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di Savino Frigiola
E' stata varata la prima manovra economica di 54 miliardi voluta dai "poteri forti" (prelevati in grandissima parte dalle tasche degli italiani). Insieme all'altra ancora in corso, produce la riduzione della circolazione monetaria sul mercato pari alla somma delle due manovre ed insieme all'aumento dell'IVA un'ulteriore contrazione dei consumi interni e, quindi, un diffuso incremento della povertà per tutti. La manovra, almeno questa è la versione ufficiale, serve per ridurre il mastodontico debito pubblico. Tutti sanno che non sarà l'ultima (hanno già cominciato a prepararci in tal senso), e tutti continuano a ballare allegramente al suono dell'orchestrina delle menzogne, come sul ponte del Titanic mentre stava affondando.
Gli analisti in buona fede concordano nell'attribuire all'emissione monetaria, ad opera dei banchieri privati, Banca d'Italia prima e BCE dopo, la causa e la fabbrica del debito pubblico. Il significato del titolo del libro, da me pubblicato nel 1997, "La Fabbrica del Debito, dell'Usura e della Disoccupazione", ritenuto all'inizio incomprensibile, lo stanno appalesando gli accadimenti. In tanti anni non è pervenuta nessuna contestazione ne denunce di vario tipo dagli ambienti economici, bancari e monetari, ma solo prudente ed omertoso silenzio. I fatti oggi stanno impietosamente a dimostrare quanto tempo si è perso e quanti disastri si sarebbero potuti evitare solo se la "politica" avesse svolto la sua legittima e doverosa funzione di controllo, prevenzione e d'indirizzo nei confronti del sistema bancario-monetario a favore dei cittadini e dei propri elettori.
La prova che la "politica" continua irresponsabilmente ad ubbidire ai diktat che giungono dagli ambienti bancari-monetari a proprio vantaggio ed a danno dei cittadini, la si ricava proprio dall'impostazione di questa ultima manovra economica. Anche i più sprovveduti sanno che prima, o nella più drammatica delle ipotesi durante lo sgottamento dell'acqua che sta imbarcando il bastimento, bisogna accanirsi a tamponare la falla mediante la quale la nave rischia di affondare. Ciò è indispensabile per impedire che gli addetti allo sgottamento debbano continuare ad espellere l'acqua all'infinito. Ci vengono richiesti 54 miliardi senza farci capire a che titolo e per cosa farne, se servono per abbattere il debito o ancor peggio per pagare gli interessi sul debito pubblico che stanno crescendo a dismisura. Di tamponare la falla che continua a produrre il debito, nessuno ne parla né è dato sapere se rientra nei piani di una qualunque compagine partitica.
E' del tutto insensato continuare ad emettere i titoli di debito nazionali, sui quali paghiamo subito gli interessi ai signori banchieri privati, scontarli presso la BCE ed utilizzare il netto ricavo per pagare i titoli di debito in scadenza. Tutti comprendono che se non si blocca questo meccanismo diabolico il debito pubblico non può che continuare a crescere e l'inevitabile strangolo che ne deriva diventa sempre più soffocante. Per interrompere questa spirale malefica è sufficiente che lo Stato smetta di emettere propri titoli di debito e ritorni ad emettere titoli monetari come ha saputo fare benissimo per cento anni dal 1874 al 1975. Alle immancabili perplessità dei soliti "economisti di sistema", ricordiamo loro che il "valore convenzionale della moneta" enunciato da Auriti, nell'interesse dei cittadini lo impone, e per quanto concerne i trattati europei, troppo frettolosamente firmati, e sufficiente un piccolo strappo sulla scia dei numerosi già effettuati anche da Paesi più blasonati di noi. Gli ultimi due, proprio attinenti all'argomento, riguardano quelli della Grecia e dell'Irlanda avvenuti addirittura con la benedizione della Ela (Emergency liliquidity assistance) - BCE. Le banche di questi due Paesi emettono direttamente Euro in proprio. I soliti pateracchi dei banchieri privati e della "Commissione Europea" si evince dalla risposta all'interpellanza del parla-mentare greco Kostantinos Poupakis, che chiedeva lumi sull'accaduto: «la commissione europea non detiene statistiche sulle varie operazioni Ela... Mentre è la BCE che cura questi aspetti.» I fatti sono ineludibili; non è più possibile che la politica tutta permetta che lo Stato italiano così maldestramente continui ad indebitarsi nei confronti dei banchieri privati.
