martedì 31 agosto 2010

Rounding Up the Culprits of Rising Prices

Rounding Up the Culprits of Rising Prices

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08/31/10 Tampa, Florida – From Bloomberg.com we get the bad news that “Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said inflation is likely to exceed the UK government’s upper 3% limit in coming months as higher sales taxes drive gains in consumer prices,” which “rose 3.1% in July from a year earlier after climbing 3.2% in June.”

Apparently, he has to write a letter about it, probably something along the lines of “Dear British taxpayer, Our stupidity and incompetence have caused prices to rise more than 3% in a year, which means you are all doomed unless we government lowlife halfwits stop being incompetent, especially as regards monetary policy in general and creating far too much new money in particular, which we won’t. Terribly sorry, old chap. Respectfully yours, Mervyn.”

Of course, this cruel punishment of having to write a letter is harsher than the justice meted out in the USA, as New Jersey, and everybody connected with their pension disgrace, lied, hid relevant information and data, and is, according to the SEC, being charged with the fraud and corruptions of “withholding and misrepresenting pertinent information about its financial situation” so that municipal bond sales could continue.

Actually, in the UK, their consumer price index (CPI) rose at an annual rate of a scary 3.1% in July, which was only down from a slightly-scarier 3.2% rise in prices in June.

And inflation in something called the retail price index (RPI) came in at a terrifying 4.8% annual rate of increase! Yikes!

Here in the USA, according to The New York Post reporting a “recent JPMorgan Chase study” of prices at Wal-Mart showed that “the world’s largest retailer has raised prices by nearly 6% on average over the past six weeks,” and, “Prices on certain items increased by more than half,” which is an instant inflation rate of 50%, which all thinking people agree is a lot of inflation! Wow!

Now, if you are like me, then you are already calling for rough vigilante justice and/or some mindless, merciless mob rule, an obviously hysterical over-reaction when compared to saner heads saying to simply let the justice system take care of these governmentand Federal Reserve creeps, and they will all be found guilty and locked away in a dark and dank dungeon for the rest of their lives, and you can go to the prison on visiting day and laugh at them and make fun of them right to their snotty faces, and tell them how much you enjoy seeing them slowly rotting in prison as punishment for having caused so much suffering and misery with their greedy, self-serving arrogant treachery.

So, we all finally agreed that they would let me up from being pinned rudely to the ground if I agreed not to advocate open revolution, rebellion of any kind, mob rule, vigilante justice, or have anything to do with any extra-legal “rounding up” of any, or all, of these malfeasant monsters for any punishment, well-deserved or not.

They, in turn, were required to stipulate that this Whole Stinking Mess (WSM) was proof of how justified I was in having so little faith in a lying, moronic, rat’s nest of incestuous government thievery and lying.

So, what happened to these lying, thieving Jersey scumbags who ripped us off? According to Ian Mathias, in his essay “Another Warning Shot for Bond Investors” here at The Daily Reckoning, “the penalty for this outright fraud” is “Nothing.”

In fact, “The State of New Jersey will pay the SEC precisely zero dollars. Not one state employee will pay a fine either, or go to jail…not even lose his job. In fact, the State didn’t even have to admit wrongdoing. ‘New Jersey agreed to settle the case without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings,’ calmly explains the SEC press release.”

About this time my fists clenched into Mogambo Fists Of Rage And Outrage (MFORAO), and I am screaming obscenities at them, and curses upon them, and exhorting the excitable gathering crowd to do the same and then converge on Washington, DC to take over the US government in some spontaneous revolutionary rebellion, whereupon everybody agrees to place me, The Fabulous Mogambo (TFM), on the Throne Of Absolute Dictatorial Power (TOADP), and thus begin the wonderful reign of the Fabulous Emperor Mogambo (FEM)!

This is where I bring back gold and silver as the currency of the United States to fix the dollar’s value to the only tangible things that have survived 4,500 continuous years of history, explaining their required use as money as written in the Constitution of the United States, and I will be a true American hero, and everyone will love me and proudly name their children Mogambo, a proud name meaning, “The wise and handsome one, and hung like a horse” instead of meaning, you know, other stuff not as complimentary.

After doing that, I would probably have lunch, and maybe a nice nap. Then, when I got up, I would eliminate, at a stroke, all barriers to real entrepreneurial free-market capitalism that don’t address actual criminal frauds and corruptions, setting us on the road, at last, to Utopia.

The closest I can come to providing a parallel is in the movie It’s a Wonderful Life when Jimmy Stewart returns to Bedford Falls after Clarence the Angel gives him his wish to have “never been born.” Jimmy discovers that the town has turned into Pottersville, where the previously sedate downtown area is now a hoppin’ and boppin’, be-boppin’ thriving community, where one finds blaring marquees advertising “Girls Girls! Girls!”, all in a fun-loving, laughing, whirling, jazz-crazed, alcohol-fueled boomtown extravaganza of “party down, dudes and dudettes!”

I will not get into criticizing Jimmy Stewart when he finds out he is not married anymore, since he had never been born, and he gets weird about it (“Mary! Mary!”), instead of saying “Yippee!” and happily heading back to the party, hopefully to run into Violet, and I will stick, instead, strictly to economics.

From a research standpoint, I had been hoping that there was something in the official records of Pottersville that would indicate the conditions of the local economy under the wise stewardship of Mr. Potter lending money for capital equipment to satisfy real demand, instead of the previously lackluster economy of crumbling Bedford Falls, where the Savings and Loan was apparently so broke that they had all Sam’s money in Joe’s house, and Sam said to Joe, “What are you doing with my money in your house, you moron?” and Joe said, “Who you calling a moron, you ugly little snot?” and there was a big fight, all of which was later completely edited out of the movie, which explains why not many people know about this ugly part of the story.

The point is that the people affected by my wholesale slicing of the government payrolls and paring of the list of Pottersville government parasites would be employed as new-hires by new private businesses, new industries springing up as solid, demand-led growth, and hired as part of a brave new economic tomorrow of zero inflation, higher quality goods and services with lower prices, thus raising the standard of living for everyone, which is the gift of the free market. Whee!

Well, it turns out that official records of Pottersville are, mysteriously, missing, and there is constant denial at all levels of government, where most of their “official government policy” is summarized as, “It was only a movie, you nitwit! They made it all up! There is no Pottersville, and there never was! What in the hell is wrong with you that you keep calling us up and asking this stupid question all the time?”

So, it looks like the truth will never be known, so my advice is to keep buying gold, silver and oil until it all gets sorted out, one way or the other. By that I mean, of course, that one way is to end badly, and the other way is to end very badly.

Except if you are buying gold, silver and oil today, because then it will all end happily for you, and you will say to your son Mogambo Junior, “Whee! That investing stuff was easy!”

The Mogambo Guru
for The Daily Reckoning


China denies central bank chief has fled

China denies central bank chief has fled

(AFP) – 14 hours ago

BEIJING — China on Tuesday denied rumours that the country's central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan had fled after the bank posted huge bond losses, a report said.

Several Chinese websites reported Monday that the People's Bank of China had incurred a 430-billion-dollar loss on bonds from US mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and that Beijing might punish some people including Zhou.

The websites cited the Ming Pao Daily as their source, but the Hong Kong newspaper denied publishing any such articles, Dow Jones Newswires reported.

The reports fuelled rumours among Chinese Internet users that Zhou had left the country.

"They say that Governor Zhou has fled...," said central bank deputy governor Hu Xiaolian. "But in actual fact Zhou was chairing a PBOC meeting."

Chinese shares were down 0.44 percent in afternoon trade.

"Usually market volatility is in response to economic news, data or analysis. People will speculate on such factors. But to speculate on this sort of thing is extremely abnormal," Hu said.

The central bank was at pains to prove Zhou was at work, issuing two statements Monday with photos of the PBOC governor meeting with a Japanese official and a former Italian official.

The Ming Pao Daily said its "editorial department clarifies that it hasn't made any such report, and it strongly condemns the act of using Ming Pao's name to spread false information."

The newspaper said it had reported the incident to the Hong Kong police and mainland authorities.

The central bank declined to comment on the report when contacted by AFP.

Copyright © 2010 AFP

Giallo alla banca centrale di Pechino

martedì 31 agosto 2010, 16:07

Giallo alla banca centrale di Pechino: governatore scomparso, forse fuggito


Zhou Xiaochuan, 62enne governatore della Banca centrale, stava per essere punito dal governo per un buco da 430 miliardi di dollari in investimenti sui bond dei fondi americani Ginnie Mae e Freddie Mac

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Pechino - Voci, smentite, notizie attribuite alle fonti sbagliate, turbolenze sui mercati e una sparizione molto dubbia: il "caso Zhou Xiaochuan" è esploso nelle ultime ore, e possiede tutti gli ingredienti per diventare il giallo finanziario di fine estate.

Sparito il governatore cinese A partire dalle 10 del mattino di ieri, ora di Pechino, sul web cinese si diffonde come un virus la notizia della defezione di Zhou Xiaochuan, attribuita all’autorevole agenzia di stampa di Hong Kong Ming Pao: il 62enne governatore della Banca centrale cinese, sul punto di essere punito dal governo per un buco da 430 miliardi di dollari nelle riserve in valuta estera bruciati in investimenti sui bond dei fondi americani Ginnie Mae e Freddie Mac, sarebbe fuggito negli Stati Uniti. La notizia riporta anche un commento via Twitter attribuito a Donald Kohn, "vicepresidente della Federal Reserve e portavoce del Congresso USA", secondo il quale gli Stati Uniti sono pronti "a pubblicare i dettagli dei conti in Svizzera di circa 5mila funzionari cinesi se Zhou Xiaochuan verrà incarcerato", ma a questo punto le voci iniziano a presentare numerose incongruenze.

La smentita della notizia Il gruppo editoriale Ming Pao smentisce categoricamente la pubblicazione della notizia e chiede alla polizia di Hong Kong di indagare. Donald Kohn, vicepresidente della Fed, non può ricoprire contemporaneamente un ruolo nell’esecutivo come "portavoce del Congresso", carica peraltro inesistente, e anche la minaccia (smentita dall’interessato) di pubblicare i dettagli dei conti correnti elvetici dei famosi 5mila funzionari ha tutta l’aria di un bluff maldestro: come avrebbero fatto esattamente gli Stati Uniti a procurarsi questi dati? Attraverso un’operazione di pirateria informatica che equivarrebbe a un atto di guerra contro la Svizzera? E quale funzionario porterebbe all’estero i propri risparmi, evidentemente frutto di operazioni non proprio immacolate, senza avvalersi di una rete di prestanome difficilmente individuabili?

