lunedì 23 settembre 2013

The Philadelphia Public Bank Solution

No More Detroits…The Philadelphia Public Bank Solution

See also a new 1-hour video posted on the PublicBankingTV channel showing Mike Krauss’ presentation to a group in Philadelphia on the proposed Philadelphia Public Bank.  This video is full of information useful to people interested in finding out what a public bank could do for their city, county, university, etc.  It’s linked here.

The Rothschild House of Naples

The Rothschild House of Naples (1821-63) by marco saba

venerdì 20 settembre 2013

Why the IMF must cancel Pakistan's debt

Why the IMF must cancel Pakistan's debt

COMMENT|DR FAYAZ AHMED|19 SEPTEMBER 2013|URL
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-573374

Comment by Dr Fayaz Ahmed, Country Director, Islamic Relief Pakistan
This year, Nawaz Sharif will take over as Pakistan’s new prime minister with expectations of a ‘new’ vision for the country. Sharif will have his hands full; Pakistan is a nation facing economic challenges, chronic energy shortages, widespread poverty, inequality and all too regular episodes of extreme violence. Alongside development and economic issues, Sharif’s new government will also be tasked with tackling the debt repayments that the country is scheduled to make in the next two years and beyond in a $6.64 billion IMF loan agreement that was approved in September.
For four decades, the burden of crippling external debt has continued to strangle the development of Pakistan - a country in which more than 50 million people live below the poverty line. Pakistan’s response to its debt crisis has relied on continual bail-out loans from the IMF. The country has received bail-out loans for 29 years, one of the longest periods of lending to any nation in the world, with the debt being passed down through the generations. Today, Pakistan’s debt stands at $58 billion – including $8 billion in IMF loans made over just two years.

Public spending suffocated and resources stretched

The debt burden is suffocating public spending. Pakistan spends just three per cent of GDP on healthcare and education, forcing the country’s poorest people to revert to the more expensive private sector or rely on aid and development organisations, like Islamic Relief, to provide vital services, where available.
Pakistan’s involvement in the ‘war on terror’, reported to have cost between $68 billion and $80 billion, has further stretched resources; between 24,000 and 38,000 people have been killed in military operations, acts of terror and drone attacks.
Regional climatic changes have increased the frequency – and the economic and social cost - of natural disasters in Pakistan. In the wake of the worst floods in living memory, and the global financial crisis, the country’s debt burden increased yet again to double the $30 billion owed in 2006.
Furthermore, the economic conditions imposed by the IMF have given the organisation major sway over the country’s development – making it even harder for Pakistan to build a more stable economic future. The government has been unable to refuse the IMF’s demand to eliminate oil and electricity subsidies - although these conditions hit the poorest communities the hardest.  IMF loan programmes to Pakistan – including the most recent - have demanded the increase of sales taxes. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, these sales tax increases were coupled with a reduction in taxes on imports. Sales taxes rose from 7 per cent in 1980 to almost 30 per cent by 2000. The combined impact of these regressive changes saw the tax bill for the poorest families rising by 7 per cent, while for the richest they reduced by 15 per cent.
Fuel prices were also to rise under the IMF’s regime; despite the devastating impact this would have in causing essential commodities such as food and energy to become more expensive. During negotiations for a loan with the Fund in 2010, the  second largest party in Pakistan’s government opposed this same condition, which would have pushed poor people deeper into poverty – leading to the near-collapse of the government. As Pakistan reversed the planned price rises, the IMF shut the door to future loans and suspended its loan arrangement until negotiations re-started this year.
The September IMF loan must be repaid by 2015. The IMF provides loans to make sure that Pakistan’s creditors get their money back, but the repayments will add further to the suffering of the country’s poorest communities. External borrowing can reduce poverty when invested in useful projects which create the revenue to repay the debt with surplus used in improving the lives of Pakistani people. However, foreign lending may be wasted on failed projects or consumption rather than investment. Large amounts of foreign lending can undermine the local economy. Capital inflows, or exports of particularly high-value goods, can push up the exchange rate and damage other industries. Pakistan suffered from just such a ‘Dutch disease’ between 2002 and 2008; the elite benefited while workers in other industries lost out. Domestic saving was crowded out, leading to no net increase in investment but more foreign-owned debt.
Deciding whether debt repayments are affordable does not account for the repercussions of reduced expenditure for public services and undermining the domestic economy. Pakistan’s debt repayment costs have been rising dramatically to over $6 billion a year, which is over 20 per cent of export revenues. Repaying the debt may trigger an economic and social crisis. It will certainly increase inequality, injustice and instability in Pakistan and the wider region.

A July report by Islamic Relief and Jubilee Debt CampaignUnlocking the chains of debt, calls on the IMF and other foreign lenders, as well as the government of Pakistan, to protect and improve the lives of millions of poor people. It recommended that repayments are suspended until a public audit into Pakistan’s debt has been carried out, unjust debts cancelled, progressive taxation reforms introduced, and public spending rebalanced towards poverty reduction and infrastructure investment.
To sign Islamic Relief's petition to conduct a debt audit and cancel Pakistan's debt, please go tohttps://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Cancel_Pakistans_Debt_2/

Islamic Relief, Pakistan is part of Islamic Relief Worldwide, an independent non-governmental organisation, founded in the UK in 1984 and currently tackling poverty and suffering in 29 countries.
Islamic Relief Worldwide

We welcome submissions from representatives of Southern civil society organisations for the “comment” feature. If you are interested in contributing please contactcomment@brettonwoodsproject.org.

