest about its own probity?

In a sense, however, the game is already up for Wikipedia. With its editors now leaving at an alarming rate and the official exams watchdog in the UK, Ofqual, recently stating that schoolchildren should avoid Wikipedia as it is not “authoritative or accurate” and in some cases “may be completely untrue”, the credibility of the website is undeniably sinking fast. And this is before we even begin to consider the fact that some of the most prolific contributors to Wikipedia are the CIA, the British Labour Party and the Vatican – and that they are not just updating their own entries, either.

Notably, therefore, Virgil Griffith, the creator of the WikiScanner, an online tool that links millions of anonymous Wikipedia edits to the organizations where those edits originated, has openly accused Wikipedia of being laden with manipulation, forgery, and the downright unscrupulous.

Based upon what we ourselves now know about Wikipedia and its backers, we’re increasingly inclined to agree with his analysis.

The Beat of the Economic Heart

The Beat of the Economic Heart: Joseph Schumpeter and Arthur Spiethoff on Business Cycles

Kurz, Heinz D. (2010): The Beat of the Economic Heart: Joseph Schumpeter and Arthur Spiethoff on Business Cycles. Unpublished.

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Abstract

The paper discusses the relationship between Arthur Spiethoff and Joseph A. Schumpeter, the men and their works. Had it not been for Spiethoff Schumpeter would in all probability have forever been lost to scientific work. It was Spiethoff who brought the Austrian back to academia and research after a sequence of serious mishaps in politics and banking. Spiethoff's contribution to an analysis of business cycles is then summarized and important similarities and some differences between it and Schumpeter's are pointed out. The view of Spiethoff and Schumpeter that cycles are endogenous and cannot possibly be eliminated without at the same time eliminating the dynamism of the capitalist economy is then couterposed with views of some of their contemporaries and particularly modern mainstream macroeconomics that this is not so.