La stima degli analisti Molti analisti, inoltre, giudicano irrealistica la perdita di 430 miliardi di dollari in bond Ginnie Mae e Freddie Mac: i treasury bonds americani stanno andando molto meglio del mercato azionario USA; dollaro e yuan sono più o meno allo stesso livello di tasso di cambio dal luglio 2008 e una perdita valuta su valuta appare quindi altamente improbabile, senza contare che un buco di questo genere sulle riserve cinesi in valuta estera - stimate intorno ai 2500 miliardi di dollari- avrebbe effetti enormi sui mercati mondiali. Il governo cinese non ha commentato la notizia e fonti americane smentiscono che Zhou Xiaochuan sia sotto custodia Usa; e mentre le voci continuano a diffondersi l’indice Nikkei della Borsa di Tokyo apre stamattina con un secco -2.09%.

Le ultime mosse di Xiaochuan Come in tutti i thriller che si rispettino, intanto, si cercano di ricostruire le ultime mosse di Zhou Xiaochuan, ed emerge a sorpresa un filone tutto italiano: tra le ultime persone ad averlo visto ieri, infatti, ci sono il ministro dei Servizi Finanziari giapponese Shozaburo Jimi (che ha confermato l’incontro) e l’ex ministro delle Finanze Tommaso Padoa Schioppa (la cui presenza a Pechino in questi giorni è stata confermata). Forse allora la chiave di quella che di ora in ora appare sempre di più come una colossale montatura mediatica va ricercata nell’identikit dello "scomparso": nominato governatore della Banca centrale nel 2002, Zhou Xiaochuan sta terminando il suo ultimo mandato, che scadrà nel 2012 in coincidenza del ricambio del governo cinese.

Governatore con poteri limitati Molto stimato nel mondo, Zhou gode però di poteri tutto sommato limitati rispetto alle sue controparti straniere: la Banca centrale di Pechino non può muoversi autonomamente sulle politiche monetarie o valutarie e deve sottostare alle decisioni del Consiglio di Stato. Politicamente, Zhou viene considerato vicino alla cosiddetta "cricca di Shanghai", la fazione del Partito Comunista Cinese che ha come padre nobile l’ex presidente Jiang Zemin, coinvolta negli ultimi anni in numerosi scandali finanziari che sono andati a tutto vantaggio del gruppo di potere di Hu Jintao e Wen Jiabao. Nell’incredibile corsa al credito dell’anno scorso che, su impulso del governo, ha portato le banche cinesi ha erogare nuovi prestiti per 9590 miliardi di yuan (più di 600 miliardi di euro), Zhou si è distinto per i continui richiami alla moderazione, che hanno causato diversi mal di pancia tra i fautori della linea della "crescita minima all’8% ad ogni costo". Gli scontri interni per la successione a Zhou Xiaochuan, insomma, sono già iniziati, e la notizia non confermata della sua fuga potrebbe essere indifferentemente una bufala da web o una polpetta avvelenata messa in giro da chi avversa la sua linea economica. Ma, anche grazie all’assordante silenzio del governo, la domanda di queste ore non ha ancora trovato risposta: dov’è Zhou Xiaochuan?

Les banques centrales dansent sur le volcan

Les banques centrales dansent sur le volcan
Après l'éclatement de la crise financière en 2007, au lieu d'opter pour la solution proposée par Lyndon LaRouche dans sa « Loi de protection des propriétaires et des banques accréditées », les Etats-Unis et les autres pays du G20 ont décidé de créer plus de dettes – ce pour sortir de la crise de la dette ! Aujourd’hui, cette bulle éclate à son tour, comme LaRouche l’avait prévu début juillet. Dans un nouvel écrit intitulé « Argent ou crédit », il évoque l'effondrement en cours : « Cela s'est produit comme je l'avais prévu, en un laps de temps relativement court. C'est arrivé dans les derniers jours ouvrés de la semaine dernière [soit du 16 août]. »

Cela s’est produit aux Etats-Unis parce que le gouvernement n’a rien fait de ce qu’il aurait dû faire depuis 2007. Par conséquent, le système monétaire mondial est sur le point d'entrer dans une phase d'effondrement hyperinflationniste. « J'avais averti en juillet 2007 qu'il fallait empêcher l'effondrement. Maintenant, quelle que soit la forme de prévention à prendre, aucun retard n’est tolérable. On ne pourra pas s'en sortir tant que l’on n’aura pas écarté du pouvoir le président Obama, du jour au lendemain, en toute sécurité et de manière pacifique. Il y a une semaine environ, la cabale autour de ce Président a déjà déclenché une hyperinflation globale infernale. Nous devons éteindre immédiatement cet incendie, ou alors il sera trop tard pour empêcher le nouvel holocauste s'abattant sur notre planète. »

Comme pour témoigner du danger, les chiffres du marché immobilier américain font apparaître une chute de 27,2 % des ventes de logements en juillet, en base annuelle, signalant l'écroulement de la pyramide des titres adossés aux crédits hypothécaires. En même temps, la crise de l'euro s'affirme, avec une hausse des coûts d'emprunt et d'assurance pour tous les pays du « Club Med », plus l'Irlande.

Face à cette réalité, les directeurs de banques centrales intensifient les mesures hyperinflationnistes tant décriées par LaRouche. Lors de la réunion annuelle de la Réserve fédérale à Jackson Hole, dans le Colorado, le 27 août, le directeur de la Fed Ben Bernanke a annoncé le recours à des « moyens non conventionnels » pour assurer l'expansion monétaire, tandis le chef de la BCE Jean-Claude Trichet confirme de son côté que sa banque est prête à appliquer des « mesures hors standard ». En outre, pour la première fois, on a admis que les banques centrales discutent de la possibilité de provoquer délibérément l'inflation. C'est ainsi que M. Trichet a évoqué « une suggestion récurrente » pour faire face à la dette, à savoir « la création de l'inflation surprise ». Si cette option a été officiellement rejetée pour l'instant, Bernanke a fait savoir que parmi les options « non conventionnelles » envisageables à l'avenir figure « un accroissement des objectifs d'inflation ».

Néanmoins, une opposition obstinée se fait entendre au sein de la Réserve fédérale. Selon le Wall Street Journal du 25 août, la réunion du Federal Open Market Committee le 10 août, où il a été décidé d'acheter des centaines de milliards de dollars de bons du Trésor, a été la plus controversée depuis les plus de quatre ans que Bernanke fait office de président. Si Thomas Hoenig, de la Fed du Kansas, a finalement été le seul à voter contre, le WSJ croit savoir que non moins de sept des dix-sept membres du Comité ont exprimé de sérieuses réserves. En fait, selon Lyndon LaRouche, « la rupture est intervenue il y a plusieurs semaines », et à Jackson Hole, on a vu des signes que les cercles initiés savent bien, « au-delà du charabia des statistiques, que ce système s'écroule à une vitesse inouïe ».

Hoenig, de même que son homologue de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, qui a exprimé des doutes sur la politique de Bernanke lors d'une interview à Fox Business News le 24 août, soutiennent un nouveau Glass-Steagall et ont également appuyé les efforts de la sénatrice Blanche Lincoln en vue de réguler les produits dérivés.

Crisi economica: scartato il resto, proviamo con la sanità mentale

Lettera al premier Silvio Berlusconi
e, p.c. al ministro Tremonti.


Bergamo, 31 agosto 2010

Oggetto: Crisi economica: scartato il resto, proviamo con la sanità mentale

Caro premier,
sono ormai anni che su internet c'è una campagna d'informazione sullo scandalo nazionale - e internazionale - della rendita monetaria affidata a privati tramite l'atto di alto tradimento chiamato Trattato di Maastricht. Ne informammo anche Cossiga, che ne fu il responsabile, ma si vede che preferì morire piuttosto che tirare fuori un po' d'onestà.

Ora Lei che è ancora vivo, e che ha una certa età, potrebbe forse dare una svolta alla sua carriera alla grande, denunciando questo scandalo pubblicamente nelle televisioni, come già ha fatto in sordina su Il Giornale, coi bellissimi articoli di Ida Magli. Le citazioni dotte si possono mettere in fila, come prove anche da portare in un Tribunale, partendo dal procuratore generale Bruno Tarquini nel 1997, passando per Guido Tabellini rettore della Bocconi, ricordando il precursore prof. Giacinto Auriti ed il questore di polizia - ex Gladio - Arrigo Molinari, ucciso a coltellate poco prima di testimoniare in merito in Tribunale. Possiamo citare anche il prof. Antonino Galloni, piuttosto che una serie di avvocati tra cui Alfonso Luigi Marra e Marco Della Luna, giusto per analizzare meglio i risvolti penali, se ce ne sarà tempo...
Naturalmente non mancano citazioni estere di illustri cattedratici, fino ad arrivare alla London School of Economics che - in uno scritto recente di un suo illustre membro - parla apertamente del falso in bilancio della BCE.

Il tempo era denaro, ora ?
Con Basilea II (o III), nel dicembre 2011, verranno stretti i cordoni del credito, moltiplicando per quattro i requisiti di riserva obbligatoria. Questo decimerà le rimanenti linee di credito delle PMI italiane (oltreché europee in genere), nonché le linee di credito degli altri soggetti della clientela bancaria. Questa operazione di strozzamento è voluta per ricapitalizzare le banche assorbendo i beni reali della clientela che non potrà saldare il debito: si tratta, ad esempio, degli assets di molti cittadini che l'hanno votata, Signor Premier!

Su internet non manca una spiegazione quanto mai approfondita ed in varie lingue di come questa rendita monetaria (signoraggio) sia sottratta da un sistema bancario andato a male con - finora - l'allegro disinteresse dei tanti politici (salvo alcuni eroi). Questa campagna virale su internet creerà - se già non lo sta facendo - un effetto di risonanza che porterà in piazza milioni di persone. Infatti, la cifra sottratta ad ogni - OGNI! - italiano si aggira ormai su circa 1,5 milioni di euro.
Appena la quantità di disperati che hanno evitato il suicidio arriverà ad un 15% della popolazione.... stiamo parlando di almeno 8 milioni di incazzati, vorrei davvero capire se lei crede che non si accoderanno anche le forze dell'ordine, alle quali con il pizzo del signoraggio è stata da anni dimezzata la busta paga...