Lo Stato, in nome e per conto dei propri cittadini, deve ritornare ad emettere la propria moneta. La deve acquisire a titolo originario e registrarla all'attivo del proprio bilancio al valore corrispondente al signoraggio. L'attività così conseguita dovrà essere utilizzata per le proprie spese istituzionali, per dimostrare che le istituzioni sono al servizio del cittadino e non viceversa.
Su queste posizioni bisogna che i cittadini realizzino un fronte comune capace di fare piazza pulita, trasversale ai vecchi apparati partitici a difesa degli interessi nazionali e quindi di tutti. Lasciare agli altri la difesa dei banchieri, delle losche attività finanziarie e dei poteri forti. La nuova linea di demarcazione della politica separa quelli che intendono operare per il benessere dei cittadini da quelli a tutela dei banchieri & C. Solo così sarà possibile rilanciare l'economia e l'occupazione, e ciò che più conta la speranza nel prossimo futuro. Per quanto riguarda il debito pregresso, tra i tanti suggerimenti che ci sono giunti registriamo anche quello del prof. Bruno Amoroso (economista italiano che insegna in una università in Danimarca) che sostiene non solo di "non pagare un debito illegittimo" ma addirittura "chiede i danni" per il mal tolto. Abbiamo tempo per decidere su tutto ciò, intanto pensiamo all'Islanda. Mai come oggi; o con i cittadini o con i banchieri.
S. F.
venerdì 9 settembre 2011
Big Risk: $1.2 Quadrillion Derivatives Market Dwarfs World GDP
Big Risk: $1.2 Quadrillion Derivatives Market Dwarfs World GDP
One of the biggest risks to the world's financial health is the $1.2 quadrillion derivatives market. It's complex, it's unregulated, and it ought to be of concern to world leaders that its notional value is 20 times the size of the world economy. But traders rule the roost -- and as much as risk managers and regulators might want to limit that risk, they lack the power or knowledge to do so.
A quadrillion is a big number: 1,000 times a trillion. Yet according to one of the world's leading derivatives experts, Paul Wilmott, who holds a doctorate in applied mathematics from Oxford University (and whose speaking voice sounds eerily like John Lennon's), $1.2 quadrillion is the so-called notional value of the worldwide derivatives market. To put that in perspective, the world's annual gross domestic product is between $50 trillion and $60 trillion.
To understand the concept of "notional value," it's useful to have an example. Let's say you borrow $1 million to buy an apartment and the interest rate on that loan gets reset every six months. Meanwhile, you turn around and rent that apartment out at a monthly fixed rate. If all your expenses including interest are less than the rent, you make money. But if the interest and expenses get bigger than the rent, you lose.
You might be able to hedge this risk of a spike in interest rates by swapping that variable rate of interest for a fixed one. To do that you'd need to find a counterparty who has an asset with a fixed rate of return who believed that interest rates were going to fall and was willing to swap his fixed rate for your variable one.
The actual cash amount of the interest rates swaps might be 1% of the $1 million debt, while that $1 million is the "notional" amount. Applying that same 1% to the $1.2 quadrillion derivatives market would leave a cash amount of the derivatives market of $12 trillion -- far smaller, but still 20% of the world economy.
Getting a Handle on Derivatives Risk
How big is the risk to the world economy from these derivatives? According to Wilmott, it's impossible to know unless you understand the details of the derivatives contracts. But since they're unregulated and likely to remain so, it is hard to gauge the risk.
But Wilmott gives an example of an over-the-counter "customized" derivative that could be very risky indeed, and could also put its practitioners in a position of what he called "moral hazard." Suppose Bank 1 (B1) and Bank 2 (B2) decide to hedge against the risk that Bank 3 (B3) and Bank 4 (B4) might fail to repay their debt to B1 and B2. To guard against that, B1 and B2 might hedge the risk through derivatives.