giovedì 19 settembre 2013

The Armageddon Looting Machine

The Armageddon Looting Machine: The Looming Mass Destruction from Derivatives

Increased regulation and low interest rates are driving lending from the regulated commercial banking system into the unregulated shadow banking system. The shadow banks, although free of government regulation, are propped up by a hidden government guarantee in the form of safe harbor status under the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act pushed through by Wall Street. The result is to create perverse incentives for the financial system to self-destruct.
Five years after the financial collapse precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the risk of another full-blown financial panic is still looming large, despite the Dodd Frank legislation designed to contain it. As noted in a recent Reuters article, the risk has just moved into the shadows:
[B]anks are pulling back their balance sheets from the fringes of the credit markets, with more and more risk being driven to unregulated lenders that comprise the $60 trillion “shadow-banking” sector.
Increased regulation and low interest rates have made lending to homeowners and small businesses less attractive than before 2008. The easy subprime scams of yesteryear are no more. The void is being filled by the shadow banking system. Shadow banking comes in many forms, but the big money today is in repos and derivatives. The notional (or hypothetical) value of the derivatives market has been estimated to be as high as $1.2 quadrillion, or twenty times the GDP of all the countries of the world combined.
According to Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, investment banks as well as commercial banks may conduct much of their business in the shadow banking system (SBS), although most are not generally classed as SBS institutions themselves. At least one financial regulatory expert has said that regulated banking organizations are the largest shadow banks.
The Hidden Government Guarantee that Props Up the Shadow Banking System
According to Dutch economist Enrico Perotti, banks are able to fund their loans much more cheaply than any other industry because they offer “liquidity on demand.” The promise that the depositor can get his money out at any time is made credible by government-backed deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  But what guarantee underwrites the shadow banks? Why would financial institutions feel confident lending cheaply in the shadow market, when it is not protected by deposit insurance or government bailouts?
Perotti says that liquidity-on-demand is guaranteed in the SBS through another, lesser-known form of government guarantee: “safe harbor” status in bankruptcy. Repos and derivatives, the stock in trade of shadow banks, have “superpriority” over all other claims. Perotti writes:
Security pledging grants access to cheap funding thanks to the steady expansion in the EU and US of “safe harbor status”. Also called bankruptcy privileges, this ensures lenders secured on financial collateral immediate access to their pledged securities. . . .
Safe harbor status grants the privilege of being excluded from mandatory stay, and basically all other restrictions. Safe harbor lenders, which at present include repos and derivative margins, can immediately repossess and resell pledged collateral.
This gives repos and derivatives extraordinary super-priority over all other claims, including tax and wage claims, deposits, real secured credit and insurance claims. Critically, it ensures immediacy (liquidity) for their holders. Unfortunately, it does so by undermining orderly liquidation.
When orderly liquidation is undermined, there is a rush to get the collateral, which can actually propel the debtor into bankruptcy.
The amendment to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 that created this favored status for repos and derivatives was pushed through by the banking lobby with few questions asked. In a December 2011 article titled “Plan B – How to Loot Nations and Their Banks Legally,” documentary film-maker David Malone wrote:
This amendment which was touted as necessary to reduce systemic risk in financial bankruptcies . . . allowed a whole range of far riskier assets to be used . . . . The size of the repo market hugely increased and riskier assets were gladly accepted as collateral because traders saw that if the person they had lent to went down they could get [their] money back before anyone else and no one could stop them.
Burning Down the Barn to Get the Insurance
Safe harbor status creates the sort of perverse incentives that make derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction,” as Warren Buffett famously branded them. It is the equivalent of burning down the barn to collect the insurance. Says Malone:
All other creditors – bond holders – risk losing some of their money in a bankruptcy. So they have a reason to want to avoid bankruptcy of a trading partner. Not so the repo and derivatives partners. They would now be best served by looting the company – perfectly legally – as soon as trouble seemed likely. In fact the repo and derivatives traders could push a bank that owed them money over into bankruptcy when it most suited them as creditors. When, for example, they might be in need of a bit of cash themselves to meet a few pressing creditors of their own.
The collapse of . . . Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG were all directly because repo and derivatives partners of those institutions suddenly stopped trading and ‘looted’ them instead.
The global credit collapse was triggered, it seems, not by wild subprime lending but by the rush to grab collateral by players with congressionally-approved safe harbor status for their repos and derivatives.
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were strictly investment banks, but now we have giant depository banks gambling in derivatives as well; and with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that separated depository and investment banking, they are allowed to commingle their deposits and investments. The risk to the depositors was made glaringly obvious when MF Global went bankrupt in October 2011. Malone wrote:
When MF Global went down it did so because its repo, derivative and hypothecation partners essentially foreclosed on it. And when they did so they then ‘looted’ the company. And because of the co-mingling of clients money in the hypothecation deals the ‘looters’ also seized clients money as well. . . JPMorgan allegedly has MF Global money while other people’s lawyers can only argue about it.
MF Global was followed by the Cyprus “bail-in” – the confiscation of depositor funds to recapitalize the country’s failed banks. This was followed by the coordinated appearance of bail-in templates worldwide, mandated by the Financial Stability Board, the global banking regulator in Switzerland.
The Auto-Destruct Trip Wire on the Banking System
Bail-in policies are being necessitated by the fact that governments are balking at further bank bailouts. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 716) now bans taxpayer bailouts of most speculative derivative activities. That means the next time we have a Lehman-style event, the banking system could simply collapse into a black hole of derivative looting. Malone writes:
. . . The bankruptcy laws allow a mechanism for banks to disembowel each other. The strongest lend to the weaker and loot them when the moment of crisis approaches. The plan allows the biggest banks, those who happen to be burdened with massive holdings of dodgy euro area bonds, to leap out of the bond crisis and instead profit from a bankruptcy which might otherwise have killed them. All that is required is to know the import of the bankruptcy law and do as much repo, hypothecation and derivative trading with the weaker banks as you can.
. . . I think this means that some of the biggest banks, themselves, have already constructed and greatly enlarged a now truly massive trip wired auto-destruct on the banking system.
The weaker banks may be the victims, but it is we the people who will wind up holding the bag. Malone observes:
For the last four years who has been putting money in to the banks? And who has become a massive bond holder in all the banks? We have. First via our national banks and now via the Fed, ECB and various tax payer funded bail out funds. We are the bond holders who would be shafted by the Plan B looting. We would be the people waiting in line for the money the banks would have already made off with. . . .
. . . [T]he banks have created a financial Armageddon looting machine. Their Plan B is a mechanism to loot not just the more vulnerable banks in weaker nations, but those nations themselves. And the looting will not take months, not even days. It could happen in hours if not minutes.
Crisis and Opportunity: Building a Better Mousetrap
There is no way to regulate away this sort of risk. If both the conventional banking system and the shadow banking system are being maintained by government guarantees, then we the people are bearing the risk. We should be directing where the credit goes and collecting the interest. Banking and the creation of money-as-credit need to be made public utilities, owned by the public and having a mandate to serve the public. Public banks do not engage in derivatives.
Today, virtually the entire circulating money supply (M1, M2 and M3) consists of privately-created “bank credit” – money created on the books of banks in the form of loans. If this private credit system implodes, we will be without a money supply. One option would be to return to the system of government-issued money that was devised by the American colonists, revived by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and used by other countries at various times and places around the world. Another option would be a system of publicly-owned state banks on the model of the Bank of North Dakota, leveraging the capital of the state backed by the revenues of the state into public bank credit for the use of the local economy.
Change happens historically in times of crisis, and we may be there again today.
_______________
Ellen Brown is an attorney, president of the Public Banking Institute, and author of twelve books including the best-selling Web of Debt. In The Public Bank Solution, her latest book, she explores successful public banking models historically and globally. Her websites are http://WebofDebt.comhttp://PublicBankSolution.com, andhttp://PublicBankingInstitute.org.

