venerdì 30 agosto 2019

The Key to a Sustainable Economy Is 5,000 Years Old

The Key to a Sustainable Economy Is 5,000 Years Old


The Key to a Sustainable Economy Is 5,000 Years Old
Klaus Wagensonner / Flickr

 Source: https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-key-to-a-sustainable-economy-is-5000-years-old/

We are again reaching the point in the business cycle known as “peak debt,” when debts have compounded to the point that their cumulative total cannot be paid. Student debt, credit card debt, auto loans, business debt and sovereign debt are all higher than they have ever been. As economist Michael Hudson writes in his provocative 2018 book, “…and forgive them their debts,” debts that can’t be paid won’t be paid. The question, he says, is how they won’t be paid.

Mainstream economic models leave this problem to “the invisible hand of the market,” assuming trends will self-correct over time. But while the market may indeed correct, it does so at the expense of the debtors, who become progressively poorer as the rich become richer. Borrowers go bankrupt and banks foreclose on the collateral, dispossessing the debtors of their homes and their livelihoods. The houses are bought by the rich at distress prices and are rented back at inflated prices to the debtors, who are then forced into wage peonage to survive. When the banks themselves go bankrupt, the government bails them out. Thus the market corrects, but not without government intervention. That intervention just comes at the end of the cycle to rescue the creditors, whose ability to buy politicians gives them the upper hand. According to free-market apologists, this is a natural cycle akin to the weather, which dates all the way back to the birth of modern economics in ancient Greece and Rome.

Hudson counters that those classical societies are not actually where our financial system began, and that capitalism did not evolve from bartering, as its ideologues assert. Rather, it devolved from a more functional, sophisticated, egalitarian credit system that was sustained for two millennia in ancient Mesopotamia (now parts of Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait and Iran). Money, banking, accounting and modern business enterprise originated not with gold and private trade, but in the public sector of Sumer’s palaces and temples in the third century B.C. Because it involved credit issued by the local government rather than private loans of gold, bad debts could be periodically forgiven rather than compounding until they took the whole system down, a critical feature that allowed for its remarkable longevity.
The True Roots of Money and Banking

Sumer was the first civilization for which we have written records. Its notable achievements included the wheel, the lunar calendar, our numerical system, law codes, an organized hierarchy of priest-kings, copper tools and weapons, irrigation, accounting and money. It also produced the first written language, which took the form of cuneiform figures impressed on clay. These tablets were largely just accounting tools, recording the flow of food and raw materials in the temple and palace workshops, as well as IOUs (mainly to these large public institutions) that had to be preserved in writing to be enforced. This temple accounting system allowed for the coordinated flow of credit to peasant farmers from planting to harvesting, and for advances to merchants to engage in foreign trade.

In fact, it was the need to manage accounts for a large labor force under bureaucratic control that is thought to have led to the development of writing. The people willingly accepted this bureaucratic control because they viewed the gods as having decreed it. According to their cuneiform writings, humans were genetically engineered to work the fields and the mines after certain lower gods tasked with that hard labor rebelled.

Usury, or the charging of interest on loans, was an accepted part of the Mesopotamian credit system. Interest rates were high and remained unchanged for two millennia. But Mesopotamian scholars were well aware of the problem of “debts that can’t be paid.” Unlike in today’s academic economic curriculum, Hudson writes:
Babylonian scribal students were trained already c. 2000 BC in the mathematics of compound interest. Their school exercises asked them to calculate how long it took a debt at interest of 1/60th per month to double. The answer is 60 months: five years. How long to quadruple? 10 years. How long to multiply 64 times? 30 years. It must’ve been obvious that no economy can grow in keeping with this rate of increase.
Sumerian kings solved the problem of “peak debt” by periodically declaring “clean slates,” in which agrarian debts were forgiven and debtors were released from servitude to work as tenants on their own plots of land. The land belonged to the gods under the stewardship of the temple and the palace and could not be sold, but farmers and their families maintained leaseholds to it in perpetuity by providing a share of their crops, service in the military and labor in building communal infrastructure. In this way, their homes and livelihoods were preserved, an arrangement that was mutually beneficial, since the kings needed their service.

Jewish scribes, who spent time in captivity in Babylon in the sixth century B.C, adapted these laws in the year or jubilee, which Hudson argues was added to Leviticus after the Babylonian captivity. According to Leviticus 25:8-13, a Jubilee Year was to be declared every 49 years, during which debts would be forgiven, slaves and prisoners freed and their property leaseholds restored. As in ancient Mesopotamia, property ownership remained with Yahweh and his earthly proxies. The Jubilee law effectively banned the outright sale of land, which could only be leased for up to 50 years (Leviticus 25:14-17). The Levitican Jubilee represented an advance over the Mesopotamian “clean slates,” Hudson says, in that it was codified into law rather than relying on the whim of the king. But its proclaimers lacked political power, and whether the law was ever enforced is unclear. It served as a moral rather than a legal prescription.

Ancient Greece and Rome adopted the Mesopotamian system of lending at interest, but without the safety valve of periodic “clean slates,” since the creditors were no longer the king or the temple, but private lenders. Unfettered usury resulted in debt bondage and forfeiture of properties, consolidation into large landholdings, a growing wedge between rich and poor, and the ultimate destruction of the Roman Empire.

As for the celebrated development of property rights and democracy in ancient Greece and Rome, Hudson argues that they did not actually serve the poor. They served the rich, who controlled elections, just as rich donors do today. Taking power away from local governments by privatizing once-communal lands allowed private creditors to pass laws by which they could legally confiscate property when their debtors could not pay. “Free markets” meant the freedom to accumulate massive wealth at the expense of the poor and the state.

Hudson maintains that when Jesus Christ preached “forgiveness of debts,” he was also talking about economic debt, not just moral transgressions. When he overturned the tables of the money changers, it was because they had turned a house of prayer into “a den of thieves.” But creditors’ rights had by then gained legal dominance, and Christian theologians lacked the power to override them. Rather than being a promise of economic redemption in this life, forgiveness of debts thus became a promise of spiritual redemption in the next.