Questa massa furiosa vi chiederà ragione del vostro silenzio, e mi pare difficile credere lo farà sottovoce. Come pensa di fermarli? Con escort e spacciatori di coca libera per tutti? Con biglietti omaggio per entrare al Billionaire? Con foto osé dedicate in villa Certosa?

Non credo proprio. Occorre - caro premier - che lei tenga conto della rabbia che da anni il popolo ha ingoiato a causa delle ruberie sempre più clamorose del sistema bancario. Occorre che lei faccia almeno un sondaggio, per vedere se effettivamente quanto dico rischia di avverarsi o meno. Occorre che lei si faccia spiegare da Putin come ha fatto a cacciare gli oligarchi dal suo paese. Perché questi oligarchi, se non li caccia lei in qualche modo, verranno inseguiti da una popolazione vendicativa con gli occhi iniettati di sangue. Zombi che non hanno più nulla da perdere contro i pochi che hanno rubato tutto. Come finirà? 1, 2 o X ? Oppure si può far qualcosa PRIMA.

Prima che il redde rationem venga invocato vox populi?

Non si potrebbero rimettere in auge i Biglietti Di Stato a Corso Legale (ma anche a corso libero, eventualmente) per pagare il welfare a chi, a causa della distruzione pianificata del sistema manifatturiero, è costretto a rimanere senza lavoro?
A chi, con i 500 euro che voi vi fate una pippata è costretto a camparci un mese intero?
Non si potrebbe prevedere un reddito di cittadinanza che a una Banca Di Stato non costerebbe quasi niente? Oppure vogliamo aspettarci tutti quanti di goderci quest'ultimo olocausto?

Ci pensi. E poi, per cortesia, ci faccia sapere.

Con tanti cari auguri per un produttivo rientro dalle ferie,

Marco Saba

Explanation of Securitization

Explanation of Securitization


For those that are in or about to be in Foreclosure or Bankruptcy, you need to study this and have an understanding of what the Banks, Mortgage Companies and the Securities Exchange do against the private citizens (Mortgagor) that were borrowing money and deeding their properties to the Banks and Mortgage Company without recognizing what they are really doing and that the Bank’s put up NOTHING. Now see how the securitization of the mortgager ‘s NOTE and actually does the mortgagor a favor by making securitization for the following reasons:

Previously, it was stated that, in order for the investment entity to be a REMIC (in other words, in order for the entity to be able to qualify for the single taxable event as a pass through entity), all interest in the mortgage is supposed to be transferred forward to the certificate holders.

Well, in fact, such a transfer never occurs. Either that is the case, or the parties who state that they have a right to foreclose on a securitized note are not being truthful when they present themselves as the real party in interest.

In any case, they cannot have it both ways. The servicer cannot claim to hold legal and/or equitable interest in the mortgages held in the name of an investment trust that also provides the (REMIC) pass through tax benefit to its investors. [give credit to Atkin for this attachment to complaint (Mortgage Challenge, (Blog]]

Attachment A

Explanation of Securitization

Introduction

Securitization takes a commonplace, mundane transaction and makes very strange things happen. This explanation will show that, in the case of a securitized mortgage note, there is no party who has the lawful right to enforce a foreclosure, and the payments alleged to have been in default have, in fact, been paid to the party to whom such payments were due.

Additionally, in the case of a securitized note, there are rules and restrictions that have been imposed upon the purported debtor that are extrinsic to the note and mortgage* as uted by the mortgagor and mortgagee, rendering the note and mortgage unenforceable.

This explanation, including its charts, will demonstrate how securitization is a failed attempt to use a note and a mortgage for purposes for which neither was ever intended.

Securitization consists of a four way amalgamation. It is partly 1) a refinancing with a pledge of assets, 2) a sale of assets, 3) an issuance and sale of registered securities which can be traded publicly, and 4) the establishment of a trust managed by third party managers. Enacted law and case law apply to each component of securitization. However, specific enabling legislation to authorize the organization of a securitization and to harmonize the operation of these diverse components does not exist.

Why would anyone issue securities collateralized by mortgages using the structure of a securitization? Consider the following benefits. Those who engage in this practice are able to…

1. Immediately liquidate an illiquid asset such as a 30 year mortgage.

2. Maximize the amount obtained from a transfer of the mortgages and immediately realize the profits now.

3. Use the liquid funds to enter into new transactions and to earn profits that are immediately realized… again and again (as well as the fees and charges associated with the new transactions, and the profits associated with the new transactions... and so on).

4. Maximize earnings by transferring the assets so that the assets cannot be reached by the creditors of the transferor institution or by the trustee in the event of bankruptcy. (By being “bankruptcy-remote” the value to investors of the illiquid assets is increased and investors are willing to pay more.)

5. Control management of the illiquid asset in the hands of the transferee by appointing managers who earn service fees and may be affiliated with the transferor.

6. Be able to empower the transferor by financially supporting the transferred asset by taking a portion of the first losses experienced, if any, from default, and entering into agreements to redeem or replace mortgages in default and to commit to providing capital contributions, if needed, in order to support the financial condition of the transferee [In other words, provide a 100% insured protection against losses].

7. Carry the reserves and contingent liability (for the support provided in paragraph 6) off the balance sheet of the transferor, thereby escaping any reserve requirements imposed upon contingent liabilities that would otherwise be carried on the books.

8. Avoid the effect of double taxation of, first, the trust to which the assets have allegedly been transferred and, second, the investor who receives income from the trust.

9. Insulate the transferor from liability and moves the liability to the investors.

10. Leverage the mortgage transaction by creating a mortgage backed certificate that can be pledged as an asset which can be re-securitized and re-pledged to create a financial pyramid.

11. Create a new financial vehicle so mind numbingly complicated that almost no one understands what is going on.

The obvious benefit of the above #11 is that courts are predisposed to disbelieve the allegation that a securitized note is no longer enforceable. To a reasonable person, the claim that a mortgage note is unenforceable merely because it has been securitized does sound somewhat outlandish. And frankly, the more complex and difficult the securitized arrangement is to explain and perceive, the more likely a judgment in favor of the “lender” will be in litigation.

Simply stated, the vast majority of litigants – and judges – have not been properly informed as to the true nature of this type of transaction. This is said not to insult anyone. Quite to the contrary, this is just to say that the true identity of the real party in interest is able to be obfuscated in the labyrinth of the securitization scheme such that whoever steps forward claiming to be that party and showing documentation appearing to be legitimate is assumed to have standing, and there are too few knowledgeable challengers of that mistaken assumption.

So much more so in the case of the “layman” homeowner. Most homeowners have no idea that the transaction being referred to as a debt and as an obligation that they must pay or be subject to foreclosure, has actually already been paid. And not just once! In cases where a default has been alleged, the securitized note has likely already been satisfied (not just sold and/or assigned) four or five times over.

Securitization is a product of the genius of capitalism. As long as profits continued to be made, all participants did very well from this creative new financial arrangement, and bliss reigned supreme. Then the other shoe dropped.

There is a mortgage default crisis underway in the United States and a credit crisis caused by toxic assets in the secondary mortgage market. Goldman Sachs estimates that, starting at the end of the last quarter of 2008 through 2014, 13 million foreclosures will occur. The Center for Responsible Lending, based on industry data, predicted 2.4 million foreclosures occurred in 2009, and that there would be a total of 9 million foreclosures between 2009 and 2012. At the end of the first quarter of 2009, more than 2 million houses were in foreclosure. Mortgage Bankers’ Ass’n, Nat’l Delinquency Survey Q109 at 4 (2009) reporting that 3.85% of 44,979,733, or 1.7 million, mortgages being serviced were in foreclosure. Roughly half of these were serviced by national banks or federal thrifts. Over twelve percent of all mortgages had payments past due or were in foreclosure and over 7% were seriously delinquent—either in foreclosure or more than three months delinquent.

These spiraling foreclosures weaken the entire economy and devastate the communities in which they are concentrated. According to The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here, foreclosed home owners are projected to lose $71 billion due to foreclosure crisis, while neighbors will lose $32 billion, and state and local governments will lose $917 million in property tax revenue.

What is a Securitization?

In the mortgage securitization process, collateralized securities are issued by, and receive payments from, mortgages collected in a collateralized mortgage pool. The collateralized mortgage pool is treated as a trust. This trust is organized as a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) and a qualified special purpose entity (“QSPE”) which receives special tax treatment. The SPV is organized by the securitizer so that the assets of the SPV are shielded from the creditors of the securitizer and the parties who manage it. This shielding is described as making the assets “bankruptcy remote”.

To avoid double taxation of both the trust and the certificate holders, mortgages are held in Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICS”). To qualify for the single taxable event, all interest in the mortgage is supposed to be transferred forward to the certificate holders.

The legal basis of REMICs was established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (100 Stat. 2085, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 47, 1042), which eliminated double taxation from these securities. The principal advantage of forming a REMIC for the sale of mortgage-backed securities is that REMIC’s are treated as pass-through vehicles for tax purposes helping avoid double-taxation. For instance, in most mortgage-backed securitizations, the owner of a pool of mortgage loans (usually the Sponsor or Master Servicer) sells and transfers such loans to a QSPE, usually a trust, that is designed specifically to qualify as a REMIC, and, simultaneously, the QSPE issues securities that are backed by cash flows generated from the transferred assets to investors in order to pay for the loans along with a certain return. If the special purpose entity, or the assets transferred, qualify as a REMIC, then any income of the QSPE is “passed through” and, therefore, not taxable until the income reaches the holders of the REMIC, also known as beneficiaries of the REMIC trust.

Accordingly, the trustee, the QSPE, and the other parties servicing the trust, have no legal or equitable interest in the securitized mortgages. Therefore, any servicer who alleges that they are, or that they have the right, or have been assigned the right, to claim that they are the agent for the holder of the note for purposes of standing to bring an action of foreclosure, are stating a legal impossibility. Any argument containing such an allegation would be a false assertion. Of course, that is exactly what the servicer of a securitized mortgage that is purported to be in default claims.