Item Type:	MPRA Paper
Language:	English
Keywords:	Schumpeter; Spiethoff; business cycles; innovations; creative destruction
Subjects:	B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B3 - History of Thought: Individuals > B31 - Individuals E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
ID Code:	20429
Deposited By:	Heinz D. Kurz
Deposited On:	04. Feb 2010 14:58
Last Modified:	09. Feb 2010 09:47
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Borchardt (ed.), Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59-83 and 224-229 Borchardt, K. (1985) Konjunkturtheorie in der Konjunkturgeschichte: Entscheidung über Theorien unter Unsicherheit ihrer Gültigkeit, Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 72: 537-555. Borchardt, K. (1988) Keynes’ “Nationale Selbstgenügsamkeit” von 1933. Ein Fall von kooperativer Selbstzensur, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 108: 271-284. Bronfenbrenner, M. (ed.) (1969) Is the Business Cycle Obsolete? Based on a Conference of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Economic Stability, New York etc.: Wiley-Interscience. Clausing, G. ed (1933) Der Stand und die nächste Zukunft der Konjunkturforschung. Festschrift für Arthur Spiethoff, Munich: Duncker and Humblot. Clausing, G. 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Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Rieter, H. (1994) Historische Schulen, in O. Issing (ed.), Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, 3rd edn, Munich: Franz Vahlen, pp. 127-162. (4th edn Munich: Franz Vahlen 2002, pp. 131-168.) Rieter, H. (1998) Der deutsche Volkswirt 1926 bis 1933. Eine Fallstudie zur publizistischen Umsetzung wirtschaftspolitischer Konzeptionen, in E.W. Streissler (ed.), Die Umsetzung wirtschaftspolitischer Grundkonzeptionen in die kontinentaleuropäische Praxis des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, II. Teil, in Studien zur Entwicklung der ökonomischen Theorie, vol. XVII, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 95-154. Salin, E. (1951) Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 4th edn, Bern: A. Francke AG–Verlag, and Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schefold, B. (1992) Nationalökonomie als Geisteswissenschaft – Edgar Salins Konzept einer Anschaulichen Theorie, List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, 18(4): 303-324. Schefold, B. (1994) Wirtschaftsstile, vol. 1: Studien zum Verhältnis von Ökonomie und Kultur, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. Schefold, B. (2010) Spiethoff, Arthur August Caspar (Kaspar), in Neue Deutsche Biographie; to be published. Schumpeter, J. A. (1908) Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Schumpeter, J. A. (1910) Über das Wesen der Wirtschaftskrisen, Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung 19: 271-325. Reprint in Schumpeter (1987), pp. 227-274. Schumpeter, J. A. (1911) Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (the impressum gives wrongly 1912 as the year of publication), Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Schumpeter, J. A. (1914). Die Wellenbewegung des Wirtschaftslebens, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik 39: 1-32. Schumpeter, J. A. (1926a) Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, second edn, Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Schumpeter, J.A. (1926b) Gustav v. Schmoller und die Probleme von heute, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 50: 337-388. Reprinted in J. A. Schumpeter, Dogmenhistorische und biographische Aufsätze, edited by E. Schneider and A. Spiethoff, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schumpeter, J. A. (1928) The Instability of Capitalism, Economic Journal 38: 361-386. Schumpeter, J. A. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, English translation of Schumpeter (1926), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schumpeter, J. A. (1939) Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, two vols, New York: McGraw-Hill. Schumpeter, J. A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, edn of 1975, New York: Harper. Schumpeter, J. A. (1952) Aufsätze zur ökonomischen Theorie, edited by E. Schneider and A. Spiethoff, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schumpeter, J. A. (1954) History of Economic Analysis, London: Allen & Unwin. Schumpeter, J. A. (1985) Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik, edited by Ch. Seidl and W. F. Stolper, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schumpeter, J. A. (1987) Beiträge zur Sozialökonomik, edited and introduced by S. Böhm, Vienna: Böhlau. Schumpeter, J. A. (1993) Joseph Alois Schumpeter. Aufsätze zur Tagespolitik, edited by Ch. Seidl and W. F. Stolper, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schumpeter, J. A. (2000) Briefe/Letters, edited by U. Hedtke and R. Swedberg, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Schweitzer, A. (1941) Spiethoff’s Theory of the Business Cycle, University of Wyoming Publications (Continuation of University of Wyoming Publications in Science), 8(1): 1-30. Smith, A. (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1st edn 1776. Vol. II of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd, Oxford: Oxford University Press. In the text quoted as WN, book number, chapter number, section number, paragraph number. Spiethoff, A. (1902) Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie der Überproduktion, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 26: 721-59. Spiethoff, A. (1903) Die Krisentheorien von M. v. Tugan-Baranowski und L. Pohle, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 27: 679-708. Spiethoff, A. (1909a) Die äussere Ordnung des Kapital- und Geldmarktes, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 33: 445-67. Spiethoff, A. (1909b) Das Verhältnis von Kapital, Geld und Güterwelt, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 33: 927-51. Spiethoff, A. (1909c) Der Kapitalmangel in seinem Verhältnis zur Güterwelt, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 33: 1417-1437. Spiethoff, A. (1914) Untersuchungen über Preisbildung, Abteilung D, Der Einfluss der Golderzeugung auf die Preisbildung 1890 – 1913. Part 1. Die allgemeine Preisbewegung 1890 – 1913, Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Spiethoff, A. (1925) “Krisen”, Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 6, pp. 8-91. English translation, see Spiethoff (1953). Spiethoff, A. (1932) Die allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre als geschichtliche Theorie. Die Wirtschaftsstile, in Festschrift in honour of Werner Sombart, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 56: 891-924. Spiethoff, A. (1934) Boden und Wohnung in der Martkwirtschaft, insbes. im Rheinland, Jena: Fischer. Spiethoff, A. (1938) Gustav von Schmoller und die anschauliche Theorie der Volkswirtschaft, in Gustav von Schmoller und die deutsche geschichtliche Volkswirtschaftslehre, Gedenkschrift in Memory of Gustav von Schmoller, Schmollers Jahrbuch, 62: 400-419. Spiethoff, A. (1949) Anschauliche und reine volkswirtschaftliche Theorie und ihr Verhältnis zueinander, in E. Salin (ed.), Synopsis. Festgabe für Alfred Weber in Honour, Heidelberg, pp. 567-664. Spiethoff, A. (1950) Joseph Schumpeter in Memoriam Kyklos 3: 289-93. Spiethoff, A. (1953) Business Cycles, with a preface by the author, International Economic Papers, vol. 3, London and New York, pp. 75-171. Spiethoff, A. (1955) Die wirtschaftlichen Wechsellagen. Aufschwung, Krise, Stockung, with a preface by Edgar Salin, two vols, Tübingen and Zürich: Polygraph. Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Streissler, E.W. (1994) The Influence of German and Austrian Economics on Joseph A. Schumpeter, in Y. Shionoya and M. Perlman (eds), Schumpeter and the History of Ideas, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 13-40. Swedberg, R. (1991) Joseph A. Schumpeter. His Life and Work, Cambridge: Polity Press. Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I. (1894) Promyshlennye krizisy v sovremennoi Anglii (The Industrial Crises in England), St. Petersburg. German translation in 1901, French translation in 1913.