How to Pull Off a Modern Debt Jubilee

Such has been the fate of debtors in modern Western economies. But in some modern non-Western economies, vestiges of the debt write-off solution remain. In China, for instance, nonperforming loans are often carried on the books of state-owned banks or canceled rather than putting insolvent debtors and banks into bankruptcy. As Dinny McMahon wrote in June in an article titled “China’s Bad Data Can Be a Good Thing”:
In China, the state stands behind the country’s banks. As long as authorities ensure those banks have sufficient liquidity to meet their obligations, they can trundle along with higher delinquency levels than would be regarded safe in a market economy.
China’s banking system, like that of ancient Mesopotamia, is largely in the public sector, so the state can back its banks with liquidity as needed. Interestingly, the Chinese state also preserves the ancient Near Eastern practice of retaining ownership of the land, which citizens can only lease for a period of time.

In Western economies, most banks are privately owned and heavily regulated, with high reserve and capital requirements. Bad loans mean debtors are put into foreclosure, jobs and capital infrastructure are lost, and austerity prevails. The Trump administration is now aggressively pursuing a trade war with China in an effort to level the playing field by forcing it into the same austerity regime, but a more productive and sustainable approach might be for the U.S. to engage in periodic debt jubilees itself.

The problem with that solution today is that most debts in Western economies are owed not to the government but to private creditors, who will insist on their contractual rights to payment. We need to find a way to pay the creditors while relieving the borrowers of their debt burden.

One possibility is to nationalize insolvent banks and sell their bad loans to the central bank, which can buy them with money created on its books. The loans can then be written down or voided out. Precedent for this policy was established with “QE1,” the Fed’s first round of quantitative easing, in which it bought unmarketable mortgage-backed securities from banks with liquidity problems.

Another possibility would be to use money generated by the central bank to bail out debtors directly. This could be done selectively, by buying up student debt or credit card debt or car loans bundled as “asset-backed securities,” then writing the debts down or off, for example. Alternatively, debts could be relieved collectively with a periodic national dividend or universal basic income paid to everyone, again drawn from the deep pocket of the central bank.

Critics will object that this would dangerously inflate the money supply and consumer prices, but that need not be the case. Today, virtually all money is created as bank debt, and it is extinguished when the debt is repaid. That means dividends used to pay this debt down would be extinguished, along with the debt itself, without adding to the money supply. For the 80% of the U.S. population now carrying debt, loan repayments from their national dividends could be made mandatory and automatic. The remaining 20% would be likely to save or invest the funds, so this money too would contribute little to consumer price inflation; and to the extent that it did go into the consumer market, it could help generate the demand needed to stimulate productivity and employment. (For a fuller explanation, see Ellen Brown, “Banking on the People,” 2019).

In ancient Mesopotamia, writing off debts worked brilliantly well for two millennia. As Hudson concludes:
To insist that all debts must be paid ignores the contrast between the thousands of years of successful Near Eastern clean slates and the debt bondage into which [Greco-Roman] antiquity sank. … If this policy in many cases was more successful than today’s, it is because they recognized that insisting that all debts must be paid meant foreclosures, economic polarization and impoverishment of the economy at large.



giovedì 29 agosto 2019

Tax Fraud Searches at Deutsche Boerse’s Clearstream Unit Continue

BLOOMBERG - markets

Tax Fraud Searches at Deutsche Boerse’s Clearstream Unit Continue

Updated on
  • Cologne prosecutors investigating staff and customers
  • Deutsche Boerse says it’s cooperating with the authorities
A Deutsche Boerse Group banner hangs outside the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
A Deutsche Boerse Group banner hangs outside the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Photographer: Krisztian Bocsi/Bloomberg
 
Deutsche Boerse AG, the operator of the Frankfurt stock exchange, said that searches at the company’s offices are continuing for a second day in a tax probe related to controversial Cum-Ex trades.
Cologne prosecutors started the searches at Deutsche Boerse’s Clearstream unit on Tuesday. The company has said that the probe targets staff and customers. The raids took place at the company’s offices in Eschborn, Germany, and Luxembourg, according to people familiar with the investigation.

More at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-28/cum-ex-searches-at-deutsche-boerse-s-clearstream-unit-continue

Prosecutor arrives again at Clearstream

Prosecutor arrives again at Clearstream

Source: Staatsanwaltschaft rückt erneut bei Clearstream an

https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/deutsche-boerse-tochter-staatsanwaltschaft-rueckt-erneut-bei-clearstream-an-a-1284081.html

 The Cologne prosecutor has again made representations to the Deutsche Börse subsidiary Clearstream. This is apparently about tax evasion in so-called cum-Ex shops.


Another raid on the Deutsche Börse subsidiary Clearstream
DPA


Another raid on the Deutsche Börse subsidiary Clearstream
Wednesday, 28.08.2019 15:46

Investigators have again searched the headquarters of Deutsche Börse. The prosecution is looking for evidence of cum-ex-share deals at the expense of the state treasury.

Further details about the raid in the head office of the stock exchange operator in Eschborn near Frankfurt did not make the public prosecutor's office Cologne. The focus is on the clearing and custody business Clearstream of Deutsche Börse. At the behest of the public prosecutor's office in Cologne about 50 officials were on Tuesday before the announcement.

Investigations against customers and employees

A speaker of the German stock exchange had announced that the searches had taken place in the course of investigations against customers and coworkers. According to information of the "Handelsblatt" it concerns the suspicion on assistance to the tax evasion with so-called Cum Ex transactions.

In such stock deals, investors used a gap in the law to bounce the government down billions for years. Around the dividend record date, shares with ("cum") and no ("ex") dividend entitlement were moved back and forth between several participants.


  In the end, the tax authorities were no longer sure who owned the papers. The result: tax offices reimbursed capital gains tax that had not been paid at all. The tax loop hole was closed in 2012.

br / dpa

Raid on the German stock exchange over Cum-Ex

Raid on the German stock exchange over Cum-Ex

Source: Razzia bei der Deutschen Börse wegen Cum-Ex

Steuerskandal

https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/deutsche-boerse-cum-ex-razzia-1.4577345

 
The central office of the German stock exchange in Eschborn near Frankfurt was searched by the public prosecutor's office Cologne.
    Investigations against customers and employees are about equity transactions at the expense of the state treasury.
    The raid is part of international investigations into the Cum-Ex scandal, the largest German tax scandal, which is estimated to have cost the taxpayer more than ten billion euros.