The same is the case when a lender makes that same claim. The party shown as “Lender” on the mortgage note was instrumental in the sale and issuance of the certificate to certificate holders, which means they knew that they were not any longer the holder of the note.

The QSPE is a weak repository and is not engaged in active management of the assets. So, a servicing agent is appointed. Moreover, all legal and equitable interest in the mortgages are required by the REMIC to be passed through to the certificate holders. Compliance with the REMIC and insulating the trust assets from creditors of third parties (who create or service the trust) leads to unilateral restructuring of the terms and conditions of the original note and mortgage.

The above fact, and the enormous implications of it, cannot be more emphatically stressed.

A typical mortgage pool consists of anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 loans. This represents millions of dollars in cash flow payments each month from a servicer (receiving payments from borrowers) to a REMIC (QSPE) with the cash flow “passing through”, tax-free, to the trust (REMIC). Those proceeds are not taxed until received as income to the investors. Only the investors have to pay taxes on the payments of mortgage interest received.

The taxes a trust would have to pay on 30, 50, or 100 million dollars per year if this “pass through” taxation benefit didn’t exist would be substantial and it would, subsequently, lower the value of the certificates to the investors, the true beneficiaries of these trusts. Worse, what would be the case if a trust that was organized in February 2005 were found to have violated the REMIC guidelines outlined in the Internal Revenue Code? At $4 million per month in cash flow, there would arise over $200 million in income that would now be considered taxable.

It is worth repeating that in order for one of these investment trusts to qualify for the “pass through” tax benefit of a REMIC (in other words, to be able to qualify to be able to be referred to as a REMIC), ALL LEGAL AND EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE MORTGAGES HELD IN THE NAME OF THE TRUST ARE VESTED IN THE INVESTORS, not in anyone else AT ANY TIME. If legal and/or equitable interest in the mortgages held in the name of the trust are claimed by anyone other than the investors, those that are making those claims are either defrauding the investors, or the homeowners & courts, or both.

So, if the trust, or a servicer, or a trustee, acting on behalf of the trust, is found to have violated the very strict REMIC guidelines (put in place in order to qualify as a REMIC), the “pass through” tax status of the REMIC can be revoked. This, of course, would be the equivalent of financial Armageddon for the trust and its investors.

A REMIC can be structured as an entity (i.e., partnership, corporation, or trust) or simply as a segregated pool of assets, so long as the entity or pool meets certain requirements regarding the composition of assets and the nature of the investors’ interests. No tax is imposed at the REMIC level. To qualify as a REMIC, all of the interests in the REMIC must consist of one or more classes of “regular interests” and a single class of “residual interests.”

Regular interests can be issued in the form of debt, stock, partnership interests, or trust certificates, or any other form of securities, but must provide the holder the unconditional right to receive a specified principal amount and interest payments. REMIC regular interests are treated as debt for federal tax purposes. A residual interest in a REMIC, which is any REMIC interest other than a regular interest, is, on the other hand, taxable as an equity interest.

According to Section 860 of the Internal Revenue Code, in order for an investment entity to qualify as a REMIC, all steps in the “contribution” and transfer process (of the notes) must be true and complete sales between the parties and must be accomplished within the three month time limit from the date of “startup” of the entity. Therefore, every transfer of the note(s) must be a true purchase and sale, and, consequently the note must be endorsed from one entity to another. Any mortgage note/asset identified for inclusion in an entity seeking a REMIC status must be sold into the entity within the three month time period calculated from the official startup day of the REMIC.

Before securitization, the holder of an enforceable note has a financial responsibility for any possible losses that may occur arising from a possible default, which means that holder also has the authority to take steps to avoid any such losses (the right to foreclose). Securitization, however, effectively severs any such financial responsibility for losses from the authority to incur or avoid those losses.

With securitization the mortgage is converted into something different from what was originally represented to the homeowner. For one thing, since the party making the decision to foreclose does not actually hold any legal or equitable interest in any securitized mortgage, they have not realized any loss or damages resulting from the purported default. Therefore, it also follows that the foreclosing party avoids the liability which could result if a class of certificate holders claimed wrongful injury resulting from a modification made to achieve an alternate dispute resolution.

Securitization also makes the mortgage and note unalienable. The reason is simple: once certificates have been issued, the note cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed; at least not in the sense that such a transfer, sale, or conveyance should be considered lawful, legal, and legitimate. This is because the securitized note forever changes the nature of that instrument in an irreversible way, much in the same way that individual strawberries and individual bananas can never be extracted, in their “whole” form, from a strawberry banana milkshake once they’ve been dropped in the blender and the blending takes place.

It might appear that the inability to alienate the note has no adverse consequences for the debtor, but recent history disproves this notion. Several legislative and utive efforts to pursue alternate dispute resolution and to provide financial relief to distressed homeowners have been thwarted by the inability of the United States government to buy securitized mortgages without purchasing most of the certificates issued.

An SPV cannot sell any individual mortgage because individual mortgages are not held individually by the certificate holders; the thousands of mortgages held in the name of the REMIC are owned collectively by the certificate holders. Likewise, the certificate holders cannot sell the mortgages. All the certificate holders have are the securities, each of which can be publicly traded.

The certificate holders are, in no sense, holders of any specific individual note and have no legal or beneficial interest in any specific individual note. The certificate holders do not each hold undivided fractional interests in a note which, added together, total 100%. The certificate holders also are not the assignees of one or more specific installment payments made pursuant to the note.

For the certificate holder, there is no note. A certificate holder does not look to a specific note for their investment’s income payment. Instead, the certificate holder holds a security similar to a bond with specific defined payments. The issuer of trust certificates is selling segments of cash flow.

The concept of securitization is brilliant. It began as a simple idea; a way to convert illiquid, long term debt into liquid, tradable short term debt. It cashes out the lender, allowing the lender to make new “loans” while realizing an immediate profit on the notes sold.

The Charts

In order to more easily identify the parties and their relationship to the securitization arrangement, it is useful to view it in diagram form. The parties to a securitization and their relationships to each other, including the duties and obligations one party owes to another party, is referred to on Wall Street as “The Deal”. The Deal is created and defined by what functions as a declaration of trust, also known as “the master servicing and pooling agreement”, hereafter “pooling agreement”.

Chart 1 below shows a Net Asset Trust created to convert long term mortgage debt into short term, publicly traded securities.

Chart 1

The transferor purchases a portfolio of mortgages and sells them to a trust. The trust purchases the mortgages. The trustee holds the mortgages and becomes the holder of legal title. The trust then issues a bond to the investors; debenture-like certificates. The bond issues different classes of certificates, called tranches.

The certificate entitles the certificate purchaser to certain stated, repeated segments of cash flow paid by the trust. The certificate holders do not hold fractional, undivided interest in the mortgages. Instead, each tranche is entitled to an identified, segmented pool of money payable in an order of priority. A senior tranche will get paid before a junior tranche. A junior rate provides a higher promised rate of return because it has a higher risk than a senior tranche. Another tranche exists that pays interest, but does not pay out principal.

The type and variety of tranche that is created is limited only by the limits of financial ingenuity. Tranches have been created which pay only a portion of principal repaid on the mortgages but no interest.

The investors buy the mortgages from the transferor by paying cash to the trustee who pays the transferor. The investors purchase securities (certificates) which are collateralized by the mortgages held in trust in the collateral pool. Legal title to the mortgages is held by the trustee and beneficial title is owned by the investors.

Only the extremely savvy debtor in this arrangement would know that he should perhaps begin to become concerned upon learning that his mortgage note had been sold to a trust and exchanged for certificates that are issued to unknown beneficiaries (investors) whose certificates were issued under one of many different types of tranches. However, the debtors – the homeowners; the people who provide the income that funds the entire securitization scheme – have no say in the matter because they are never told what will be done with their note. It is never disclosed in the transaction.

So, whereas it would take an extremely savvy person to understand why this arrangement is potentially troublesome to the homeowner whose note has been used in this way, it would take an omniscient homeowner to know that securitization is even going on in the first place. For reasons already stated above, it is not only disingenuous to suggest that securitization does not affect the rights of the debtor, it is downright dishonest.

Nevertheless, for purposes of breaking down the topic into bite-sized pieces: suffice it to say that the trust purchased mortgages and sold certificates. Another way to describe it: the trust bought cattle and wound up selling ground beef.

This then raises questions suitable for a law school examination or law journal article: Are the purchasers of these certificates really beneficial holders of the note, or are they merely purchasers of a contract right to payment from the trust? In other words, Is the trustee limited to being the holder of legal title, or does the trustee also hold the beneficial title? While these may be good questions for an academic exercise, they aren’t germane to defending the debtor being sued in foreclosure. The reason is that under either case, the trustee has standing to foreclose.

More germane is the fact is that an asset trust is likely not the type of securitization vehicle to hold a debtor’s mortgage. This is because Wall Street decided to improve the “asset trust paradigm”. If the Deal could be made safer for, and more lucrative to, the investor, the investor would pay more for the investment. This was accomplished by adding objectives 2-11 to the list already referred to above, shown again below:

1. Immediately liquidate an illiquid asset such as a 30 year mortgage.

2. Maximize the amount obtained from a transfer of the mortgages and immediately realize the profits now.

3. Use the liquid funds to make new loans and earn profits that are immediately realized… again and again (as well as the fees and charges associated with making loans, and the profits associated with liquidating the new loans as quickly as practicable... and so on).

4. Maximize earnings by transferring the assets so that the assets cannot be reached by the creditors of the transferor institution or by the trustee in the event of bankruptcy. (By being “bankruptcy-remote” the value to investors of the illiquid assets is increased and investors are willing to pay more.)

5. Control management of the illiquid asset in the hands of the transferee by appointing managers who earn service fees and may be affiliated with the transferor.

6. Be able to empower the transferor to support the transferred asset by taking a portion of the first losses experienced, if any, from default, entering into agreements to redeem or replace mortgages in default and commit to providing capital contributions, if needed, in order to support the financial condition of the transferee.

7. Carry the reserves and contingent liability for the support provided in paragraph 6 off the balance sheet of the transferor, thereby escaping any reserve requirements imposed upon contingent liabilities carried on the books.

8. Avoid the effect of double taxation of, first, the trust to which the assets have allegedly been transferred and, second, the investor who receives income from the trust.