Eu Barter Assembly To Make Historic Decisions

European Barter Assembly To Make Historic Decisions

In addition to an ambitious agenda at the upcoming Paris Conference, where barter companies of Europe and Asia are meeting in May, the Assembly to decide whether to petition the European Commission to exempt trade clearinghouses from pending regulations of financial clearinghouses.

The draft regulations could be construed to cover trade companies by virtue of their use of trade credits, resulting in capital requirements that many trade companies would find difficult to meet. IRTA is also considering this matter.

The Assembly will also consider an action program to build strong relations with universities in Europe and Asia, concentrating on economics departments and business schools. It may additionally advance a cooperative program with business trade associations in each country. Thus to demonstrate the power and value of commercial exchanges for business in present economic conditions.

BarterNews will report on the outcome of these historic precedents in a future issue of the Tuesday Report.

[BWP Newswire] 28/04/2010 - The best stories about the World Bank and IMF

A selection of news stories related to the World Bank and IMF, brought to you by the Bretton Woods Project:

Disappointing disconnect between World Bank general capital increase, need for low-carbon development
http://www.favstocks.com/disappointing-disconnect-between-world-bank-general-capital-increase-need-for-low-carbon-development/2710382/
FavStocks, 27 April 2010

Civil society calls on World Bank to reform its energy lending
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51203
IPS, 26 April 2010

Developing nations gain clout at World Bank - depending on your math
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51198
IPS, 26 April 2010

World Bank promotes land grab: think tank report charges that the International Finance Corporation aids corporate control of arable land
http://www.straightgoods.ca/2010/ViewArticle.cfm?Ref=452&Cookies=yes
Straight Goods, 26 April 2010

UN official urges more power to developing countries in world financial system
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/6962215.html
People's Daily, 25 April 2010

Brazil finance minister: No confidence IMF surveillance ever evenhanded
http://imarketnews.com/node/12338
iMarketNews, 24 April 2010

Argentina says it is better off without IMF advice
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2414517920100424?type=marketsNews
Reuters, 24 April 2010

Making the International Monetary Fund accountable to human rights
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/radhika-balakrishnan/making-the-international_b_549976.html
Huffington Post, 23 April 2010

"Radical reform" urged for private-sector development support
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51179
IPS, 23 April 2010

Paying for the crisis: IMF staff reject the FTT (in favour of a financial activities tax)
http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=4108
Eurodad, 22 April 2010

Romanian teachers strike over IMF-driven pay cuts
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/22/world/international-uk-romania-strike..html?_r=1
New York Times, 22 April 2010

Emerging world urges rich world to tame debt
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/22/world/international-uk-g24.html?_r=1
New York Times, 22 April 2010