By Jan Willmroth, Frankfurt

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The public prosecutor's office in Cologne has searched in connection with stock transactions at the expense of the state treasury on Tuesday the headquarters of the German stock exchange in Eschborn near Frankfurt am Main. Corresponding information from the Süddeutsche Zeitung was confirmed by the Group on request. In the framework of international investigations into Cum-Ex, the investigators are therefore looking for the second time in rooms and on computers of the Deutsche Börse for incriminating material. "The searches are carried out in the context of investigations against customers and employees," it says, without going into detail, in the written statement of a spokesman. You fully cooperate with the investigative authorities.

The Cologne Public Prosecutor's Office simply confirmed that "as part of the complex of proceedings for the Cum-Ex-Shops", search warrants for accused persons are ongoing. A spokesman did not want to comment on the tax secrecy.

About two years ago, Deutsche Börse was the first to come under suspicion of aiding and abetting tax evasion. In September 2017, the Cologne investigators had rooms searched at the corporate headquarters. In April 2018, it was announced that the Group division Clearstream was being investigated for one employee. This is after SZ information again this time in the focus of the investigation. Clearstream is being prosecuted under the Administrative Offenses Act. Unlike previously suspected the investigators now an unspecified number of other employees of the stock exchange. Thus, the investigation is no longer limited to the one subsidiary.

Clearstream is one of the world's largest providers of securities services and manages assets of around € 14 trillion on behalf of clients, such as custodians. Clearstream claims to handle more than 100 million transactions per year. As the securities central securities custodian, Clearstream collects and monitors all transaction data, including those suspected of being taxed.
At least one employee should have supported Cum Ex trades

The investigation files in the Cum-Ex scandal also contain numerous indications of a participation of Clearstream in the shops. First of all, this is in the nature of things: without a central depositary, stock trading is unthinkable. At least one of Clearstream's employees should, however, according to the findings of the investigators, banks have helped to handle cum-Ex transactions. In January 2018, Deutsche Börse was also heard as a side party in the proceedings, according to the current annual report of the Group. There is also the passage, because of the "early stage of the procedure" it is not possible to "predict the timing, extent and extent and consequences of any decision".

 In Cologne, the focus of cross-border investigations in the largest tax scandal in German history. Banks, stock traders and their henchmen had been trading for years on shares with (cum) and no (ex) dividends to get more capital gains tax than they had previously paid. It was only in 2012 that the legislator closed a corresponding legislative gap. Law enforcement officials see the trade structures as heavy tax evasion; in Cologne, meanwhile, investigations are under way against more than 100 accused persons. Tax inspectors estimate the total damage caused by cum-ex-business for the taxpayer to more than ten billion euros.

On Wednesday in a week begins at the district court of Bonn, the first criminal case because of Cum-Ex against two former dealer of Hypo-Vereinsbank. At the time of 2007, the bank had been intensively involved in cum-ex-deals. It had long ago cleared the table, paid its tax bill and paid a fine. For the processing of the scandal in the bank of the former boss Theodor Weimer was responsible. The 59-year-old has been CEO of Deutsche Börse since the beginning of 2018.

mercoledì 14 agosto 2019

Commercial Banks as Creators of ‘“‘Money’’ (Tobin, 1963)

Financial Markets and Economic Activity

Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money"*
JAMES TOBIN


*SOURCE: Reprinted from Banking and Monetary Studies, edited by Deane Carson, for the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S, Treasury (Homewood,Ill.: Richard D.Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 408-419.
          

THE OLD VIEW

Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank credit and bank deposits. Before the admiring eyes of freshmen he puts to rout the practical banker who is so sure that he “lends only the money depositors entrust to him.” The banker is shown to have a worm’s-eye view, and his error stands as an introductory object lesson in the fallacy of composition.
From the Olympian vantage of the teacher and the textbook it appears that the banker’s dictum must be reversed: depositors entrust to bankers whatever amounts the bankers lend. To be sure, this is not true of a single bank; one bank’s loan may wind up as another bank’s deposit. But it is, as the arithmetic of successive rounds of deposit creation makes clear, true of the banking system as a whole. Whatever their other errors, a long line of financial heretics have been right in speaking of “fountain pen money”’— money created by the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower’s checking account.

In this time-honored exposition two characteristics of commercial banks — both of which are alleged to differentiate them sharply from other financial intermediaries—are intertwined. One is that their liabilities— well, at least their demand deposit liabilities — serve as widely acceptable means of payment. Thus, they count, along with coin and currency in public circulation, as “money.” The other is that the preferences of the public normally play no role in determining the total volume of deposits or the total quantity of money. For it is the beginning of wisdom in monetary economics to observe that money is like the “hot potato” of a children’s game: one individual may pass it to another, but the group as a whole cannot get rid of it. If the economy and the supply of money are out of adjustment, it is the economy that must do the adjusting. This is as true, evidently, of money created by bankers’ fountain pens as of money created by public printing presses. On the other hand, financial intermediaries other than banks do not create money, and the scale of their assets is limited by their liabilities, i.c., by the savings the public entrusts to them. They cannot count on receiving “deposits” to match every extension of their lending.

The commercial banks and only the commercial banks, in other words, possess the widow’s cruse. And because they possess this key to unlimited expansion, they have to be restrained by reserve requirements. Once this is done, determination of the aggregate volume of bank deposits is just a matter of accounting and arithmetic: simply divide the available supply of bank reserves by the required reserve ratio.