9. Insulate the transferor from liability and moves the liability to the investors.

10. Leverage the mortgage transaction by creating a mortgage backed certificate that can be pledged as an asset which can be re-securitized and re-pledged to create a financial pyramid.

11. Create a new financial vehicle so mind numbingly complicated that almost no one understands what is going on.

The net asset trust structure does not provide the additional 10 benefits of securitization listed above (items 2 through 11). For instance, under the net asset trust, the income received by the collateral pool from the mortgage debtors is taxed and the interest paid to each investor is taxed again.

To achieve the goals listed above, it became necessary to structure the Deal to create a pass through trust and replace the net asset trust. As shown in Chart 2 shown below, the Deal starts off on straight forward easily charted path. The path of the mortgages identifies the note holder at each stage…

Chart 2

1. ORIGINATOR. The Transaction takes place between the debtor (mortgagor) and the creditor here called the “originator” a.k.a. the mortgagee. The transaction consists of the mortgage note and the mortgage. The originator becomes the note holder.

2. WAREHOUSER. The originator sells the transaction to the warehouser. The warehouser then becomes the note holder.

3. TRANSFEROR. The warehouser buys the mortgage and also buys other mortgages to assemble a portfolio of mortgages. The portfolio is then sold to the transferor who is the initiating party of the securitization. The transferor then becomes the note holder. The transferor creates the securitization.

As previously stated, a portfolio for securitization typically contains from 2,000 to 5,000 mortgages.

There are many different structures for securitization but the potential negative impact of securitization on the debtor is the same. The chart on the following page shows a typical securitization.

Chart3

The structure seen above is called the “Deal”. The Deal is created through a complex instrument that, among other things…

1. Serves as a declaration of trust,

2. Identifies the parties who manage the Deal and describes their duties, responsibilities, liabilities and obligations,

3. Defines the different classes of investment securities, and

4. Is called the Master Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

The instrument is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is a public record. This document is the most important source for discovery as it provides the who, the how, the where, and the when of the Deal.

Chart 2 shows the mortgage portfolio in the hands of the transferor who was the note holder.

The Transferor. In the “new and improved” securitization process (shown in Chart 3), the transferor transfers the mortgages to the underwriter. In addition, the transferor may arrange for credit enhancements to be transferred for the benefit and protection of investors. Such enhancements may include liquid assets, other securities, and performing mortgages in excess of the mortgage portfolio being sold. NOTE: the transferor also usually obligates itself to redeem and replace any mortgage in default.

The Underwriter. The underwriter creates the securities and arranges to place the various tranches of securities (different classes of certificates) with investors. The underwriter then transfers the mortgage portfolio and securities to the issuer.

The Issuer. The issuer is organized as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV); a passive conduit to the investors. The issuer issues the securities to the investors and collects payment from the investors. The payments from the investors are transferred through the underwriter to the transferor.

The QSPE. The mortgage portfolio is conveyed from the issuer to the collateral pool which is organized as a Qualifying Special Purpose Entity (“QSPE”). As previously stated, what makes the entity “qualified” is strict adherence to a set of rules. Among other things, these rules make the QSPE a passive entity which has no legal or equitable title to the mortgages in the mortgage portfolio and restrict modification of the mortgages in the portfolio.

As a result, the QSPE provides to the investors the benefit of its earnings (paid to it by the mortgage debtors) not being taxed. These earnings flow through the QSPE to the investors. Only the investors are taxed at the individual level.

Custodian. The QSPE transfers the mortgage portfolio to the custodian who acts as a bailee of the assets. The custodian is a mere depository for safekeeping of the mortgages.

Tranches. The investors invest in different classes of securities. Each class is called a tranche. Each tranche is ranked by order of preference in receipt of payment and the segment of cash flow to be received and resembles a bond. The basic stratification by order of priority of payment from highest to lowest is categorized as follows: senior notes, mezzanine notes and unrated equity.

Parties described in the Master Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The Deal establishes a management structure to supervise the investment. The specific parties for a Deal are indentified in the master Pooling and Servicing Agreement which states their duties and obligations, their compensation, and their liability. Typically the managers include: the Master Servicer, the Trustee, the Subservicer, and the Custodian.

Master Servicer. The Master Servicer is in overall charge of the deal and supervises the other managing parties.

Trustee. The day to day operations of the collateral pool is administered by the trustee. However, the trustee does very little since the trust must remain passive. The trustee does not have a legal or equitable interest in any mortgage in the portfolio because the trust is a mere passive conduit.

Subservicer. The Subservicer is responsible for dealing with the property owners; collecting monthly payments, keeping accounts and financial records and paying the monthly proceeds to the trustee for distribution to the investors by order of tranche.

The Subservicer may also be responsible for foreclosure in the event a mortgage is in default or some deals call for the appointment of a special subservicer to carry out foreclosure. Usually the subservicer is obligated to make monthly advances to the investors for each mortgage in default. In addition, the subservicer may also have undertaken to redeem or replace any mortgage in default.

Counterparty. Finally, there is a counterparty to make sure that investors get paid on time. The counterparty is like an insurer or guarantor on steroids; a repository of all kinds of financial arrangements to insure payment to the investors. Such financial arrangements include derivatives, credit default swaps and other hedge arrangements.

The term “counterparty” is frequently associated with “counterparty risk” which refers to the risk that the counterparty will become financially unable to make the “claims” to the investors if there are a substantial number of mortgage defaults. The counterparty may guarantee the obligation of the transferor or servicer to redeem or replace mortgages in default. The counterparty may also guarantee the obligation of the subservicer to make monthly payments for mortgages that are said to be in default.

Questions worth asking. We now know that an examination of the Master Servicing and Pooling Agreement filed with the SEC will reveal substantial barriers to a lawful foreclosure. We also know that there are parties involved in this arrangement, as well as insurance products in place, intended to financially “cover” certain “losses” in certain situations, such as an alleged default.

In light of this, there are a few questions the Subservicer and/or the Successor Trustee and/or the foreclosure law firm who claims to have the legal right and authority to conduct a foreclosure, ought to be prepared to answer before the foreclosure goes forward:

· Have you read, and are you familiar with, the Master Servicing and Pooling Agreement relating to this mortgage that was filed with the SEC?

· The Servicer, Subservicer, or some other party (counterparty) likely made a payment to the party who allegedly owns the purported debt obligation. This payment, if made, was intended to cover sums that are alleged to be in default. Therefore, the party who allegedly owns the purported debt obligation has, by virtue of that payment, not been damaged in any way. Therefore, if any sums have thusly been paid, how is it being truthfully stated that a default has occurred?

· If the investment trust that ostensibly owns the mortgage obligation is a REMIC, the trustee, the QSPE, and the other parties servicing the trust, have no legal or equitable interest in the securitized mortgages. Therefore, any servicer who alleges that they have the right, or that they have been assigned the right, to claim that they are the agent for the holder of the note for purposes of standing to bring an action of foreclosure, are stating a legal impossibility. In light of this, by what authority can you show that you can administer a lawful foreclosure?

There are many more questions that can and should be asked in such a situation. They all stem from one central fact: a note that has been securitized and submitted to an entity qualifying as a REMIC and organized as a Qualifying Special Purpose Entity, is not enforceable. That is an incontrovertible fact that servicers of securitized mortgages will have to cope with as more and more homeowners discover the truth.

Conclusion

Previously, it was stated that, in order for the investment entity to be a REMIC (in other words, in order for the entity to be able to qualify for the single taxable event as a pass through entity), all interest in the mortgage is supposed to be transferred forward to the certificate holders.

Well, in fact, such a transfer never occurs. Either that is the case, or the parties who state that they have a right to foreclose on a securitized note are not being truthful when they present themselves as the real party in interest.

In any case, they cannot have it both ways. The servicer cannot claim to hold legal and/or equitable interest in the mortgages held in the name of an investment trust that also provides the (REMIC) pass through tax benefit to its investors.

Does the Master Servicing Agreement – made public through its filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission – show that the entity is a REMIC? If so, the note has become unenforceable because the unnamed parties who are receiving the pre-tax income from the entity are the real parties in interest. They hold the legal and/or equitable interest in the mortgages held, but they do not have the ability to foreclose on any one individual mortgage because the mortgages held by the REMIC have all been bundled into one big income-producing unit.

The Introduction explains that securitization consists of a four way amalgamation. It is partly 1) a refinancing with a pledge of assets, 2) a sale of assets, 3) an issuance and sale of registered securities which can be traded publicly, and 4) the establishment of a trust managed by third party managers.

Also discussed is the fact that enacted law and case law apply to each component of securitization, but that specific enabling legislation to authorize the organization of a securitization, and to harmonize the operation of these diverse components, does not exist. This bears repeating even more explicitly because this is central to the rights of a homeowner facing foreclosure whose underlying mortgage has been securitized: specific enabling legislation to authorize the pass through structure of a trust holding a mortgage portfolio does not exist.

Many unresolved legal issues could be addressed if the Uniform Commercial Code Commissioners added a chapter for securitization. However, that has yet to happen.

So as it now stands, a lawful foreclosure cannot occur against a mortgage whose note has been securitized because of the lack of an actual damaged party who has standing to state a claim.

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* The use of the terms Mortgage, Mortgagor, and Mortgagee are, for purposes of this document, synonymous with Deed of Trust, Trustor, Trustee and Beneficiary

Financial Crises Linked to Central Bank Stupidity

Financial Crises Linked to Central Bank Stupidity

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08/30/10 Tampa, Florida – It was an interesting psychological phenomenon when I read where Michael Kosares of USAGold.com wrote, “Private citizen, Alan Greenspan, could afford to be blunt,” but I interpreted it in my Mysterious Mogambo Mind (MMM) to mean, “Private citizen, Alan Greenspan, should be afforded a blunt instrument applied with extreme prejudice to his stupid head, over and over, as he is the moron that, as chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987-2006, created all the money and credit to finance the now-busting booms in stocks, booms in bonds, booms in houses, booms in derivatives, and booms in the size and cost of governments, and if there is one sorry, worthless bastard who can be singled out as guilty, guilty, guilty, it is Alan Greenspan.”