In so doing, B1 and B2 might buy a credit default swap (CDS) on B3 and B4 debt. The CDS would pay B1 and B2 if B3 and B4 failed to repay their loan. B1 and B2 might also bet on the decline in shares of B3 and B4 through a short sale.
At that point, any action that B1 and B2 might take to boost the odds that B3 and B4 might default would increase the value of their derivatives. That possibility might tempt B1 and B2 to take actions that would boost the odds of failure for B3 and B4. As I wrote back inSeptember 2008onDailyFinance'ssister site,BloggingStocks, this kind of behavior -- in which hedge funds pulled their money out of banks whose stock they were shorting -- may have contributed to the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
It's also the sort of conduct that makes it extremely difficult to estimate the risk of the derivatives market.
How Positive Feedback Loops Crash Markets
Another kind of market conduct that makes markets volatile is what Wilmott calls positive and negative feedback loops. These relatively bland-sounding terms mask some really scary behavior for investors who are not clued into it. Wilmott argues that a positive feedback loop contributed to the 22.6% crash in the Dow back in October 1987.
In the 1980s, a firm run by some former academics came up with the idea of portfolio insurance.
Their idea was that if investors are worried about their assets losing value, they can buy puts -- the option to sell their investments at pre-determined prices. They can sell everything -- which would be embarrassing if the market then started to rise -- or they could sell a fixed proportion of their portfolio depending on the percentage decline in a particular stock market index.
This latter idea is portfolio insurance. If the Dow, for example, fell 3%; it might suggest that investors should sell 20% of their portfolio. And if the Dow fell 20%, it would indicate that investors should sell 100% of their portfolio.
That positive feedback loop -- in which a stock price decline leads to more selling -- boosts market volatility. Portfolio insurance causes more investors to sell as the market declines by, say 3%, which causes an even deeper plunge in the value of investors' holdings. And that deeper decline leads to more selling. Before you know it, many investors are selling everything.
The portfolio insurance firm started off with $5 billion, but as its reputation spread, it ended up managing $50 billion. In 1987, that was a lot of money. So when that positive feedback loop got going, it took the Dow down 22.6% in a day.
The big problem back then was the absence of a sufficient number of traders using a negative feedback loop strategy. With a negative feedback loop, a trader would sell stocks as they rose and buy them as they declined. With a negative feedback loop strategy, volatility would be far lower.
Unfortunately, data on how much money has been going into negative and positive feedback loop strategies is not available. Therefore, it's hard to know how the positive feedback loops have gained such a hold on the market.
But it is not hard to imagine that if a particular investor made huge amounts of money following a positive feedback loop strategy, other investors would hear about it and copy it. Moreover, the way traders get compensated suggests that it's better for them to take more and more risk to replicate what their peers are doing.
Traders Make More Money By Following the Pack
There is a clear economic incentive for traders to follow what their peers are doing. According to Wilmott, to understand why, it helps to imagine a simplified example of a trading floor. Picture yourself as a new college graduate joining a bank's trading floor with 100 traders. Those 100 traders each trade $10 million: They "win" if a coin toss lands on heads and "lose" if it lands on tails. But now imagine you've come up with a magic coin that has a 75% chance of landing on heads -- you can make a better bet than the other 100 traders with their 50-50 coin.
You might think that the best strategy for you would be to bet your $10 million on that magic coin. But you'd be wrong. According to Wilmott, if the magic coin lands on a head but the other 100 traders flip tails, the bank loses $1 billion while you get a relatively paltry $10 million.
The best possible outcome for you is a 37.5% chance that everyone makes money (the 75% chance of you tossing heads multiplied by the 50% chance of the other traders getting a head). If instead, you use the same coin as everyone else on the floor, the probability of everyone getting a bonus rises to 50%.
When Traders Say 'Jump,' Risk Managers Ask 'How High?'
Traders are a huge source of profit on Wall Street these days and they have an incentive to bet together and to bet big. According to Wilmott, traders get a bonus based on the one-year profits of those on their trading floor. If the trading floor makes big money, all the traders get a big bonus. And if it loses money, they get no bonus -- but at least they don't have to repay their capital providers for the losses.