The foregoing is admittedly a caricature, but I believe it is not a great exaggeration of the impressions conveyed by economics teaching concerning the roles of commercial banks and other financial institutions in the monetary system. In conveying this mélange of propositions, economics has replaced the naive fallacy of composition of the banker with other half-truths perhaps equally misleading. These have their root in the mystique of “‘money”—the tradition of distinguishing sharply between those assets which are and those which are not “money,” and accordingly between those institutions which emit “money” and those whose liabilities are not “money.” The persistent strength of this tradition is remarkable given the uncertainty and controversy over where to draw the dividing line between money and other assets. Time was when only currency was regarded as money, and the use of bank deposits was regarded as a way of economizing currency and increasing the velocity of money. Today scholars and statisticians wonder and argue whether to count commercial bank time and savings deposits in the money supply. If so, why not similar accounts in other institutions? Nevertheless, once the arbitrary line is drawn, assets on the money side of the line are assumed to possess to the full properties which assets on the other side completely lack. For example, an eminent monetary economist, more candid than many of his colleagues, admits that we do not really know what money is, but proceeds to argue that, whatever it is, its supply should grow regularly at a rate of the order of 3 to 4 per cent per year.(1)

THE “NEW VIEW”


A more recent development in monetary economics tends to blur the sharp traditional distinctions between money and other assets and between commercial banks and other financial intermediaries; to focus on demands for and supplies of the whole spectrum of assets rather than on the quantity and velocity of “money”; and to regard the structure of interest rates, asset yields, and credit availabilities rather than the quantity of money as the linkage between monetary and financial institutions and policies on the one hand and the real economy on the other.(2) In this chapter I propose to look briefly at the implications of this “new view" for the theory of deposit creation, of which I have above described or caricatured the traditional version. One of the incidental advantages of this theoretical development is to effect something of a reconciliation between the economics teacher and the practical banker.

According to the “new view,” the essential function of financial intermediaries, including commercial banks, is to satisfy simultaneously the portfolio preferences of two types of individuals or firms.(3) On one side are borrowers, who wish to expand their holdings of real assets—inventories, residential real estate, productive plant and equipment, etc. — beyond the limits of their own net worth.
On the other side are lenders, who wish to hold part or all of their net worth in assets of stable money value with negligible risk of default. The assets of financial intermediaries are obligations of the borrowers — promissory notes, bonds, mortgages.
________________________
1) E.S, Shaw, “Money Supply and Stable Economic Growth,” in United States Monetary Policy (New York: American Assembly, 1958), pp. 49-71.

2) For a review of this development and for references to its protagonists, see Harry Johnson’s survey article, “Monetary Theory and Policy,” American Economic Review, Vol. LII (June, 1962), pp. 335-84. I will confine myself to mentioning the importance, in originating and contributing to the ‘new view,” of John Gurley and E. S. Shaw (yes, the very same Shaw cited in the previous footnote, but presumably in a different incarnation), Their viewpoint is summarized in Money in a Theory of Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

3) This paragraph and the three following are adapted with minor changes from the author’s paper with William Brainard, “Financial Intermediaries and the Effectiveness of Monetary Controls,” reprinted in this volume, Chapter 3.
_______________________

The liabilities of financial intermediaries are the assets of the lenders—bank deposits, insurance policies, pension rights.

Financial intermediaries typically assume liabilities of smaller default risk and greater predictability of value than their assets. The principal kinds of institutions take on liabilities of greater liquidity too; thus, bank depositors can require payment on demand, while bank loans become due only on specified dates. The reasons that the intermediation of financial institutions can accomplish these transformations between the nature of the obligation of the borrower and the nature of the asset of the ultimate lender are these:

(1) administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, accounting, appraising, and collecting;

(2) reduction of risk per dollar of lending by the pooling of independent risks, with respect both to loan default and to deposit withdrawal;

(3) governmental guarantees of the liabilities of the institutions and other provisions (bank examination, investment regulations, supervision of insurance companies, last-resort lending) designed to assure the solvency and liquidity of the institutions.

For these reasons, intermediation permits borrowers who wish to
expand their investments in real assets to be accommodated at lower rates and easier terms than if they had to borrow directly from the lenders.
If the creditors of financial intermediaries had to hold instead the kinds of obligations that private borrowers are capable of providing, they would certainly insist on higher rates and stricter terms. Therefore, any autonomous increase — for example, improvements in the efficiency of financial institutions or the creation of new types of intermediaries — in the amount of financial intermediation in the economy can be expected to be, ceteris paribus, an expansionary influence. This is true whether the growth occurs in intermediaries with monetary liabilities, i.e., commercial banks, or in other intermediaries.

Financial institutions fall fairly easily into distinct categories, each industry or “intermediary” offering a differentiated product to its customers, both lenders and borrowers.
From the point of view of lenders, the obligations of the various intermediaries are more or less close, but not perfect, substitutes. For example, savings deposits share most of the attributes of demand deposits; but they are not means of payment, and the institution has the right, seldom exercised, to require notice of withdrawal. Similarly there is differentiation in the kinds of credit offered borrowers. Each intermediary has its specialty, e.g., the commercial loan for banks, the real-estate mortgage for the savings and loan association. But the borrowers’ market is not completely compartmentalized.
The same credit instruments are handled by more than one intermediary, and many borrowers have flexibility in the type of debt they incur. Thus, there is some substitutability, in the demand for credit by borrowers, between the assets of the various intermediaries.(4)

The special attention given commercial banks in economic analysis is usually justified by the observation that, alone among intermediaries, banks “create” means of payment. This rationale is on its face far from convincing. The means-of-payment characteristic of demand deposits is indeed a feature differentiating bank liabilities from those of other intermediaries. Insurance against death is equally a feature differentiating life insurance policies from the obligations of other intermediaries, including banks. It is not obvious that one kind of differentiation should be singled out for special analytical treatment. Like other differentia, the means-of-payment attribute has its price. Savings deposits, for example, are perfect substitutes for demand deposits in every respect except as a medium of exchange. This advantage of checking accounts does not give banks absolute immunity from the competition of savings banks; it is a limited advantage that can be, at least in some part for many depositors, overcome by differences in yield. It follows that the community’s demand for bank deposits is not indefinite, even though demand deposits do serve as means of payment.

THE WIDOW’S CRUSE

Neither individually nor collectively do commercial banks possess a widow’s cruse. Quite apart from legal reserve requirements, commercial banks are limited in scale by the same kinds of economic processes that determine the aggregate size of other intermediaries.
One often cited difference between commercial banks and other intermediaries must be quickly dismissed as superficial and irrelevant.
This is the fact that a bank can make a loan by “writing up”its deposit liabilities, while a savings and loan association, for example, cannot satisfy a mortgage borrower by crediting him with a share account. The association must transfer means of payment to the borrower; its total liabilities do not rise along with its assets. True enough,but neither do the bank’s, for more than a fleeting moment. Borrowers do not incur debt in order to hold idle deposits, any more than savings and loan shares. The borrower pays out the money, and there is of course no guarantee that any of it stays in the lending bank. Whether or not it stays in the banking

___________________________
4) These features of the market structure of intermediaries, and their implications for the supposed uniqueness of banks, have been emphasized by Gurley and Shaw,op.cit. An example of substitutability on the deposit side is analyzed by David and Charlotte Alhadeff, “The Struggle for Commercial Bank Savings,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXII (February, 1958), pp. 1-22.