Well, I am sure you can understand how I could easily make the mistake, and now we are screwed because Alan Greenspan was a lying, slimy little treacherous weasel who could not “afford to be blunt,” but who could afford to keep creating more and more money, gradually destroying the US dollar’s buying power with constant, simmering inflation in prices, so that even the lying US government is forced to admit that $1 in 1987, when Greenspan took over the Fed, had the buying power of $1.77 in 2006 when he retired, which is a compounding inflation rate of 3%! Yikes!

Long-term 3% inflation is, as you can probably tell by the expression on my face, outrageous! And it is especially outrageous because the Federal Reserve was created to prevent inflation! Their mission was to preserve the value of the dollar, and Alan Greenspan gave us a cumulative 77% inflation in the 19 years he was in office! Gaaahhh!

Well, Mr. Greenspan has apparently finally gotten some smarts from somewhere, although I don’t know where, and earlier this month he said this month “Our choices right now are not between good and better; they’re between bad and worse.”

Then, to show you that he is still a complete dolt, he said, “The problem we now face is the most extraordinary financial crisis that I have ever seen or read about,” which is so stupid that I laugh in contemptuous scorn with which to ridicule his, you know, stupidity.

The reason that I snarl in contempt is that this current recession is actually nothing –nothing! – compared to the many, many other financial crises throughout history, all of them caused when stupid bankers like him, or governments themselves, were allowed to create too much money, which distorts the whole economy and causes inflation in the cost of consumer goods, like food and energy, and nowadays those yummy little chocolate-covered donuts that we all love so much, but which cost almost 50 cents apiece now.

Apparently, there is more demand for chocolate-covered donuts than I realized, as Mr. Kosares says, “These comments echo a growing sentiment that Americans are up against something far different from the average downturn,” which is weird, because I would have thought that the rising cost of chocolate-covered donuts would not be very important compared to their other problems, such as, “according to the Pew Economic Policy Group, the financial crisis has cost the American people $3.4 trillion in lost real estate; $7.4 trillion in lost stock wealth; and 5.5 million jobs.”

Perhaps that is why the piece is titled “The Perils of Unmitigated Positive Thinking,” or perhaps it is how I think that Seneca, 2,000 years ago, anticipates Taleb’s “Black Swan” theory, when Seneca said, as Mr. Kosares quotes him, “You say: ‘I did not think it would happen.’ Do you think there is anything that will not happen, when you know that it is possible to happen, when you see that it has already happened?”

Then Mr. Kosares quotes Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, who “made a similar point to Seneca’s in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in March, 2009 in the wake of Wall Street’s near collapse in late 2008.”

What Bernanke said was, “Financial crises will continue to occur, as they have around the world for literally hundreds of years,” although he should have added “that will result from the repeated stupidity of banks and countries continually increasing the money supply, which distorts the economy in weird, unpredictable booms and makes consumer prices go up, which is the Exact Wrong Thing (EWT) to do, which is a point that you would think would be crystal-clear even to a neo-Keynesian econometric halfwit like me, seeing that mere literacy is required to read the actual, written mission of the Federal Reserve, which is to maintain stable prices.

“But thanks to the incompetence of the Federal Reserve, the dollar has tragically lost almost 97% of its purchasing power since the inception of the Federal Reserve in 1913, making a complete mockery of me and the Federal Reserve, proving that I obviously have no idea what in the hell I am doing, except that I know it is wrong, but I keep doing it.”

Well, I know what he is doing, and I know what I am doing, and I am doing what needs doing because of what he is doing, and what I am doing is buying gold, silver and oil to protect myself against the laughable stupidities of the Federal Reserve continuing to create too much money, and in the process will theoretically make myself rich, rich, rich, at least in the relative sense when compared to the busted-out idiots who persisted in clinging to dollars and dollar-dependent assets.

And anyone can do what I am doing by just also buying gold, silver and oil, which makes it all so easy to do that the greedy, lazy little man inside me cries out, in heartfelt joy, “Whee! This investing stuff is easy!”

The Mogambo Guru
for The Daily Reckoning

lunedì 30 agosto 2010

De advocatorum ignorantia, stupiditate, nequitia et fraudolentia

De advocatorum ignorantia, stupiditate, nequitia et fraudolentia


Mi spiace ma, salvo eccezioni, di cui, se emergeranno, darò testimonianza, avvocati non vi ci chiamo, Cristiana Arditi di Castelvetere, Goffredo Maria Barbantini, Alessandro Cassiani, Donatella Ceré, Domenico Condello, Antonio Conte, Rodolfo Murra, Francesco Gianzi, Pietro Di Tosto, Sandro Fasciotti, Alessandro Graziani, Paolo Nesta, Livia Rossi, Mauro Vaglio. Devo escludere solo l’Avv. Giovanni Cipollone, anch’egli Consigliere dell’Ordine a Roma, che non conosco, per aver pubblicato un bell’articolo su “La storia di Giovanni e Margherita”.

Non vi ci chiamo perché qui, o siete avvocati voi, o lo sono io. Io che sono iscritto al molto scarno albo dei veri difensori dell’umanità dai crimini che la stanno annientando, a partire dal signoraggio bancario, di cui anche voi vi siete assunti la grave responsabilità di fingere di non sapere.
Albo diverso dal vostro, vastamente connotato da “avvocati” nel senso di meri mediatori scaltri e ladri in ogni sorta di scontri.

Distinguo verificati i quali io potrò rinunziare a ogni intento di iscrivere voi al mio albo, perché finora gli estremi non ci sono stati, e voi estromettere me dal vostro, o (è lo stesso) sospendermi sine die, fino cioè alla conclusione di questa pagliacciata del processo e procedimento per un falso inesistente e inconfigurabile del luglio 2001, per euro 271,71, di cui si può leggere in dettaglio dal doc. n. 158, da www.marra.it, già distribuito a Roma e Napoli.

Una pagliacciata sì, che però, proprio perché tale, rivela volgari intenti e motivazioni né palesabili né legittimi. Altrimenti è ovvio che un così insulso procedimento disciplinare non si spiegherebbe, visti oltretutto i moltissimi mai aperti pur a fronte di giudizi penali per ben altro che 271,71 euro.
Metodi vergognosi, odiosi che, peraltro, a usarli in accertamenti sui vostri studi, vorrei proprio vedere cosa farebbero emergere.

Un caso che sembra malizioso, quello dei due 71, visto che il 71, nella cabala, è l’uomo di merda.
Scenari retrostanti occulti fino a un certo punto, perché si comprende bene quante pressioni (e blandizie) ministeriali, giudiziarie, dell’Avvocatura, e di chissà chi altro, gravano su questo processo e procedimento.
Il mostro degli apparati e delle burocrazie si accorge infatti delle cause solo quando iniziano i pignoramenti, per cui, siccome stanno iniziando quelli ex lege Pinto, le aggressioni saranno ora continue.
Sciacalli che però vi invitano a nozze, perché mi aggredite anche per motivi legati al vostro conservatorismo da piattole, categoriale e non, di cui ora vi parlerò. Cosa che rende grave che ad aggredirmi siate voi.

Io infatti divido le persone tra avvocati e non avvocati, perché il livello di fraudolenza raggiunto dalla società è tale che solo gli avvocati possano districarcisi.
Ora, vedete, entro luglio pubblicherò “Il labirinto femminile”, il mio ultimo libro, oggetto del quale è la particolarissima vicenda d’amore tra Luisa e Paolo.

Luisa, giovane avvocatessa creata per sintetizzare in lei caratteri, aspetti e parti di un po’ tutte le donne e le esperienze sentimentali della mia vita, alcune lontanissime, ancorché focali, come quella, a lungo cercata, non più ritrovata, mai dimenticata, della soavissima nudità di una popolanina napoletana distesa tra me e i tiepidi umidori notturni della spiaggetta di Nisida, cullati noi dai lenti mormorii equorei, mentre i suoi occhi dorati dalla luna mi pervadevano l’anima e mi smarrivo nelle voluttà dello svolgersi della sua passione, quando l’ansito del suo respiro, al culmine del farsi profondo, meraviglioso si volse in un canto d’amore bellissimo, antichissimo, dolcissimo, che mi pervase ragazzo di una struggente stupefazione e dissolse le pareti di un antro in cui non sapevo di essere liberando su noi l’onda del firmamento pullulante di stelle.

Una Luisa positiva, giudiziosa, bella, innamorata ma preda, oltre che delle remore dettate dalla differenza di età, di una forma maniacale, fobica, di maliardismo: una particolare, estrema tipologia di strategismo sentimentale che pervaderà irriducibilmente ogni dettaglio del suo comportamento.
E Paolo, il titolare del grande studio legale in cui lavora, che ha il doppio dei suoi anni, e anche lui ho creato per sintetizzare in un unico io narrante i molti me attraverso i quali ho vissuto quelle esperienze, e ricavarne una sorta di romanzo fatto dei “loro” sms.

Ma, tra le righe dell’epistolario, vero protagonista del libro è il dramma universale di una “normalità” malgrado tutti spaventosamente fraudolenta, trasformistica, che ci sta distruggendo.
Non solo voi, cioè, ma tutti sono diventati dei biechi opportunisti, incapaci di elevarsi da quelli che credono essere i loro miseri interessi. E tutti usate, quale strumento intellettuale, la furberia.

Forma della conoscenza animale, la furberia, consistente nella capacità di svilupparsi prevaricando gli altri senza usare l’intelligenza, a cui vorrei condurvi, perché è la capacità di svilupparsi passando attraverso lo sviluppo degli altri. Astenendosi però dalla tendenziosità, che è la capacità di asservire l’intelligenza alle finalità della furberia.

Definizione di intelligenza, la mia, fin qui sconosciuta, e di cui vi segnalo io stesso la straordinaria rilevanza perché so già che siete così ignoranti che da soli non ci arrivereste; tant’è che non siete stati capaci di distinguere, da quanto siete zotici, il più grande pensatore di tutti i tempi da un malfattore. Né, vi capisco, le vostre conoscenze giuridiche da tragicomici paglietta e azzeccagarbugli potrebbero bastare a farvi capire che la mia cultura, le mie scoperte scientifiche, vi pongono obblighi di riconoscimento e di sostegno, sì morali, ma anche giuridici, perché i benefici delle mie tesi alla società sono un milione di volte maggiori di quelli che potreste arrecare voi, ammesso ne arrechiate, in un milione di intere vite come le vostre.