US monetary rent stolen by banks: half trillion/Year

9/18/13

How US Banks have pumped $10 trillion of debt into the US economy since 1992

Here's a great website. It's called US Banks Locations and it provides tables with numbers for the value of the assets held by every single US bank. You can get new sets of figures every 3 months (the latest are from the end of June 2013), and the data goes back to 1992.

It's fairly hard work, but I have downloaded all the data and added up the numbers for each year. You also get to see every single bank individually, and you get to see the number of banks as well.


As you can see, the financial assets of US banks totaled $4.6 trillion at the end of 1992. But by the end of 2012, the number had reached over $14.5 trillion. Where had all that "money" come from? Was it people depositing their savings with the banks?

Almost certainly not. The vast majority of the $10 trillion of extra assets corresponds to money that the commercial banks created out of thin air and then used to buy assets or make loans. Lending money to someone so that they can buy a house means that the bank increases its assets, even if they didn't actually have the money they lent.

Of course, certain banks have been particulary active. For example, JP Morgan's assets have increased  18-fold from $109 billion in 1992 to $1.95 trillion in 2013.

But the other fascinating bit of information that you can get by looking at this dataset is that the number of banks has plumetted. From 13,973 at the end of 1992, the number has halved to just 6949 in June 2013. Where did all those bank go? Of course, 6949 is still a huge number, and it's roughly the number of banks in Europe.

Unfortunately, I've not yet managed to find an equivalent set of data for the 6000+ European banks. Leave me a message if you know where to find such information. 

A CLOCKWORK ORANGE FOR MR VAN ROMPUY

Herman Van Rompuy 675.jpg
  1. To Van Rompuy

  2. Dear Mr President,

  3. The entire Euro architecture has a fatal flaw in that the 
  4. real monetary rent coming from paper euros and A/C 
  5. euros is withheld by the European banks BUT in this way 
  6. it is not given to the public Treasuries as a sovereign rent. 
  7. Not satisfied to get this rent, the banks also put the 
  8. rent as a liability in the balance thus evading all taxation
  9.  As you may know, the single states are retaining only
  10.  the seigniorage coming from COINS. It seems to me that
  11.  there is no sense at all in further taxation in our country,
  12.  Italy, where the phantom-owned-banks have yet stolen
  13.  some 100 trillion euros of SOVEREIGN MONETARY 
  14. RENT. Do you see what I mean ? It may happen very 
  15. soon the day when this question will surround you, 
  16. coming from every European citizen. Then ?

lunedì 16 settembre 2013

Imposimato, Assassiga e le Brigate....Rothschild

Imposimato conferma: “Moro fu ucciso per volere di Andreotti e Cossiga, responsabili della stragi: da Piazza Fontana a Via D’Amelio”