Would the real IMF please stand up? by Kevin Gallagher
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2010/04/would-the-real-imf-please-stand-up/ Financial Times, 21 April 2010

World Bank's IFC, Nordea, Calyon and Finnvera complicit in violations of international law
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more_information/icj-rules.php
CEDHA, 20 April 2010

L’accertamento dell’usura nelle operazioni di credito

Riepilogo dei punti più innovativi sviluppati nel saggio:

L’accertamento dell’usura nelle operazioni di credito finanziario


Rispetto al "tradizionale" approccio al fenomeno dell'usura bancaria (che per i conti correnti, attualmente, è orientato esclusivamente a verificare per quanti trimestri e di quanto, è stato superato il tasso soglia) ho sottolineato che si tratta di un reato di pericolo.
Nessuno per la verità contesta questa caratteristica del reato, ma sono le conseguenze giuridiche e pratiche, di questa classificazione che finora nessuno sembra aver mai considerato: se l'usura è un reato di pericolo significa che non è necessario che il supero del tasso soglia si realizzi effettivamente, ma è sufficiente che nel contratto si trovino le clausole che lo permettano e di conseguenza, le autorità competenti come prima cosa da fare, quando gli si chiede di verificare se il tasso di un’operazione creditizia (anche bancaria) è usurario o meno, dovrebbero guardare alle clausole del contratto di prestito che stabiliscono quali sono, in teoria, i tassi (massimi) complessivamente applicabili all'operazione.

L'esempio fatto nell'articolo credo sia incontestabile: "Il tasso soglia per mutui (a tasso variabile), nel primo trimestre del 2010, è del 4,38%, se le parti si accordano per un muto (di questo tipo) al tasso del 4,00%, sembrerebbe tutto regolare, ma nel caso in cui il tasso di mora previsto in quel contratto fosse dello 0,50% si tratterà di un mutuo usurario, anche se si pagheranno tutte le rate puntualmente e pertanto, alla fine del contratto, il contraente potrebbe farsi restituire tutti gli interessi pagati (come previsto dall'art. 1815 del c.c.) a causa della nullità delle clausole che stabiliscono i tassi".

Riporto qui un altro passo del saggio (tratto dal § 5) dove sottolineo un altro aspetto finora trascurato da giudici, procuratori della repubblica ed avvocati: " l’“arma” del delitto di usura non è il tasso elevato, ma l’accordo con cui si chiedono interessi oltre il limite o sproporzionati ed i colpevoli, in tal caso, saranno logicamente tutti quelli che approvano e utilizzano (anche in sede giudiziaria) il contratto usurario! E’ pertanto evidente che penalmente responsabili del reato di usura, sono coloro che predispongono (fasi preliminari e/o precontrattuali), concludono (stipula) e/o chiedono l’esecuzione dell’accordo usurario."

In questo contesto è chiaro che i dirigenti, cui la legge (art. 50 Tub) permette, con una loro semplice firma, di attestare il credito del conto corrente bancario, allo scopo di ottenere l’emanazione di decreti ingiuntivi, saranno responsabili, non tanto del reato di falso, ma di quello di usura !

Nelle perizie e nei processi per usura relativi ai contratti di prestito connessi ai conti correnti (apertura di credito/castelletto) finora tutti gli interessati (periti, avvocati, magistrati) si affannano a vedere se il tasso è stato superiore o meno alle soglie trimestralmente stabilite, ma tale approccio, secondo il mio parere, è assolutamente errato; sarebbe come se in un processo per detenzione di arma da guerra ci si mettessero a discutere e ad esaminare i proiettili per stabilire se sono idonei o meno ad uccidere, ma quello che la legge punisce è il mero possesso dell'arma (reato di pericolo), non se l'arma ha sparato o meno (che è un'altro reato, eventualmente).