_____________________________

system as a whole is another question, about to be discussed. But the answer clearly does not depend on the way the loan was initially made.
It depends on whether somewhere in the chain of transactions initiated by the borrower’s outlays are found depositors who wish to hold new deposits equal in amount to the new loan. Similarly, the outcome for the savings and loan industry depends on whether in the chain of transactions initiated by the mortgage are found individuals who wish to acquire additional savings and loan shares.

The banking system can expand its assets either (a) by purchasing, or lending against, existing assets; or (b) by lending to finance new private investment in inventories or capital goods, or buying government securities financing new public deficits. In case (a) no increase in private wealth occurs in conjunction with the banks’ expansion. There is no new private saving and investment. In case (b), new private saving occurs, matching dollar for dollar the private investments or government deficits financed by the banking system. In neither case will there automatically be an increase in savers’ demand for bank deposits equal to the expansion in bank assets.

In the second case, it is true, there is an increase in private wealth.
But even if we assume a closed economy in order to abstract from leakages of capital abroad, the community will not ordinarily wish to put 100 per cent of its new saving into bank deposits. Bank deposits are, after all, only about 15 per cent of total private wealth in the United States; other things equal, savers cannot be expected greatly to exceed this proportion in allocating new saving. So, if all new saving is to take the form of bank deposits, other things cannot stay equal. Specifically, the yields and other advantages of the competing assets into which new saving would otherwise flow will have to fall enough so that savers prefer bank deposits.

This is a fortiori true in case (a) where there is no new saving and the generation of bank liabilities to match the assumed expansion of bank assets entails a reshuffling of existing portfolios in favor of bank deposits. In effect the banking system has to induce the public to swap loans and securities for bank deposits. This can happen only if the price is right.

Clearly, then, there is at any moment a natural economic limit to the scale of the commercial banking industry. Given the wealth and the asset preferences of the community, the demand for bank deposits can increase only if the yields of other assets fall. The fall in these yields is bound to restrict the profitable lending and investment opportunities available to the banks themselves. Eventually the marginal returns on lending and investing, account taken of the risks and administrative costs involved, will not exceed the marginal cost to the banks of attracting and holding additional deposits. At this point the widow’s cruse has run dry.

BANKS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES COMPARED

In this respect the commercial banking industry is not qualitatively different from any other financial intermediary system. The same process limits the collective expansion of savings and loan associations, or savings banks, or life insurance companies. At some point the returns from additional loans or security holdings are not worth the cost of obtaining the funds from the public.

There are of course some differences. First, it may well be true that commercial banks benefit from a larger share of additions to private savings than other intermediaries. Second, according to modern American legal practice, commercial banks are subject to ceilings on the rates payable to their depositors — zero in the case of demand deposits. Unlike competing financial industries, commercial banks cannot seek funds by raising rates. They can and do offer other inducements to depositors, but these substitutes for interest are imperfect and uneven in their incidence. In these circumstances the major readjustment of the interest rate structure necessary to increase the relative demand for bank deposits is a decline in other rates. Note that neither of these differences has to do with the quality of bank deposits as “money.”

In a world without reserve requirements the preferences of depositors, as well as those of borrowers, would be very relevant in determining the volume of bank deposits. The volume of assets and liabilities of every intermediary, both nonbanks and banks, would be determined in a competitive equilibrium, where the rate of interest charged borrowers by each kind of institution just balances at the margin the rate of interest paid its creditors. Suppose that such an equilibrium is disturbed by a shift in savers’ preferences. At prevailing rates they decide to hold more savings accounts and other nonbank liabilities and less demand deposits.
They transfer demand deposits to the credit of nonbank financial institutions, providing these intermediaries with the means to seek additional earning assets. These institutions, finding themselves able to attract more funds from the public even with some reduction in the rates they pay, offer better terms to borrowers and bid up the prices of existing earning assets.
Consequently commercial banks release some earning assets — they no longer yield enough to pay the going rate on the banks’ deposit liabilities.
Bank deposits decline with bank assets. In effect, the nonbank intermediaries favored by the shift in public preferences simply swap the deposits transferred to them for a corresponding quantity of bank assets.

FOUNTAIN PENS AND PRINTING PRESSES

Evidently the fountain pens of commercial bankers are essentially different from the printing presses of governments. Confusion results from concluding that because bank deposits are like currency in one respect — both serve as media of exchange — they are like currency in every respect. Unlike governments, bankers cannot create means of payment to finance their own purchases of goods and services. Bank-created “money” is a liability, which must be matched on the other side of the balance sheet. And banks, as businesses, must earn money from their middleman’s role. Once created, printing press money cannot be extinguished, except by reversal of the budget policies which led to its birth. The community cannot get rid of its currency supply; the economy must adjust until it is willingly absorbed. The “hot potato” analogy truly applies. For bank-created money, however, there is an economic mechanism of extinction as well as creation, contraction as well as expansion. If bank deposits are excessive relative to public preferences, they will tend to decline; otherwise banks will lose income. The burden of adaptation is not placed entirely on the rest of the economy.

THE ROLE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS

Without reserve requirements, expansion of credit and deposits by the commercial banking system would be limited by the availability of assets at yields sufficient to compensate banks for the costs of attracting and holding the corresponding deposits. In a régime of reserve requirements, the limit which they impose normally cuts the expansion short of this competitive equilibrium. When reserve requirements and deposit interest rate ceilings are effective, the marginal yield of bank loans and investments exceeds the marginal cost of deposits to the banking system. In these circumstances additional reserves make it possible and profitable for banks to acquire additional earning assets. The expansion process lowers interest rates generally — enough to induce the public to hold additional deposits but ordinarily not enough to wipe out the banks’ margin between the value and cost of additional deposits.

It is the existence of this margin — not the monetary nature of bank liabilities — which makes it possible for the economics teacher to say that additional loans permitted by new reserves will generate their own
deposits. The same proposition would be true of any other system of financial institutions subject to similar reserve constraints and similar interest rate ceilings. In this sense it is more accurate to attribute the special place of banks among intermediaries to the legal restrictions to which banks alone are subjected than to attribute these restrictions to the special character of bank liabilities.