SEGUITECI SULLA PAGINA FACEBOOK Siamo La Gentezzzsss
Imposimato conferma: “Moro fu ucciso per volere di Andreotti e Cossiga, responsabili della stragi: da Piazza Fontana a Via D’Amelio”
Ferdinando Imposimato torna a parlare del caso del rapimento e dell’uccisione di Aldo Moro e lo fa puntando il dito contro quelli che allora erano i vertici dello stato e della Democrazia Cristiana: Giulio Andreotti e Francesco Cossiga.
L’ex giudice istruttore della vicenda dice: “L’uccisione di Moro è avvenuta per mano delle Brigate Rosse, ma anche e soprattutto per il volere di Giulio Andreotti, Francesco Cossiga e del sottosegretario Nicola Lettieri”. Poi ha aggiunto: “Se non mi fossero stati nascosti alcuni documenti li avrei incriminati per concorso in associazione per il fatto. I servizi segreti avevano scoperto dove le Br lo nascondevano, così come i carabinieri. Il generale Dalla Chiesa avrebbe voluto intervenire con i suoi uomini e la Polizia per liberarlo in tutta sicurezza, ma due giorni prima dell’uccisione ricevettero l’ordine di abbandonare il luogo attiguo a quello della prigionia”.
“Quei politici – ha detto Imposimato – sono responsabili anche delle stragi: da Piazza Fontana a quelle di Via D’Amelio. Lo specchietto per le allodole si chiama Gladio. A Falcone e Borsellino rimprovero soltanto di non aver detto quanto sapevano, perché avevano capito e intuito tutto, tacendo per rispetto delle istituzioni. Per ucciderli Cosa Nostra ha eseguito il volere della Falange Armata, una frangia dei servizi segreti”.
Ferdinando Imposimato appena un mese fa ha presentato un esposto alla Procura di Roma, affermando che le forze dell’ordine sapevano dove si trovava la prigione di Aldo Moro. Per questo i magistrati hanno aperto un fascicolo per valutare se esistano i presupposti per riaprire il caso Moro.
Nel testo di Imposimato ci sono le rivelazioni di 4 appartenenti a forze dell’ordine e armate secondo cui il covo Br di via Montalcini fu monitorato per settimane. Ma non è tutto: recentemente la Procura di Roma ha aperto un fascicolo di indagine relativo alle dichiarazioni di due artificieri, che hanno raccontato come il ritrovamento della Renault 4 contenente il cadavere di Moro sia avvenuto alle 11, e come sul posto fosse stato presente fin da subito Francesco Cossiga.
Fonte: articolotre.com

mercoledì 11 settembre 2013

Truth Warrior - Karen Hudes, World Bank



09/09/13

Karen Hudes studied law at Yale Law School and economics at the University of Amsterdam. She worked in the US Export Import Bank of the US from 1980-1985 and in the Legal Department of the World Bank from 1986-2007. She established the Non Governmental Organization Committee of the International Law Section of the American Bar Association and the Committee on Multilateralism and the Accountability of International Organizations of the American Branch of the International Law Association.

In 2007 Karen warned the US Treasury Department and US Congress that the US would lose its right to appoint the President of the World Bank if the current American President of the World Bank did not play by the rules. The 66 year old Gentlemen’s Agreement that Europe would appoint the Managing Director of the IMF and US would appoint the World Bank President ended in 2010. Her website is: http://kahudes.net

http://www.theworldwasmeanttobefree.com/quotes.html

Cutting crime through court innovation

Better courts: cutting crime through court innovation

SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 // WRITTEN BY:
Stephen Whitehead, Researcher, Valuing What Matters
Phil Bowen , Director, Centre for Justice Innovation
The criminal courts of England and Wales do a tough job, ensuring the rights of citizens are protected and that the guilty are sentenced. But they are often seen as conservative institutions, reluctant to embrace change unless it comes from central government.
Away from Westminster and Whitehall, however, some courts are using their own initiative to find ways to cut costs, speed up court cases and reduce re-offending –in many cases without additional funding. Encouraging and learning from these innovations will be key to meeting the significant challenges faced by our justice system in 2013 and beyond.
Having reviewed the evidence base on court innovation, and conducted in depth studies of a number of innovative courts in action, we identify examples of courts that are:
  • Saving time by diverting low-level anti-social behaviour cases into community-led restorative justice panels;
  • Improving victims’ experiences and making more effective decisions by specialising in certain types of issue such as domestic violence or drug addiction;
  • Providing at-court support and advice services to help their users access support with issues like mental health, addiction debt or housing;
  • Making faster and more effective decisions by taking new approaches to pre-sentence assessments of offenders;
  • Expanding and improving their on-going supervision of offenders, delivering swift and certain enforcement of court orders.
Our case studies demonstrate it is possible for courts in England and Wales to innovate to improve the way they do their job. Underpinning the most effective court innovations we have studied are four basic principles:
  • Fairness – better courts are seen by all parties, especially victims and defendants, to be fair
  • A focus on people as well as crimes – better courts understand the backgrounds and needs of the people who come before them
  • Authority – better courts impose credible, proportionate sentences and take a greater role in enforcing them
  • Speed – better courts act swiftly, processing cases efficiently and responding quickly to breaches.
But examples of court innovation are still too few and too far between. A range of practical and structural challenges stand in the way of widespread court innovation. For example, would-be court innovators currently have difficulty identifying which innovations to trial, and monitoring and evaluating innovations once they are in place. This is aggravated by a general lack of practice sharing between court practitioners and programmes. Court managers and other key agents often lack the autonomy or opportunity to pursue local innovation or influence the decisions occurring around them in the justice system. Some potential innovations (such as sentencer supervision programmes) are barred by legal and operational constraints.
Overcoming these obstacles will, in part, require action at the national level. The Government should consider how best to reform the governance of courts in order to deepen local discretion and judicial empowerment. We recommend:
a. Giving court administrators and sentencer representatives a role in approving and monitoring the new prison and probation contracts;
b. Revisiting s178 of the Criminal Justice Act in order to remove the legal obstacle that currently bars courts from reviewing community orders.
The innovations we document also highlight the scope for practitioners to get on and try new things, regardless of national policy and reform. We urge practitioners to look seriously at testing out the following four practice innovations in their courts:
a. Diverting simple summary cases to more proportionate ways of dealing with them, such as Neighbourhood Justice Panels
b. New ‘procedural justice’ training for magistrates, ensuring a higher quality of communication between the court and victims, witnesses and defendants
c. Improving the information provided to sentencers about defendants and the services available in their communities to support them to desist from crime;
d. Extending and strengthening the use of sentencer supervision.
To support these efforts, the Centre for Justice Innovation and nef plan to provide technical support to practitioners. We will also explore the evidence around particular innovations such as sentencer supervision to help providers understand what has been shown to work and in what contexts.
We believe that innovation can make our courts better: faster, more efficient and more effective at reducing crime. But the only people who can drive this improvement are court innovators working at ground level – for it is our courts themselves which should be engines of change. Only then will they, and the justice system, become better.
ISSUES

martedì 10 settembre 2013

Evaluation of “Modern Monetary Theory” (MMT)