Un quadro in cui alla dialogicità proposta da Paolo come unico strumento per sconfiggere il male, si contrappongono furberia, strategismo, maliardismo, negatività e inciviltà, che non sono la stessa cosa, ma si rassomigliano moltissimo, perché si fecondano e si partoriscono l’un l’altra in una proliferazione infinita in cui di costante c’è il seme: la prevaricatorietà.

Prevaricatorietà che definisce come quella degenerazione della gerarchicità che si verifica quando la gerarchicità, che è tanto indispensabile quanto inevitabile, non si sviluppa attraverso l’intelligenza \ dialogicità, ma attraverso la furberia \ strategicità.
Un tormentarsi attraverso lo strategismo (attenti a quel che segue perché capirlo potrebbe aiutarvi a uscire dallo status di “gente meccanica”, che di certo vi attribuirebbe Manzoni), che ha rallentato di centinaia di migliaia di anni, se non milioni, il cammino dell’umanità.

Detto infatti che definisco cultura il modo che gli uomini mediano di dover avere in comune nel vedere la realtà, ciascuno, per dare il suo assenso a quella mediazione, esige che il sapere comune non contenga cose che non gli convengano. Una lotta per stabilire cosa si può sapere e cosa va rimosso che, ai primordi, avviene mediante la prevaricazione fisica e poi psichica, cioè la furberia.
Finché, a partire diciamo da un po’ più di due milioni di anni fa, quel tipo di homo non a caso chiamato habilis inizia ad acquisire le prime rudimentali forme di intelligenza. Salvo, disgraziatamente,
a inventare subito dopo la tendenziosità.

Insomma, il cervello umano è immutato da circa 35.000 anni, dall’affermazione dell’homo sapiens- sapiens, benché il cervello del sapiens (una sola volta sapiens), fosse circa lo stesso già da 200.000 anni, e anche il cervello del Neanderthal, comparso circa 700.000 anni fa, e scomparso circa 30.000 anni fa, avesse una capacità di pensiero simile.
Dove voglio arrivare? Al fatto che il cammino dell’umanità è stato così lento a causa della furberia \ strategismo!

Voglio affermare che quegli uomini erano dotati di cervelli come i nostri, capaci di forme primordiali di intelligenza da circa 2.000.000 di anni, e di forme acute da diciamo 500.000 anni.
Voglio affermare che se non riuscirono a creare una civiltà in cui il tempo delle piramidi era già da centinaia di migliaia di anni un tempo di viaggi siderali fu perché glielo impedì la stessa tara che frustra voi: lo strategismo.

Così come è stato lo strategismo, quando la civiltà, con ritmi lentissimi, ha raggiunto lo stadio attuale, che l’ha resa tale da pregiudicare l’abitabilità della Terra.
L’intelligenza è cioè cruciale, perché consente di accedere a forme di organizzazione sociali particolarmente proficue.
Organizzazione tipica anche di molti animali, come le api, che però non sono intelligenti, perché il loro operare è frutto di una selezione automatica per fini di sopravvivenza e di sviluppo, e al massimo esprime partecipatività, come nel cane che, in funzione delle sue esigenze emotive, quindi per quello che serve a lui, è in grado di spingere la sua partecipatività a livelli molto avanzati e flessibili, ma sarà intelligente solo quando saprà capire se hai fame e se dividere con te la scodella.

Animali che non esprimono mai intelligenza perché essa si identifica con quel volersi sviluppare passando attraverso lo sviluppo degli altri che nasce quando gli uomini scoprono i nuclei primordiali di ciò che si configurerà come generosità, che è quasi sinonimo di intelligenza, ma non necessariamente di amore.

Amore, o ciò che di solito si qualifica tale, che non si identifica automaticamente con l’intelligenza perché è sempre connotato dalla partecipatività, ma non automaticamente dalla generosità, ben potendosi amare in modo egoistico (furbesco) per goderne per quel che serve a noi; come il cane il padrone, o il satrapo le sue donne.
Amore che quando, anziché essere fondato, come oggi, sul dominare o essere dominati, sarà fondato sulla dialogicità \ intelligenza \ generosità, avrà esiti di grande potenza e particolarità.

Generosità \ intelligenza che l’uomo di Neanderthal testimonia di avere da centinaia di migliaia di anni per il sol fatto, ad esempio, di compiere gesti struggenti quali il seppellire i suoi cari in prossimità del fuoco perché possano godere del suo calore nei veri e propri “vani” che scavava nella roccia per allocarvi il tipo di civiltà che gli consentì di vivere in era glaciale.

Civiltà che è stata rallentata dal fatto che la prevaricatorietà \ egoismo \ furberia \ strategismo, in quanto rivolti, non a cercare soluzioni, ma a far conseguire vantaggi a chi li esercita, non possono innescare quella logica virtuosa di produzione automatica e continua di risultati positivi che innescherebbe la dialogicità, ma causano anzi serie ininterrotte di sempre più aggrovigliati problemi e contraddizioni che conducono all’inestricabilità e alla reiterazione infinita sia delle problematiche che dei rituali pseudo-risolutori, ovvero alla perpetuazione del male.

Inestricabilità che si insedia anche nelle menti di chi pratica lo strategismo, che finirà per ingrossare le fila degli individui caratterizzati dalle svariate tipologie di insufficienza o inadeguatezza mentale.

Perché, come per i bersagli fisici anche i bersagli intellettuali, per colpirli, bisogna mirargli.
Significa che se uno scienziato vuole giungere a una scoperta deve essere generoso, perché altrimenti la sua mente lavorerà per arrecargli vantaggi, e non saprà seguire la pista per giungere alla comprensione a cui aspira.
Ecco così che a Roma, a Gaza, a Londra, a New York, nel mondo, gli avvocati, i politici, gli scienziati, i filosofi, le persone, ricominciano ogni mattina come se fosse il primo mattino del mondo a dire e a fare con lo stesso tono e negli stessi modi le cose che da sempre non hanno mai risolto pressoché nulla.

Pressoché nulla perché alla fine i cambiamenti pure avvengono, ma con una lentezza e delle modalità che li rendono impercettibili e li guastano prima che si compiano, e con un immenso dispendio di energie, perché il lavorio dei meccanismi produce risultati mille volte no e una sì.
In regime dialogico, invece, iniziando alle 8 di un giorno qualsiasi, i soli 200.000 avvocati italiani produrrebbero prima di sera tipologie di cambiamenti mai realizzati dalla fondazione di Roma. Capite ora perché, se io scrivo cose come queste e voi vi alleate con la parte meno nobile e degli apparati e della magistratura per fermarmi, voi e io non possiamo stare nello stesso albo?

Voi cioè, per poter essere iscrivibili nel vero albo, il mio, avreste dovuto sì sollevarmi dalle cure della professione, ma aiutandomi in tutti i modi a sostenere le mie tesi e facendo sì che potessi conseguire un livello di riconoscimento sociale che non mi costringesse, come ho scritto nel 1986, “a lavorare finanche da avvocato per finanziare la mia rivoluzione senza sangue, senza morti e senza sconfitti.”

Voi e vostri colleghi di tutta Italia, avreste dovuto cioè divenire i sostenitori della mia cultura, usando la quale avreste cambiato con facilità il mondo; che invece vi sta cadendo sul capo.
Ma, visto che insistete a non farlo fin da quando, oltre 25 anni fa, iniziai a divulgare i miei scritti anche nel tribunale di Roma, vediamo il perché.

Ebbene, non lo fate, nonostante non vi spiacciano certo gli argomenti giuridici che io formulo nell’interesse della civiltà e voi copiate per lucrarci, perché siete solo degli squallidi evasori fiscali e previdenziali, dei vili, degli abboffini chini come cani sulle scodelle, degli accattoni che non riescono a vedere a un palmo dal naso e sfruttano la furberia per strappare brani di cibo dal corpo agonico della civiltà.

Perché me la prendo proprio con voi? Me la prendo con voi perché dovreste avere i requisiti morali per provare la vergogna; perché ho detto all’inizio che solo gli avvocati hanno il tipo di esperienza e di consapevolezza giuridica adatto a domare la fraudolenza moderna; perché tra tutti gli avvocati del mondo voi siete quelli dell’Italia e di Roma, cioè dei luoghi in cui da sempre è stata coniata la civiltà, perché l’Eneide è il codice dei valori dell’occidentalesimo, e in essa sono confluiti i valori dell’aristocrazismo greco pagano, codificato da Omero nell’Iliade e nell’Odissea, e del concettualesimo ebraico cristiano, codificato nella Bibbia.

Chi dunque, se non voi, può alzare lo scudo contro la barbarie che ci sta divorando? I Perry Mason?
O gli Obama e le Merkel, eletti quali garanti dell’immobilismo culturale funzionale al potere bancario?
Se me la prendo solo con voi o con tutta la categoria?
Me la prendo con tutta la categoria, salvo eccezioni, ma ci sono tra i normali iscritti all’albo e voi delle differenze, perché il normale iscritto ha più che altro la colpa di avervi votato.

Voi invece, a fronte dei vantaggi e onori del vostro ruolo, avreste il dovere di riconoscere e sostenere con adeguati gesti istituzionali ciò che conta; sicché l’esservi alleati con i nemici della mia cultura, delle mie scoperte scientifiche, della mia scoperta del modo di formazione del pensiero, è un tradimento a voi stessi, alla categoria e alla società.

Chiedete a me perché mai avreste fatto una cosa simile?
Secondo la vulgata è per invidia, ed è vero, perché nei miei confronti siete invidiosi come scimmie, sia voi che gli altri avvocati d’Italia, per non parlare dei napoletani.

Lo so anche perché ho inviato per anni le mie mail circolari a 75.000 avvocati di tutta Italia, con medie di cliccaggi fino al 25%, e “invidia” è la parola che trasuda dai molteplici dati che forniscono i programmi che descrivono ogni aspetto degli accessi al sito.

Un’invidia da “pezzenti e cazzi arrizzati”. “Pezzenti” nel senso di moralmente immiseriti dall’abdicazione culturale e intellettuale a un potere che vi sta soffocando sotto gli occhi i figli, le mogli, la vita, nell’insoddisfazione, nell’alienazione, nella droga, nella psicosi, nella disoccupazione, senza che muoviate un dito, e aiutandolo anzi nel combattere me che lo contrasto; e “cazzi arrizzati” nel senso di pervasi dalla convinzione che il diritto a esprimersi comporti l’automatica rilevanza delle puttanate che pensate e dite, per cui, avendo maturato una sia pur frustrata supponenza, perché è ovvio che nessuno vi pensa, e meno che mai vi pensate tra voi, ecco, sol che vi si tocchi, che vi ergete.
Ma io so che il male di per sé non esiste perché non è funzionale allo sviluppo, e la natura non lo ha selezionato. Per cui, se si vuol ledere un altro è sempre per procurare a sé un bene, magari in maniere anomale.