But the textbook description of multiple expansion of credit and deposits on a given reserve base is misleading even for a régime of reserve requirements. There is more to the determination of the volume of bank deposits than the arithmetic of reserve supplies and reserve ratios. The redundant reserves of the thirties are a dramatic reminder that economic opportunities sometimes prevail over reserve calculations. But the significance of that experience is not correctly appreciated if it is regarded simply as an aberration from a normal state of affairs in which banks are fully “loaned up” and total deposits are tightly linked to the volume of reserves. The thirties exemplify in extreme form a phenomenon which is always in some degree present; the use to which commercial banks put the reserves made available to the system is an economic variable depending on lending opportunities and interest rates.

An individual bank is not constrained by any fixed quantum of reserves.
It can obtain additional reserves to meet requirements by borrowing from the Federal Reserve, by buying “Federal Funds” from other banks, by selling or “running off" short-term securities.
In short, reserves are available at the discount window and in the money market, at a price.
This cost the bank must compare with available yields on loans and investments. If those yields are low relative to the cost of reserves, the bank will seek to avoid borrowing reserves and perhaps hold excess
reserves instead. If those yields are high relative to the cost of borrowing reserves, the bank will shun excess reserves and borrow reserves occasionally or even regularly. For the banking system as a whole the Federal Reserve’s quantitative controls determine the supply of unborrowed reserves. But the extent to which this supply is left unused, or supplemented by borrowing at the discount window, depends on the economic circumstances confronting the banks — on available lending opportunities and on the whole structure of interest rates from the Federal Reserve’s discount rate through the rates on mortgages and long-term securities.

The range of variation in net free reserves in recent years has been from —5 per cent to +5 per cent of required reserves. This indicates a much looser linkage between reserves and deposits than is suggested by the textbook exposition of multiple expansion for a system which is always precisely and fully “loaned up.” (It does not mean, however, that actual monetary authorities have any less control than textbook monetary authorities. Indeed the net free reserve position is one of their more useful instruments and barometers. Anyway, they are after bigger game than the quantity of “money”!)

Two consequences of this analysis deserve special notice because of their relation to the issues raised earlier in this chapter. First, an increase - of, say, a billion dollars — in the supply of unborrowed reserves will, in general, result in less than a billion-dollar increase in required reserves. Net free reserves will rise (algebraically) by some fraction of the billion dollars — a very large fraction in periods like the thirties, a much smaller one in tight money periods like those of the fifties. Loans and deposits will expand by less than their textbook multiples. The reason is simple.
The open-market operations which bring about the increased supply of reserves tend to lower interest rates. So do the operations of the commercial banks in trying to invest their new reserves. The result is to diminish the incentives of banks to keep fully loaned up or to borrow reserves, and to make banks content to hold on the average higher excess reserves.

Second, depositor preferences do matter, even in a régime of fractional reserve banking. Suppose, for example, that the public decides to switch new or old savings from other assets and institutions into commercial banks. This switch makes earning assets available to banks at attractive yields — assets that otherwise would have been lodged either directly with the public or with the competing financial institutions previously favored with the public’s savings. These improved opportunities for profitable lending and investing will make the banks content to hold smaller net free reserves. Both their deposits and their assets will rise as a result of this shift in public preferences, even though the base of unborrowed reserves remains unchanged. Something of this kind has occurred in recent years when commercial banks have been permitted to raise the interest rates they offer for time and savings deposits.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The implications of the “new view” may be summarized as follows:

1. The distinction between commercial banks and other financial intermediaries has been too sharply drawn. The differences are of degree, not of kind.

2. In particular, the differences which do exist have little intrinsically to do with the monetary nature of bank liabilities.

3. The differences are more importantly related to the special reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings to which banks are subject. Any other financial industry subject to the same kind of regulations would behave in much the same way.

4. Commercial banks do not possess, either individually or collectively, a widow’s cruse which guarantees that any expansion of assets will generate a corresponding expansion of deposit liabilities. Certainly this happy state of affairs would not exist in an unregulated competitive financial world. Marshall’s scissors of supply and demand apply to the “output” of the banking industry, no less than to other financial and nonfinancial industries.

5. Reserve requirements and interest ceilings give the widow’s cruse myth somewhat greater plausibility. But even in these circumstances, the scale of bank deposits and assets is affected by depositor preferences and by the lending and investing opportunities available to banks.

I draw no policy morals from these observations. That is quite another story, to which analysis of the type presented here is only the preface. The reader will misunderstand my purpose if he jumps to attribute to me the conclusion that existing differences in the regulatory treatment of banks and competing intermediaries should be diminished, either by relaxing constraints on the one or by tightening controls on the other.

martedì 13 agosto 2019

Banco Santander: La batalla del relato entre Orcel y Botín

La batalla del relato entre Orcel y Botín: las discrepancias clave de un juicio de 112M

Orcel y Banco Santander están inmersos en un proceso judicial tras la demanda presentada por el exejecutivo de UBS. Hay varias divergencias clave en sus versiones

https://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2019-08-10/santander-botin-orcel-batalla-legal-112millones-demanda_2170535/

Foto: Oficinas del Banco Popular y del Santander. (EFE)
Oficinas del Banco Popular y del Santander. (EFE)
La batalla judicial entre Ana Botín y Andrea Orcel ya es una de las más mediáticas en la historia reciente del sector financiero, y apunta a ir más allá. En juego hay 112 millones de euros, que son los que pide el banquero italiano en su demanda a Banco Santander por su fichaje frustrado, con varias contradicciones clave en las versiones de ambos que serán clave para dilucidar el ganador, una vez que las grabaciones de Orcel a Botín dificultan cualquier posible acuerdo.
Las dos versiones coinciden en que el 'flechazo' surgió en Nueva York en julio del año pasado, cuando Ana Botín propuso a Orcel ejecutar él mismo como consejero delegado las propuestas como asesor que le había trasladado para "triplicar" el valor de la acción. Las conversaciones continuaron hasta septiembre, cuando se aceleró el anuncio por petición de UBS, para que fuera antes del plan estratégico que tenía previsto lanzar en octubre.
Orcel firmó una carta contrato el 24 de septiembre, y un día después el consejo aprobó el fichaje y Santander lo anunció en un hecho relevante remitido a la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). Las dos versiones coinciden en los tiempos, al señalar que tras las Navidades se rompió el proceso de incorporación. También en que el banco ofreció una compensación al italiano, tanto económica como en responsabilidad a través de algún alto cargo en empresas vinculadas al grupo.
Pero también hay muchas contradicciones entre dos de los banqueros más influyentes y poderosos de Europa.