AMI’s Evaluation of “Modern Monetary Theory” (MMT)

by AMI Research, with Steven Walsh; and assistance by Stephen Zarlenga

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is a theory developed by a group of economists over the past 25 years or so. In the current crisis it has been receiving some wider attention from the economic community and politicians looking for a new direction.
The American Monetary Institute (AMI) is sometimes asked about MMT and whether it fits in with monetary reform. We assess anything to do with monetary matters carefully.
At the outset AMI enjoys a good, cordial relationship with some of the leading MMT economists, and we certainly wish to build on this relationship. But one thing we can’t compromise on is facts. MMT, like much of modern economic thinking, builds upon some erroneous assumptions and a definition of money that is faulty and works to the extreme detriment of the 99%. In addition MMT has its own specific problems between its claims and the facts which have bearing on the validity of MMT.
Economists too often get the facts wrong
MMT shows a lack of respect for empirical facts. This is a problem with economists’ theories in general, and we find that MMT is no exception. As the monetary historian Alexander del Mar observed over a century ago (and it still holds true today):
“As a rule, political economists … do not take the trouble to study the history of money; it is much easier to imagine it and to deduce the principles of this imaginary knowledge.”1
To their credit, MMT economists like Professor L. Randall Wray admit to using imaginary history, for example:
“This … summation of the ‘origins’ of money, much of it relying on speculation” is used in “a stylized, hypothetical example of the way in which an economy can be monetized.”2
But by using this imaginary method, important historical facts get missed. For instance, in an overview of the Continental currency of the Revolutionary War, Professor Wray jumps to the MMT theory-fitting conclusion that “Without a sufficient tax liability, the notes depreciated quickly.”3
No mention is made of the massive counterfeiting done by the British. This played the main part in the ultimate depreciation of the currency, as Benjamin Franklin tells us in an article he wrote in 1786, reflecting on his first-hand experience of that time:
“Paper money was in those times our universal currency. But, it being the instrument with which we combated our enemies, they resolved to deprive us of its use by depreciating it; and the most effectual means they could contrive was to counterfeit it. The artists they employed performed so well, that immense quantities of these counterfeits, which issued from the British government in New York, were circulated among the inhabitants of all the States, before the fraud was detected. This operated considerably in depreciating the whole mass, first, by the vast additional quantity, and next by the uncertainty in distinguishing the true from the false; and the depreciation was a loss to all and the ruin of many. It is true our enemies gained a vast deal of our property by the operation; but it did not go into the hands of our particular creditors; so their demands still subsisted, and we were still abused for not paying our debts!4
For its part, the Continental Congress maintained an excellent record: $200 million notes were authorized, and about $200 million were put in circulation at any one time (and about $48 million damaged notes were replaced).5
This example highlights the poor methodology which is at the root of MMT’s problems: it’s extremely bad practice of selectively taking pieces of history out of context and then using them as a prop to give their pre-conceived ideas the appearance of legitimacy, when they are in fact baseless.
Not that MMT is alone in doing this, the mainstream high school textbook, Economics: Principals in Action (published by Pearson, 2007, p. 248) written by Arthur O’Sullivan and Steven M. Sheffrin, perpetuates this same misunderstanding of the American Revolution. What is happening here is that these stories put in people’s minds that government is incapable of handling monetary affairs, specifically, the supply of money. History shows that ancient governments, the American colonies and the United States government were quite capable of running their monetary systems in a healthy and fairer way than today’s system.
MMT misuses terms
MMT stretches and twists the meaning of words beyond normal usage; for example, Wray says:
“We say that fiat money is a government liability. For what is the government liable? To accept its money in payment of taxes.”6
Normally people think of a liability as being something owed and due. Money need not be something owed and due, it’s what we use to pay something owed and due. To call money a liability ignores the nature and properties of money. It removes the concept of money and substitutes a concept of debt in its place.
MMT mis-defines money as debt
Poor methodology and misuse of terms leads MMT to mis-define money as debt; e.g., Wray says: “Fiat money will be defined as … nothing more than a debt.”7
But money and debt are two different things, that’s why we have different words for them. We pay our debts with money.
If money is defined as a debt, it artificially places an unnecessary burden of debt on the whole of society. It turns the positive real net worth of all we produce into a financial negative instead of positive. In effect, it artificially places financial claims on all of our achievements and progress, thus denying us full benefit and enjoyment of all we create.
While most money in the U.S. mis-designed system is really debt, put into circulation by banks when they make loans, it is a huge error to then define the “nature” of money as debt. That mistake would render it impossible to redesign the system in a just and sustainable way.
The AMI considers the concept and definition of money as the most critical factor in determining whether a society’s money system functions in a just and sustainable way.
How money is defined determines who controls the money system, and whoever controls the money system will dominate the whole society. For instance:
• If money is defined as wealth (e.g., commodities like gold and silver by weight), as Adam Smith did, then the wealthy will control not only their own wealth, but the money system and thus the whole society as well.
• If money is defined as credit or debt, as MMT and most economists now do, those who dominate credit (the banks) will control society’s monetary mechanism – and we know from experience they will misuse it to create bubbles, until the whole system crashes.
• If money is defined as an abstract legal power of society, as the Constitution does, then the money system is placed under our constitutional system of checks and balances to work justly and sustainably for the whole society, not for only a privileged part of it.
The AMI uses the following concept of money:
Money’s essence (apart from whatever is used to signify it) is an abstract social power, embodied in law, as an unconditional means of payment.
Some particulars about MMT
Now we’ll look at some of what MMT claims and compare it with the facts. Then we’ll look at where MMT got its ideas from, what that means, and suggest how MMT can fix these errors.
MMT makes these specific claims about the present monetary system:
1. government creates money when it spends, and can create as much as society wants;
2. taxes aren’t used for government spending, and are “literally burned” instead;
3. government bonds aren’t used for government spending either, but to help the Fed;
4. right now, government can create money for full employment and price stability.
MMT confuses its theory for facts
We’ll take some quotes from MMT literature related to these claims and show that there are serious problems with them. We then take some of MMT’s own contradictory quotes which seem to admit this.
1. Does government create money when it spends (as much as we want)? – No
Wray says “Government expenditure will generate coins, notes or bank reserves”8 and “Government spending is constrained only by … the public’s desire for money.”9