Given that bonus structure, a trader is always better off risking $1 billion than $1 million. So if the trader, who is the king of the hill at the bank, asks alowly risk managerto analyze how much risk the trader is taking, that risk manager is on the spot. If the risk manager comes back with a risk level that limits how big a bet the trader can take, the trader will demand that the risk manager recalculate the risk level lower so the trader can take the bigger bet.
Traders also manipulate their bonuses by assuming the existence of trading profits before they are actually realized. This happens when traders get involved with derivatives that will not unwind for 20 years.
Although the profits or losses on that trade have not been realized at the end of the first year, the bank will make an assumption about whether that trade made or lost money each year. Given the power traders wield, they can make the number come out positive so they can receive a hefty bonus -- even though it is too early to tell what the real outcome of the trade will be.
How Trader Incentives Caused the CDO Bubble
Wilmott imagines that this greater incentive to follow the pack is what happened when many traders were piling into collateralized debt obligations. In Wilmott's view, CDO risk managers who had analyzed a future scenario in which housing prices fell and interest rates rose would have concluded that the CDOs would become worthless under that scenario. He imagines that when notified of that possible outcome, CDO traders would have demanded that the risk managers shred that nasty scenario so they could keep trading more CDOs.
Incidentally, the traders who profited by going against the CDO crowd were lone wolves whose compensation did not depend on following the trading floor pack. This reinforces the idea that big bank compensation policies drive dangerous behavior that boosts market volatility.
What You Don't Understand, You Can't Properly Regulate
Wilmott believes that derivatives represent a risk of unknown proportions. But unless there is a change to trader compensation policies -- one which would force traders to put their compensation at risk for the life of the derivative -- then this risk could remain difficult to manage.
Unfortunately, he thinks that regulators aren't in a good position to assess the risks of derivatives because they don't understand them. Wilmott offers training in risk management. While traders and risk managers at banks and hedge funds have taken his course, regulators so far have not.
And if regulators don't understand the risks in derivatives, chances are great that Congress does not understand them either.
'Contagion' would 'destroy euro zone'
Poland warns Italy: 'Contagion' would 'destroy euro zone'
EurActiv, 09 September 2011
The euro zone needs to get ahead of the curve in tackling its sovereign debt crisis, preventing it from infecting Italy, or else face disaster, the finance minister of Poland, the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, said yesterday (8 September) at an economic forum in Krynica. Poland, the largest of the European Union's new member states, does not belong to the euro zone but says it still hopes to join the common currency once the crisis has been resolved. "There is no way the euro zone will survive a sovereign debt crisis in Italy," Jacek Rostowski told the economic forum in Krynica, southern Poland. "If a large eurozone country gets embroiled in the crisis, we would have an extremely dangerous situation." The European Central Bank last month began buying the debt of Italy and Spain – respectively the third and fourth-largest economies in the euro zone – after a big jump in their bond yields. With that decision, Rostowski said, European Central Bank governor Jean-Claude Trichet had "saved the euro zone" and possibly the EU. "The ECB has bought us some time but this is a temporary solution," said Rostowski, who told Reuters in an interview last month he believed the euro zone was moving towards a fiscal union. Squabbling over the size of the euro zone's new rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), exemplifies the weakness of its approach, he said. "We are always behind the curve [...] If we had created an EFSF with firepower totalling 450 billion euros of real disbursable funds, not 250 billion euros, we would not have had the problems we have had," he said. European leaders agreed in the summer to boost the size of the EFSF, whose "effective lending capacity" is now around 250 billion euros, to 440 billion, but this must be approved by national parliaments in the 17-nation euro zone. Economists say rich eurozone countries may eventually have to override opposition from their taxpayers and pledge to contribute to a drastic expansion of the EFSF – possibly doubling or trebling it – to end the crisis. Rostowski, a British-educated economist, also took a swipe at those who suggest that surplus countries such as Germany, one of the world's biggest exporters, might consider quitting the euro and forging a new strong currency. "Do the surplus countries really want to create their own currency and see it appreciate like the Swiss franc?" he said, referring to the Swiss Central Bank's decision this week to set a ceiling on the value of its currency versus the euro. EurActiv with Reuters