¿Hay contrato?

El primer choque entre las versiones de Andrea Orcel y de Banco Santander está en el compromiso adquirido —o no— por ambos en septiembre. El 25 de septiembre, en un hecho relevante inesperado, la entidad cántabra anunció tras la aprobación del consejo la incorporación del italiano para ser consejero delegado en una reestructuración de la cúpula, siempre y cuando culminaran las negociaciones y recibiera las autorizaciones pertinentes. Un día antes, el 24 de septiembre, Orcel firmó la carta oferta.
La defensa de Banco Santander, según fuentes jurídicas, argumenta que la carta-oferta no es un contrato y no hay relación laboral
Hasta este punto no hay dudas. La divergencia se produce en torno a las implicaciones de este documento. La demanda de Orcel, a la que ha tenido acceso este medio, habla de contrato y de su incumplimiento. Pero la defensa de Banco Santander, según fuentes jurídicas, argumenta que esta carta-oferta no es un contrato, ya que al no llegar a buen puerto las negociaciones entre ambos y con UBS —culpando de ello a Orcel—, nunca llegó a activarse ni hubo relación laboral o mercantil entre el italiano y el banco español.

El coste del fichaje

Cuando Banco Santander anunció la cancelación del fichaje de Orcel el 15 de enero, fuentes de la entidad argumentaron que no querían hacer frente a un bonus de 55 millones de euros, que no conocían cuando se anunció la incorporación. La defensa del banco ha ido virando hacia que Orcel lideró las negociaciones con UBS y siempre dio a entender que podía rebajar el coste de su contratación para la entidad, mientras que el italiano apunta a mensajes de Botín en los que se habla de cómo actuar respecto al banco suizo.
El financiero italiano Andrea Orcel. (EFE)
El financiero italiano Andrea Orcel. (EFE)
De hecho, la carta-oferta recoge una prima de fichaje de 17 millones, además del compromiso de Banco Santander de sufragar con hasta 35 millones el bonus acumulado de Orcel —mayoritariamente en acciones de UBS—, con la condición de que el banco suizo pagara una cantidad igual o superior. La demanda de Orcel, que está asesorado por el despacho De Carlos Remón, asegura que "la señora Botín y, en consecuencia, Banco Santander, conocían la postura inflexible de UBS y el alcance de los costes de compensación".

Los esfuerzos de Orcel

Al firmar la carta oferta de Santander, Orcel se comprometió a esforzarse en que UBS asumiera la mayor parte posible del coste de su fichaje. Los 'best efforts' que según la respuesta del banco cántabro a la demanda del italiano, no existieron. La entidad asegura que el banquero lideró las negociaciones con la firma suiza y que siempre dio a entender que no habría problema en que se rebajara la parte a pagar del bonus por Santander.
En efecto, el texto de la demanda señala que Orcel "se obligaba a seguir realizados sus mejores esfuerzos para lograr que UBS le abonase los costes de compensación", y transcribe un mensaje de Botín del 20 de diciembre en el que pide al italiano seguir "empujando" ya que Axel (Weber, presidente de UBS) "no se mueve nada". Pero también asegura que Botín siempre conoció la postura inflexible de UBS, hasta el punto de que puso encima de la posibilidad de amenazar al banco suizo con quitarle negocio: "Hay una línea que tenía reservada para Axel: si deciden que no te pagan nada porque somos competidores es bueno saberlo y no pueden ser asesores estratégicos nuestros", escribió Ana Botín el 10 de septiembre, según Orcel.

El papel de Ana Botín

Orcel apunta continuamente a Ana Botín en la demanda. De hecho, un correo de la presidenta menciona que Orcel habría insinuado "acciones judiciales" contra su persona, y no solo contra el Santander como persona jurídica. Según el italiano, la presidenta ejecutiva lideró en todo momento su fichaje "personalmente", y "había ido soslayando con su intervención personal y directa todos los obstáculos que surgieron durante la negociación". Cuando llegó la ruptura también señala a Botín directamente, ya que acusa a la ejecutiva de adelantar una reunión prevista del 8 de enero al 7 de enero "saltándose todas las previsiones de gobierno corporativo de Banco Santander", para comunicar a Orcel que el contrato quedaba resuelto y que la decisión había sido comunicada a miembros del consejo y del comité de dirección, así como al Banco Central Europeo (BCE). También según la demanda, Botín lideró el intento de alcanzar algún acuerdo con el italiano, hasta ofreciendo algún cargo: "Yo tengo empresas en España donde te puedo poner de CEO mañana o de presidente, que son empresas cotizadas inmobiliarias", cita Orcel de una supuesta conversación telefónica grabada.
Ana Botín, presidenta del Banco Santander. (Reuters)
Ana Botín, presidenta del Banco Santander. (Reuters)
Banco Santander, por su parte, mantiene una versión contraria, que señala que siempre siguió el proceso establecido para nombrar un ejecutivo. Por ello, la defensa asevera que Bruce Carnegie-Brown, vicepresidente del banco y presidente de la Comisión de Nombramientos y Retribuciones, estuvo en todo momento implicado en el proceso, igual que Shaun Coles, director global de gobernanza del grupo cántabro. Orcel, por su parte, incluye en su demanda un mensaje que muestra que el primer encuentro con Carnegie-Brown fue el 31 de agosto, mes y medio después de acordar la incorporación con Botín.