Esaminare se il tasso massimo teoricamente applicabile ai prestiti sia superiore o meno al tasso soglia indicato dalla legge, al momento della conclusione del contratto, porta logicamente a delle perizie per l'accertamento dell'usura costruite sui contratti e non sui tassi applicati trimestralmente al conto corrente, come erroneamente fatto finora. Un ulteriore aspetto, finora taciuto e che nell’articolo si evidenza, è che l’usura è un reato che continua finché ci sono richieste di pagamento di capitale ed interessi usurai e perciò anche le esecuzioni immobiliari/fallimenti cui partecipano le banche denunciate per usura dall'esecutato/fallito (o dai fideiussori) rientrano in questa situazione, perché è evidente che con queste procedure si vuole consegnare del danaro a coloro che, secondo l’esecutato, sono autori di un reato gravissimo.

Delle due l’una: o l’esecutato è un calunniatore o la procedura va sospesa, perché altrimenti i pubblici ufficiali addetti (giudici, cancellieri, ufficiali giudiziari, notai) favorirebbero il compimento del reato di usura e nell'articolo faccio notare che a fronte di centinaia di denuncie per usura bancaria non c'è mai stata nemmeno una semplice querela per calunnia !

E se i giudici delle esecuzioni non capiscono questo elementare problema di ordine pubblico (chi denuncia l'usura, anche quella bancaria, ha diritto alla sospensione delle esecuzioni), gli interessati passeranno alle vie di fatto perché il reato di usura consente l’arresto in flagranza degli autori, anche da parte del privato cittadino, ai sensi dell’art. 380 c.p.p..
A mio avviso pure i soci delle banche o delle finanziarie i cui dirigenti potrebbero essere riconosciuti colpevoli di usura, essendosi avvantaggiati con la percezioni di utili (spa) o con l’aumento del valore delle quote (popolari/cooperative) potrebbero essere accusati di favoreggiamento dell'usura.
In questi casi un mezzo per evitare incriminazioni potrebbe essere la verbalizzazione, nelle assemblee societarie, di una dichiarazione con cui il socio, che non intende essere correo di usura, chiede agli amministratori, eventualmente imputati (o anche solo imputandi), di riparare o risarcire i danni mediante il “ravvedimento operoso” di cui parla l’art. 62 c.p., in modo che gli effetti del reato non ricadano sugli azionisti.
Altro punto importante dell'articolo è l'aver evidenziato che, oltre al supero del tasso soglia esiste anche la fattispecie dell'usura per sproporzione (usura “soggettiva”), la quale non richiede particolari disquisizioni sull'utilizzo o meno della formula della Banca d'Italia (non si guarda al supero del tasso soglia), ma pone l'attenzione sul tasso medio vigente all'epoca della stipula e all'approfittamento della situazione di (temporanea) difficoltà economica o finanziaria di un'impresa o di una famiglia.
Che ci sia anche quest'altro tipo di usura nessuno lo nega, ma perché magistrati, consulenti ed avvocati, finora, non hanno mai guardato a questa forma usura ? Forse perché l'applicare tassi più alti a chi è in difficoltà, con la scusa del maggior rischio, è per l'appunto la logica normale delle banche.
Perché in quindici anni nessuno ha detto o fatto qualcosa per far cessare l’usura bancaria, ma anzi hanno “legittimato” l’anatocismo, che è la principale fonte di questo tipo di usura ?

Che dipenda dalla conventio ad escludendum illustrata nel § 3 ?

Gianni Frescura

How the SEC and Congress Can Bring Down Goldman Sachs

How the SEC and Congress Can Bring Down Goldman Sachs and Expose the Financial Coup

Posted on Wednesday, April 28th, 2010

By David DeGraw, AmpedStatus Report

Not only did Goldman Sachs profit on betting against CDOs they designed to fail; more importantly, they insured them through AIG which led to a $182 billion taxpayer bailout.

Have you heard the news? It’s everywhere! The SEC and Congress have all of a sudden sprung to life and are now “getting tough” on Goldman Sachs. Is this all the first phase of a long-awaited investigation that will reveal the causes of our current economic crisis, or is this just more show trials and psychological operations designed to manipulate public opinion and make the American people feel that our elected officials are finally standing up to their campaign funders on Wall Street?