La gelosia, l’invidia, l’odio, sono cioè una fondamentale griglia che serve a impedire la velleità di riconoscimento, perché, se non ci fossero, chissà cosa ognuno di noi sarebbe capace di rivendicare.
Tant’è che non siete invidiosi dei soggetti innocui, come calciatori o rock star, o che consideriate utili, come i politici di comodo.

Ne deriva, a vostro maggior disonore, che vi sforzate di soffocarmi nei miasmi della vostra invidia e livore proprio perché sapete che sono un riformatore, e inoltre le mie tesi, e i miei ricorsi ex lege Pinto, legge causata da me quando ero parlamentare europeo, hanno la forza di rendere veloce la giustizia.

E’ indubbio, infatti, come scrivo sull’intestazione dei miei atti, che “..Se la civiltà è figlia del controllo la disfunzione della giustizia civile e amministrativa è necessariamente la madre dell’attuale stato delle cose.”

Disfunzione che voi potreste far cessare in un attimo, perché non siete i normali cittadini, che non capiscono e non sanno come reagire. Voi conoscete le frodi, i trucchi, i segreti di tutti, e siete anzi gli architetti di ogni broglio e raggiro, a partire dal signoraggio. Siete quelli che fanno scivolare nelle tasche della giustizia gli argomenti irresistibili per indurla a “non capire” che nei processi per usura deve rinviare a giudizio i consigli di amministrazione delle banche, non i funzionari delle agenzie; o per convincerla a “farsi sfuggire” che, per essere paritario l’anatocismo, bisognerebbe che il tasso non fosse il 10% al passivo, e lo 0,01% all’attivo, e che ci fosse un attivo.
Non capite perché mai non dovreste volere una giustizia veloce?

Non la volete, bari e bugiardi che non siete altro, intanto perché cambierebbe il mondo, e siete preda di un conservatorismo così sclerotico da concepire solo la stasi, ma soprattutto perché siete 200.000, e sapete che farebbe crollare il numero delle cause, perché in ogni causa c’è uno che ha torto e che eviterebbe la lite se sapesse che la settimana dopo sarebbe colpito da una sentenza, o al limite la definirebbe negli uffici di conciliazione, oggi negletti per gli stessi motivi.
Dietro la vostra invidia c’è insomma la paura che se le miei tesi divengono troppo note rimanete disoccupati.

Una paura che dimostra che dei giuristi non avete che le toghe, perché siete presi solo di voi e indifferenti al destino del mondo poiché la quasi totalità delle cose che ci soffocano sono perseguibili penalmente e civilmente.

Dei ciechi opportunisti che non capiscono neanche che la nuova società avrebbe bisogno di un numero infinito di veri esperti di cose giuridiche, data ormai la complessità di tutto, per cui è questo il tipo di servizio che dovreste specializzarvi a rendere, laddove pochissimi sanno fare qualcosa di diverso da quel che fate in massa.

E non basta. Voi sapete che il sistema fiscale è illecito, perché lo avete letto dal mio volantino sul signoraggio, e che basterebbe nazionalizzare la BCE, la Banca d’Italia e le altre banche centrali, che tutti credono siano già pubbliche, e finirebbe il debito pubblico, e non occorrerebbe più pagare le tasse, perché servono solo a comprare i soldi dalle banche centrali.

E che fate dinanzi a simili cose?
Niente altro che accanirvi a cercare di evadere e a tenere in piedi un giro di cause faraonico che serve solo a voi!

Lo faccio anch’io? No io no. A prescindere che le mie cause sono sempre funzionali allo sviluppo, le faccio per finanziare il cambiamento, e non ho conservato un euro dei molti che ho guadagnati, perché li ho spesi tutti in propaganda, libri, volantinaggi.
Ho sbagliato perché non dovevo generalizzare? No, non ho sbagliato. Sull’intestazione ci sono da sempre i miei numeri di telefono.
Anche ora, chi vuole aderire può chiamarmi o scrivermi.

Alfonso Luigi Marra

Moneta di Stato e... qualche assassinio

Kennedy emise US Notes e venne assassinato. Moro emise Biglietti di Stato (come già Mussolini) e venne assassinato. Ma alla Federal Reserve stanno tutti bene... e nessuno se n'è ancora accorto? Ah ah ah...

domenica 29 agosto 2010

Monetary Shock and Awe

"Monetary Shock and Awe": The Fed Prepared to Launch Most Radical Intervention in History
Bernanke's "Nuclear Option"




Global Research, August 28, 2010

The equities markets are in disarray while the bond markets continue to surge. The avalanche of bad news has started to take its toll on investor sentiment. Barry Ritholtz's "The Big Picture" reports that the bears have taken the high-ground and bullishness has dropped to its lowest level since March ‘09 when the market did a quick about-face and began a year-long rally. Could it happen again? No one knows, but the mood has definitely darkened along with the data. There's no talk of green shoots any more, and even the deficit hawks have gone into hibernation. It feels like the calm before the storm, which is why all eyes were on Jackson Hole this morning where Fed chairman Ben Bernanke delivered his verdict on the state of the economy on Friday.

Wall Street was hoping the Fed would "go big" and promise another hefty dose of quantitative easing to push down long-term interest rates and jolt consumers out of their lethargy. But Bernanke provided few details choosing instead this vague commitment:

“The Committee is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly."

Check. There's no doubt that Helicopter Ben would be in mid-flight right now tossing bundles of $100 bills into the jet-stream like confetti if he had the option. But Bernanke is fighting a rearguard action from inside the FOMC where a fractious group of rebels want to wait and see if the recent downturn is just a blip on the radar or something more serious, another tumble into recessionary hell.

This week, the markets were blindsided by two days of dismal housing news, grim durable goods orders, a slowdown in manufacturing, and modest gains in employment. 4 years later, and housing is still mired in a depression. When does it end? Households and consumers are buried under a mountain of debt; personal bankruptcies, delinquencies, defaults and foreclosures continue to mount while politicians threaten to tighten the purse-strings putting more pressure on families who can barley put food on the table let alone pay the mortgage.

Just months ago, 57 out of 57 economists surveyed predicted that the economy would avoid a double dip recession. Now they're not so sure. Stock market gains have been wiped out and the S&P 500 has dropped 14 percent from its high in April. All of the main economic indicators are testing new lows. The so-called "soft patch" is looking like another hard landing. The fear is palpable. On Thursday, the Dow slipped another 74 points by the end of the session. It could have been worse. The markets have been holding on by their fingernails hoping that Bernanke will bail them out. But it's going to take more than the usual promise of low interest rates for an "extended period" to boost enthusiasm. Wall Street is looking for the "big fix", a trillion dollar resumption of the Fed's bond purchasing program (QE) to pump up flaccid asset prices, electro-shock demand, and raise consumer inflation expectations. The big banks and the brokerage houses want Bernanke to rout the Cassandras and the gloomsters and pump some adrenalin into sluggish indexes. The Fed chairman promised to help.....but not just yet, which is why the markets continue to seesaw.

Bernanke takes the threat of deflation seriously. His earlier speeches laid out a deflation-fighting strategy that is so radical it would shock the public and Wall Street alike. Here's an excerpt from a speech he gave in 2002 which illustrates the Fed boss's willingness to move heaven and earth to fend off the scourge of pernicious deflation:

Ben Bernanke: “My thesis here is that cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities in Japan could help solve the problems that each policymaker faces on its own. Consider for example a tax cut for households and businesses that is explicitly coupled with incremental BOJ purchases of government debt – so that the tax cut is in effect financed by money creation. Moreover, assume that the Bank of Japan has made a commitment, by announcing a price-level target, to reflate the economy, so that much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed as permanent.

Under this plan, the BOJ’s balance sheet is protected by the bond conversion program, and the government’s concerns about its outstanding stock of debt are mitigated because increases in its debt are purchased by the BOJ rather than sold to the private sector. Moreover, consumers and businesses should be willing to spend rather than save the bulk of their tax cut: They have extra cash on hand, but – because the BOJ purchased government debt in the amount of the tax cut – no current or future debt service burden has been created to imply increased future taxes.

Essentially, monetary and fiscal policies together have increased the nominal wealth of the household sector, which will increase nominal spending and hence prices....from a fiscal perspective, the policy would almost certainly be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio....

Potential roles for monetary-fiscal cooperation are not limited to BOJ support of tax cuts. BOJ purchases of government debt could also support spending programs, to facilitate industrial restructuring, for example. The BOJ’s purchases would mitigate the effect of the new spending on the burden of debt and future interest payments perceived by households, which should reduce the offset from decreased consumption. More generally, by replacing interest-bearing debt with money, BOJ purchases of government debt lower current deficits and interest burdens and thus the public’s expectations of future tax obligations." (Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan, Governor Ben S. Bernanke, The Federal Reserve Board Tokyo, Japan, May 31, 2003)

Yikes! This is monetization writ large. Anyone who thought Bernanke lacked cohones should reread this passage. The Fed chair is prepared to launch the most radical intervention in history, monetary Shock and Awe. But will the bewhiskered professor be able to persuade congress to follow his lead, after all, the fiscal component is critical to the program's success. They're two spokes on the same wheel. Here's how (I imagine) it would work: Congress passes emergency legislation to suspend the payroll tax for two years stuffing hundreds of billions instantly into the pockets of struggling consumers. The Fed makes up the difference by purchasing an equal amount of long-term Treasuries keeping the yields low while the economy resets, employment rises, asset prices balloon, and markets soar. As the economy accelerates, the dollar steadily loses ground triggering a sharp increase in exports and sparking a viscous trade war with foreign trading partners. Then......it's anyone's guess? Either Bernanke's "nuclear option" succeeds in resuscitating the comatose economy or foreign holders of dollars and dollar-backed assets dump their gargantuan trove of US loot in a pile and set it ablaze. It's all a roll of the dice.