El motivo de la ruptura

Todo parecía ir bien hasta finales de diciembre, cuando la relación entre Botín y Orcel se empezó a torcer, hasta romperse en enero. Aquí hay otro desencuentro entre las versiones. El italiano apunta en la demanda, de 200 páginas, a que el reparto de poder con Botín fue la causa de que Banco Santander decidiera cancelar el fichaje.
Orcel envió a la presidenta ejecutiva del banco un mensaje el 20 de diciembre con varias propuestas para desarrollar una vez que finalizara su periodo de no competencia (‘gardening leave’) de seis meses, periodo tras el cual Santander tenía previsto presentar su plan estratégico, que había retrasado desde septiembre esperando al que iba a ser su nuevo consejero delegado. Según Orcel, Botín respondió a este mensaje apremiando al italiano para tener un encuentro: “Conviene pararnos a ver dónde estamos”.
Santander, por su parte, argumenta que el motivo fue la obsesión de Orcel con el dinero y su falta de esfuerzos para abaratar el fichaje. Asegura incluso que el italiano cobró 13,7 millones de UBS durante el 'gardening leave' por la parte no diferida del bonus de 2018 y de años anteriores, y critica que no pretendía descontarlos del bonus pendiente.

El techo de Orcel en UBS

Desde Banco Santander se considera que Orcel había tocado techo en UBS, y que ser consejero delegado de la entidad cántabra era su única opción de dar un impulso a su carrera, al tiempo que se desconfía de que tuviera una oferta del grupo suizo que el italiano recoge en el escrito hasta cuatro veces. "Prueba del excelente reconocimiento por parte de UBS a las capacidades de gestión del Sr. Orcel es la contraoferta que su anterior empleador le hizo al conocer sus planes de marcha al BS, contraoferta que suponía una promoción significativa dentro del grupo, a un puesto similar al que se le ofrecía en BS, en un esfuerzo por retener el talento de uno de sus más brillantes ejecutivos", relata la demanda.

¿Vídeo con la conformidad de Orcel?

El escrito de Banco Santander en contestación a la demanda de Orcel explica que el italiano entendió la decisión de la entidad de cancelar el fichaje e incluso que grabó un vídeo aceptándolo. El italiano solo menciona dos veces en las 200 páginas algo sobre este vídeo, sin concretar si existe: "Le plantearon al Sr. Orcel incluso rodar un vídeo similar al que se había rodado con ocasión de su nombramiento".
La otra mención es en un extenso email que envió Orcel a Jaime Pérez Renovales, secretario general y del consejo, en el que acusa al banco de haber "destrozado" su carrera. "En este momento no tenéis mi acuerdo en incluirme de ninguna manera en vuestras comunicaciones internas y externas (incluido el vídeo que ahora me temo haya sido extraído bajo falso pretexto). Si procedéis, lo hacéis sin que tengamos acuerdo ninguno con todas las consecuencias del caso", escribió el italiano.

martedì 6 agosto 2019

Legality is not the problem with parallel currencies

Financial Times
Opinion Global Economy
Legality is not the problem with parallel currencies
Critics of Italy’s mini-BOT identify the threat in the wrong place
Izabella Kaminska
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/e34402da-b799-11e9-8a88-aa6628ac896c

For a while now the Italian government has been toying with the idea of introducing mini bills of treasury — so-called mini-BOTs — to help it pay debts to private sector businesses. A parliamentary vote in May which endorsed the proposal helped give the idea further credence.

But there are many who have not taken the idea seriously. This is an error. Some wrongly believe that because the securities would be considered a parallel currency they would be deemed illegal in the eurozone.

This is because European Central Bank members are obliged to hold the euro as legal tender in their respective sovereign states. Thus, the scheme would be impossible to implement unless Italy was prepared to leave the euro. It is rightly assumed that Italy is not prepared to do that.

When asked about the mini-BOT plan, ECB president Mario Draghi did not hold back. He noted: “They are either money and then they are illegal, or they are debt and then that stock goes up.”

But this view overlooks the fact that parallel currencies can circulate without legal tender status. It also fails to acknowledge that parallel currencies have always been with us, and that in most western economies there is no prohibition on settling commercial debts in other forms of mutually agreed securities or assets. Not even in the eurozone.

Legal tender status helps in establishing and popularising a currency, but it is not essential. The system as it stands features a plethora of parallel currencies, none of which are legal tender, but which all seamlessly interact with each other without any legal contradiction.

As the Bank of England points out, cheques, debit cards and contactless payments don’t constitute legal tender. They too are a form of parallel currency.
The reason we have possibly forgotten the extent and breadth of the pre-existing parallel currency network — which features everything from store-issued points, bank money to the eurodollar market — is because in recent years it has been overshadowed by the emergence of cryptocurrencies. These differ from traditional parallel currencies in that they have no overt issuer or guarantor.
But it is this wider context that makes Mr Draghi’s stance on mini-BOTs disingenuous. He should recognise that in being issued by a national treasury and capable of being accepted as payment for taxes, mini-BOTs have a better chance of succeeding as a highly liquid currency than most other rival parallel systems (certainly more so than Facebook’s proposed cryptocurrency, Libra).
As the economist Willem Buiter noted last month in a research note, if mini-BOTs do acquire the property of moneyness, they have the potential to make a real difference by transforming illiquid government liabilities (arrears) into liquid ones. Indeed, once the private sector becomes willing to hold zero interest mini-BOTs, despite there being other risk-free assets with positive interest rates, the market begins to view them as “fiscal money”.

This in turn allows the state to use that liquidity to raise public spending on real goods and services. According to Mr Buiter, in an economy with slack, output and employment could rise leading to an increase in tax receipts.

There are certainly other examples where such fiscal monetary exercises have paid dividends. Consider the IOUs California began issuing in 2009. These helped to inject enough liquidity to spare the state from bankruptcy. Those IOUs were a form of debt, which also worked like a currency with very positive impact.
Clearly, the eurozone is far more fragile than the dollar system ever was. So the analogy with California is not perfect. Another possible parallel is with the other famous state that used monetary fragmentation to tackle growing imbalances: the Soviet Union.

The original goal there was to create a system that transferred value so seamlessly that money itself would, in theory, no longer be needed. Except, as imbalances built up, the state was forced to issue three different types of money, with varying usability profiles. Unfortunately, the managed nature of these currencies, plus the lack of slack in the system, inhibited growth. A system-wide economic collapse with inflationary consequences followed.

With precedents like that, it is unsurprising that Mr Draghi was inclined to talk down the mini-BOT plan: it could genuinely undermine the euro. The legality question, however, is a distraction — something that Mr Draghi’s successor Christine Lagarde, a former lawyer, will be aware of.

izabella.kaminska@ft.com


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