First off, let’s address these SEC charges against Goldman Sachs. At first glance you might think, oh big deal, this is just a minor civil suit that only indicts a low-level Goldman employee. Goldman will just throw some money at it and it will most likely go away. After all, Wall Street firms have already thrown over $430 billion out to derail 1500 cases against them, so what will make this any different?

We are also left wondering, if the SEC was serious about this case, why aren’t they investigating and prosecuting John Paulson and top Goldman executives under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutes? Even the NY Times reported that top executives were involved in the process. If you think Lloyd Blankfein wasn’t fully aware of this billion dollar deal involving John Paulson, you’re delusional. Blankfein became CEO of Goldman due to his outstanding expertise in this particular area, serving as Goldman’s head of the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities Division (FICC) since its formation in 1997.

So unless this is just the first of many moves on the part of the SEC, this whole case amounts to a psychological operation designed to once again quell popular outrage. These indications lead me to believe that this is a classic “limited hang-out.” As Wikipedia explains it:

“A limited hangout is a form of deception, misdirection, or coverup often associated with intelligence agencies involving a release or ‘mea culpa’ type of confession of only part of a set of previously hidden sensitive information, that establishes credibility for the one releasing the information who by the very act of confession appears to be ‘coming clean’ and acting with integrity; but in actuality by withholding key facts is protecting a deeper crime and those who could be exposed if the whole truth came out. In effect, if an array of offenses or misdeeds is suspected, this confession admits to a lesser offense while covering up the greater ones.”

However, on the other hand, if you take a close look at this case, it shows you that the SEC and the recent Senate probe are on exactly the right trail to not only bring down Goldman and the major players who caused the economic crisis, but also to target the key aspects of the much bigger crime, or as I call it the financial coup that led to trillions of our tax dollars being handed over to the very people who caused the crisis.

So let’s look again at the specifics of the SEC case from this angle.

Congress and the SEC are making the case that Goldman Sachs and John Paulson put together CDOs that they knew would fail and then made huge profits shorting (betting against) them.

Although the SEC and Congress are focusing on Goldman Sachs and John Paulson shorting these CDOs they knew would fail, these CDOs are at the heart of the case I presented in my Financial Coup report. Not only did they create CDOs they knew would fail and bet against them, but they also, more importantly, insured these CDOs through AIG. This is the key point and exactly what led to US taxpayers being forced to bail AIG out at the extraordinary expense of $182 billion.

Hank Paulson’s Role

Here’s how a report on Zero Hedge put it: “They [Goldman] fabricated synthetic CDOs, such as Abacus 2007 AC-1. These toxic assets, invented out of thin air, made the meltdown worse than it otherwise would have been. How much worse? Consider the numbers: According to the New York Fed, about $1.275 trillion in subprime mortgage-backed bonds were issued between 2004 and 2006.”

Now, the quote above references some of the CDO time bombs that were created in the market that eventually blew up. Also, notice when the bulk of these CDOs were created - during Hank Paulson’s reign as CEO of Goldman. As I wrote in early February, “Paulson knew these CDOs would go bust because they were based on fraudulent activities…. So Paulson and Goldman Sachs covered their risk by insuring them through AIG, making it pivotal to save AIG….”

So after Hank Paulson and Goldman Sachs created a ticking time bomb in CDOs — Paulson personally made $700 million on these shady activities — they then insured them through AIG. Paulson then moved to the US Treasury where he was calling the shots once his time bomb went off. And once it went off, Paulson quickly made the decision that AIG was “too big too fail” and must be saved at all costs.