In fact, according to official sources, the creation and issuance of coins, notes and bank reserves is unrelated to government expenditure. All coins and notes are issued to the public through banks, and all bank reserves are originally created by the Fed for banks.10 Government expenditure merely transfers (previous) bank reserves back to banks.11
Therefore, government spending is constrained by present monetary arrangements, not by the public’s desire for money.
MMT bases this erroneous claim on the assertion that, as Wray says: “Treasury spends before and without regard to either previous receipt of taxes or prior bond sales.”12
In fact, Treasury must receive taxes or the proceeds of bond (or other debt) sales into its general (checking) account at the New York Fed before payments can be made from it, as the law prohibits the Fed from making loans or overdrafts to Treasury.13 The Fed has to debit Treasury’s account to credit banks’ accounts, otherwise its books wouldn’t balance.
Therefore, Treasury cannot spend without regard to how much is in its account.
2. Is our tax money “literally burned” instead of being spent again? – No
Wray says “tax receipts cannot be spent”14 as “the money is literally burned, or simply wiped off the liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet.”15
In fact, Treasury publishes daily statements of its accounts showing that tax funds are transferred to its account at the Fed, and the Fed publishes weekly statements showing these amounts as liabilities on its balance sheet; they are not wiped off.11 As for burning money, that is a federal crime.16 Currency re-enters circulation until damaged or worn.17
MMT bases its erroneous claims on the belief that, as Wray says: “Taxes are used to drain excessive disposable income.”18
In reality we’re in a deep recession (or depression) right now, most people certainly don’t have any excessive disposable income, and yet most people are still being taxed.
3. Is government borrowing presently unnecessary? – No
Wray says “bond sales … cannot finance or fund deficit spending,”19 but are done “to prevent … a zero per cent bid for reserves, … allowing the [Fed] to hit its target.”20
As above, data published by Treasury and the Fed show the proceeds of bond (and other debt) sales go in and out of Treasury’s account/s at the Fed; they are used.11 And today the effective bid rate for reserves is at the Fed’s target rate of near-zero,21 yet Treasury is still selling more bonds.22
Yet MMT believes that, as Wray says: “Once domestic households and banks are content with their holdings of government bonds and … reserves, then government need not … sell any more bonds.”23
Today holdings of government debt and bank reserves are much higher than ever before, but Treasury is still selling more bonds.22 Aren’t we “content” with government debt yet?
4. Is government presently able to create money to create full employment? – No
Wray says “Treasury’s ability to issue fiat money”24 means “full employment with price stability … can be achieved, now.”25
But as we’ve seen above, Treasury does not do this at present, banks do, so government is not in a position to create and spend money into the economy to achieve full employment and price stability right now.
MMT lacks any real evidence
We haven’t found any real, officially-confirmed, evidence to support what MMT claims.
All the official sources we’ve checked (and we have!) indicate that the facts are contrary to what MMT claims; under the monetary arrangements that prevail at present.
Of course, Congress can change these arrangements, and fortunately we have legislation introduced into this Congress which restructures our money system so Treasury can create the money supply (as MMT thinks is happening) to enable full employment and price stability to be achieved and sustained.
MMT doubts its own validity
To their credit, MMT economists like Wray question their own assumptions:
“What if we have erred in our understanding of money, and in our analysis of government budgets? In this case, we must take [federal program] costs seriously.”26
In this case, we must ask: What is MMT really doing? We ask because MMT literature sometimes admits something factual, but then reverts straight back to saying things that are completely contradictory to the facts just admitted; e.g., Wray says:
“It is true that the Treasury transfers funds from the private banks to its account at the Fed when it wishes to ‘spend’,” but in the very next paragraph says: “Treasury cannot withdraw taxes from the economy before spending.”27
As we’ve seen above, Treasury’s account is debited when it spends, so it must get funds from the economy (since the Fed can’t lend it funds). The funds transfer back and forth between Treasury and the economy; so it’s pointless saying which direction occurs first.
What else – some other problems with MMT:
5. Combining the Treasury and Fed together as though they’re both “the government”:
In fact, the operational arms of the Fed, the 12 Fed banks, are stock-owned by member banks. It should be clear by now that the Fed exists to help banks, not society.28
6. Saying money has value because of taxes, that’s why people want it, and government decides its value:29
In reality, money has value because of what it can buy, we want it for many things, e.g., to buy food (paying taxes is much lower on the list), and sellers usually decide its “value” as such. What enables that value to be created in the first place is people living together in a supportive legal and social structure creating values for living, such as education, science, medicine, technology, the arts, etc.
7. Ignoring the continuous transfer of wealth from poor to rich due to government debt:
A big part of our taxes go to pay interest on debt, held disproportionately by the top 1%.
8. Ignoring banks’ ability to counteract government’s effect on the economy at any time:
Banks can shrink the economy by shrinking the money supply (e.g., Great Depression) or expand it with bubbles (e.g., housing) regardless of government deficits or surpluses.
9. Ignoring the continuous theft from society due to private money creation:
Society creates all economic value; private money acts as a private tax on that value.
10. Accepting systematic injustice:
Loaning money into circulation widens wealth and income disparities, as those with the most get the most loans and those with the least get the least; e.g., Wray says: “Clearly, large segments of the population are ‘quantity rationed’ … quantity rationing can even be irrational – perhaps discriminatory -” but then says: “We will not dwell on such issues.”30
At AMI we do dwell on such issues, because not doing so is a morally bankrupt position.
MMT goes back and forth in its logic
MMT backtracks on the timing of government spending and tax transfers; e.g., Wray says: “Treasury transfers funds … to its account at the Fed simultaneously as it spends.”31 That’s a lot different from “Treasury spends before and without regard to … receipt of taxes”10 (as quoted above). So MMT admits that Treasury does need funds to spend.
MMT even admits that banks control our money supply; e.g., Wray says: “the supply of bank money depends on the supply of loans which is not under the control of the government.”32
We need bank money before anyone can get cash, buy government bonds, or pay taxes. Thus banks have total control over our money supply: nobody (including government) can get any money unless a bank decides to make a loan or purchase.
MMT fails to realize that this vast power is in private hands, not in the hands of society through government. We’re supposed to be living in a democracy, not a plutocracy.
MMT also admits the Fed exists to serve the needs of banks, not society; e.g., Wray says: “the [Fed] cannot … refuse to provide reserves … needed by the … private banking system … as all banking systems operate with a fractional reserve system, banks … are automatically loaned reserves.”33 (emphasis added)
All of this gives a very different impression of the main assertions of MMT.