EurActiv, 09 September 2011
The euro zone needs to get ahead of the curve in tackling its sovereign debt crisis, preventing it from infecting Italy, or else face disaster, the finance minister of Poland, the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, said yesterday (8 September) at an economic forum in Krynica. Poland, the largest of the European Union's new member states, does not belong to the euro zone but says it still hopes to join the common currency once the crisis has been resolved. "There is no way the euro zone will survive a sovereign debt crisis in Italy," Jacek Rostowski told the economic forum in Krynica, southern Poland. "If a large eurozone country gets embroiled in the crisis, we would have an extremely dangerous situation." The European Central Bank last month began buying the debt of Italy and Spain – respectively the third and fourth-largest economies in the euro zone – after a big jump in their bond yields. With that decision, Rostowski said, European Central Bank governor Jean-Claude Trichet had "saved the euro zone" and possibly the EU. "The ECB has bought us some time but this is a temporary solution," said Rostowski, who told Reuters in an interview last month he believed the euro zone was moving towards a fiscal union. Squabbling over the size of the euro zone's new rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), exemplifies the weakness of its approach, he said. "We are always behind the curve [...] If we had created an EFSF with firepower totalling 450 billion euros of real disbursable funds, not 250 billion euros, we would not have had the problems we have had," he said. European leaders agreed in the summer to boost the size of the EFSF, whose "effective lending capacity" is now around 250 billion euros, to 440 billion, but this must be approved by national parliaments in the 17-nation euro zone. Economists say rich eurozone countries may eventually have to override opposition from their taxpayers and pledge to contribute to a drastic expansion of the EFSF – possibly doubling or trebling it – to end the crisis. Rostowski, a British-educated economist, also took a swipe at those who suggest that surplus countries such as Germany, one of the world's biggest exporters, might consider quitting the euro and forging a new strong currency. "Do the surplus countries really want to create their own currency and see it appreciate like the Swiss franc?" he said, referring to the Swiss Central Bank's decision this week to set a ceiling on the value of its currency versus the euro. EurActiv with Reuters
POSITIONS:
Nations that have joined the European Union since 2004 must get a fair hearing as the bloc strives to solve a string of crises, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said at the opening ceremony of the Krynica forum on Wednesday, quoted by AFP.
"When we look at those who joined recently, they are now doing their homework much better than their teachers," he said in a keynote address to the three-day annual gathering dubbed the 'Davos of the East'.
"That's why our voice should be heard when we are defending Schengen, Maastricht and the idea of an integrated Europe," he added.
Mercedes Bresso, chair of the EU's Committee of the Regions, said at a panel of the Krynica summit organised by Polish daily Rzeczpospolita that solidarity among European countries is possible on the condition that joint system solutions are implemented.
"The suggestion of [German] Chancellor [Angela] Merkel and [French] President [Nicolas] Sarkozy regarding the joint economic government for the euro zone is good and of key importance," Bresso explained. "However, we have to think through the model of a common Europe in terms of strengthening its structures, because the future exists but only as long as we act together," she added.
According to Paweł Lisicki, chief editor of Rzeczpospolita, it might be true that actions have to be realised in a joint manner. However, he questioned what role was reserved for countries like Poland, which do not belong to the euro zone.
Grzegorz Schetyna, speaker of the Polish Sejm, stated that the most important thing was to look for experts in the debate about solidarity. "The economies of European countries are different and the people in charge of them have to feel responsible," Schetyna said.
"The first thing we should take care of is equalling the disproportions and the countries which cannot manage in a given situation should feel support but also control so that a joint policy can bring the best possible results," the Polish MP said.
"It is the countries themselves that need to be reformed in the first place. Support will be given but it has to be clearly communicated to people that they will have to repay these debts one day," stated German MEP Elmar Brok (European People's Party).
Michael Barrington, managing partner for Central and Eastern Europe at Deloitte, admitted that decisive measures had to be undertaken on all the levels as otherwise Europe would depart from the road to more competitiveness and stronger economies.
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