As bad as that sounds, this is just part of the story. Enter Edward Liddy, as I wrote:

“Another egregious unilateral move by Paulson was installing Edward Liddy, one of his former board members at Goldman Sachs, as CEO of AIG. Liddy was the Chairman of Goldman’s Audit Committee, making him the most knowledgeable person regarding Goldman’s collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)… making it pivotal to… have one of Paulson’s most trusted allies run the company. With Liddy in place, billions of taxpayer dollars were secretly funneled by the Geithner-led NY Federal Reserve through AIG to Goldman Sachs and several other Wall Street elite counterparties.”

Without the AIG bailout, Goldman Sachs would have collapsed as a result of its own scam. So Hank Paulson, not John Paulson, should be the ultimate target of this investigation.

Credit Ratings Agencies and Other Firms

Other key players in this scam/coup were the credit ratings agencies. Congress is pounding away on this front now as well. Goldman Sachs either duped the major ratings agencies or got them to play along - getting them to give fraudulent AAA ratings to the CDOs that were designed to fail, thus leading investors to believe that they were safe investments.

Now, to be clear, Goldman Sachs wasn’t the only firm to create these CDO bombs, as Pro Publica reported:

“Investment banks including JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch (now part of Bank of America), Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and UBS also created CDOs that a hedge fund named Magnetar was both helping create and betting would fail. Those investment banks marketed and sold the CDOs to investors without disclosing Magnetar’s role or the hedge fund’s interests.

Here is a list of the banks that were involved in Magnetar deals, along with links to many of the prospectuses on the deals, which skip over Magnetar’s role. In all, investment banks created at least 30 CDOs with Magnetar, worth roughly $40 billion overall. Goldman’s 25 Abacus CDOs—one of which is the basis of the SEC’s lawsuit—amounted to $10.9 billion.”

The Federal Reserve’s Role

The investigations also need to target the fact that Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke turned Goldman Sachs into a bank holding company overnight, which gave Goldman and a handful of other firms, chosen by Paulson and Bernanke, access to trillions in taxpayer backed zero interest loans. This allowed them to buy up assets and manipulate the market at a time when other firms, not blessed by the Fed, couldn’t compete. This is why we now see Goldman racking in record breaking profits. Even to this day, the Fed is fighting disclosure of information on these scandalous loans estimated to be worth a stunning $2 trillion. The Fed’s desire to conceal information regarding $2 trillion in taxpayer backed loans demonstrates a complete disregard for the American people.

And while Congress is at it, they need to hold accountable the people involved in the Maiden Lane II and III taxpayer money giveaways. In these deals, the Fed moved tens of billions of taxpayer dollars without Congressional approval prior to TARP and the bailout. This is a direct violation of the Constitution, not to mention completely illegal. The Fed cannot move a single tax dollar without Congressional approval, let alone tens of billions.

Yet another focus of the investigation needs to be the outright fraudulent accounting scams that were exposed in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy report and have since been proven to be standard procedure among the 18 largest politically-connected firms. As Jennifer S. Taub revealed on Baseline Scenario: “…based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, eighteen banks ‘understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods.’ These banks include Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup.”

Once again, the Federal Reserve played a significant role in aiding and abetting these illegal accounting scams, which of course led to record breaking bonuses that are handed out based on false profits.

This is why we must aggressively pursue RICO charges, this is an organized criminal operation of the highest degree.

The bottom line is, these are the illegal activities that led to our current crisis and what amounts to trillions of dollars lost to theft and outright fraud.

There is no question that Congress and the SEC have been derelict in their duties thus far, and possibly criminally negligent, and this all could very well just be more show trials that are psychological operations to make the US public think that there is actually accountability and a rule of law. However, if Congress and the SEC can stay the course and follow this investigation through, it will lead them right into the heart of an intelligence operation designed to take down the US working class taxpayer and enrich the wealthiest people on the planet.

A bold claim, but if Congress and the SEC are actually concerned about the interests of 99% of the US population, their investigation will lead them down this path, which will eventually bring down Goldman Sachs and expose the Financial Coup.

The American public must demand that this investigation proceed along these lines. We are literally confronted with the greatest theft of wealth in history and the consequences of this are only just beginning to reap their toll.