Where MMT got its mistaken ideas from: The ‘Smoking Gun’ and fatal error
MMT got its mis-definition of money from two articles written by “A. Mitchell Innes”
(actually A. Mitchell-Innes), a top British diplomat to America at the time the Fed was being established. Innes only ever wrote two articles on money (the second was only to drive home the first), and in effect they created a “backstory” for the new Fed system.34 Innes is the rotten apple. Following Innes has led MMT down a hole.
Through the Looking-Glass, and What MMT Found There . . .
Through a maze of inaccuracies and inconsistencies, Innes created a “theory” which says:
“It is the issue of money which is the burden and the taxation which is the blessing.”35
Take a moment to test this theory against your own experience. Have you ever felt this? This is backward thinking. Innes tricked serious people by removing the concept of money and replacing it with debt.36
Substituting debt for money inverts the idea of money. It turns good into bad; and has a domino effect: inverting everything else to give a totally inverted view of the real world.
The inherent problem with MMT: it keeps the present problems in place
Under present arrangements, all money is issued with debt (but it doesn’t have to be). Issuing money with debt places an unnecessary interest burden on our money supply and makes it susceptible to collapse and susceptible to private, often corrupt, interests. These are existential threats to our economy and society that MMT fails to address.
It’s okay, there is a way out: HR 2990
It doesn’t have to be like this. We need a simple system which every normal person can understand. There is already a bill in Congress which gives us a simple system which isn’t prone to endless bubbles and crashes. This bill is HR 2990 and it’s main goals are full employment and price stability, which are the main goals of MMT too. HR 2990 explicitly takes the money power back into Congress, where it belongs, which is where MMT says it belongs too.
HR 2990 enables government to spend money without taxing or borrowing, i.e, the functional approach MMT espouses. HR 2990 requires non-inflationary results and provides funds to improve our infrastructure and education at all levels.
HR 2990 is the missing link that makes what MMT says happens really happen, by treating money as money, not debt.
MMT needs HR 2990 for the things they say they want to become a reality. MMT can then be about calling for more money instead of more debt – a more reasonable position, and a much easier sell politically.
Conclusion
MMT economists are commended for at least looking at money creation, when almost all other economists don’t even consider it, but they look at it in such an inaccurate way that MMT is rendered useless in any practical sense.
This is because MMT has embedded within it a mis-definition of money as debt, meaning the harder we work as a society, the more in debt we get, meaning we have to work even harder, use more resources, get into more debt, and so on, i.e., it’s a self-defeating system.
Thus MMT fails to address the source of economic instability and the driver of the social and environmental degradation we see all around us. It proposes putting an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff whenever there’s a crash, instead of preventing them happening.
This error comes from the mis-definition of money as debt. The mis-definition of money as debt is incompatible with the Chartal (legal) nature of money that MMT espouses, and history shows us that it is also incompatible with MMT’s stated goals of full employment and price stability. Therefore, MMT has to treat money as money: a necessary medium of exchange – without associated debt – if it wants our money system to reflect reality.
Treating money as money is a pre-requisite for any realistic and sustainable solution. Only then can we enjoy the benefits of technology without endless toil and resource use. When economics is founded on reality, not theory, we’ll all be better off.
References:
Bech, Morten L. (2008), “Intraday Liquidity Management: A Tale of Games Banks Play”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review, September 2008, New York, NY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, pp. 7-23.
Coleman, Stacy Panigay (2002), “The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Intraday Credit Policies”, Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 2002, Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems, pp. 67-84.
del Mar, Alexander ([1895] 1978), History of Monetary Systems, Clifton, NY: Augustus M. Kelley.
Febrero, Eladio (2008), “Three difficulties with Neo-Chartalism”[*], XI Jornadas de Economía Crítica, Bilbao, Spain: La Asociación de Economía Crítica; Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 31 (3), 2009, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., pp. 523-541.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “How Currency Gets into Circulation”, Fedpoint, June 2008(http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed01.html).
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Currency Processing and Destruction”, Fedpoint, October 2011 (http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed11.html).
Federal Reserve System (2005), The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ninth Edition, June 2005.
Federal Reserve System (2011), Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk, As amended effective March, 24, 2011, Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve System (2011), “Currency and Coin Services”, Payment Systems, Last update: July 20, 2011 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_about.htm).
Federal Reserve System (2012), Account Management Guide, March, 2012, Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, Release Date: March 15, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20120315/).
Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, Release Date: March 19, 2012(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/20120319/).
Franklin, Benjamin ([1786] 1987), “The Retort Courteous”, Franklin: Writings, New York, NY: Library of America.
Franklin, William Temple (1819), The posthumous and other writings of Benjamin Franklin, London: A. J. Valpy.
Mitchell-Innes, Alfred [“A. Mitchell Innes”] (1914); “The Credit Theory of Money”, [American] Banking Law Journal, Dec./Jan., 1913/14.
Sparks, Jared (Ed.) ([1836] 1840), The works of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. II, Boston, MA: Whittemore, Niles, and Hall (reprint 1856).
US Mint, 2011 Annual Report, Washington, D.C.: United States Mint.
US Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement, March 19, 2012, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service (https://www.fms.treas.gov/fmsweb/viewDTSFiles?dir=w&fname=12031900.pdf).
US Treasury, Treasury Direct, Historical Auction Query, March 1-19, 2012, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFAuctions).
Wray, L. Randall (1998), Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and Price Stability, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Wray, L. Randall (2003), “Functional Finance and US Government Budget Surpluses in the New Millennium”, Reinventing Functional Finance: Transformational Growth and Full Employment, edited by Edward Nell and Mathew Forstater, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Wray, L. Randall (Ed.) (2004), Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Zarlenga, Stephen A. (2002), The Lost Science of Money: The Mythology of Money – the Story of Power, Valatie, NY: American Monetary Institute.
Zarlenga, Stephen A. (2006), “Is the Federal Reserve System a Governmental or a Privately controlled organization?”, Valatie, NY: American Monetary Institute.
Zarlenga, Stephen A. (2010), “Brief Comments on Innes’s ‘Credit Theory of Money’”, Valatie, NY: American Monetary Institute.
* MMT forms part of a sub-branch of economic theories called “Neo-Chartalism” which itself forms part of a branch of economic theories called “Post-Keynesian” (after the late economist John Maynard Keynes).
Notes:

1 del Mar, 1895, p. 101; Zarlenga, 2003, p. 4
2 Wray, 1998, p. 54 (paragraphs 1 and 2)
3 Wray, 1998, p. 62
4 Franklin, 1819, p. 488; Sparks, 1840, p. 504; Franklin, 1987, p. 1127; Zarlenga, 2002, p. 380-81
5 Zarlenga, 2002, p. 381-82, and p. 388, note 37
6 Wray, 1998, p. 95, note 6; Wray, 2003, p. 15, note ix (using slightly different words/terms)
7 Wray, 1998, p.12
8Wray, 1998, p. 80; Wray, 2003, p. 6
9 Wray, 1998, p. 87
10 US Mint, 2011 Annual Report, p. 9http://www.usmint.gov/downloads/about/annual_report/2011AnnualReport.pdf); Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2008 (http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed01.html); Federal Reserve System, July 20, 2011(http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_about.htm); Federal Reserve System, 2005, pp. 27-50 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf); Coleman, 2002(http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/0202lead.pdf); Bech, 2008(http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/08v14n2/0809bech.pdf)
11 US Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement, March 19, 2012(https://www.fms.treas.gov/fmsweb/viewDTSFiles?dir=w&fname=12031900.pdf); Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, March 15, 2012(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20120315/)
12 Wray, 1998, p. 78; Wray, 2003, p. 5
13 Federal Reserve Act, Section 14, Subsection (b)(http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section14.htm) [12 USC 355]
14 Wray, 1998, p. 78
15 Wray, 1998, p. 111
16 18 USC 333
17 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, October 2011(http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed11.html)
18 Wray, 2003, p. 9
19 Wray, 1998, p. 85; Wray, 2003, p. 7
20 Wray, 1998, p. 86
21 Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, March 19, 2012(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/20120319/)
22 US Treasury, Treasury Direct, Historical Auction Query, March 1-19, 2012(http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFAuctions).
23 Wray, 1998, p. 87
24 Wray, 1998, p. 119
25 Wray, 1998, p. 124
26 Wray, 1998, p. 180 (5 pages from the end of the book)
27 Wray, 1998, p. 78 ((new) paragraphs 1 and 2); Wray, 2003, p. 5 ((new) paragraphs 2 and 3)
28 Zarlenga, 2006 (http://www.monetary.org/is-the-federal-reserve-system-a-governmental-or-a-privately-controlled-organization/2008/02)
29 For an academic critique on these points, readers are referred to Febrero (see References).
30 Wray, 1998, p. 110
31 Wray, 1998, p. 116
32 Wray, 1998, p. 110
33 Wray, 1998, p. 105
34 Wray, 2004, p. 11-13
35 Innes, 1914, p. 160
36 Zarlenga, 2010 (http://www.monetary.org/critique-of-innes/2012/06)

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